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Many states use systems of merit-based judicial selection for supreme court appointments. Under "merit selection," an independent commission screens judicial candidates before the governor makes a final appointment. Proponents of these systems claim that by limiting gubernatorial influence over the selection process, merit selection protects judicial independence from partisan intrusion. This study evaluates such claims by comparing the recent ideological voting behavior of judges appointed by Republican and Democratic governors in three states. Those states, Kansas, Missouri, and Colorado, use three different types of merit selection--barcontrolled, hybrid, and governor-controlled, respectively--that grant the governor varying degrees of influence over the judicial selection process. This study finds the largest gap between the voting behavior of Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges in Colorado and the smallest gap in Kansas, with Missouri falling in between. These results show how increased gubernatorial influence over the judicial selection process translates into a judiciary that is more ideologically polarized. This ideological polarization limits judicial independence but is indicative of greater democratic control, as exercised by the popularly elected governor, over the state judiciary. In relative terms, Colorado maximizes political accountability, Kansas maximizes political independence, and Missouri strikes a balance between the two goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are leaders held accountable for inherited conditions, and does accountability increase with time in office? I combine hundreds of opinion polls to test how new presidents are rewarded or punished for current economic perceptions, and how these judgments evolve over time. I find the economy influences voter evaluations in a president's first year, that it influences evaluations more so in the second year, and that it does not influence evaluations any more in later years. Surveys of governor approval and state economic conditions yield similar results, as does an original survey experiment exploiting the varying tenure of state governors in the wake of the 2018 elections. While raising questions about voter competence, these findings also suggest leaders have incentives to spread effort more broadly over their terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What has been the response of U.S. governors to the COVID-19 pandemic? In this research note, we explore the determinants of implementing stay-at-home orders, focusing on governors' characteristics in the early stage of the pandemic. In our most conservative estimate, being a Democratic governor increased the probability of implementing a stay-at-home order by more than 50%. Moreover, we found that the probability of implementing a statewide stay-at-home order was about 40% more likely for governors without term limits than governors with term limits. We also found that Democratic governors and governors without term limits were significantly faster to adopt statewide orders than Republican governors and governors with term limits. There is evidence of politics as usual in these unusual times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The partisanship of a policy maker is often noted as correlated with a state government's support for social welfare. However, less attention has been paid to how a governor is able to steer the budget in a manner that reflects her political views. This study assesses how changes in the economy and level of budgetary authority of the governor can jointly condition the effect of a governor's partisanship on the change in social welfare spending. Using the panel data for 49 U.S. states from 1987 to 2014, we examine whether budgetary authority allows governors to respond to an economic contraction in the expected partisan manner. Using a three‐way interaction model, we found that Democratic governors are more likely to increase social welfare funding when the economy contracts, particularly when she has high budgetary authority relative to non‐Democratic counterparts. The results highlight how the state of the economy and institutional constraints jointly condition the budget process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, states have had to make drastic cuts to their budgets even as the economy flourished in the wake of the Great Recession. The task of balancing state budgets has always been a formidable one, but recent shifts in revenue sources and their ability to generate reliable funding have made this challenge increasingly common and difficult. Historically, states have viewed budget balancing as a fundamentally legislative obligation and prerogative, which is often delegated to the executive branch in the form of impoundment statutes because of the executive's superior budgeting capabilities. In several states, however, the legislature has either kept the power to balance the budget for itself or has delegated insufficient discretion to the executive, hampering the state's ability to meet its constitutional obligation to balance the budget. Consequently, this Note presents an alternative interpretation of the power to impound. It conceives of impoundment as a shared constitutional power exercisable by either the executive or legislature that can be constrained by statute. This interpretation permits the executive to better leverage its strengths in fiscal matters to resolve budget deficits quickly and efficiently, ensuring that the state meets its constitutional obligation to balance the budget. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of the institutional power of executives in public budgeting; specifically, how executives change spending on particular budget items. Leveraging extant theories of the policy process concerning preference expression, attention, and institutions, we argue that executives deepen large cuts and boost large increases in budgetary change. The strictures of the budgetary process force trade‐offs for executives in preference expression such that increases to preferred categories typically require decreases in other categories. Literatures in public policy and political representation suggest that all executives would like to express fiscal preferences, thereby contributing to categorical budget oscillations; however, not all executives are created equal. We employ quantile regression to examine whether the institutional strength of governors determine cuts, stasis, and expansion in spending across all budget functions in the American states between 1985 and 2009. Our model includes a host of political and economic variables found in the literature of fiscal policymaking, such as partisanship and divided government. The desire to change policy may be widely shared across executives, but we find that the ability to "top off" categorical increases and bottom out categorical decreases is a function of an executive's capacity to call attention to preferred categories via agenda‐setting power and to secure those changes via veto power. The findings show strong governors are well positioned to influence public policy through the budgetary process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State public child welfare agencies have statutory responsibility for responding to allegations of child maltreatment and providing app­ropriate services. Governors have oversight of the work of the state agencies that provide this func­tion. Consequently, governors can be major policy actors in child wel­fare. When a tragedy occurs with a child in state care, governors often are visible on child welfare issues and a reactive response typically is employed. This raises questions about governors’ attention to child welfare in more routine circumstances. To further understand gover­nors’ attention, we provide an analysis of governors’ state­-of­-the-state addresses in early 2019. Our study used these data to answer two ques­tions: (1) How are governors addressing issues of child welfare? And (2) What other child­-focused issues are governors addressing? We conclude that there is insufficient attention to child maltreatment and other issues affecting child well­being. Consequently, advocates, prac­titioners, and researchers need to enhance efforts to gain governors’ (and other policy­makers’) attention to these issues. We offer ideas on how to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A case study of the Altoona Conference, also known as the Loyal Governors' Conference, held during the U.S. Civil War in Altoona, Pennsylvania, in September 1862 is presented. It examines the relationship between then-U.S. president Abraham Lincoln and loyal U.S. state governors who wished to convince Lincoln to alter his war policies, particularly concerning the possibility of the emancipation of slaves in the U.S.

The article discusses the efforts of California Governors Leland Stanford and John G. Downey and Oregon Governor John Whiteaker to keep their states in the Union during the U.S. Civil War. The author explains Stanford's allegiance to the Republican Party and Downey's allegiance to the Democrats, along with Downey's work in recruiting Union Army troops. Also explained is Whiteaker's pro-slavery stance during the war.

The article discusses the state constitutional law-related implications of power plays by state government legislators and governors across America as of 2019, and it mentions the restoration of constitutional norms in the U.S., as well as American case law involving political actions at the state government level. State constitutions, partisanship, and the rule of law in America are assessed, as well as legislative actions in places such as North Carolina, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

This article proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely used two‐term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one‐term regime, and better voter information about the effort of the governors would further increase voter welfare by up to 0.5%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Kansas Governor Thomas A. Osborn who promoted white colonization of the state in 1872 through the removal of Native American inhabitants and cites the need to recast the mythology of the Osage Border War of 1874-1875 which had clashing versions of related events. Topics include Osborn's policy and political agenda, the public fear fanned by killings of White settlers and Osages, and the emergence of vigilante groups. Also noted is the grasshopper plague in Kansas in 1875.

The article focuses on the efforts to achieve disarmament among different nations and mold global peace. The Democratic Advisory Council adopted the recommendation of its Science and Technology Committee regarding the establishment of the National Peace Agency. The said agency will be tasked to carry out research and development in varios things relative to international security. In support to the worldwide initiative of disarmament, several conferences have been done starting from the Geneva Convention in 1955. Moreover, two bills were introduced in the U.S. senate to establish a National Peace Agency and Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller supported the effort by clearly defining the need to establish a National Defense Agency.

The article discusses the criminal justice reform which has been a priority among conservative minds over the past years. It states that the federal-criminal-justice efforts have stemmed from the success in the states, more pronounced in red states like Texas and those with conservative governors including Nathan Deal, Nikki Haley and Greg Abbott.

We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments. (JEL D72, D73, H74, H77) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do immigrants have better labor market outcomes under Democratic governors? By exploiting variations associated with close elections in a regression discontinuity (RD) design applied on gubernatorial elections in 50 states over the last two decades, we find that immigrants are more likely to be employed, work longer hours and more weeks, and have higher earnings under Democratic governors. Results are robust to a number of different specifications, controls, and samples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does merit selection work? Existing evidence on institutional performance compares outcomes of interest across selection mechanisms, which does not account for the two-stage process that makes merit selection unique. Using information obtained from public records requests, this article analyzes the determinants of commission and gubernatorial selections from relevant candidate pools. The evidence suggests that although commissions and governors seem to select on certain qualifications, women are disadvantaged at the commission stage and partisanship is relevant at both stages. The results have important implications for our understanding of merit selection’s institutional performance and the broader judicial selection debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]