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Related Articles This research employs the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to examine two coalitions of U.S. foreign policy during the early part of Barack Obama's presidency when U.S. policy shifted from leading multilateral security operations with European allies to catalyzing others to lead. It identifies the primary members of two coalitions, the Democratic Interventionists and the Pragmatic Realists, who held differing beliefs about U.S. foreign policy. I investigate the beliefs of the members of these coalitions regarding the U.S. role in multilateral security operations, the policy preferences that emerge from those beliefs, the many strategies employed to ensure the adoption of their policy preferences, and the impact of the implemented policy. The ACF facilitates consideration of the strategy, means, and settings that the Pragmatic Realist coalition used to win the policy debate in the Obama administration. This article further provides a greater understanding of the circumstances that support U.S. multilateralism.Dolan, Chris J. 2008. “The Shape of Elite Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1992 to 2004.” Politics & Policy 36(4): 542–85. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2007.00121.x/abstract.Haar, Roberta N., and Lutz F. Krebs. 2021. “The Failure of Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in the Trump Administration.” Politics & Policy 49(2): 446–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12399.Lasher, Kevin J., and Christine Sixta Rinehart. 2016. “The Shadowboxer: The Obama Administration and Foreign Policy Grand Strategy.” Politics & Policy 44(5): 850–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12175. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformative nature and accelerating pace of development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies have generated frenzied political debate and urgent calls for regulation. The European Union's (EU) AI Act is one of the earliest, most ambitious, legally binding efforts to regulate high-risk AI systems. This article argues that the thrust of the EU's focus on 'ethical and secure' AI and its first-mover regulatory status have helped to foster transatlantic cooperation on AI governance. To probe this assertion, the article analyzes the ethical underpinnings and key provisions of the AI Act and compares them to policy developments in the United States. The analysis provides preliminary evidence of policy similarities across the Atlantic from an alignment of ethical concerns to a shared understanding of the risks and associated need for common guidelines and standards in the AI sector. Tracing agreements within the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) suggests further cooperation and relative congruence in the EU and US approaches to AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the European Commission continue to sign onto unstable international data flow agreements with the United States? After two agreements were struck down by the European Court of Justice, and clear signals that a new one could meet a similar fate, the European Commission agreed to the Data Privacy Framework. To make sense of this behavior, we connect traditional work on veto points with work on historical institutionalism to highlight an international negotiation strategy – running out the clock. While traditional veto points literature suggests multiple institutions with varying preferences will limit the set of potential policies or their adoption, we highlight how these dynamics change when considering veto points in time. We showcase our argument by building three historical narratives detailing the negotiation of the successive data flow agreements. Our findings have important implications for the future of the transatlantic privacy regime as well as negotiation dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the scope and evolution of the European transatlantic policy with the United States of America (USA). Our research questions are related to the number and content of the texts adopted by the European Parliament (EP) and the role of the EP and its Committees in shaping the European transatlantic policies. We examine which are the committees that lead and guide the EP transatlantic conclusions. Within this context, this research paper highlights the substance of the European Union (EU) and the USA relations over the last 25 years and the major areas in which the EU cooperates with the USA. We have built our research on the European Parliament since it has legislative authority in shaping and guiding EU’s external policy. Therefore, our study brings a new perspective to the current literature on transatlantic relations by assessing the EU-USA relations from the EP conclusions and adopted legal texts. A document and policy analysis are conducted between 1999 and 2024, to assess each of the last five Parliamentary Terms and through the entire current EU laws in force. We conclude that despite studies asserting the weakening of the EU-USA relations, EU’s relations have been consistent since 1999 and even increasing in the last decade, from technical and legal achievement, based on the quantitative and contentive analysis of our research.

The article deals with Turkey's trust in the USA as its most important ally in NATO. Semi-structured interviews with Turkish academics and international relations experts during field research identified three main areas of Turkish mistrust in the USA – the Cyprus question, USA support for the PYD/YPG in Syria, and USA intervention in Turkish politics. The research results presented in the causal network show that the main cause of Turkish mistrust towards the USA is the factors leading to the phenomenon of fear of abandonment. That causes Turkey's increased need for independence from strategic partners and the subsequent increase in the application of a balance policy. The study concludes that one of the main reasons for Turkey's current attitude towards NATO is the need to ensure its security, and this need stems from Turkey's mistrust of the USA.

With the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016, the transatlantic relations entered a renewed period of crisis. The former US administration challenged key international norms at the core of the EU's identity – thereby testing the EU's ability to rethink its position in the world. Against this background, studies have attempted to analyse the EU's response vis-à-vis the US mainly from a realist and socio-psychological perspectives. Yet little attention has been given to the crucial emotional component underlying the EU's response – related to EU's recognition needs. Therefore, this article proposes to analyse the transatlantic crisis under the Trump administration through the lens of recognition theories and emotions in IR. Based on the emotion discourse analysis of public statements, it shows that dynamics of misrecognition and re-affirmation of identity have been at play in this recent crisis fuelled by the powerful emotion of contempt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: The opening of the Congress Hall in Berlin-Tiergarten in 1957 took place during the heyday of the Cold War. Designed by American architect Hugh Stubbins, the building became a focal point in East–West confrontations. Against this backdrop, the article explores the role of architecture in national soft power by taking the example of the Berlin Congress Hall. Commencing with a discussion of architecture as a component of soft power along five criteria, it goes on to examine the planning of the Congress Hall and the significance of its unique design vocabulary. The article concludes that the building, strategically located near the sector borders separating East and West, represents a concrete embodiment of US soft power. Although not an official representational building, the Congress Hall has thus served as a political, cultural and ideational 'embassy' of the United States and a major building block in German–American relations up to the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point in European security policy. Defense concepts have been altered within Europe as well as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Russia is no longer seen as a European partner, but a threat to security and stability in Europe. The article argues that the term Zeitenwende coined by the German chancellor is not a rhetorical figure; rather, it is reshaping Germany's approach to the East and upended German and European Ostpolitik. In fact, the new foreign policy direction sheds illusions of both the classic Ostpolitik of the Cold War and the new Ostpolitik of post-unification Germany by introducing a fundamentally different approach to Eastern and Central Eastern Europe and within NATO. The article explores the critical juncture created by the Zeitenwende of 2022 and its implications for European security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractRussia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is not an accident but an inevitable consequence of how the West, especially the US, has utilised NATO in the post-Cold War period. This encompasses the activities which the US has supported NATO to pursue in the last 30 years: transformation, expansion, and participation in “out of area” actions. However, the US has never found it easy to help NATO remain the leading security organisation in Europe, not only because of threats posed by outside actors like Russia but also the mounting internal challenges, especially the long-standing issue of a “two-tiered” alliance. Washington has already shown reluctance to utilise NATO in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and now Ukraine to varying degrees. This paper seeks to understand why the US has remained committed to NATO and how the future US-NATO relationship will likely fare, including whether the Ukraine crisis can inject new life into the Alliance. It is believed that in the current context of uncertainty posed by NATO’s “Smart Defence” and the US “Pivot to Asia”, it seems highly likely that unless something changes, NATO will end up just doing less with less.

This article explains a dominant, curious and important pattern that emerges from our original data on 11 areas of financial regulation in the United States and the European Union from the Great Financial Crisis to 2020: sustained regulatory stringency in both jurisdictions. Our novel explanation, rooted in theories about international economic interdependence, temporal process and market power, emphasizes cross-border interactions that arose from a build-up of ‘border-policing’ capacities. Our medium-n study, which combines congruence analysis and process tracing, reveals a causal mechanism – ‘joint reinforcement’ – whereby the potential penalties imposed by one of the two jurisdictions prevent or temper the other from watering down-regulation. The study pushes the boundaries of qualitative research, advances theory and speaks to debates about global public goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politologija is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2016 the Visegrad states' political representatives were seemingly more comfortable with the election of Donald Trump than their Western EU counterparts. Though this geographical rift among EU members in accepting the Trump administration can be viewed partly through ideological proximity of contemporary Visegrad governments to the Trump agenda, this article argues that the matter should be analyzed through the prism of status enhancement. The V4 states are still perceived as new members and even "junior partners" within the Transatlantic community, burdened with the post-communist semi-peripheral position in the global economy, and have felt deprived of attention from their most significant peer partner—the US—during previous presidential administrations. The Trump administration presented a unique window of opportunity for the Visegrad states to remind the USA of their persisting partnership and contribution to the survival of the Transatlantic community through various substantive initiatives. On the case of status-enhancing behavior of the Visegrad states during the Trump presidency, the paper introduces three attention-seeking mechanisms—agenda co-option, ideational alignment and partnership concessions—employed by the respective governments. The paper argues that the V4 states individually sought attention from the Trump administration, which hence served as a social reinforcer of their relevance and worth for the Transatlantic club, but also as part of domestic political legitimation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there were many disagreements in transatlantic relations before the COVIC-19, the pandemic accelerated tensions in transatlantic relations even more. The inauguration of the new US president Joe Biden, however, has been perceived as a new chapter in transatlantic relations. The paper aims to assess the COVID-19 pandemic implications to transatlantic relations and answer the question of whether the pandemic has strengthened or weakened the transatlantic security community? The paper stems from the idea that transatlantic countries compose a transatlantic security community. It examines the COVID-19 implications to several tiers of features that should be present in every security community: namely, implications to the perception of threats, patterns of communication and policy coordination, as well as to institutional framework. The paper argues that COVID-19 has not transformed the transatlantic security community; however, it highlighted certain problematic aspects of transatlantic relations.

Failed humanitarian projects provide us with an opportunity to shed light on the complex interactions and conflicts among international donors, humanitarian workers and local recipients. This article explores such a contested and terminated project in post-First World War Belgium. The Child Health Section (1922–24) was a US international development programme initiated by Herbert Hoover and the Commission for Relief in Belgium Educational Foundation. Its aim was to provide health education to school children. Despite reaching 113,136 Belgian children between the ages of six and 12 in 1221 schools across the country, the project was abruptly discontinued after only one year. This contribution examines why the development assistance programme failed by using a micro-historical approach combined with concepts from development studies. The well-kept records of the CHS on the enduring conflicts with Belgian administrations reveal how US assumptions about their role in transforming or modernizing Europe clashed with (the diverse) European views on their own post-war reconstruction. This case demonstrates that the shift from providing short-term, needs-based humanitarian assistance to investing in long-term international development assistance did not always go smoothly or uncontested in post-war Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thanks to its innovative supranational features, the European Coal and Steel Community is widely recognized as the cornerstone of the European integration process. This article offers an alternative history of the European Coal and Steel Community's origins by highlighting the role of transnational expertise and public diplomacy. More precisely, this study seeks to demonstrate that the policies carried out by Jean Monnet, the mastermind of European Coal and Steel Community's blueprint, originated from the plans elaborated by the New York-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations. While advising the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the Council on Foreign Relations formed a policy network with European policymakers sharing similar political values and goals. Although the interactions between these figures have never been studied, new findings reveal that the Council on Foreign Relations–Monnet partnership proved instrumental in improving inter-Allied coordination, managing postwar recovery and framing the idea of European unity. Eventually, the Council on Foreign Relations helped Monnet to define, adjust and promote the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty draft. In this perspective, the foundation of the first European institution derived from a long-term strategic design rooted in wartime planning and transatlantic diplomatic exchanges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the place of Equatorial Guinea in US-Spanish relations during the final years of the Franco dictatorship and the transition to democracy that followed. It analyses the relationship between US policies toward both countries, explores the degree to which fears of communism and other concerns overlapped and affected one another, and shows how US diplomats internalised Spanish perceptions of Spain’s former colony, thereby influencing US policy toward West Central Africa. The article also helps to decentre the history of the Spanish transition to democracy and the role of the United States therein. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public diplomacy is one of the key foreign policy instruments of the European Union for strengthening its international stance. In that regard, Brussels pays special attention to ensuring trust-based relations with the United States, which traditionally acts as the EU’s leading trade and military partner. The apparent cooling in transatlantic relations provoked by harmful rhetoric and practices of D. Trump administration forced the EU to focus on non-traditional channels of interacting with the American audience. In this context, the analysis of the EU’s attempts to adapt its public diplomacy programmes in the United States to the new realities is of particular interest. The first section outlines the political, economic, administrative, and image risks faced by EU diplomats in this area during the presidency of D. Trump (2017−2020). The second section examines the main thematic priorities, mechanisms and projects of the EU public diplomacy aimed at the American audience. The author argues that during the period under review the EU placed special emphasis on advocacy, cultural diplomacy, and exchange programmes for young people. The author concludes that, although European diplomats failed to achieve a qualitative improvement in transatlantic relations during D. Trump’s tenure, the EU public diplomacy demonstrated resilience and flexibility in the face of adverse circumstances. Indeed, the EU diplomats proved their creativity in developing innovative programmes which can be instrumental for future development of the EU public diplomacy in general.

Climate change policy stands out as a highly salient issue in European and in American public opinion. This article contends that a significant transatlantic consensus supports multilateral action on climate change. Leveraging a broad review of survey data in our time series, the analysis identifies a clear pattern of increasing agreement in public opinion. Yet progress in joint transatlantic climate change action has been rather slow and fragmented. To explain this puzzle, we connect these findings to pitfalls for transatlantic cooperation by weighing partisan polarization and regional differences in the U.S. and country variations in the EU as plausible hurdles to policy consistency. We argue that, beneath broader trends in shared concerns, roadblocks on the national level inhibit the implementation of coherent and effective transatlantic climate change policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the trends and theoretical positions found in the recent academic literature on the status and trajectory of transatlantic relations with the beliefs of 96 German and US foreign policy experts. The qualitative data are derived from open-ended in-depth interviews about the political, economic, and cultural factors that influence transatlantic cooperation and friction. Conducted in Berlin in 2011 and in Washington, D.C., in 2017, the interviews correspond with optimist and pessimist perceptions found in the academic literature and align roughly with realist, respectively, liberal/institutionalist and constructivist theoretical positions in International Relations theory and left/right political leanings. The study concludes with suggestions about the prospects for transatlantic relations, and the methodological benefits of comparing beliefs of foreign policy actors with theoretical paradigms and trends in the academic literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes President George W. Bush’s 2005 visit to the Netherlands-American Military Cemetery in Margraten as a case study in transatlantic ‘memory diplomacy’ in the context of the ‘War on Terror.’ It explores why, how and to what ends US diplomats in the Netherlands employed President Bush’s visit to Margraten, and the collective memory attached to this place, for transatlantic political-diplomatic purposes. By incorporating the role and agency of Dutch citizens in the development of the local commemorative culture, which in turn informed alternative-‘vernacular’-interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of Margraten as a lieu de mémoire, it demonstrates not only how top-down-‘official’-aims and narratives were at times contested, but also how public diplomacy has the power to obfuscate such alternative meanings, while simultaneously building upon these citizen initiatives for its own purposes. More specifically, this article demonstrates how president Bush’s visit was rhetorically and visually framed through the memory of World War II-inked to Margraten as the décor of this transatlantic diplomatic spectacle-and how this framing in turn informed ‘emotional norms’ that facilitated the creation of an unequal platform for political messaging in favor of the purposes and narratives of the official political-diplomatic actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses the priorities of US relations with European Union. The victory of Joseph Biden and Democratic Party on the elections of 2020 signified quite radical twist in US foreign policy. The election slogan «America is back» which won the White House for the Democratic Party and Congress, means restoration of transatlantic relationship, damaged by the previous administration. Growing cooperation between the U.S. and E.U. is defined by a long term trend towards global competitiveness between Western democracies led by the United States against Asian autocracies headed by China. Besides, another impetus towards transatlantic relations was given by Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. The institutions of bilateral relations established by the Biden and Obama administration were used for coordinating the measures to support Ukraine, adopt new sanctions against Russia and general cooperation tracks between Western countries.

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The European Union (EU) relies substantially on public diplomacy (PD) activities to sustain its international reputation, with the EU delegation in Washington playing a central role in the United States (US) context. The EU's PD in the US is of particular significance, and a quite complex undertaking given structural as well as agent-based challenges. How have socio-political structural changes and the EU delegation's agency influenced EU PD in the US? Based on interviews with EU PD practitioners in the US as well as policy documents, this article evidences structural constraints such as changing institutional configurations in the US and EU, political polarization and misinformation. In terms of the delegation's agency, the use of local intermediaries and digital PD is examined, highlighting the multiplicity of objectives, as well as the outreach strategies used to approach audiences. Finally, it critically discusses the EU's PD impact in the face of increasingly complex objectives and challenges to measure its impact. Overall, it suggests that while the EU delegation has aimed to adapt to the political and communicative environment it operates in, its (over)reliance on digital PD in order to engage a diverse and increasingly polarized public may compromise the effectiveness of its activities [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Denne artikkelen analyserer et av virkemidlene amerikanske myndigheter tok i bruk for å påvirke norsk opinion i tidsrommet 1950–1965, det såkalte Foreign Leader Program (FLP). Dette var et utvekslingsprogram rettet mot ledere fra ulike samfunnsområder, og det spilte en viktig rolle i USAs arbeid overfor offentligheten i allierte land. Her studeres programmets gjennomføring i Norge. FLP skulle fremme kunnskaper om, interesse for og identifikasjon med USA, ikke bare hos deltakerne, men i deres nettverk eller blant deres publikum. Selv om antall deltakere var begrenset, var FLP et effektivt virkemiddel. Hovedmålet var å sikre oppslutning om norsk vestvending og om USAs geopolitiske og strategiske kald krigs-mål. Artikkelen analyserer FLPs utvikling gjennom perioden. Programmets innretting og mål forble i hovedsak de samme, men det ble i økende grad politisert og rettet inn mot kortsiktige mål. Der betydningen av internasjonal kontakt og forståelse ble fremhevet tidlig i 1950-årene, var forventningen om at FLP skulle bidra til å konsolidere en USA-vennlig elite i Norge, mer uttalt i midten av 1960-årene. Det er likevel snakk om en nyanseforskjell: FLP var fra opprettelse til avslutning et kulturelt redskap for å nå politiske mål.

In spite of being criticised as 'talking shops' and easily replaced by technological innovations, dialogues – defined as face-to-face interactions in an institutionalised framework – remain a staple of international politics. While prevailing accounts have shown that dialogues help states advance their quest for security and profit, the key role dialogues play in the quest for recognition has been overlooked and remains undertheorised. Emphasising the socio-psychological need for ontological security, this article argues that institutions relentlessly engage in dialogues because it allows them to seek, gain and anchor the recognition of their identity. The significance for international relations is illustrated through the emblematic case of the European Union–US dialogues, specifically the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue. The multi-method qualitative analysis based on original interviews, participant observations, visuals and official documents demonstrates how the European Union exploits these dialogues with its 'Significant Other' to seek, gain and anchor the recognition of its complex institutional identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Azores Archipelago has from very early on played an essential role in transatlantic relations and, in particular, in the bilateral relationship of Portugal with the United States and of Europe with North America. Our research, through a qualitative and hermeneutic analysis, aims to take stock of the most important stages, the difficulties, the solutions found and the challenges faced in transatlantic relations, exploring the centrality of the Azores, mainly at the scientific and geopolitical level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Electronic Journal of Political Science Studies (EJPSS) is the property of Electronic Journal of Political Science Studies (EJPSS) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article addresses the priorities of US relations with the European Union. The victory of Joseph Biden and Democratic Party on the elections of 2020 signified quite radical twist in US foreign policy. The election slogan "America is back" which won the White House for the Democratic Party and Congress, means restoration of transatlantic relationship, damaged by the previous administration. Growing cooperation between the U.S. and E.U. is defined by a long term trend towards global competitiveness between Western democracies led by the United States against Asian autocracies headed by China. Besides, another impetus towards transatlantic relations was given by Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. The institutions of bilateral relations established by the Biden and Obama administrations were used for coordinating the measures to support Ukraine, adopt new sanctions against Russia and general cooperation tracks between Western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that European monetary integration is inherently neoliberal in its very structure gained prominence after the Eurozone crisis and has had considerable impact. The implication is that the only alternative to disciplinary neoliberalism in Europe is an exodus from EU institutions. This article contributes to the testing of such arguments through an empirical analysis of the origins of the Eurozone in the formation of the EMS during the 1977–1978 Locomotive Conflict. It finds that the variety of construal in EMS design and contingencies in the politics of selection between such designs do not accord with structuralist arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a “comprehensive neo-functionalist” approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European “strategic autonomy,” the Strategic Compass, and the European “defence package” should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU’s role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

This article aims to investigate the character of transatlantic security relations in Africa: How can it be characterized? Have they become weaker or stronger over the past decade? How can this development be explained? As NATO has not yet been heavily engaged on the African continent, it is prudent to study the relations between the EU and the US. Africa has been of concern to the EU (and its member states) for decades due to its geographical closeness and historic bonds. Since 2001, for both Europe and the US, Africa has become a region of increasing security concern due to the threat of international terrorism—for Europe, we can also add the migration concern. The European side of this relationship has also been largely dominated by France, making the transatlantic security cooperation in Africa essentially about French-American relations. As France has taken the lead regarding Europe’s security and defense engagement in Africa, increasingly with the support of other EU member states and associated non-members, this bilateral relationship is more than simply cooperation between two states. By applying a framework that understands EU security and defense policy as a process increasingly characterized as a differentiated and flexible integration under French leadership, the development of the Franco-US security relations in Africa must be understood as an expression of the transatlantic security relations in this region.

In 2019, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement System (WTO-DSS) lost its quorum. Instead of the required minimum number of three members, the AB’s membership fell to one member only as the US under Donald Trump blocked the appointment of new members upon the expiry of the terms of two incumbent ones. The AB’s paralysis produced a high level of shock in the EU. In this article, we take a closer look at the US’s decision to paralyze the WTO’s AB and the EU’s reaction to it. Its point is that it will not be easy to get the US back on board as the factors that drove its decision predate the Trump era. Long before Trump, the tradeoff upon which the US based its acceptance of the WTO-DSS unraveled. For US policy makers, the EU is partly to blame for this as it undermined the system’s prompt compliance assumption. More important even is the claim that the system’s AB created new obligations for the WTO members to the point where the acceptance of some WTO rules—notably regarding trade remedies—became politically unsustainable in the US itself.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Europe and the US quickly joined in a strong and coordinated response. But how significant is the Ukraine crisis response for longer-term trends in transatlantic relations? This thematic issue addresses this question by focusing on the factors that affect the strength of the transatlantic relationship. Only by exploring the impact of various structural, strategic, economic, institutional, and domestic factors can we better understand the current and future state of EU–US relations—both in normal times and in times of crisis. Two questions are explored across cases: First, is the EU–US relationship changing in various fields? Second, how can the putative changes (or stability) in EU–US relations be explained? For this purpose, the articles also operationalize and apply a common explanatory framework. This Introduction sets out and justifies the overall research questions, develops the analytical framework, and briefly explains the empirical focus of the articles that follow.