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The ROK-Japan relationship, characterized as a quasi alliance, has oscillated between moments of friction and cohesion. This study endeavours to pinpoint the explanatory variables responsible for these fluctuations and to articulate a coherent causal mechanism. Drawing upon alliance theories and the quasi alliance model, two hypotheses centred on external factors – common threats and common allies – are posite. In 2019, divergent threat perceptions between the ROK and Japan, coupled with doubts about the US's reliability, strained their quasi alliance. Yet, as the prospects for North Korea's denuclearization grew murky, both the ROK and Japan began to share heightened threat perceptions. Concurrently, the US's commitment and credibility were reestablished, bolstering the cohesion of the quasi-alliance. This study strengthens the quasi-alliance model both theoretically and empirically. Furthermore, the study's findings suggest the necessity for more direct and binding bilateral ties between the ROK and Japan to ensure greater stability in future relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Term limit changes are significantly linked to political instability in Africa. Yet, it is ignored as an issue in the trilateral cooperation between European Union (EU), China and Africa. Indeed, a central question that could face both the EU and China over term limits in Africa is the extent to which it is legitimate for them to take action against attempts to violate term limits. This paper is an attempt to consider joint EU and China influence on African politics from the perspective of term limits. Why and how have/should EU and China respond to term limits? How can a trilateral cooperation between EU, China and Africa help institutionalize the respect of term limits? With the help of qualitative and quantitative data from official communiqués, events, and reports, the paper considers term limits as major political issue EU, China and Africa must care about given that it is a major factor of State fragility and political instability. It finds that a grounded trilateral policy framework on term limits is not only possible in an EU-China-Africa cooperation, but can strengthen democratic institutions in the continent and reflect the genuine commitment of the EU and China to promote sustainable democracy and political stability in Africa. If the EU and China want sustainable development of Africa, then the issue of presidential term limits must be significantly addressed within a trilateral cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Trilateral South‒South cooperation is envisioned as an equal and empowering partnership model but still faces certain challenges. This study addresses whether and how trilateral South‒South cooperation can transform traditional development assistance for health (DAH) and explores the opportunities and challenges of trilateral South‒South cooperation for transforming future DAH, in the theme of “the emerging development partner’s DAH transformation facilitated by a multilateral organization”. Methods We evaluate a maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) project involving the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and China (hereinafter referred to as the “DRC–UNICEF–China project”). We analyze data from project documents and seventeen semi-structured interviews using a pragmatic analytical framework based on the DAH program logic model and the OECD’s trilateral cooperation framework. Results Evidence from the DRC–UNICEF–China MNCH project suggests that trilateral South‒South cooperation facilitated by a multilateral organization can provide transformative opportunities for emerging development partners’ DAH to generate and deliver context-based, demand-oriented solutions, harmonize rules and procedures, institutionalize mutual learning and knowledge sharing, and increase the visibility of emerging development partners as sources for South‒South development experience transfer. However, the project revealed some challenges, including the neglect of key stakeholders in the complex governance structure, the high transaction costs needed to ensure transparency, and the harm local absence of the emerging development partner poses to long-term DAH engagement. Conclusions This study echoes some of the findings in trilateral SSC literature that claim power structures and philanthropic, normative justification for health equity are often juxtaposed in trilateral SSC partnerships. The opportunities offered by the DRC–UNICEF–China project align with China’s cognitive learning process for strengthening international engagement and global image building. However, challenges may arise as a result of complex governance structures and the entrustment of facilitating partners, which can threaten the effectiveness of trilateral cooperation. We call for strengthening the beneficiary partner’s ownership at all levels, engaging the emerging development partner to better understand the beneficiary partner’s local context(s) and needs, and ensuring available resources to support programmatic activities and long-term partnerships for the health and well-being of the beneficiaries.

Background: Trilateral South‒South cooperation is envisioned as an equal and empowering partnership model but still faces certain challenges. This study addresses whether and how trilateral South‒South cooperation can transform traditional development assistance for health (DAH) and explores the opportunities and challenges of trilateral South‒South cooperation for transforming future DAH, in the theme of "the emerging development partner's DAH transformation facilitated by a multilateral organization". Methods: We evaluate a maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) project involving the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and China (hereinafter referred to as the "DRC–UNICEF–China project"). We analyze data from project documents and seventeen semi-structured interviews using a pragmatic analytical framework based on the DAH program logic model and the OECD's trilateral cooperation framework. Results: Evidence from the DRC–UNICEF–China MNCH project suggests that trilateral South‒South cooperation facilitated by a multilateral organization can provide transformative opportunities for emerging development partners' DAH to generate and deliver context-based, demand-oriented solutions, harmonize rules and procedures, institutionalize mutual learning and knowledge sharing, and increase the visibility of emerging development partners as sources for South‒South development experience transfer. However, the project revealed some challenges, including the neglect of key stakeholders in the complex governance structure, the high transaction costs needed to ensure transparency, and the harm local absence of the emerging development partner poses to long-term DAH engagement. Conclusions: This study echoes some of the findings in trilateral SSC literature that claim power structures and philanthropic, normative justification for health equity are often juxtaposed in trilateral SSC partnerships. The opportunities offered by the DRC–UNICEF–China project align with China's cognitive learning process for strengthening international engagement and global image building. However, challenges may arise as a result of complex governance structures and the entrustment of facilitating partners, which can threaten the effectiveness of trilateral cooperation. We call for strengthening the beneficiary partner's ownership at all levels, engaging the emerging development partner to better understand the beneficiary partner's local context(s) and needs, and ensuring available resources to support programmatic activities and long-term partnerships for the health and well-being of the beneficiaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organized economic cooperation among China, South Korea (Republic of Korea) and Japan has been difficult due to the "Asia Paradox" and different interests. However, the digital age is fostering cooperation and interdependence among the three countries. As a result, it is time to explore new areas and methods of cooperation. Therefore, this study focuses on and analyzes the possibility and impacts of digital trade cooperation among the three countries in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Applying a tripartite cooperation model, this study analyzes the relative advantages of the three countries in digital trade and the "benefits" and "costs" of establishing a Digital Trade Agreement (DTA). The research indicates that the power basis for establishing an equal relationship exists. However, the "cost" of establishing a trilateral DTA is higher than the short-term "benefit," providing insufficient motivation to develop a trilateral DTA in the short-term. Nevertheless, this study suggests that in the long run, due to new opportunities and crises, the three countries will still seek to pursue a DTA in different ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development cooperation system is currently under pressure to change and demonstrate its usefulness for addressing more complex development challenges. Triangular Cooperation constitutes a modality of cooperation that can contribute to this change, opening space to more inclusive formulas of partnership. However, such results are neither guaranteed nor automatic, as TC can also contribute to reinforcing vertical relationships that characterize traditional aid. It is therefore important to identify the factors that contribute to tipping this balance in one direction or another. This article aims to investigate these aspects, offering an analytical framework by which to identify the main elements that contribute to giving TC its transformative role. The analysis suggests that this result depends on the relationships established among the actors involved, which are conditioned not only by structural factors associated with the countries' diverse conditions (economic, technological, geostrategic position) but also by other ideational and strategic factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and the United States are among the most important external stakeholders in Africa’s peace, security, and prosperity. The African continent, with some of the world’s fastest-growing economies, an expanding consumer base, and an exploding youth population, has recently witnessed intensifying China-U.S. competition. In economic and trade terms, the United States is playing catch-up as Beijing has long ago overtaken Washington as the continent’s largest trading partner and investor. While China regards Africa’s adherence to the “One China” principle as the only political prerequisite for its engagement with the continent, the United States views greater democracy and rule of law in Africa as in the best interests of both. China’s security presence in Africa pales in comparison with that of the United States, as Washington boasts an extensive network of military bases on the continent while Beijing’s peace and security engagement mainly involves multilateral UN peacekeeping operations and bilateral security cooperation, such as arms sales and training programs. However, growing China-U.S. competition does not necessarily crowd out shared interests or preclude closer coordination in specific areas, for example, market development, infrastructure building, anti-piracy, health capacity-building, and so on. By fending off a senseless ideological contest, respecting each other’s core interests in Africa, accommodating Africans’ development aspirations and security concerns, Beijing and Washington can find more common ground than many believe.

Three major factors have made closer China-UK cooperation on African peace and security not only desirable but also feasible: expanding convergence of outlook and overlap of interests, the pan-African vision of peace and development as outlined in Agenda 2063, and the launch of a global comprehensive strategic partnership between Beijing and London. At the same time, the increasing securitization of Britain’s aid policy, Africans’ growing concern about unwarranted external intervention in continental affairs, and disparate development priorities may present significant challenges for closer trilateral coordination. The prospects of China-UK cooperation on African peace and security depend on whether Beijing and London can narrow differences, achieve policy alignment, and build a multilayered security cooperation mechanism. This article proposes three priorities where closer three-way coordination can contribute to African peace and security: a regularized China-UK-Africa peace dialogue, a development-centered approach to conflict prevention and response, and increased cooperation on nontraditional security risks.

Over the years, China has forged and mastered its own distinctive foreign aid practices as an emerging aid donor. China’s approach to foreign assistance has become highly appreciated as the country’s stature as a provider of economic assistance has matured. In 2013, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a leading component of China’s foreign policy and triggered a new round of policy reform in its foreign aid agenda. In Africa, China’s foreign assistance has kept in line with the policy of equal treatment. It has shared its development experience, helped many African countries to transition from “poor” to “developing”, from “aid recipients” to “wealth creators,” and many African countries are thus turning their interests from the West to the East. Certainly, the European Union as a traditional aid donor, remains the largest aid distributor in the world, especially in Africa. In other words, the EU’s foreign assistance has become an indispensable source of funding for many African countries. However, foreign aid effectiveness remains low on the African continent because of the absence of native African policymakers in aid programs designed and implemented by Beijing and Brussels. Some critics argue that Chinese and European assistance to Africa is not bringing about the best results as expected. This article argues that a new international architecture of foreign assistance through trilateral cooperation is needed to increase Chinese and European aid effectiveness in Africa. Trilateral cooperation will not only increase foreign assistance efficiency in Africa, but also give a chance to African countries to strengthen their own development capacity through assistance and guidance, reduce Africa’s aid dependence, and hopefully guarantee a smooth “graduation” of African countries from official development assistance.

In 2019, Trilateral Cooperation celebrated its 20th anniversary. As China, Japan and South Korea are close trade partners, economic cooperation is a focal point in Trilateral Cooperation. This paper endeavours to examine and explain China's approach towards the institutionalization of trilateral economic cooperation from 1999 to 2019. The findings indicate that China was supportive towards institutionalizing trilateral economic cooperation, but it was less proactive in recent years. This is explained by two factors, namely, (a) the declining economic interdependence between China and other member states and (b) the shift in China's regional strategy with the introduction of new regional initiatives by China, especially the Belt and Road Initiative. The findings of this study cast doubt on the critical juncture approach and the alternative explanation on balancing which perceives China's participation in Trilateral Cooperation primarily through the lens of Sino-US relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's foreign policy has attracted the attention of many parties. Various views emerged after knowing the spread of Chinese influence, especially in the Asia Pacific Region. Foreign aid is the main tool used by China to approach developing countries. The existence of China indirectly threatens old donor countries that have helped development in developing countries. This article is discussing the involvement of China with old donors such as New Zealand and Australia in trilateral aid cooperation in the Pacific. Trilateral cooperation involves old donor countries, recipient countries, and new donor countries, namely China. This research uses the approach of engagement concept through descriptive research and qualitative approaches with sources of literature study data from books, journals, research reports that support the final results of the analysis. Increasing Chinese aid in the Pacific is seen as a threat to old donor countries in the region. This attitude can indirectly inhibit China in articulating its interests in the Pacific. The results of this paper indicate that China uses engagement strategies through a trilateral assistance cooperation approach to change the behavior and views of old donors on the existence of China in the Pacific. China's role has succeeded in reducing the views and behavior of old donors who consider it as a threat. China also proves the success of exploring broader cooperation with countries in the Pacific.

By using Lowell Dittmer's game-theoretical analysis as a method, this article examines how North Korea's room to maneuver has been affected by Chinese-South Korean, Japan-ROK, and Sino-Japanese interactions, and how the DPRK sought to exploit the various conflicts between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul. Placing the period of 2012-2016 into historical context, it emphasizes that North Korea has consistently tried to hinder cooperation between South Korea and the other two Northeast Asian states by creating "romantic triangles." North Korean propaganda frequently highlighted local territorial disputes, Japanese historical revisionism, and the deployment of US missile defense batteries in South Korea, but it could also abruptly remove these issues from its agenda if Pyongyang's foreign policy underwent a shift. Still, the DPRK was not necessarily able to benefit from these disagreements, because a Japan-ROK conflict could reinforce China-ROK cooperation (or vice versa). In periods of inter-Korean confrontation, Pyongyang had less chance to take advantage of Sino-Japanese and Japan-ROK friction than in periods of North-South rapprochement. If China or Japan decided to confront Seoul, they could easily have found alternative partners that were more powerful and attractive than the DPRK (like Russia or the United States), which limited their readiness to engage a confrontational North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to assess the progress of the ROK--Japan security cooperation in recent years, both in the bilateral and trilateral framework involving the United States. It argues that the unprecedented progress in North Korea's nuclear program, along with a constant U.S. persuasion, led to a certain political convergence to allow and accompany the security cooperation. This said, political mistrust, asymmetric expectations and diverging perspectives still persist, explaining why the cooperation is mainly taking place within the trilateral framework. Nevertheless, the latest set of dialogue, exchanges and joint exercises did build up confidence and highlighted the benefit of an expanded cooperation while pushing the two countries to seriously consider the concrete issues, conditions and implications of such cooperation. The paper concludes that the recent progress in the security cooperation is still fragile and dependent on external factors, even if it is pointing to a greater understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The President of the China Xi Jinping announced the initiative "One Belt & One Road" in the world in 2013. This initiative is the Chinese foreign economic policy of the nearest 10 years. As part of this initiative, China has started to cooperate with many countries, including the countries of the Eurasian continent. In line with this, our country wants to cooperate with China in the framework of the initiative. Mongolia wants to become a transit country between Russia and China. Thus, the heads of the three countries agreed to create an "economic corridor". However, the question remains of what Mongolia is in a political and economic crisis can I participate in the initiative "One belt one way" and its railway modernized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Cuban relations have deepened rapidly since the beginning of the twenty-first century, propelled by both political ideology and economic interests. A shared commitment to socialism with “local characteristics” has enabled the pursuit of an unusually broad range of cooperative initiatives. These include Chinese investment in the Cuban nickel and oil sectors, educational and medical exchange programs, the development of tourism, and engagement with the Chinese diaspora on the island. Data from Chinese sources on these spheres of engagement reflect an attempt to address contemporary needs with a blend of state and market forces. The intensification of Sino-Cuban relations over the past decade poses no challenge to the United States; on the contrary, it opens new opportunities for trilateral cooperation.Las relaciones sino-cubanos se han profundizado rápidamente desde comienzos del siglo XXI, impulsadas tanto por ideología política como por intereses económicos. Un compromiso compartido al socialismo con “características locales” ha permitido la consecución de una gama inusualmente amplia de iniciativas cooperativas. Éstas incluyen la inversión china en sectores cubanos de níquel y petróleo, programas de intercambio educacionales y médicos, el fomento de turismo, y la interacción con la diáspora china en la isla. Datos de fuentes chinas sobre estos ámbitos de interacción reflejan un intento de abordar necesidades contemporáneas con una mezcla de fuerzas estatales y del mercado. La profundización de relaciones sino-cubanas en recientes décadas no presenta ningún desafío a los Estados Unidos; al contrario, abre nuevas oportunidades de cooperación trilateral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Optimising the development opportunities presented by emerging powers' growing interest in trade, investment and diplomatic engagement in Africa seems a priority for the continent in the context of a changing global system in which power is more diffuse. Taking into account a reconceptualisation of aid effectiveness as development effectiveness, this paper focuses on the manner in which African states understand and approach new opportunities for cooperation with emerging powers, especially China, India and Brazil, including the crucial issue of whether they seek joint development initiatives with both traditional partners and emerging powers. The central argument is that South–South cooperation, which is value-neutral although rhetorically reflecting the principles of solidarity and mutual benefit, must be part of an effective strategy to draw emerging economies into the national or regional development objectives of African states and the continent at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present highlights of the 11th Trilateral Conference of Scholars from Russia, India, and China, held in Beijing on November 15-16, 2011. The viability of the Russia-China-India format is emphasized, and new spheres and forms of increasing trilateral cooperation are listed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the impact of China's rise in Africa on the European Union (EU). Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that the EU's renewed interest in Africa is not the result of China's new assertiveness in the continent, but is a consequence of the EU's ambitions to become an influential global actor and the consequent search for a more coherent external policy. Africa, thus, represented an ideal venue in which different EU actors could simultaneously pursue traditional development goals together with new political objectives. Moreover, the existence of three competing visions within the EU negatively affected its ability to constructively engage with China: the European Commission sought to affirm the EU's aspiration to become an influential global actor; the European Parliament projected its preference for a value-based development policy, blended with paternalistic overtones; the Council of the European Union was driven more by the emotional reactions of some member states, who did not want to lose their position as Africa's main reference point. Unsurprisingly, the result has been a confused message, which China has found hard to follow, never mind Africa, since they were not effectively involved in the process and were sceptical about the whole idea of 'trilateral cooperation'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the immediate post-World War II era following independence, India as the second largest country in Asia played an active role as promoter of Asian regionalism. However, India's decision to pursue a policy of non-alignment in international relations was not well received by the West and also some ASEAN countries as that policy evidenced a pro-Soviet orientation during the Cold War (1947-91). In Southeast Asia, India's support for North Vietnam and its recognition of the Khmer Rouge regime of Heng Samrin in Cambodia did little to promote good relations between New Delhi and ASEAN. However, as the Cold War ended in the early 1990s and China's influence increased in Southeast Asia, India again realized ASEAN's importance in terms of politics, economy, and diplomacy, and consequently launched its "Look East" policy, the focus of which was how to become actively engaged in Southeast Asian affairs in the post-Cold War era. This article attempts to analyse India's Look East policy and its new strategies towards ASEAN. It examines the factors affecting India's post-Cold War policies towards ASEAN, the China factor in the changing relationship between India and ASEAN, and the India factor in Sino-ASEAN relations. It concludes with the suggestion that both these simultaneously rising powers, despite being rivals, can also become stakeholders or partners in ASEAN-led Southeast Asian regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initiated by a speech by the Japanese Prime Minister in 2002, an improved strategy for the creation, protection and use of intellectual property in the Japanese economy has rapidly evolved. The author outlines the major elements and achievements of the new strategy under five categories: (1) Creativity and inventiveness (e.g. facilitating technology transfer from universities to the private sector). (2)Protection (e.g. trilateral sharing of search and examination results, speedier examination, and the establishment of an IP high court). (3) Exploitation (e.g. widening the range of organisations allowed to assist SMEs). (4) Contents (mainly aspects of IP in the movie industry). (5) Cultivating human resources (e.g. increased emphasis on IP education in universities). Future work, in phase 2 through to 2009, in making Japan an ‘IP Rich Country’, will concentrate on building on these changes to integrate IP more fully into business growth. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Accurate forecasting of numbers of patent application filings is crucial for resource planning at the European Patent Office (EPO) and other patent offices. As a supranational office, the EPO usually attracts Subsequent Filings rather than the priority forming First Filings. This fact needs to be incorporated in forecasting models for EPO filings and a two stage mechanistic framework is proposed.The forecasting methods that have been used routinely at the EPO have been: trend analyses; a transfer model that uses First Filings as an indicator of EPO filings one year later; and regular surveys of applicants to determine their future intentions. Controlling Office (CO) carries out the basic forecasting exercise on an annual basis as an input to discussions on the formation of the EPO Budget.A Research Programme has been set up for the improvement of the patenting methodology. Five projects under the programme have achieved mixed degrees of success up to this stage. A new challenge for the forecasting team is to accommodate the need to make forecasts for each of 14 Joint Clusters, based on the different technical areas in which patent applications are made to the EPO.The EPO participates in a Trilateral Statistical Working Group (TSWG), together with representatives of the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). This group examines and compares forecasting techniques, and seeks to find models for world-wide patent application patterns across borders. The EPO also has a duty to review or participate in more general studies of the patenting system, in order to advise EPO management on strategic issues regarding the environment of patenting. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]