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Familiar information is more likely to be accepted as true. This illusory truth effect has a tremendous negative impact on misinformation intervention. Previous studies focused on the familiarity from repeated exposure in the laboratory, ignoring preexisting familiarity with real-world misinformation. Over three studies (total N = 337), we investigated the cognitive mechanisms behind the truth biases from these two familiarity sources, and whether fact-checking can curb such biased truth perceptions. Studies 1 and 2 found robust truth effects induced by two sources of familiarity but with different cognitive processes. According to the cognitive process model, repetition-induced familiarity reduced decision prudence. Preexisting familiarity instead enhanced truth-congruent evidence accumulation. Study 3 showed that pre-exposing statements with warning flags eliminated the bias to truth induced by repetition but not that from preexisting familiarity. These repeated statements with warning labels also reduced decision caution. These findings furthered the understanding of how different sources of familiarity affect truth perceptions and undermine the intervention through different cognitive processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perceived truthfulness of advertised claims plays a vital role in healthy food marketing, shaping positive consumer responses. This study investigates how the presentation order of healthy ingredients and food products commonly featured in advertisements influences the perceived truthfulness of these claims, also known as the truth effect, using the congruency effect as a theoretical framework. Two studies were conducted to explore the impact of the compatibility between a contextual factor (presentation order) and cultural/individual difference (locus of attention) on the subjective experience of processing fluency, and how it subsequently enhances the truth effect, wherein consumers believe the advertised claims about the product. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that individuals, depending on their locus of attention, are more likely to exhibit a heightened truth effect when the food product is presented first, followed by the healthy ingredient as an attribute, or when the information is presented in the opposite order. Additionally, the observed effect was found to be completely mediated by processing fluency. These findings make theoretical and practical contributions by highlighting the role of the congruency effect as a novel determinant of the truth effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite their apparent benevolence, positive stereotypes have negative effects on person and group perception. However, little is known about how exposure can intensify these negative consequences. In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 240) we investigated the effect of exposure on believability and moral condemnation of positive stereotypes. In Experiment 1, participants rated the truth value of positive stereotypes, which were either previously encountered or not during an exposure phase. Repeated positive stereotypes were perceived as more true than unrepeated ones, indicating a truth effect. In Experiment 2, we replicated the truth effect and further found that exposure to stereotypes reduced their moral condemnation, indicating a moral-repetition effect. Extending the truth effect and moral-repetition effect research to positive stereotypes, our findings emphasize the need to raise awareness of the impact of exposure on reinforcing the believability and moral condemnation of stereotypical beliefs.

The feeling that an imagined event will or will not occur in the future – referred to as belief in future occurrence – plays a key role in guiding our decisions and actions. Recent research suggests that this belief may increase with repeated simulation of future events, but the boundary conditions for this effect remain unclear. Considering the key role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in occurrence, we suggest that the effect of repeated simulation only occurs when prior autobiographical knowledge does not clearly support or contradict the occurrence of the imagined event. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the repetition effect for events that were either plausible or implausible due to their coherence or incoherence with autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 1), and for events that initially appeared uncertain because they were not clearly supported or contradicted by autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 2). We found that all types of events became more detailed and took less time to construct after repeated simulation, but belief in their future occurrence increased only for uncertain events; repetition did not influence belief for events already believed or considered implausible. These findings show that the effect of repeated simulation on belief in future occurrence depends on the consistency of imagined events with autobiographical knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People believe repeated statements more than new ones, a phenomenon called the repetitioninduced truth effect. It is chiefly explained with the subjective processing ease (i.e., fluency) for repeated as compared to new information. To date, the role of affective processes for the repetition-induced truth effect is rather unclear. Different mechanisms may play a role: Affect influences processing styles, it may directly inform judgments, and positive affect may be misattributed to fluency/familiarity. In the current study, we compared mechanisms and tested whether a positive, neutral, or negative picture presented before a statement would influence the repetition-induced truth effect. Experiment 1 followed a classical repetition-induced truth effect procedure with two sessions that were a week apart. In the second session, each statement was preceded by an affective picture. We replicated the repetition-induced truth effect, and we observed a statistically significant main effect of affect—statements were rated as truer after a positive rather than a negative or neutral picture, but the interaction between repetition and affect was not statistically significant. In Experiment 2, we aimed to clarify the mechanism behind this finding using only new statements preceded by affective pictures. No statistically significant main effect of affect emerged. We conclude that the results in Experiment 1 were due to the misattribution of positive affect to fluency/ familiarity, enhancing the perceived truth of the statements. In sum, our results suggest two factors that enhance truth judgments: repetition and positive affect, but the effects of affect depend on the exact paradigm used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the information overload in today’s digital age, people may sometimes feel pressured to process and judge information especially fast. In three experiments, we examined whether time pressure increases the repetition-based truth effect — the tendency to judge repeatedly encountered statements more likely as “true” than novel statements. Based on the Heuristic-Systematic Model, a dual-process model in the field of persuasion research, we expected that time pressure would boost the truth effect by increasing reliance on processing fluency as a presumably heuristic cue for truth, and by decreasing knowledge retrieval as a presumably slow and systematic process that determines truth judgments. However, contrary to our expectation, time pressure did not moderate the truth effect. Importantly, this was the case for difficult statements, for which most people lack prior knowledge, as well as for easy statements, for which most people hold relevant knowledge. Overall, the findings clearly speak against the conception of fast, fluency-based truth judgments versus slow, knowledge-based truth judgments. In contrast, the results are compatible with a referential theory of the truth effect that does not distinguish between different types of truth judgments. Instead, it assumes that truth judgments rely on the coherence of localized networks in people’s semantic memory, formed by both repetition and prior knowledge.

Corneille et al. (2020) found that repetition increases judgments that statements have been used as fake news on social media. They also found that repetition increases truth judgments and decreases falsehood judgments (i.e., two instantiations of the truth-by-repetition effect). These results supported an ecological explanation of the truth-by-repetition effect better than two alternative accounts. However, the first author of the present article found unsuspected programming issues in Corneille et al.’s experiments. These programming issues introduced confounds that may have been responsible for the results. To estimate whether Corneille et al.’s main findings and claims hold when correcting these issues, the current team agreed on two high-powered preregistered replications of Corneille et al.’s experiments ('N'total = 540). The results replicate Corneille et al.’s findings, which are more consistent with an ecological account of repetition effects on judgment than the alternative accounts tested in the original publication.

People rate and judge repeated information more true than novel information. This truth-by-repetition effect is of relevance for explaining belief in fake news, conspiracy theories, or misinformation effects. To ascertain whether increased motivation could reduce this effect, we tested the influence of monetary incentives on participants' truth judgments. We used a standard truth paradigm, consisting of a presentation and judgment phase with factually true and false information, and incentivized every truth judgment. Monetary incentives may influence truth judgments in two ways. First, participants may rely more on relevant knowledge, leading to better discrimination between true and false statements. Second, participants may rely less on repetition, leading to a lower bias to respond "true." We tested these predictions in a preregistered and high-powered experiment. However, incentives did not influence the percentage of "true" judgments or correct responses in general, despite participants' longer response times in the incentivized conditions and evidence for knowledge about the statements. Our findings show that even monetary consequences do not protect against the truth-by-repetition effect, further substantiating its robustness and relevance and highlighting its potential hazardous effects when used in purposeful misinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corneille et al. (2020) found that repetition increases judgments that statements have been used as fake news on social media. They also found that repetition increases truth judgments and decreases falsehood judgments (i.e., two instantiations of the truth-by-repetition effect). These results supported an ecological explanation of the truth-by-repetition effect better than two alternative accounts. However, the first author of the present article found unsuspected programming issues in Corneille et al.’s experiments. These programming issues introduced confounds that may have been responsible for the results. To estimate whether Corneille et al.’s main findings and claims hold when correcting these issues, the current team agreed on two highpowered preregistered replications of Corneille et al.’s experiments (Ntotal = 540). The results replicate Corneille et al.’s findings, which are more consistent with an ecological account of repetition effects on judgment than the alternative accounts tested in the original publication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract To better understand the spread of fake news in the Internet age, it is important to uncover the variables that influence the perceived truth of information. Although previous research identified several reliable predictors of truth judgments—such as source credibility, repeated information exposure, and presentation format—little is known about their simultaneous effects. In a series of four experiments, we investigated how the abovementioned factors jointly affect the perceived truth of statements (Experiments 1 and 2) and simulated social media postings (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 1 explored the role of source credibility (high vs. low vs. no source information) and presentation format (with vs. without a picture). In Experiments 2 and 3, we additionally manipulated repeated exposure (yes vs. no). Finally, Experiment 4 examined the role of source credibility (high vs. low) and type of repetition (congruent vs. incongruent vs. no repetition) in further detail. In sum, we found no effect of presentation format on truth judgments, but strong, additive effects of source credibility and repetition. Truth judgments were higher for information presented by credible sources than non-credible sources and information without sources. Moreover, congruent (i.e., verbatim) repetition increased perceived truth whereas semantically incongruent repetition decreased perceived truth, irrespectively of the source. Our findings show that people do not rely on a single judgment cue when evaluating a statement’s truth but take source credibility and their meta-cognitive feelings into account.

Due to the information overload in today's digital age, people may sometimes feel pressured to process and judge information especially fast. In three experiments, we examined whether time pressure increases the repetition-based truth effect -- the tendency to judge repeatedly encountered statements more likely as "true" than novel statements. Based on theHeuristic-SystematicModel, a dual-process model in the field of persuasion research, we expected that time pressure would boost the truth effect by increasing reliance on processing fluency as a presumably heuristic cue for truth, and by decreasing knowledge retrieval as a presumably slow and systematic process that determines truth judgments. However, contrary to our expectation, time pressure did not moderate the truth effect. Importantly, this was the case for difficult statements, for which most people lack prior knowledge, as well as for easy statements, for which most people hold relevant knowledge. Overall, the findings clearly speak against the conception of fast, fluency-based truth judgments versus slow, knowledge-based truth judgments. In contrast, the results are compatible with a referential theory of the truth effect that does not distinguish between different types of truth judgments. Instead, it assumes that truth judgments rely on the coherence of localized networks in people's semantic memory, formed by both repetition and prior knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The repetition-induced truth effect refers to a phenomenon where people rate repeated statements as more likely true than novel statements. In this paper, we document qualitative individual differences in the effect. While the overwhelming majority of participants display the usual positive truth effect, a minority are the opposite—they reliably discount the validity of repeated statements, what we refer to as negative truth effect. We examine eight truth-effect data sets where individual-level data are curated. These sets are composed of 1105 individuals performing 38,904 judgments. Through Bayes factor model comparison, we show that reliable negative truth effects occur in five of the eight data sets. The negative truth effect is informative because it seems unreasonable that the mechanisms mediating the positive truth effect are the same that lead to a discounting of repeated statements' validity. Moreover, the presence of qualitative differences motivates a different type of analysis of individual differences based on ordinal (i.e., Which sign does the effect have?) rather than metric measures. To our knowledge, this paper reports the first such reliable qualitative differences in a cognitive task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Repetition increases belief in information, a phenomenon known as the illusory truth effect. In laboratory experiments, the illusory truth effect has often been examined using general trivia statements as stimuli, but repetition also increases belief in misinformation, such as fake news headlines and conspiracy beliefs. Repetition even increases belief in claims that are implausible or that contradict prior knowledge. Repetition also has broader impacts beyond belief, such as increasing sharing intentions of news headlines and decreasing how unethical an act is perceived to be. Although the illusory truth effect is robust, some interventions reduce its magnitude, including instruction to focus on accuracy and awareness of the illusory truth effect. These strategies may be effective for reducing belief in misinformation., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2023. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

Information is judged as more true when it has been seen or heard repeatedly than when it is new. This illusory truth effect has important consequences in the real world, where we are repeatedly exposed to information of unknown veracity. While false information in natural contexts rarely comes with a warning label, false information in truth effect experiments often does. Commonly used experimental procedures alert participants to potential falsehoods at exposure through instructional warnings. Three experiments show that the size of the truth effect is over twice as large when such warnings are avoided. The influence of pre-exposure warnings on the size of the truth effect persists even after a delay of three to six days. These findings demonstrate that common experimental procedures invite a systematic underestimation of illusory truth effects. They also highlight that simple warnings can curb the impact of repetition on judgments of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Repeated exposure to information increases its' perceived truth, and this illusory truth effect is often explained by two theoretical frameworks: the fluency account and the referential theory of truth. Whereas the fluency account suggests that prior activation of a single referent within a statement should increase its perceived truth, the referential theory makes no such predictions. The referential theory instead proposes that when a statement is processed, it activates the corresponding memory referents within that statement and strengthens the connection between these referents in the semantic memory network. Because repeated statements will have more coherent corresponding referents than new statements, they are perceived as relatively truer. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on testing the fluency account, with participants exposed to one or two of a statement's referents before evaluating that statement's truth. Experiments 3 and 4 focused on the referential theory by exposing participants to non-critical facts that linked together two of a critical statements' referents before evaluating the truth of the critical statements. We consistently observed a standard illusory truth effect, such that facts that repeated verbatim were rated as truer than new facts. However, perceived truth was not affected by prior exposure to the critical statement's topic (Experiment 1) or by prior exposure to non-critical facts related to the same topic(s) as the critical statement (Experiment 2). There was also no boost in perceived truth following prior exposure to non-critical facts that linked together two of the primary referents of the critical statement but did so in a semantically distinct manner from how those same referents were linked in the critical statement itself (Experiments 3 and 4). However, Experiment 4 demonstrated that perceived truth significantly increased if there was prior exposure to non-critical facts that linked two of the critical statement primary referents in a way that was semantically coherent with how those same referents were linked within the critical statement. Together, these results are consistent with the referential theory, and suggest that semantic consistency across repetitions plays a crucial role in leading to repetition-based illusory truth effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When you lack the facts, how do you decide what is true and what is not? In the absence of knowledge, we sometimes rely on non-probative information. For example, participants judge concretely worded trivia items as more likely to be true than abstractly worded ones (the linguistic truth effect; Hansen & Wänke, 2010). If minor language differences affect truth judgements, ultimately they could influence more consequential political, legal, health, and interpersonal choices. This Registered Report includes two high-powered replication attempts of Experiment 1 from Hansen and Wänke (2010). Experiment 1a was a dual-site, in-person replication of the linguistic concreteness effect in the original paper-and-pencil format (n = 253, n = 246 in analyses). Experiment 1b replicated the study with an online sample (n = 237, n = 220 in analyses). In Experiment 1a, the effect of concreteness on judgements of truth (Cohen’s dz = 0.08; 95% CI: [–0.03, 0.18]) was smaller than that of the original study. Similarly, in Experiment 1b the effect (Cohen’s dz = 0.11; 95% CI [–0.01, 0.22]) was smaller than that of the original study. Collectively, the pattern of results is inconsistent with that of the original study.

People believe repeated information more than novel information; they show a repetition-induced truth effect. In a world of "alternative facts," "fake news," and strategic information management, understanding this effect is highly important. We first review explanations of the effect based on frequency, recognition, familiarity, and coherent references. On the basis of the latter explanation, we discuss the relations of these explanations. We then discuss implications of truth by repetition for the maintenance of false beliefs and ways to change potentially harmful false beliefs (e.g., "Vaccination causes autism"), illustrating that the truth-by-repetition phenomenon not only is of theoretical interest but also has immediate practical relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Previous research has shown that fluency effects are driven by discrepancies between current and baseline fluency. Thus, illusions of truth associated with repetition (which increases statement fluency and its perceived truth-value relative to new statements) are less likely to occur when participants judge pure lists of either all-repeated or all-new statements and comparisons are between-participants, than when participants judge mixed lists and comparisons are within-participants. Still, there are demonstrations of between-participants illusions of truth in the literature. In this manuscript, we explain the emergence of between-participants truth effects in terms of hypothetical dynamic updating of fluency standards. The findings of two experiments provide evidence for this hypothesis by showing that between-participants truth effects occur most strongly for the first elements of the statement list but are reduced over time. The findings suggest that the dynamics of fluency experiences contribute to the truth effect and should be taken into account when investigating illusions of truth. Highlights • Illusions of truth (IOT) are driven by discrepancies amid expected & actual fluency. • IOT are more likely in within- rather than between-ps variations of fluency. • We explored how fluency standards are updated across a truth ratings task. • Fluency was manipulated both in within- and between-ps setting. • The updating of fluency standards supports IOT in within- and between-ps settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Recent evidence suggests that judgment biases may diminish when a problem is presented in a foreign language. This foreign-language effect has primarily been examined with emotional materials such as risky-choice problems and moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of foreign-language processing on an emotionally neutral judgment bias: the repetition-based truth effect , the phenomenon that statement repetition enhances the perceived truth of statements. In Experiment 1, we found no evidence for the truth effect to be moderated by the language in which the statements were processed (native language: Hungarian; foreign language: English). In Experiment 2, in turn, we not only manipulated language (native language: German; foreign language: English), but also the retention interval between statement repetitions. Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, language did not moderate the truth effect for statements that were repeated within the same experimental session. However, after a two-week interval, the truth effect was significantly smaller in the foreign-language condition than in the native-language condition. Overall, our findings suggest a faster decay of semantic memory for foreign-language as compared to native-language statements. Highlights • Repeating a statement typically enhances its perceived truth (aka truth effect). • We investigated whether language (native vs. foreign) moderates the truth effect. • When using a short statement repetition interval, no language effect occurred. • After a two-week interval, however, foreign language reduced the truth effect. • Apparently, foreign language reduces the longevity of the truth effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We contrast the effects of conceptual and perceptual fluency resulting from repetition in the truth effect. In Experiment 1, participants judged either verbatim or paraphrased repetitions, which reduce perceptual similarity to original statements. Judgments were made either immediately after the first exposure to the statements or after one week. Illusions of truth emerged for both types of repetition, with delay reducing both effects. In Experiment 2, participants judged verbatim and paraphrased repetitions with either the same or a contradictory meaning of original statements. In immediate judgments, illusions of truth emerged for repetitions with the same meaning and illusions of falseness for contradictory repetitions. In the delayed session, the illusion of falseness disappeared for contradictory statements. Results are discussed in terms of the contributions of recollection of stimulus details and of perceptual and conceptual fluency to illusions of truth at different time intervals and judgmental context conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the truth effect has demonstrated that statements are rated as more credible when they are repeatedly presented. However, current research indicates that there are limits to the truth effect and that too many repetitions can decrease message credibility. This study investigates whether message negativity contributes to this boomerang effect and whether the interaction of credibility and negativity influences political attitudes. These assumptions were tested in an online experiment in which the frequency of exposure to political campaign posters and message negativity were manipulated. The results show that negativity on political campaign posters functions as a crucial moderator, especially in combination with high-frequency exposure. Repeatedly presented negative posters resulted in a more negative attitude toward the presented political issue, which was mediated by a decrease in credibility judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]