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This paper provides a novel reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This reconstruction relies on two main contentions: first, that Kant accepts the then-ubiquitous view that all cognition is either from grounds or consequences, a view he props up by drawing a distinction between logical and real grounds; second, that Kant, like most of his contemporaries, holds that our representations are the most immediate grounds of our cognition. By stressing these elements, the most threatening objection to Kant’s argument can be avoided, namely, the claim that Kant ignores the possibility that our representations of space and time are subjective in origin, but objective as regards their applicability. My reconstruction shows that this so-called neglected alternative objection is based on a conceptual confusion about the nature of a priori cognition.

In this commentary, I scrutinize Coeckelbergh’s criticism of postphenomenology, and question whether postphenomenology indeed tends to neglect the social dimension of technology use (ontic), and must necessarily be conceived as being in opposition to transcendental philosophy (ontological). Second, I suggest that the Wittgensteinian concepts that Coeckelbergh introduces are interesting additions to the concepts used in postphenomenology, but that his use of the term “transcendental” seems up to now primarily to be a rhetorical means enabling him to distance himself from postphenomenology.

This paper will be divided in Three topics: “I. The antinomic conflicts of reason with itself”, “II. Reconstruction of the arguments of the Third Antinomy and of the critical solution” and “III. Transcendental Freedom and Practical Freedom”. The first will argue of what consists the antinomic problem. The second is about the third antinomic problem and the critical solution given by Kant. Last but not least, the third will present a discussion between Kant and Schopenhauer, underlining the reason why Schopenhauer’s solution to the Third Antinomy should be refused, and Kant’s solution should not.

In this paper, I discuss an alternative conception of internalism and externalism for transcendental phenomenology. Recent debates of internalism and externalism in phenomenology start from familiar notions of internalism and externalism about content. This, I believe, is an unhappy match: internalism and externalism in common philosophical usage are perspectives on representational content; yet phenomenology deals with intentionality, which is not primarily representational. I argue that phenomenology is better served by understanding the distinction between internalism and externalism as a distinction about constitution. Drawing on Kant and Davidson for inspiration, I explore varieties of this alternative—transcendental—understanding of internalism and externalism in the classical phenomenological literature. I conclude with a suggestion on how this alternative conception of internalism and externalism could be put to use. As its founders noted, phenomenology occupies an uneasy place between idealism and realism because idealism and realism are metaphysical positions with distinctive ontological commitments; yet phenomenology purports to examine structures of subjectivity without committing to any specific ontology. To this day, the phenomenological literature is divided on whether this is a weakness or strength. Siding with the latter view, I suggest that transcendental internalism and transcendental externalism allow us to explain, and potentially to challenge, ontological commitments such as those of transcendental idealism and eliminative materialism.

This paper is devoted to studying the transcendental directions of entire solutions of $ f^{(n)}+A_{n-1}f^{(n-1)}+...+A_0f = 0 $, where $ n(\geq 2) $ is an integer and $ A_i(z)(i = 0, 1, ..., n-1) $ are entire functions of finite lower order. With some additional conditions, the set of common transcendental directions of non-trivial solutions, their derivatives and their primitives must have a definite range of measure. Moreover, we obtain the lower bound of the measure of the set defined by the common transcendental directions of Jackson difference operator of non-trivial solutions.

This paper examines the astonishing parallels in the depictions of childhood experience in the works of Polish writer Bruno Schulz and German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, which so far have not received any attention in research. For both authors, the experience of the child−be it autobiographically remembered as in Adorno, or fantastically transformed as in Schulz−bears the characteristics of transcendental experience manifest in everyday life. As similar as the childhood images and scenes in Schulz and Adorno might be, their significance points in two different directions. While for Schulz, the experience of the child leads back to an original meaning of things and thus to myth, for Adorno, it points to the conditions of a new order and thus to utopia.

Legal aid in Indonesia, especially in terms of access to justice, legal aid provided by the state to the people still relies on positive law. The law governing legal aid in Indonesia still revolves around the number of cases and the budget absorption target given to legal aid institutions that have been verified and accredited by the state for people/groups in need. Verification and Accreditation from the state with the parameters written in the law prevent those who need legal assistance if they are not categorized as poor. The requirement of the poor to access legal aid implies that access to legal aid for everyone in conflict is far from fair. Access to legal aid is very important because the goal of law is justice. In addition, legal aid aims to provide justice for those who do not have legal knowledge, in other words, are blind to the law. Justice for all is the pulse of legal aid that cannot be separated from the right to legal aid for those in need. Legal aid can be managed by the community, legal aid institutions/institutions that should provide access to those who need legal assistance and those in dispute, both poor and rich, so that justice for all is achieved. This study discusses the transcendental dimensions of legal aid. This study uses a descriptive research method that aims to analyze legal aid from aid agencies seen from the study of legal philosophy and legal aid with a transcendental dimension.

The author analyzes the difference between the transcendental ego and the transcendental I in Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological egology. The concept of the I is one of the central ones in Husserl’s philosophy. It has been exhaustively worked upon and, in development of which, several different standpoints have been changed, from the nonegological to the egologically solipsistic. The most mature formulation can be found in Husserl’s final works, in which an important “shift” happens, from the pure I to the transcendental ego. It is argued that this change isn’t simply terminological, but conceptual. In the light of the difference between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, and corresponding phenomenological reduction and transcendental reduction respectively, the pure I (or I-pole) is still seen as something individual, private and psychological, and too “empty”, that needs to be overcome by a wider notion of transcendental ego that incorporates systems of intentionality, a (constituted) surrounding world, constituted intentional objectivities, habitualities, and intentional life – all without which ego couldn’t be concrete. In this part, Husserl explicates that transcendental ego is equivalent to the soul (psyche) in psychological parallel, and not to the I. Therefore, it is implied that the ego can grasp itself in two ways, as a flowing life and as an I, identical and active subject of consciousness. This, in turn, implies two different ways of constituting ego for itself – in its history of the egological genesis and, at the same time, as being one and the same I for itself. The last chapter will differentiate between two ways of defining transcendental I. According to one, the ego of epoche, which is not declinable, becomes an I, “one” transcendental I among others in transcendental intersubjectivity. The second one is, what we term, a pure-transcendental I, the I-pole of transcendental ego; the consequence of which is the necessity of original (pre-reflective) self-givenness, irrelevant of intersubjectivity. This I is then understood as the irreducible first-person point of view of consciousness, and the bearer of a character of Nunc stans. As always-subject, it itself is then unchangeable, nonpermutable, and indeclinable. Because of its emptiness, the I-pole or pure-transcendental I cannot be made concrete like the concrete-transcendental ego; and yet, precisely this I is the one that can distance itself from itself and phenomenologically investigate the transcendental ego, subjectivity, and eidos ego as the subject of transcendental reduction. In the footsteps of Ingarden’s and Fink’s critique of the subject of transcendental investigation, the transcendental-phenomenological on-looker, it will be shown that the pure-transcendental I is the phenomenologizing I, the I of the disinterested spectator, through which the transcendental subjectivity comes to itself. That I remains the same through all reductions and attitudes, through all constitutions of essential types of eidos ego, and is the ineliminable subject originally pregiven for itself as an object in original I-splitting.

The authors consider faith as a direct way to form spirituality of an individual and nation on the whole, as our main moral wealth. This problem is especially relevant in the modern world, since the most important words for national consciousness are now devaluating. The purpose of the research is to prove that the language, namely the word , has resources for creating and accumulating the spiritual potential of the native speaker. The research has been carried on the material of the Bible and the National Corpus of the Russian language (a subcorpus of literary texts published after 1950). The authors used the following research methods: the traditional general scientific methods of analysis, comparison, generalization and the new one - discourse analysis. In the course of the research two aspects of the indicated problem have been considered: the language is a spiritual essence; the word is a barometer of our understanding of the world. The study resulted in the following conclusions: the primary and the most important function of the language is the function of communication with God; the spirituality of the Russian people is formed and preserved thanks to the language, because the language contains deep transcendental meanings, almost inaccessible for rational comprehension. These meanings create and retain spirituality in the society and the individual, form the spiritual code of the nation; fulfil the sacred function of communication with God; reveals the great mystery of the world and the human soul at the same time. These provisions allow to outline the prospects for the future research within the framework of a new stage of the anthropocentric paradigm, which brings it closer to the theo-anthropo-cosmic paradigm as the paradigm of the future. In it, an individual begins to realize his place not above the world, but inside it.

Review of Laywine, A. (2020). Kant's Transcendental Deduction. A Cosmology of Experience. Oxford, University Press.

This paper investigates the relationship between James’ radical empiricism and Deleuze’s study of the genesis of sense without a transcendental subject as necessary condition. It shows that James’ concept of pure experience changes the form of relation between mind and world. Considering how to conceptualize experience without a fixed metaphysical or transcendental subject destabilizes ontological identity, leads to a founding conceptual divergence from traditional phenomenology, and motivates Deleuze’s efforts towards transcendental empiricism. The paper reads Deleuze’s work on the genesis of sense in this context, arguing that one important result is an ontological pluralism. Such pluralism is crucial in considering how meaning can be made between and across differences and is in keeping with radical empiricism’s openness to life’s complexity.

La migración venezolana ha sido un tema fundamental en la agenda política colombiana de los últimos años. Alrededor de este fenómeno han surgido diversos discursos, muchos de ellos producidos y reproducidos por los medios de comunicación, pues estos ocupan un papel clave en la lucha por la construcción de representaciones del mundo. Los discursos mediáticos suelen apelar a la evocación de emociones, ya que estas son trascendentales para generar marcos de interpretación y acción dentro de los esquemas mentales de los sujetos, lo cual las convierte en una herramienta idónea para el ejercicio del poder. Este texto pretende evidenciar, por medio del análisis de 48 noticias y reportes del periódico más leído en Colombia, El Tiempo, la forma como se suscitó la emocionalidad para la construcción discursiva sobre de la migración y las personas migrantes entre los años 2018 y 2019; periodo en el que creció exponencialmente el flujo de inmigrantes.

In this paper, we study on the existence of transcendental entire solutions of certain non-linear generalized delay-differential equations. In this respect we have improved a recent result of Wang et al. (Turk J Math 43:941–954, 2019). Also at the time of investigating the solutions of shift equations we have improved as well as extended an earlier result due to Latreuch (Mediterr J Math 14:1–16, 2017). A handful number of examples have been exhibited by us relevant to the content of the paper to show that each case as demonstrated in the conclusions of the theorems actually occurs. At last we raise a question for future investigations.

Nesse texto, na tentativa de compreensão do conceito metodológico de autodiscernimento encontrado na filosofia proposta por Abraham Joshua Heschel, objetivamos atentar para a sua compreensão do conceito de “Homem”, uma vez que o autodiscernimento pressupõe o homem que procura a sua essência transcendental. E mais ainda, para Heschel, a filosofia tem a função de analisar a religião como responsável pelas respostas fundamentais do homem, quando a religião deixa de fazer isso, ou ela se tornou ineficaz ou o homem moderno se tornou animalizado, indiscernido. Estrutura-se, pois, o fenômeno do Eclipse de Deus na modernidade. Inventariar tais matizes filosóficos à luz de Abraham Joshua Heschel torna-se o desafio por nós proposto na senda sequencial deste artigo.

The article addresses Giorgio Agamben’s critical commentary on the global governance of the Covid-19 pandemic as a paradigm of his political thought. While Agamben’s comments have been criticized as exaggerated and conspiratorial, they arise from the conceptual constellation that he has developed starting from the first volume of his Homo Sacer series. At the centre of this constellation is the relation between the concepts of sovereign power and bare life, whose articulation in the figure of homo sacer Agamben traces from the Antiquity to the present. We shall demonstrate that any such articulation is impossible due to the belonging of these concepts to different planes, respectively empirical and transcendental, which Agamben brings together in a problematic fashion. His account of the sovereign state of exception collapses a plurality of empirical states of exception into a zone of indistinction between different exceptional states and the normal state and then elevates this very indistinction to the transcendental condition of intelligibility of politics as such. Conversely, the notion of bare life, originally posited as the transcendental condition of possibility of positive forms of life, is recast as an empirical figure, whose sole form is the absence of form. We conclude that this problematic articulation should be abandoned for a theory that rather highlights the non-relation between sovereign power and bare life, which conditions the possibility of resistance and transformation that remains obscure in Agamben’s thought.

In this contribution I reply to Heather Wiltse and Roisin Lally’s commentaries. Both stress the importance of not only looking at gaps, but also accounting for relation and connection—an endeavor which was less visible in my original piece but which I wholly support, and on which I elaborate more here, making use of the example of ‘algorithmic mediation.’ In the process, I attempt to clear up some possible misunderstandings with regard to my initial formulations, as concerns object-oriented ontology’s stance on relation, the question of whether postphenomenology already has a ‘transcendental’ account, the variety of possible connotations associated with the term ‘transcendental,’ and my proposals for looking specifically at what happens in between ‘small’ (‘technology with a small “t”’) and ‘big’ (‘Technology with a capital “T”’) perspectives. It turns out that my commentators and I are pretty much on a similar track—though we may differ in the first instance as to the conceptual instruments we would choose to deploy in that, nonetheless shared, project.