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Key Findings: Non-state armed groups, including violent extremist organizations, self-defense militias, and criminal gangs, are governance providers to local populations in the Sahel to a much greater degree than previously reported in the so-called “ungoverned spaces.” NSAGs provide four key forms of governance: security; justice; political and economic administration; social support and enforcement of social rules, across large sections of Mali, but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. Through this informal governance, NSAGs garner support and legitimacy from local leaders and communities at large. Current Responses: State and international responses have overall ignored this NSAG informal governance and have pursued: 1. a counter-terrorism strategy that is hampered by its failure to take into account the deeply embedded nature of NSAGs in local communities; and 2. a central statebuilding strategy that has so far largely failed to replace or even undermine NSAG legitimacy as governance providers. Relevance to NATO: Any involvement of international organizations in the Sahel needs to go beyond a strict counter-terrorism understanding of NSAGs, including VEOs. Furthermore, local and international actors on the ground warned that any additional involvement should avoid duplicating and undermining existing activities. Thus, any international involvement in the Sahel needs to take a broader vision of NSAG activities – beyond simply seeing them as “terrorists” or “criminal gangs” – and needs to be carefully coordinated with national and international partners.

This chapter examines the potential for talks with Al-Shabaab, identifies potential facilitators and spoilers, and highlights lessons to be learned from past dialogues with Al-Shabaab. Three main conclusions are reached. First, many Somali and international parties agree that there exists some degree of common ground between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Al-Shabaab. Second, while Somali elders, business leaders, and Muslim-majority countries have been identified as potential facilitators or initiators of a dialogue with Al-Shabaab, such talks require at least non-opposition from key factions in the FGS and Al-Shabaab and more broadly from powerful regional powers who have rejected past agreements. Third, FGS and international actors need to decide whether they want to maintain their focus on facilitating and promoting defections from Al-Shabaab or explore the possibility of comprehensive talks with Al-Shabaab aimed at bringing in the entire armed group.