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How do the economy, right-wing legacies, and personal style shape today’sautocracies? Analysts have commented that especially three contemporary autocrats—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narendra Modi, and Rodrigo Duterte—have similar styles, motivations, or bases of support. Yet, this paper will show that the paths that took them to their thrones are quite distinct. Neoliberalization had disorganized society in Turkey, India, and the Philippines. The rule of “strongmen,” in response, showed the way out of this disorganization. The main divergence, however, is that Erdoğanism introduced statism and mass organization as against the disorganizing thrust of neoliberalization. Modi parallels Erdoğan in the civic paramilitary aspects of rule, but not in statism. Other than a weak infrastructure thrust, Duterte did not make the economy into a central issue in the way Erdoğan and Modi did. Moreover, he did not deploy civic activism at all. These three routes have thoroughly shaped and differentiated the autocrats’ styles too, even though all involve a heavy resort to masculinity. Coming from a thick tradition of mass politics and moving in a state-capitalist direction, Erdoğan’s performance incorporates women’s civic mobilization and heavily emphasizes fertility and productivity. Shorn of such anchors and bedeviled by a fragmented polity, Duterte’s rule sexualizes violence rather than production. Modi’s celibate masculinity is similar to Erdoğan’s in its dramatization of size and production but downplays reproduction, except for deepening the ethnic divide his party relies on. These differences have culminated in hegemonic autocracy in Turkey, ethnic autocracy in India, and oligarchic autocracy in the Philippines.

What are the social dynamics behind the rise and resilience of today’s authoritarian regimes? This paper seeks to answer this question by focusing on the longest lasting elected autocracy of our era, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) regime in Turkey. Building on the authoritarian neoliberalism literature’s criticism of the scholarship on competitive authoritarianism, I point out the seeds of authoritarianism in the pro-market reforms of the 1980s–2000s. However, both literatures fail to address the popular embrace of authoritarianism. In critical engagement with analyses of fascism, I develop the concept ‘democratic autocracy’: a parliamentarised, individualised, personalistic, and relatively more market-oriented, twenty-first century version of fascism. The democratic autocracy in Turkey organises and mobilises the people through parties, youth and aid associations, paramilitary organisations, and unions. However, both unresolved economic crises and democratic autocracy’s sociopolitical dynamics set limits to its resilience, as well as to the sustainability of its parliamentarism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamist movement in Turkey bases its mobilization strategy on transforming everyday practices. Public challenges against the state do not form a central part of its repertoire. New Social Movement theory provides some tools for analyzing such an unconventional strategic choice. However, as Islamist mobilization also seeks to reshape the state in the long run, New Social Movement theory (with its focus on culture and society and its relative neglect of the state) needs to be complemented by more institutional analyses. A hegemonic account of mobilization, which incorporates tools from theories of everyday life and identity-formation, as well as from state-centered approaches, is offered as a way to grasp the complexity of Islamism.

Scholars have argued that megaprojects' turn away from issues of employment, and mass housing are among the core traits of neoliberalism. Turkey, though once seen as a paragon of neoliberalism, problematizes this generalization. Erdoğanist megaprojects have created jobs and residence for millions, and garner consent. 'Embedded neoliberalism', a concept frequently used to explain increasing state involvement under neoliberalism, sheds light on the governing AKP's power, but is insufficient in explaining its core dynamics. Whereas the 'embedded neoliberalism' literature downplays the role of the government as a producer, the 'state capitalism' literature, as applied to Turkey, overrates the extent to which this country has moved away from neoliberalism. The concept 'neoliberal statism' (which puts the emphasis on the consent-generating and political aspects of the new economy) better captures the AKP's path. Megaproject-driven growth and popular consent, however, are restricted by vulnerabilities that also afflict neoliberal statism as a broader growth strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the 'benevolent self's relation to others changed as a result of (first) the liberalization of monotheisms and (then) the uneven transition to post-religious spiritual formations? The apparent (and misleading) effacement of the self in traditional monotheistic generosity has ultimately given way to a 'liberal' glorification of the self. In advanced liberalism (typically dubbed 'neoliberalism'), the glorification intensifies, but paradoxically becomes self-critical. Post-religious spiritualities interact with these advanced liberal dynamics to open up new possibilities for self- and community-formation. Even though the contradictions between self-centeredness and self-criticism are most acutely experienced within American post-religious spirituality, a suggestive discussion of Egypt demonstrates that these trends are not exclusively 'Western.' In both contexts, the corporate takeover of spirituality confines alternative forms of generosity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Turkey's state President Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, leadership, and the U.S., assessment of Turkey as a model partner. It emphasizes Turkey's domestic changes, such as the imprisonment of oppositionists, as well as involvement in conflicts and occupation regimes. It also highlights the importance of Turkey's strategic position and the importance of understanding the limitations of the Turkish model in a changing geopolitical moment.

The symbolic and physical map of Istanbul has undergone dramatic shifts over the past four decades. Squatters—the persistent underdogs in this huge metropolis—have mounted an attack against established economic and cultural hierarchies. This challenge has transformed the structures of symbolic violence through the production of an alternative urban space (contentious neighborhoods and districts, teahouses, innovative district and street layouts, and 'Islamic' internal and external architecture). In the process, the meanings of urbanity and provinciality, of secularity and Islam, have been altered—and stigma, along with urban rent, has been systematically redistributed (although redistribution has been far from egalitarian). The dominant sectors ultimately absorbed the attack: squatters remained subordinated, but the terms of subordination have changed. A synthesis of Bourdieu and (a geographically revised) Gramsci sheds light on this process of challenge and absorption in and through urban space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is the contemporary Right fascinated by Lenin? Commentators take this infatuation as evidence that the Right has forsaken freedom. By taking Lenin out of context, this argument not only reproduces a wrong reading of history, but misconstrues what the Right learns from its undeclared mentor. Leninism's crux is neither authoritarianism nor zealotry, but the formulation of a long-term strategy in hostile terrain. Based on conflicting right-wing currents' texts and actions, I analyze the making of such a strategy. The Right's advanced Leninism comprises: 1) post-sectarian elimination, incorporation, and disciplining of collaborationists and hardliners; 2) (semi-secretive) cadre-raising; 3) ("hegemonic") coalition-building; 4) infiltration of institutions; 5) a weakening of the enemy; 6) the creation of a parallel universe of material interests. Nevertheless, authoritarianism, which is a strong tendency of original Leninism, is an ingrained characteristic of right-wing Bolshevism. Only a Gramscian reconstruction of Leninism can restore its emancipatory potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the possible role of Turkey, considered a template and a model for other Arab countries to emulate through its practice of integrating Islam with democracy and having a robust economy, in bridging the gap between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. It talks about the current party in power led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President Abdullah Gul, and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc, which is considered as an outsider party founded in a conservative social movement. It also discusses the zero problems with neighbors diplomatic initiative launched by Erdogan, Gul and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu aimed at emphasizing the influence of Turkey in Washington, and vice versa.

The article focuses on the environmental, economic, and political developments occurring in Istanbul, Turkey. It is explained that Istanbul has always positioned itself as a "world city," mainly because it is at the crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, Russia and the Mediterranean. Over a twenty year period Istanbul's population has doubled to over 10 million, and has resulted in the uprooting of villagers who have poured into the post-imperial city. The article examines how this population increase, which has dramatically changed the racial make-up of the city, is changing as a whole Istanbul.