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The entire atmosphere created by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its presence in the world played one of the responsible roles, since after the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never used in a military situation (unless, of course, you take into account that the nuclear powers conducted more than 2,000 nuclear explosions at their test sites). It can be said that this is the result of a broad consensus reached by the international community on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the result of the actual operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons during its more than 50 years of existence. Currently, no bilateral or multilateral meeting on international security issues, including at the highest level, is held without a mention of nuclear non-proliferation, and it is often at the top of the agenda. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an international legal and ethical norm that has entered the minds of millions of people. Many countries have developed and adopted national legislation establishing export control rules for materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, as well as other laws (customs, etc.) to help ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Extensive training of young experts in basic knowledge to support the international non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons is ongoing. In the field of technology, scientists and experts in reactor engineering are working in many countries to build nuclear power plants that will not produce materials used to create weapons of mass destruction. Many scientists are working to prevent the construction of reactors that threaten the proliferation of technologies and nuclear materials capable of producing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime contributed to a fundamental change in the world’s attitude to nuclear weapons. From the first impression in the eyes of the world public that nuclear weapons are a «genius» discovery, the latter is increasingly perceived as a mortal danger that threatens human existence, and this idea penetrates deeper and deeper into the consciousness of millions of people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of all the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction of all types, the threats posed by nuclear weapons are the most devastating and far-reaching in their effects, because even limited use of such weapons anywhere in the world would have devastating economic, ecological and societal consequences in overall consequences. Addressing this danger requires a multifaceted approach. It was under this circumstance that the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became global and approached universality in terms of the number of participating countries. Regarding the issue of balance between the consensus model of decision-making and the institutional hierarchical structure of decisionmaking within the framework of the nuclear nonproliferation system, opponents and supporters of the concept of multilateralism in international relations believe that the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation system should be considered from opposite positions. The first perspective is based on the theory and practice of the Westphalian system of interaction between sovereign states, each of which seeks to survive or maximize its power in a world in which interstate relations are anarchic. From this perspective, nuclear nonproliferation is a purely national policy with its own goals, including disarmament. Therefore, the NPT is nothing more than a combination of political will and government commitments aimed at preventing or hindering the possibility of obtaining nuclear weapons by other states. However, the global nature of the threat of nuclear proliferation forces opponents of the concept of multilateralism to recognize the need for limited cooperation between states, mainly within the framework of non-binding agreements that only partially define national policy and often do not contain any provisions for collective enforcement measures. Therefore, for opponents of the concept of multilateralism, the NPT is a tool for promoting national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between the first regulatory and legal development of international nuclear law in 1957 and modern achievements, three main stages of this process can be distinguished. The first period of development of international nuclear law corresponds to the period of development of nuclear energy and guarantees of its peaceful use by all non-nuclear weapon states. This dual purpose was legally confirmed by the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. The first stage in the development of international nuclear law was complemented by a second growth phase aimed at increasing collective resilience to the dangers of nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and especially the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 triggered intense regulatory activity aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and better managing their consequences on an international scale. As a result, several international conventions have been adopted in this area: The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Between the first regulatory and legal development of international nuclear law in 1957 and modern achievements, three main stages of this process can be distinguished. The first period of development of international nuclear law corresponds to the period of development of nuclear energy and guarantees of its peaceful use by all non-nuclear weapon states. This dual purpose was legally confirmed by the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. The first stage in the development of international nuclear law was complemented by a second growth phase aimed at increasing collective resilience to the dangers of nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and especially the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 triggered intense regulatory activity aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and better managing their consequences on an international scale. As a result, several international conventions have been adopted in this area: The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Unlike the first-generation nuclear nonproliferation treaties, these norms do not violate the essential sovereignty of the states parties. By merging binding provisions and flexible legislation, a cooperative system was created for flexible and decentralized management of nuclear activities on an international scale. The third stage of the development of international nuclear law, in which we are currently located, is characterized by both negative and positive elements. On the negative side, there are problems that affect the effectiveness of international nuclear law. The most alarming issue in this area is the independence of nuclear regulatory authorities in several countries, although it is regulated by Article 8 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Article 20 of the Joint Convention on Nuclear Safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development and use of atomic energy represent one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century, opening new possibilities for global evolution. The United Nations (UN) has formulated the «Millennium Development Goals» and the «Sustainable Development Goals by 2030» to address comprehensive solutions to the social, economic, and environmental challenges facing the planet. In this context, nuclear energy offers unparalleled advantages, but it is essential to consider the risks and challenges associated with its future use and development. Nuclear law serves as a valuable tool for regulating the development of nuclear energy and overcoming these risks and challenges. All countries must strictly fulfill their international obligations, responsibly implement international legal instructions at the national level, and collectively support the international regime and legal framework organized around the United Nations. This, in turn, contributes to the achievement of the shared goal of «atoms for peace and development». The international legal framework on nuclear issues emerged alongside the development of nuclear energy worldwide. It evolves as social, economic, scientific, and technical challenges associated with this development are addressed, thereby contributing to the safe, secure, and sustainable development of peaceful nuclear energy use. The IAEA and the international community have established an almost universal regime of safeguards aimed at detecting and preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to the production of nuclear weapons. Based on the results of the conducted research, it has been established that each country not only has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but also bears the responsibility and obligation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to support nuclear safety and security. All countries should conscientiously fulfill their obligations in accordance with the international legal framework on nuclear safety, fully implement relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, strengthen and expand the existing international legal framework on nuclear safety, and provide institutional guarantees, adhering to universally defined guiding principles for managing international nuclear safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu is the property of Sveuciliste u Zagrebu, Pravni Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

International legal cooperation in the field of control over the export, transfer, transit of dual-use goods and technologies is based on a number of mechanisms of general competence (for example, the UN, WTO) and specific regimes, the core of which constitute international treaties on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention) and related multilateral export control groups (Zanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group). While the mentioned international treaties define the goals and basic principles of cooperation of their parties to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the critical task of intergovernmental export groups, capable of responding more promptly to security challenges in the light of technological progress and market dynamics, is to ensure the development and regular updating of lists of controlled goods, dissemination and exchange of best practices in this area, articulation of instructions for participating states regarding the strengthening of national export control systems. Such a structure, promoting transparency and responsible behaviour of states, objectively increases the level of international security, ensures more profound and comprehensive cooperation and interaction of participating states, regular exchange of information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, which leads to a consensus on the specifics of the implementation of export control systems and harmonisation of national policies and regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, taking into account the "softness" of obligations arising from the activities of specialised export groups, the effectiveness of the control mechanism depends on the goodwill of the participating states and their commitment to the values and goals of these regimes and is also complicated by the limited participation of individual actors (for instance, India, Pakistan, North Korea, etc.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kazakhstan's foreign policy projects make a significant contribution to strengthening regional and global security. Efficient consultative mechanisms have been created through the ministries of defense, law enforcement agencies, judicial authorities, with the help of which the participating states consult and coordinate actions on regional issues and international issues, provide mutual support to each other and establish close cooperation on major international and regional issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Internacional is the property of Asociacion Espanola de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales (AEPDIRI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Treaties can be denounced and withdrawn from unilaterally and collectively. We ask when it would be legitimate to abandon the NPT, a treaty that 50 years ago committed states to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, but still has not delivered on the latter. The end of the NPT is a taboo subject in the arms control community that sees it as the cornerstone of the nuclear order. We draw on literature on the legitimacy of and exit from international institutions. We especially explore the political substance of the discontent that the non-nuclear weapons states have expressed in and outside the NPT forum. Exiting the NPT can legitimately be used as a political tool to challenge the current status quo where five states claim a right to possess nuclear weapons based on the NPT, and to achieve a nuclear order where nuclear weapons are illegal for all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced a serious threat only a few years after it came into force in 1970. India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) in May 1974 rocked the nuclear-nonproliferation regime and cast doubt on the prospects of the NPT. Yet during the two years following the PNE, several significant countries ratified the treaty. Why did states that had been notable holdouts, like Italy, Japan, and South Korea, ratify the treaty soon after the Indian nuclear test? This article finds that the PNE galvanized pro-NPT forces in the United States and Canada, leading to changes in nonproliferation policy. In particular, it led them to threaten to withhold access to nuclear technology and materials unless the holdouts ratified the NPT. It also motivated Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to change his secret advice to Japan that the United States did not want Japan to ratify the NPT in order to keep the People's Republic of China unsure about Japan's nuclear intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the final years of South Africa's nuclear-weapon program, particularly on the decision-making process leading up to the signature of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the South African government in 1991. In August 1988, after two decades of defiance, negotiations between the apartheid government and the NPT depository powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) ensued at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Despite South Africa being the only state to give up its indigenously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently join the nonproliferation regime, little is known about how the national position on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards evolved. Research carried out in multiple archives using hitherto untapped primary sources and interviews with key actors from several countries show how domestic and regional political dynamics influenced Pretoria's position on entering the nonproliferation regime. In the process, the F.W. de Klerk government managed to skillfully exploit international proliferation fears to advance its own agenda, thereby connecting South African NPT accession with that of the neighboring Frontline States coalition of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1995, South Africa was in a special position. It was: a new party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the first country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, led by a charismatic leader, and seen as a champion of disarmament principles. Yet South Africa's new leaders were also interested in affirming their position within the Non-Aligned Movement, which was adamantly opposed to the NPT's indefinite extension. Why, then, did South Africa decide to support the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995? Existing scholarship has ascribed too much credit to pressure from the United States, overlooking domestic debates in South Africa and the bifurcation between professional diplomats and political elites. This article, building on new archival sources and in-depth oral-history interviews with major actors, demonstrates that South African diplomats opposed indefinite extension while South African policy elites allocated little attention to the topic until late in the game. The findings contribute to our understanding of South Africa's norm entrepreneurship, as well as the politics of global nonproliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the nuclear nonproliferation norm (NNPN) is a social fact with a relatively independent life of its own and that it has a powerful impact on the behavior of both nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). It challenges the application of critical constructivist research on norms to the NNPN and the idea that its legitimacy and structural power depend on contestation "all the way down." State and non-state actors play an important role in explaining the dynamics of the NNPN, but agential constructivism runs the danger of "throwing the baby out with the bath water," neglecting the structural impact of the NNPN on state behavior. The article examines the limitations of norm-contestation theory, arguing that some norms are more resistant to contestation than others. The NNPN is more difficult to contest than new norms (such as the Responsibility to Protect) because it is rooted in fifty years of nonproliferation nuclear diplomacy. The US-India nuclear deal is not a case of "norm change" but a violation of the NNPN. The "core" of the NNPN has not changed since the US-India nuclear deal. The conflict confronting NWS and NNWS is about the implementation of "type 2" norms (organizing principles) and "type 3" norms (standardized procedures), and not about the "hard core" of the NNPN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On July 7, 2017, the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons concluded with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which opened for signatures at the United Nations General Assembly two months later, on September 20. The nuclear-weapon states and their allies boycotted the negotiations with the sole exception of the Netherlands, which not only is a member of NATO, but also hosts US nuclear weapons on its territory. Domestic pressure and political traditions had significant effects on the Dutch government's decision to participate in the ban negotiations. The Netherlands negotiated in good faith, but its multilateralism and humanitarian considerations could not tip the scales in favor of joining the ban treaty. The government's commitment to a "step-by-step" approach to nuclear disarmament and maintenance of close cooperation with NATO determined the Dutch position on the new instrument. Despite staying outside the TPNW, the Dutch government shares the goal of nuclear-weapons elimination. This article also suggests a number of actions the Netherlands could take to advance nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) rejects the argument of those opposed to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that the treaty undermines the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This viewpoint is based upon Ambassador Soares's statement to the conference, "Regional Consultations on the NPT: Towards the 2018 PrepCom," held in Mexico City, February 15, 2018. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically reviews scholarship on the role of conflict and cooperation in conditioning nuclear proliferation. We start by laying out the trajectory of scholarship on the causes of proliferation, organizing it in three waves: ( a) security and ( b) nonsecurity drivers of proliferation, and ( c) supply constraints on nuclear acquisition. We then examine the recent turn in the proliferation literature toward a strategic interaction approach, focusing on how conflict and cooperation between proliferators, their adversaries, and their allies shape the spread of nuclear weapons. We argue for an integrated framework for analyzing the tools states can deploy to foster or stymie proliferation. Finally, we sketch an agenda for research on nuclear proliferation. Here, we argue that scholarship should ( a) incorporate nonsecurity dynamics into the strategic interaction approach to the study of proliferation and ( b) combine rigorous theory with careful historical research to further our understanding of the causes of proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature usually portrays Brazil as a country that set out to build nuclear weapons but ended up “rolling back” its original plans while keeping a nuclear “hedge” for an uncertain future, evidenced by Brazil's investment in uranium enrichment and its commitment to building a nuclear-powered submarine. This article draws on the historical record to offer a more nuanced view of Brazil's nuclear intentions as they evolved. It also focuses on the role of external pressure—mostly from Argentina and the United States—in shaping those motivations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a unique bilateral nonproliferation regime created by Brazil and Argentina after a long process of negotiations and confidence building. The creation of the agency in July 1991 marked a paradigmatic shift in the Brazilian-Argentine relationship, converting their long rivalry into a profound strategic partnership. This article presents a historical overview of the creation of ABACC and discusses how it paved the way for the integration of Brazil and Argentina into the nonproliferation regime. The article also shows how ABACC tackled nonproliferation challenges in the twenty-first century, helping Brazil and Argentina continue their nuclear programs with fewer risks to the autonomy and development goals traditionally defended in their foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the historical relations between Brazil and the international nonproliferation regime. It also discusses the current position of the Brazilian government regarding the Additional Protocol and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as some aspects of the Brazilian nuclear program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the tenure of the Workers' Party (2003–16), we appraise the tensions between the Brazilian government and international nuclear governance mechanisms after the end of the Cold War. We examine three main dimensions of Brazilian nuclear policy: the search for autonomy and the affirmation of sovereignty, the economic-development rationale, and the security aspect. We present an interpretation of Brazilian nuclear policy within its broader cultural setting and the framing of foreign policy and international relations as defined by the ruling elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), a site of several nuclear weapon tests for 12 years and a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), brought a lawsuit against all nuclear-weapon states [United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (DPRK)], before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in April 2014. The applications are based on the violation of article VI of the NPT and the customary international law. The RMI requested the Court to order to the five nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT to take, within one year of the judgment, all steps necessary to comply with those obligations assumed under the treaty, including the pursuit by initiation, if necessary, of negotiations in good faith aimed at the conclusion, by all nuclear-weapon states, of a convention on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international supervision and control. This paper presents an analysis of this case and its legal consequences for all nuclearweapon states, including the ICJ jurisdiction in each petition, the position of each of the NPT nuclear-weapon states in the field of nuclear disarmament, and its effects on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the political and strategic consequences of nuclear deployments overseas? The United States continues to maintain around 200 nuclear warheads in Europe, and some observers have called for the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. This article reviews the insights from recent research on the effects of foreign-deployed nuclear weapons. It asks two central questions. First, does the evidence support the view that foreign nuclear deployments contribute to deterrence? Second, do these deployments strengthen or undermine the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? The evidence suggests that foreign nuclear deployments contribute less to deterrence than previously believed. Further, nuclear deployments probably have mixed effects on proliferation. Unanswered questions for further research include the extent to which nuclear-sharing arrangements reassure allies, and the political and strategic consequences of canceling them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa had active nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs during the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapon program prior to its 1991 accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Similarly, it terminated its chemical weapons program prior to its 1995 ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Only the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program was subjected to international verification—albeitex post facto—following a 1993 decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference to verify the correctness and completeness of South Africa's declarations under its NPT safeguards agreement. During the 1980s, South Africa also developed and purportedly used biological weapons, violating its obligations under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which it had ratified in 1975. This article draws lessons from the verification of the dismantlement of these programs and makes recommendations for future verification work to confirm the elimination of weapons of mass destruction capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There have been calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons from the day they were invented. Over the last fifteen years, some indications can be found that such calls have been getting louder, among them Barack Obama's famous 2009 speech in Prague. In this article, we investigate if support for a comprehensive norm that would prohibit development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons is really growing. To assess the current status of that norm, we use the model of a “norm life cycle,” developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. We then analyze 6,545 diplomatic statements from the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as from the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, covering the years 2000 to 2013. The evidence shows that a comprehensive prohibition can be considered an emerging international norm that finds growing support among states without nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon states alike. Only a core group of states invoke the norm consistently, however. This leads us to conclude that the “tipping point” of the life cycle, at which adherence to a new norm starts to spread rapidly, has yet to be reached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]