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TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1509 I. PUBLIC NUISANCE IN CONTEXT: MEDIEVAL ENGLISH CRIME TO GUN VIOLENCE STATUTE 1511 A. Origins in English Common Law 1511 B. Recent U.S. Litigation 1512 [...]

INTRODUCTION I. TECHNOLOGICAL PROPERTY: FROM PROPERTY TO LICENSES A. Limited Consumer Control over Digital and Technological Products B. Proposed Reforms: Contracts, Torts, and Consumer Protection II. THE PROPERTY APPROACH III. [...], Can property law have a consumer protection purpose? One of the most important consumer law concerns today is the limited control consumers have over the digital assets and software-embedded products they purchase. Current proposals for reform focus on classifying the transaction as either license or sale and rely mostly on contract law and consumer protection regulation with a few calls for restoring ownership rights. This Article argues that property law can protect consumers by establishing a minimum bundle of rights for consumers: the "consumer's bundle." Working with property theory and an analysis of property values, this Article explains the importance of users' ability to use and alienate digital and technological assets as part of a new property category for consumers. These assets represent a new emerging resource that is currently managed and controlled by manufacturers and platforms. The suggested "consumer bundle" would limit platforms control and protect the rights to use, alienate, and repair.

I. Introduction II. Background A. History and Status of Human Trafficking in the United States B. Sex Trafficking and Hotels: Their Relationship in the United States C. The History and [...], The hotel industry is a critical component of sex trafficking in the United States; yet not a single Hotel chain has been held civilly liable for their compliance in sex trafficking under the current legal landscape. This Note compares state and federal civil liability laws targeting hotels and their participation in sex trafficking, with a focus on the variance in required mental states. This Note argues for a stricter standard to hold hotels liable, applying per se liability where Hotels fail to comply with mandated sex trafficking training, therefore providing victims with a real chance at receiving recovery.

INTRODUCTION 171 I. PUBLIC NUISANCE BACKGROUND 174 A. Historical Definition of Public Nuisance 174 B. Public Nuisance Today 176 C. Elements of Public-Nuisance Claims 177 D. Development of Public Nuisance [...], Always-listening devices have sparked new concerns about privacy while evading regulation, but a potential solution has existed for hundreds of years: public nuisance. Public nuisance has been stretched to serve as a basis of liability for some of the most prominent cases of modern mass-tort litigation, such as suits against opioid and tobacco manufacturers for creating products that endanger public health. While targeting conduct that arguably interferes with a right common to the public, this use of public nuisance extends far beyond the original understanding of the doctrine. Public nuisance has not been applied, however, to another prominent contemporary issue: privacy violations by always-listening devices. Plaintiffs have sued Google, Amazon, and Apple for their smart devices that listen and record snippets of conversations. But not one of these cases cites public-nuisance law as a basis for liability, even though the underlying wrong--eavesdropping--was one of the categories of conduct that fell within the earliest definitions of public nuisance. This Article explores the history of eavesdropping as a public nuisance at common law and throughout U.S. history. It explains the public nature of the wrong underlying eavesdropping and why actions that invade individuals' privacy should be understood as wrongs against the public at large. It then applies public-nuisance law to always-listening devices, arguing that public nuisance could serve as a basis for addressing privacy issues arising from modern technology or as a common-law analogue to make intangible privacy harms justiciable in federal court.

In March of 2023, OpenAI released GPT-4, an autoregressive language model that uses deep learning to produce text. GPT-4 has unprecedented ability to practice law: drafting briefs and memos, plotting litigation strategy, and providing general legal advice. However, scholars and practitioners have yet to unpack the implications of large language models, such as GPT-4, for long-standing bar association rules on the unauthorized practice of law ('UPL'). The intersection of large language models with UPL raises manifold issues, including those pertaining to important and developing jurisprudence on free speech, antitrust, occupational licensing, and the inherent-powers doctrine. How the intersection is navigated, moreover, is of vital importance in the durative struggle for access to justice, and low-income individuals will be disproportionately impacted. In this Article, we offer a recommendation that is both attuned to technological advances and avoids the extremes that have characterized the past decades of the UPL debate. Rather than abandon UPL rules, and rather than leave them undisturbed, we propose that they be recast as primarily regulation of entity-type claims. Through this recasting, bar associations can retain their role as the ultimate determiners of 'lawyer' and 'attorney' classifications while allowing nonlawyers, including the AI-powered entities that have emerged in recent years, to provide legal services--save for a narrow and clearly defined subset. Although this recommendation is novel, it is easy to implement, comes with few downsides, and would further the twin UPL aims of competency and ethicality better than traditional UPL enforcement. Legal technology companies would be freed from operating in a legal gray area; states would no longer have to create elaborate UPL-avoiding mechanisms, such as Utah's 'legal sandbox'; consumers--both individuals and companies--would benefit from better and cheaper legal services; and the dismantling of access-to-justice barriers would finally be possible. Moreover, the clouds of free speech and antitrust challenges that are massing above current UPL rules would dissipate, and bar associations would be able to focus on fulfilling their already established UPL-related aims., Article Contents Introduction I. ChatGPT Meets UPL .... A. What is UPL? B. UPL's Existential Problems C. UPL in Action (Causing Inaction) II. Human-AI Legal Collaboration III. The Case for [...]

I A RADICAL REPORT [I]t is worth remembering that the apparent heresies of one generation become the orthodoxies of the next. (1) More than a half-century after publication of the [...], The radical principles behind the 1967 Woodhouse Report were eclipsed by shifting political styles--and gradually abandoned as heretical. We can now turn to Sir Owen's own notion, that "the apparent heresies of one generation become the orthodoxies of the next", to explore how core Woodhouse heresies might themselves perform this transition: providing fresh support for a generation grappling with headline challenges of climate change and pandemic control.

I INTRODUCTION A What I Want to Say One of the advantages of doing a talk twice is that you get helpful feedback after the first lecture. In Wellington, a [...], In the 2022 Sir Owen Woodhouse Memorial Lecture, I considered what it means to make law in New Zealand. Using examples from Sir Owen Woodhouse's illustrious career as a judge and law reformer, I argued that there are important differences in judges' and law reformers' conceptions of "making law". The common law is best seen not as a collection of rules but as a custom as to how to go about recognising what the law is. As a result, it is better to think of what New Zealand judges do as making common law in New Zealand, rather than remaking a New Zealand common law outside pre-existing traditions. The lecture illustrates this point by analysing the Supreme Court's decision in Ellis v R (Continuance), which was decided between the lecture being given in Wellington and its being given in Auckland in October 2022.

I THE TRANS-TASMAN JUDICIAL AREA The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts were passed by the Australian and New Zealand Parliaments in 2010 to create a single judicial area in the single economic [...], The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts took effect in Australia and New Zealand in 2013, and since then have created a well-functioning trans-Tasman judicial area in which the process of all Australian and New Zealand courts can be served, and the judgments of all of those courts can be enforced, anywhere in New Zealand or Australia. The unquestioned jurisdiction that is given to all Australian and New Zealand courts in trans-Tasman cases is also limited only by principles of forum conveniens and the enforcement of choice of court agreements. In Zurich Insurance Company Limited v Koper ('Zurich Insurance'), the validity of the Australian rules of jurisdiction under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) was challenged. The New South Wales courts and the High Court of Australia all rejected the challenge. This article is an account of the constitutional considerations that were canvassed throughout the Zurich Insurance litigation, including the possibility that a High Court majority recognised a positive constitutional implication when upholding the personal jurisdictions created by the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) and the recognition of a federal power to extend the jurisdiction of state courts in all international cases. It also undertakes an analysis of the private international law issues of Zurich Insurance: the clarification of the effect of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts; and the unsatisfactory conclusions reached on the territorial application of the Civil Liability (Third Party Claims Against Insurers) Act 2017 (NSW)--the issue that forced the need to consider the validity of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) in the first place. In this respect, a plea is made for Australian state parliaments and courts to avoid extra-territorial overreach in the application of state legislation.

ARTICLE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 500 I. THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF DEPLATFORMING 508 A. The Common Law of Innkeepers and 508 Common Carriers B. Communications 511 1. Postal System 511 2. [...], Deplatforming in the technology sector is hotly debated, and at times may even seem unprecedented. In recent years, scholars, commentators, jurists, and lawmakers have focused on the possibility of treating social-media platforms as common carriers or public utilities, implying that the imposition of a duty to serve the public would restrict them from deplatforming individuals and content. But, in American law, the duty to serve all comers was never absolute. In fact, the question of whether and how to deplatform--to exclude content, individuals, or businesses from critical services--has been commonly and regularly debated throughout American history. In the common law and the major infrastructural and utility sectors--transportation, communications, energy, and banking--American law has long provided rules and procedures for when and how to deplat-form. This Article offers a history and theory of the law of deplatforming across networks, platforms, and utilities. Historically, the American tradition has not been one of either an absolute duty to serve or an absolute right to exclude. Rather, it has been one of reasonable deplatforming--of balancing the duties to serve and the need to, in limited and justifiable cases, exclude. Theoretically, deplatforming raises common questions across sectors: Who deplatforms? What is deplatformed? When does deplatforming occur? What are permissible reasons for deplatforming? How should deplatforming take place? The Article uses the history of deplatforming to identify these and other questions, and to show how American law has answered them. The history and theory of deplatforming shows that the tension between service and exclusion is an endemic issue for common carriers, utilities, and other infrastructural services--including contemporary technology platforms. This Article considers ways in which past deplatforming practices can inform current debates over the public and private governance of technology platforms.

I INTRODUCTION Discussions of a singular common law tort of privacy have been present for decades but never gained any meaningful traction in senior courts. (1) In New Zealand, the [...], The New Zealand common law has been hesitant to recognise the multifaceted nature of modern privacy invasions. In an attempt to maintain certainty and conceptual clarity, the courts have developed two privacy actions: the tort of wrongful publication of private facts, and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. These torts protect distinct types of wrongful conduct and different privacy interests, despite sharing almost identical structural requirements. However, the categorisation of privacy actions is becoming increasingly artificial as the characteristics of the torts overlap. In practice, both informational and physical privacy interests may be relevant to a singular claim. Furthermore, in the light of recent developments to the publicity requirement, the circumstances distinguishing one tort from the other are now as little as a disclosure to a singular individual. This article argues the existence of separate torts is becoming increasingly illogical and unduly restrictive when grappling with nuanced problems posed by emerging privacy threats. If the privacy framework is to adapt to the modern world, discussions of a singular tort ought to be reignited, albeit from a different angle. By reconfiguring the descriptive and normative tools currently deployed by courts, a singular tort will enable more flexible, cohesive and workable privacy protection.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 541 II. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON SENSE 543 III. THE GREAT NON SEQUITUR 546 IV. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 551 V. CONCLUSION 558 I. INTRODUCTION The proper scope [...]

At the turn of the twentieth century, state courts were roiled by claims against telegraph corporations for mental anguish resulting from the failure to deliver telegrams involving the death or [...]

INTRODUCTION 1552 I. REGULATIONS AND FACEBOOK'S MODERATION SYSTEM 1554 A. The Structure of Facebook's Moderation System 1556 B3 The Role of Moderators 1557 II. DETRIMENTAL IMPACTS OF LABOR ARRANGEMENTS-. HARMS [...]

INTRODUCTION Over the last several years, so-called "gig economies" have been gaining prevalence in the national economy, changing the ways many go about daily activities and creating new types of [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 242 II. THE CONDITIONS OF SMP OPERATIONS 245 A. Overview of SMP Functions 245 1. Content Moderation Algorithms 247 2. Content Navigation Algorithms 247 B. [...], Major social media platforms (SMPs), such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, have become the primary means of communication for billions of people worldwide. They are the largest modern news distributors and the primary curators of online public discourse. However, the expanding influence of SMPs has led many to publicly scrutinize the content moderation decisions of such platforms, as SMPs regularly remove, block, censor, and ban user-generated content (UGC), including third-party written messages, photos, and videos, at their discretion. Because SMPs exercise immense power and are largely self-regulated, there has been growing public sentiment that SMP content moderation violates Users' free speech rights. Nevertheless, SMP content moderation decisions are protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Congress enacted Section 230 to promote the development of the internet by granting "Good Samaritan" online services the authority to moderate UGC without potential liability. However, "Bad Samaritan" providers have also benefited from this immunity, bringing the law to the forefront of public debate regarding online free speech. Despite repeated congressional efforts to narrowly tailor Section 230's protections, the future of SMP immunity and online speech is in the hands of the United States Supreme Court. How the Court decides this question of statutory interpretation could have widespread, unintended consequences for the modern internet. That being so, because policymakers are tasked with redressing societal ills, this Note proposes that Congress articulate a specific liability standard applicable only to SMPs, drawing on the immunity framework in Section 230(c) and narrowly tailored to the unique issues arising from SMPs. This solution evades constitutional concerns and is consistent with the congressional intent to safeguard the ability of SMPs to regulate content moderation for their platforms, subject to moderately heightened standards for immunity.

NOHWERE TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1080 I. Intimation of Understanding. 1085 A. Contract: The "Intent to Be Bound" 1086 B. Tort: What It Means to "Hurt Someone" 1091 C. Criminal [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION A. Prologue B. The Supreme Court and Native Americans C. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association D. Reflections on NWIC E. Epilogue [...], This is the second in a series of critiques of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on environmental law. The first series described three cases notable for their manipulation of facts and law and ill-concealed bias against environmental plaintiffs. One crippled the National Environmental Policy Act, the second crippled citizen standing to sue, and the third pivoted to undermine the safety of nuclear power plants. (1) The instant trio of cases add yet another troubling element to the canon. What distinguishes them, beyond the usual sleight-of-hand, is their failure to demonstrate the slightest understanding or concern for the plight of some of the most disadvantaged people on the planet. All of them brown. The first case discussed, Northwest Indian Cemetery, denied First Amendment protection from the destruction of an entire Native American culture. The second case, Sandoval, effectively destroyed Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act. The third case, Kiobel, slipped the bounds of decency altogether by declaring corporations immune from actions under the Alien Tort Claims Act, expressly designed to provide damages for acts viewed by the entire world as beyond the pale.

THE NEXT ITERATION OF REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY 1480 I. WHAT IS DEEPFAKE PORNOGRAPHY? 1482 A. The Devastating Consequences of Deepfake 1482 Pornography B. Origins of Deepfake Pornography and 1484 Where Deepfake [...], Deepfake technology uses artificial intelligence to realistically manipulate videos by splicing one person's face onto another's. While this technology has innocuous usages, some perpetrators have instead used it to create deepfake pornography. These creators use images ripped from social media sites to construct--or request the generation of--a pornographic video showcasing any woman who has shared images of herself online. And while this technology sounds complex enough to be relegated to Hollywood production studios, it is rapidly becoming free and easy-to-use. The implications of deepfake pornography seep into all facets of victims' lives. Not only does deepfake pornography shatter these victims' sexual privacy, its online permanency also inhibits their ability to use the internet and find a job. Although much of the scholarship and media attention on deepfakes has been devoted to the implications of deepfakes in the political arena and the attendant erosion of our trust in the government, the implications of deepfake pornography are equally devastating. This Note analyzes the legal remedies available to victims, concludes that none are sufficient, and proposes a new statutory and regulatory framework to provide adequate redress.

ABSTRACT This Commentary examines when, consistent with First Amendment principles of free expression, speakers can be held tortiously responsible for the actions of others with whom they have no contractual [...]

I Introduction II Deliberative Challenges of Conflict Society Referendums A Five Characteristics of Conflict Societies 1 Social Division and Polarisation 2 Group-Targeting 3 Low Information and Misinformation 4 Uneven Deliberative [...], A 'safe harbour carve out' from insolvent trading liability is intended to encourage directors, particularly of large companies, not to prematurely liquidate financially troubled companies which could be rescued. While the federal government has been successful in introducing this measure, which was part of its 2016 National Science and Innovation Agenda, this article argues that some of the underlying justifications for the safe harbour are flawed and that it may not be effective. A more significant objection is that the safe harbour could lead to a greater prevalence of illegal phoenix activity, sheltering under the appearance of business rescue. The benefit of the liability carve out to the 'big end of town' is not worth this risk.

As the ubiquity and importance of the internet continue to grow, courts will address more cases involving online activity. In doing so, courts will confront the threshold issue of whether [...]