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12. INTERNATIONAL OUTSOURCING AND WELFARE REDUCTION: AN ENTRY-DETERRENCE STORY

Author

Mukherjee, Arijit and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
Economic policy, Outsourcing, Outsourcing, Economics
Abstract

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02152.x Byline: ARIJIT MUKHERJEE (1), YINGYI TSAI (2) Abstract: We show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by deterring market entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and the quality effects creating negative impacts of outsourcing. Entry deterrence under outsourcing reduces domestic welfare if both the profit extraction and cost saving from outsourcing are sufficiently small. Author Affiliation: (1)University of Nottingham and the Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy (2)National University of Kaohsiung

Published
2010

13. Optimal Management of Supply Disruptions when Contracting with Unreliable, Risk-averse, Suppliers

Author

Parlane, Sarah and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
M11, L24, Random capacity model, ddc:330, ComputerApplications_COMPUTERSINOTHERSYSTEMS, Moral hazard, D86, Newsvendor optimisation
Abstract

This paper investigates the optimal management of supply disruptions by a manufacturer who uses order inflation and/or investments in process reliability when contracting two risk-averse suppliers. We consider that these investments can be subject to moral hazard. Technically we solve a newsvendor optimization problem using a random capacity model of disruption. In such a model, the order size does not affect the average production but impacts the probability of disruption. When investments are verifiable we show that the manufacturer is more inclined to invest in the suppliers’ reliability and then refrain from using order inflation when the suppliers’ production costs and the cost of disposing of unwanted inputs are large. When investments are not verifiable we show that the order sizes can be used strategically as incentive devises due to the suppliers’ sensitivity to payoff dispersion. We show that the manufacturer does not always increase his reliance on order inflation and face less reliable suppliers once we introduce moral hazard. In some instances he induces suppliers to undertake larger investments in reliability by increasing the order size. In other instances he is able to reduce his reliance on order inflation.

Published
2017

17. Relationship-Specific Investments and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement with Heterogeneous Suppliers

Author

Naghavi, Alireza, Peng, Shin-Kun, Tsai, Yingyi, Naghavi, Alireza, Peng, Shin-Kun, and Tsai, Yingyi

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement on multinationals' choice of input suppliers and industry profits in a host economy. The framework consists of suppliers with heterogeneous capabilities who must engage in a relation-specific investment to customize intermediate inputs upon a transfer payment by final producers. An outsourcing contract with better technologically-endowed suppliers requires a lower transfer and generates a higher surplus. Stronger IPR enforcement leads firms to self-select into better quality suppliers on average by reducing their outside option. Weak legal institutions instead make it possible for a larger range of suppliers, including the less capable ones, to form partnerships by granting them a larger outside option. A better IPR environment is more likely to harm lagging countries where the technology distribution is characterized by less capable suppliers.

Published
2015

18. Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity

Author

Naghavi, Alireza and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
TRIPS, Absorptive Capacity, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Monitoring, Intellectual Property Rights, Nash Bargaining, Contract Enforcement, Development
Abstract

This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the negotiated level of IPRs and its post-treaty enforcement. The optimal level of IPR protection relates positively to absorptive capacity. This provides a rationale for the longer time-frame provided to least developed countries in Article 66 of TRIPS to implement its provisions. In addition, monitoring is only effective in preventing contract violation up to a critical level of absorptive capacity. We relate this to the US Trade Representative “Special 301” report, which flags countries that deny adequate IPR protection as “priority watch list”. While disputes with less developed economies are promptly resolved, emerging economies, where most losses from copyright piracy originates from, continue to remain on the list., Current version uploaded April 2013.

Published
2012
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21. Relationship-specific Investments and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement with Heterogeneous Suppliers.

Author

Naghavi, Alireza, Peng, Shin‐Kun, and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
INTELLECTUAL property, SUPPLIERS, TRANSFER payments, CORPORATE profits, INTERNATIONAL business enterprises
Abstract

This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement on multinationals' choice of input suppliers and industry profits in a host economy. The framework consists of suppliers with heterogeneous capabilities who must engage in a relation-specific investment to customize intermediate inputs upon a transfer payment by final producers. An outsourcing contract with better technologically endowed suppliers requires a lower transfer and generates a higher surplus. Stronger IPR enforcement leads firms to self-select into better quality suppliers on average by reducing their outside option. Weak legal institutions instead make it possible for a larger range of suppliers, including the less capable ones, to form partnerships by granting them a larger outside option. A better IPR environment is more likely to harm lagging countries where the technology distribution is characterized by less capable suppliers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2017
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32. Managerial Delegation, Cost Asymmetry and Social Efficiency of Entry.

Author

Mukherjee, Arijit and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
OLIGOPOLIES, DELEGATION of authority, ECONOMIC efficiency, MANAGEMENT styles, COST effectiveness
Abstract

This article examines the welfare implications of entry in oligopolistic markets with separation of management from ownership. In the presence of strategic managerial delegation and cost asymmetry, entry is socially insufficient unless the degree of scale economies is large. This result is in stark contrast to those documented in the extant literature. A key feature of our analysis is that a 'business stealing' effect (Mankiw & Whinston, 1986) does not arise for the relatively cost-efficient entrant under managerial delegation. The policy implication emerging from our analysis suggests that entry should be encouraged in industries with strategic managerial delegation, cost asymmetry and not large-scale economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2014
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33. Domestic patenting systems and foreign licensing choices

Author

Tsai, Yingyi, Mukherjee, Arijit, Tsai, Yingyi, and Mukherjee, Arijit

Abstract

This paper examines a foreign technology holder’s licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor’s technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.

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34. Domestic patenting systems and foreign licensing choices

Author

Tsai, Yingyi, Mukherjee, Arijit, Tsai, Yingyi, and Mukherjee, Arijit

Abstract

This paper examines a foreign technology holder’s licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor’s technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.

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35. Domestic patenting systems and foreign licensing choices

Author

Tsai, Yingyi, Mukherjee, Arijit, Tsai, Yingyi, and Mukherjee, Arijit

Abstract

This paper examines a foreign technology holder’s licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor’s technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.

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36. Domestic patenting systems and foreign licensing choices

Author

Tsai, Yingyi, Mukherjee, Arijit, Tsai, Yingyi, and Mukherjee, Arijit

Abstract

This paper examines a foreign technology holder’s licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor’s technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.

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37. Relationship-Specifiic Investments and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement with Heterogeneous Suppliers

Author

Yingyi Tsai, Alireza Naghavi, Shin-Kun Peng, Naghavi, Alireza, Peng, Shin-Kun, and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
L24, media_common.quotation_subject, Geography, Planning and Development, L22, Intellectual property, Outsourcing, Transfer payment, ddc:330, Quality (business), Development3304 Education, Enforcement, Lagging, Industrial organization, media_common, O32, O34, business.industry, Investment (macroeconomics), SECS-P/01 Economia politica, Commerce, Harm, Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, F21, D23, F23, Business, International outsourcing, Supplier heterogeneity, Relation-specific investment, Intellectual property rights enforcement, Outside option, Customization, Technological capability
Abstract

This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement on multinationals' choice of input suppliers and industry profits in a host economy. The framework consists of suppliers with heterogeneous capabilities who must engage in a relation-specific investment to customize intermediate inputs upon a transfer payment by final producers. An outsourcing contract with better technologically-endowed suppliers requires a lower transfer and generates a higher surplus. Stronger IPR enforcement leads firms to self-select into better quality suppliers on average by reducing their outside option. Weak legal institutions instead make it possible for a larger range of suppliers, including the less capable ones, to form partnerships by granting them a larger outside option. A better IPR environment is more likely to harm lagging countries where the technology distribution is characterized by less capable suppliers.

Published
2015
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38. Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity

Author

Yingyi Tsai, Alireza Naghavi, Naghavi, Alireza, and Tsai, Yingyi

Subjects
Economics and Econometric, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Exploit, Intellectual Property Rights, Nash Bargaining, International trade, Intellectual property, TRIPS, Absorptive capacity, ddc:330, C70, Economics, D78, F13, Enforcement, Emerging markets, F53, Least Developed Countries, jel:C70, Bargaining problem, O33, O34, business.industry, L10, jel:F53, jel:D78, jel:F13, SECS-P/01 Economia politica, Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, jel:L10, Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS, Nash Bargaining, Contract Enforcement, Development, Absorptive Capacity, Monitoring, jel:O34, jel:O33, TRIPS architecture, Contract, business, Intellectual property rights, contract enforcement, development, absorptive capacity, monitoring
Abstract

This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the negotiated level of IPRs and its post-treaty enforcement. The optimal level of IPR protection relates positively to absorptive capacity. This provides a rationale for the longer time-frame provided to least developed countries in Article 66 of TRIPS to implement its provisions. In addition, monitoring is only effective in preventing contract violation up to a critical level of absorptive capacity. We relate this to the US Trade Representative “Special 301” report, which flags countries that deny adequate IPR protection as “priority watch list”. While disputes with less developed economies are promptly resolved, emerging economies, where most losses from copyright piracy originates from, continue to remain on the list.

Published
2012
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