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According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That Administration perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat perception of other governments might change following the December 3, 2007 release of key judgements from a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran -- strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it curb its program. Still, the NIE does not claim that Iran has complied with U.N. Security Council demands that it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on enrichment but apparently mostly cooperating with an August 2007 offer to reveal to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information on its past nuclear program, further sanctions, possibly including on civilian trade or financing, have been under discussion at the U.N. Security Council. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran., CRS Report for Congress.

This dissertation analyses international and to some extent domestic law pertaining to trade in hazardous substances. Hazardous trade regulation is found to promote or accommodate three objectives in particular: the strengthening of the ability of (importing) States to exercise control of transboundary flows of hazardous substances; the protection of human health and environment; and the avoidance of impediments to the free flow of goods. The simultaneous pursuance of these objectives entails potential or actual conflicts. Among the regulatory instruments employed for controlling hazardous trade particular attention is given to prior informed consent (PIC) procedures. These have the potential to strengthen the effective sovereignty of importing States, i.e. their ability to make and enforce informed decisions with respect to import of hazardous substances. These procedures are also compared with export bans, import bans and export notification procedures. It is inter alia asked where different trade-restricting measures place the right to make decisions and whether that right is combined with any means by which such decisions may be enforced. It is concluded that there is no general international law requirement for PIC for transboundary shipments of hazardous substances. Such a requirement may, however, with certain caveats be substantiated for hazardous wastes. It is also concluded that the effective operation of PIC procedures requires the availability of substantial resources in both exporting States and importing States. This may argue for the application of e.g. export bans to particularly hazardous substances. PIC procedures are on the other hand more flexible, better at empowering importing States and are also less likely to conflict with free-trade law than many bans. PIC is in itself no guarantee for a particular level of environmental protection.

According to the "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006), dividing the United States and partner countries over whether to continue diplomacy with Iran or move to impose international sanctions on it. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat Iran poses. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Sunnis there., CRS Report for Congress.

The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential strategic threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement and at other times leaning toward backing efforts to change its regime. However, some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs to date. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran, and the 9/11 Commission has found that some officials in Iran might have facilitated or at least tolerated travel through Iran by Al Qaeda operatives. Iran did not obstruct the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, at least partly in the expectation that pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic factions would come to power in Iraq in the aftermath. Iran is also reported to be cultivating and assisting pro-Iranian local leaders in Afghanistan. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently and harshly criticized by official U.S. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of religious and ethnic minorities., CRS Report for Congress.

The Bush Administration has generally continued the Iran policies of previous administrations by attempting to contain Iran while pursuing limited engagement with it. At times, the Administration has appeared to favor a strategy of regime change, although without taking concrete steps in that direction. During the previous Administration, signs of moderation in Iran had stimulated the United States to try to engage Iran in broad, official talks. Relations took a downturn after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States when the issue of international terrorism took center stage. President Bush singled out Iran, North Korea, and Iraq as part of an "axis of evil" in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message. Since then, common interests in stability in post-conflict Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq have led to occasional direct contact. Iran's alleged efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery means, coupled with its support of terrorist groups, have long been key U.S. concerns. The Bush Administration and many in Congress are expressing strong suspicions of Iran's nuclear intentions; these concerns have been heightened by reported major strides in Iran's nuclear program and halting and incomplete cooperation with a strict program of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards. Another U.S. concern has been Iran's active opposition to the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including material support to Hizballah in Lebanon and such Palestinian groups as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran was quietly helpful in the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, although Iran reportedly is supporting Shiite Islamic factions there that do not espouse most Western values. Iran's human rights practices and limits on democracy are frequently criticized by U.S. officials and Members., CRS Report for Congress.

Even before Iran's tacit cooperation with post-9/11 U.S. efforts to defeat Afghanistan's Taliban regime, signs of moderation in Iran had stimulated the United States to try to engage Iran in official talks. Iran, still split between conservatives and reformers loyal to President Khatemi did not accept. By early 2002, reports of Iran's continued support to anti-Middle East peace process groups had reversed the warming trend. Iran was grouped with North Korea and Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" identified in President Bush's January 29, 2002 State of the Union message. President Bush has identified Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, coupled with its support of terrorist groups, as key U.S. concerns. Iran's ballistic missile program has made major strides over the past few years, with the help of several foreign suppliers, and the strides in its civilian nuclear power program could further a nuclear weapons effort. Iran has opposed the U.S.-led Middle East peace process since its inception in October 1991. It continues to provide material support to Hizballah in Lebanon and to Palestinian groups that oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process (e.g., Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Iran's human rights practices, particularly its treatment of the Baha'i and Jewish communities, also are a major concern. The Bush Administration has identified Iran's modernization of its conventional forces as a potential threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, but others argue that Iran still is relatively poorly equipped. Although the Bush Administration says it is still willing to hold a dialog with Iran, the focus of current U.S. policy appears to be a return to the containment policy that prevailed during the early part of the Clinton Administration. President Clinton imposed a ban on U.S. trade and investment in Iran in 1995, and a 1996 law imposed sanctions on foreign investment in Iran's energy sector (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act)., CRS Issue Brief for Congress.

More than two decades after the Nov 4, 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, signs of moderation in Iran had stimulated the United States to try to engage Iran in official talks. Iran, still split between conservatives and reformers, has not accepted to date. Even though open to engagement with Iran, the Bush Administration and Congress want to continue vigorous efforts to counter Iran's support for terrorist groups and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iran's human rights practices, particularly its treatment of the Baha'i and Jewish communities, also are a major concern. The Bush Administration has identified Iran's modernization of its conventional forces as a potential threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, but others argue that Iran still is relatively poorly equipped. Iran's efforts to acquire WMD and delivery means (i.e., ballistic missiles), have made major strides over the past few years, with the help of foreign suppliers. Barred from U.S. or European advanced technology, Iran continues to receive weaponry and WMD-related technology from China, Russia, and North Korea. Iran has opposed the U.S.-led Middle East peace process since its inception in Oct 1991. It continues to provide material support to Hizballah in Lebanon and to Islamic-oriented Palestinian groups that oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process. Current U.S. policy toward Iran marks a shift from the focus on containment that characterized U.S. policy during 1980-1997. President Clinton imposed a ban on U.S. trade and investment in Iran in 1995, and a 1996 law imposed sanctions on foreign investment in Iran's energy sector (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA). In keeping with the 1997 policy shift toward engagement, in 1999 and 2000 the Clinton Administration eased trade sanctions somewhat. However, the United States continues to work with its allies to prevent arms and advanced technology sales to Iran and to limit Iran's influence over regional energy flows., CRS Issue Brief for Congress.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was conceived in the context of a tightening of U.S. sanctions on Iran during the first term of the Clinton Administration. Most experts attributed the imposition of additional sanctions to Iran's stepped up efforts to acquire nuclear expertise -- it signed a contract with Russia in January 1995 for construction of a nuclear power reactor at Bushehr -- and to a 1994-1995 spate of terrorist attacks in Israel by the Islamist organizations Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, both of which receive some financial and material assistance from Iran, according to annual U.S. State Department reports on international terrorism. In 1995, President Clinton issued two executive orders, including Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995), which banned U.S. investment in Iran's energy sector, and Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995), which banned U.S. trade with and investment in that country. The Clinton Administration and many in Congress maintained that the new U.S. sanctions might begin to deprive Iran of the ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and fund terrorist groups by hindering its ability to modernize its key source of revenue -- the petroleum sector. The effect on Iran would be significant, according to this view, if U.S. allies joined the U.S. trade and investment ban. ILSA (P.L. 104-172) is due to expire on August 5, 2001, 5 years after enactment. Discussion on renewal of ILSA appears to center on the difficulties incurred in implementing it, reactions to ILSA on the part of U.S. allies, and changes in U.S. relations with Iran and Libya since its enactment. H.R. 1954 and S. 994, the ILSA Extension Act of 2001, would renew ILSA for another 5 years. This report will be updated to reflect legislative developments. See also CRS Issue Brief IB93033, "Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy," and CRS Issue Brief IB93109, "Libya.", CRS Report for Congress.