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This comparison of institutions of science advice during COVID-19 between the Westminster systems of England/UK and Ontario/Canada focuses on the role of science in informing public policy in two central components of the response to the pandemic: the adoption of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and the procuring of vaccines. It compares and contrasts established and purpose-built bodies with varying degrees of independence from the political executive, and shows how each attempted to manage the tensions between scientific and governmental logics of accountability as they negotiated the boundary between science and policy. It uses the comparison to suggest potential lessons about the relative merits and drawbacks of different institutional arrangements for science advice to governments in an emergency.

Institutional narratives, appealing both to the intellect and the imagination, are powerful mechanisms of entrenchment. Drawing on close examination of legislative debates, interview transcripts, and official documents, this article analyzes institutional narratives of the British National Health Service (NHS) and American Medicare and Medicaid. These narratives take the form of epics, featuring founding heroes, adversaries, stewards, saviors, and other characters, and are retold on multiple occasions, and especially on anniversaries of the founding date. In the process, certain elements of history are remembered, and others forgotten. The myth of the NHS as a single national institution obscured much of the complexity and compromise that went into its founding and subsequent development, but preserved fidelity to its founding principles. In the United States, the dominant narrative belonged to Medicare, while Medicaid featured as an afterthought. In the case of the NHS, narrative entrenchment served to preserve universal access to comprehensive health care. In the case of American Medicare, entrenchment preserved the original mission of the institution but kept it from expanding to a broader swath of the population, even as its less-entrenched companion Medicaid provided a vehicle for coverage of an increasingly wide range of population groups. A distinct Medicaid narrative developed only after incremental expansion was well underway., (Copyright © 2023 by Duke University Press.)

The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic has fuelled demands for national threshold standards of quality for long-term care in Canada. The federal government, however, lacks jurisdiction for and experience with the provision of long-term care, which rests constitutionally with the provinces. A creative approach to providing new funding and effective regulatory standard setting would seize the potential of an area of jurisdiction shared by federal and provincial governments - old age security - to establish a long-term care insurance program administered by the federal government and jointly governed by federal and provincial governments., (Copyright © 2021 Longwoods Publishing.)

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has shifted the health policy debate in Canada. While the pre-pandemic focus of policy experts and government reports was on the question of whether to add outpatient pharmaceuticals to universal health coverage, the clustering of pandemic deaths in long-term care facilities has spurred calls for federal standards in long-term care (LTC) and its possible inclusion in universal health coverage. This has led to the probability that the federal government will attempt to expand medicare as Canadians have known it for the first time in over a half century. However, these efforts are likely to fail if the federal government relies on the shared-cost federalism that marked the earlier introduction of medicare. Two alternative pathways are suggested, one for LTC and one for pharmaceuticals, that are more likely to succeed given the state of the Canadian federation in the early 21st century.

Policy decisions about healthcare coverage in Canada and the United States in the 1960s placed two virtually identical systems on different evolutionary paths in the physician and hospital sectors. However, prescription drug coverage remained outside Canada's single-payer model, and employer-based coverage continued to be the norm for the workforce population, as is the case across the broad healthcare system in the United States. As a result the current debate about pharmacare in Canada mirrors in political microcosm the larger debate on universal health insurance among American Democrats. In each case the near-term prospects for a single-payer plan appear slim., (© 2021 The Author(s); Published by Kerman University of Medical Sciences. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.)

The American Democratic leadership in the White House and Congress in 2009-10 and the British Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition government in 2010-12 each pursued a strategy of rapidly assembled multiple adjustments to the prevailing policy framework for health care rather than attempting a "big-bang" strategy of sweeping institutional change. Despite their relative modesty, each set of reforms encountered a highly conflictual and tortuous process of legislative passage. Subsequently, the reforms failed to gain broad public acceptance and were variously hobbled (in the United States) and transformed (in the United Kingdom) in the course of implementation. These two cases thus offer some common lessons about the potential and the pitfalls of such complex "mosaic" reforms., (Copyright © 2020 by Duke University Press.)

Current interest in a single-payer approach to universal health care coverage in the United States has also triggered interest in alternative multipayer approaches to the same goal.An analysis of experiences in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Israel shows how the founding of each system required a distinctive political settlement and how the subsequent timing, content, and course of the reforms were shaped by political circumstances and adjustments to the founding bargain in each nation.Although none of these systems is directly transferable to the United States, certain parallels with the American context suggest that a multipayer approach might offer a model for universal coverage that is more politically feasible than a single-payer scheme but also that issues associated with risk selection and other potential inequities would remain.

As the National Health Service (NHS) turns 70, it bears comparison with another universal system celebrating an anniversary this year: Canada's 50-year-old medicare model. Each system is iconically popular, and each revolves around a profession-state accommodation. Both the popularity and the central axis of each system have been tested by external shocks in the form of periodic fiscal cycles of investment and austerity, and internal stresses generating organizational cycles of centralization and decentralization. In addition, the English NHS has undergone periodic bursts of major policy change, which have arguably moved the system closer to the Canadian single-payer model.

Is medicare a reflection of Canadian values? Or did those values develop as we experienced the common ground of a universal system? Nothing in public opinion in Canada and the US in the 1960s, or in their respective healthcare systems, would have suggested that they would evolve in such divergent ways. Instead, decisions taken by political elites set the two systems on very different courses. In Canada, that course profoundly shaped the way we understand ourselves as citizens, and also established a powerful place for clinicians at the political core. In so doing, it insulated the system from change, for both good and ill., (© 2018 Longwoods Publishing.)

This article examines the cases of three health care states -- two of which (Britain and the Netherlands) have undergone major policy reform and one of which (Canada) has experienced only marginal adjustments. The British and Dutch reforms have variously altered the balance of power, the mix of instruments of control, and the organizing principles. As a result, mature systems representing the ideal-typical health care state categories of national health systems and social insurance (Britain and the Netherlands, respectively) were transformed into distinctive national hybrids. These processes have involved a politics of redesign that differs from the politics of earlier phases of establishment and retrenchment. In particular, the redesign phase is marked by the activity of institutional entrepreneurs who exploit specific opportunities afforded by public programs to combine public and private resources in innovative organizational arrangements. Canada stands as a counterpoint: no window of opportunity for major change occurred, and the bilateral monopoly created by its prototypical single-payer model provided few footholds for entrepreneurial activity. The increased significance of institutional entrepreneurs gives greater urgency to one of the central projects of health policy: the design of accountability frameworks to allow for an assessment of performance against objectives.

In political discourse, the term "single-payer system" originated in an attempt to stake out a middle ground between the public and private sectors in providing universal access to health care. In this view, a single-payer system is one in which health care is financed by government and delivered by privately owned and operated health care providers. The term appears to have been coined in U.S. policy debates to provide a rhetorical reference point for universal health insurance other than the "socialized medicine" of state-owned and -operated health care providers. This article, like others in this special issue, is meant to provide a more nuanced view of single-payer systems. In particular, it reviews experience in the prototypical single-payer system for physician and hospital services: the Canadian case. Given Canada's federal governance structure, this example also aptly illuminates the scope and limits of subnational variation within this single model of health care finance. And what it demonstrates in essence is that the very feature that defines the single-payer prototype -- the maintenance of independent providers remunerated by a single public payer in each province -- also leads to a set of profession-state bargains that define the limits of variation.

The impact of private finance on publicly funded health care systems depends on how the relationship between public and private finance is structured. This essay first reviews the experience in five nations that exemplify different ways of drawing the public/private boundary to address the particular questions raised by each model. This review is then used to interpret aggregate empirical analyses of the dynamic effects between public and private finance in OECD nations over time. Our findings suggest that while increases in the private share of health spending substitute in part for public finance (and vice versa), this is the result of a complex mix of factors having as much to do with cross-sectoral shifts as with deliberate policy decisions within sectors and that these effects are mediated by the different dynamics of distinctive national models. On balance, we argue that a resort to private finance is more likely to harm than to help publicly financed systems, although the effects will vary depending on the form of private finance.

Current ideas about the role of the state include an enthusiasm for mechanisms of "indirect" or "third-party" governance. The health care arena, in which models of indirect governance have a long history, is an important test bed for these ideas. Classically, the arena was marked by trust-based, principal-agent relationships established to overcome information gaps. Over time (and to different degrees across nations), emphasis shifted to contractual relationships assuming relatively well-informed actors and then to performance monitoring and information sharing within complex and loosely coupled networks. In this latest stage, there is a risk that some important features of democratic leadership, and of decision making in the health care arena, will be eclipsed. Accountability mechanisms must clearly locate responsibility for actions and must allow for the exercise of professional judgment.

The sharp decline and equally sharp recovery in public health care spending in the 1990s in Canada set the stage for a broad consideration of reform options but also established hurdles to be overcome in taking action. By moving health care to the center of the federal-provincial agenda, reconfiguring the internal politics of medical and hospital groups, and heightening a public sense of the need for improvement, the legacy of the 1990s prepared the ground for reforms that would "modernize" the Canadian model. But it also yielded a degree of federal-provincial rancor and provider demands for "catch-up," which complicated the process of achieving major change.

Different patterns of change in the American, British, and Canadian health care systems in the 1990s result from the particular logic of each system. Different balances of influence across major categories of actors, and different mixes of hierarchical, market-based, and collegial instruments have different implications for lines of accountability and for information costs, and thus create different incentives that shape behavior. Market instruments functioned differently when introduced into Britain's system of "hierarchical corporatism" than in the American mixed-market system. Profession/state accommodations in Britain and Canada tempered the pace of change, while the entrepreneurial logic of the U.S. system generated a turbulent transformation.