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Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the US. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger boards. Consistent with this notion, our empirical results show that firms located where the size of the director-age population is larger have significantly larger board size. Because the director-age population represents broad demographic trends outside of any firm’s control, it is unlikely related to firm outcomes or policies and should be exogenous. Using the director-age population as our instrument, we estimate the effects of board size on firm value and profitability. Our approach is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal effect. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using an event study approach, we seek to estimate the value investors placed on Steve Jobs by investigating the stock market reactions to his death. In the three-day window surrounding his death, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns are −5.76%. Given the market capitalization of Apple at the time, it can be inferred that investors valued Steve Jobs at 20 billion dollars. While tragic, the news about Jobs’ death is greeted favourably by Apple’s competitors. The competitors appear to be convinced that, without Steve Jobs, they can compete with Apple better. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We contribute to the literature on dividend policy by relaxing Miller and Modigliani's (1961) perfect capital market assumptions and incorporating a factor that has not been investigated before, that is, variation in managerial ability. Based on more than 24 000 observations across over 20 years (1989-2011), our results show that firms with more talented executives are more likely to pay dividends and, among firms that pay dividends, pay significantly larger dividends. A rise in managerial ability by one SD raises the propensity to pay dividends by 27% and, for firms that pay dividends, increases dividend payouts by 29%. Our results are consistent with the notion that talented managers, confident in their ability to keep the firm profitable, are more willing to pay larger dividends because they are less concerned about having to reduce dividends in the future. Further analysis shows that our results are not likely vulnerable to endogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of corporate social responsibility ( CSR), we explore how talented managers view CSR investments. Based on nearly 20,000 observations across 17 years, our evidence reveals a nonmonotonic effect of managerial talent on CSR. Exploiting a novel measure of managerial ability, we find that talented managers view CSR investments favorably. However, only those with especially strong talent are in favor of CSR investments. For executives ranked above the 75th percentile in terms of managerial talent, an increase in managerial ability leads to more CSR investments, suggesting that these strongly talented managers perceive CSR as enhancing firm performance. In contrast, for those with weaker talent, CSR investments are negatively associated with managerial ability, implying that these weakly talented managers view CSR as a wasteful deployment of resources. Further evidence shows that our conclusion is unlikely confounded by endogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the role of powerful CEOs on the extent of risk-taking, using Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer’s (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS). Based on more than 12,000 observations over 20 years (1992–2012), our results reveal a nonmonotonic association. In particular, relatively less powerful CEOs exhibit risk aversion, resulting in less risky strategies. However, when the CEO has his power consolidated beyond a certain point, he is less likely to compromise with other executives, leading to less moderate decisions and more risky strategies. We estimate that the CEO has to wield considerable power, that is, around the 75th percentile of CPS, before significantly more risk-taking is observed. Finally, we show that our results are unlikely vulnerable to endogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]