Search

This paper demonstrates how tax administrations can evaluate future compliance gains from risk‐based tax enforcement that audits all taxpayers above a risk threshold. Expanding tax enforcement in this setting means reducing the audit threshold. The compliance gains from such an expansion consist of a mechanical audit correction effect and a behavioural effect that reflects changes in self‐reporting in the subsequent years. We estimate this behavioural effect in a regression discontinuity analysis with the risk score as the forcing variable. We find that taxpayers at the margin had a significant reduction in self‐reported deductions in the next years' tax filing. The behavioural effect over a three‐year post‐audit period is estimated to be of a magnitude similar to that of the direct adjustment of the audit. This compliance effect does not change when we include the reporting of the spouse. We find that the risk score threshold that maximizes net public revenue from the audits is considerably below current practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.05.006 Byline: Ottar MA[bar]stad (a), Gaute Torsvik (b), Arild Aakvik (c) Keywords: Human resources; Quality health services; Workload; Tanzania Abstract: a[paragraph] Health workers are few, but their workload is not overwhelming. a[paragraph] There is no association between workload and effort per patient. a[paragraph] Scaling up the number of health workers is unlikely to increase quality. Author Affiliation: (a) Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway (b) Department of Economics, University of Bergen and Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway (c) Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway Article History: Received 16 July 2009; Revised 8 March 2010; Accepted 23 May 2010

Altruistic donors face common good problem which calls for cooperation and policy integration. On the other hand, the more united and responsible donors act towards the poor in the country that receives aid, the less domestic support does the poor get. I study these two countervailing effects of donor cooperation in different settings. Cooperation is always beneficial if donors can enforce contingent aid contracts. If contracts cannot be used, I show that cooperation can be harmful. I find that the negative effect of mutual aid policy is reduced if the donors lace Samaritan's dilemma. JEL classfication: D8; F35; E61 Keywords: Foreign aid; Policy integration; Fungability

The activation trend in social policy entails that caseworkers on the frontlines of the welfare state are expected to decide 'reasonable' activation requirements for clients and when and how non‐compliance should be sanctioned. This study investigates how caseworkers form judgements about their clients' personal responsibility when activation requirements are violated and how their judgements about responsibility matter for the sanctions they impose. We find that caseworkers are sensitive to personal responsibility, varying the motivation for not fulfilling the activation requirement from a case where the client has less control (circumstances) to one with more control (choice) more than doubles sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines paternalism as a justification for welfare reforms making benefits conditional on participation in activation programs. We clarify different types of what we denote 'throffer paternalism' – a paternalism conjoining an offer with a threat – and ask whether there is a good case for any of them. We argue that hard but non-perfectionistic paternalism provides the most promising defense for mandatory activation but conclude that it does not give a convincing justification for this type of welfare policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Optimal performance can be achieved by joint responsibility of tasks in a dynamic setting wherein intertemporal commitment is limited. Joint responsibility of tasks generates a weak ratchet effect, thereby, reducing the cost of optimal performance, and at the same time, allowing the principal to impose a uniform, but diverse lower-powered incentives. Such dynamic benefits, in reducing the impact of ratchet effects, make optimal grouping of tasks an effective job design.