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The FAA is looking to develop streamlined launch and reentry licensing requirements for the evolving commercial space industry. A central goal is to move from prescriptive requirements to performance requirements. By focusing on outcomes, performance standards give to developers flexibility and make it possible to find lowest-cost means to achieve compliance. Performance standards can generally accommodate technological change and the emergence of new technology driven hazards in ways that prescriptive standards cannot. However, how performance standards are designed and how they are implemented and enforced matters greatly. This paper uses the case of the Boeing B-737 MAX MCAS certification to illustrate the following mistakes to be avoided when using performance-based safety requirements: excessive trust on quantitative performance requirements, inadequate risk-based design process, and lack of independent design verification by experts.

The challenges posed by increasing space debris are becoming so severe that sustainable use of space will be seriously jeopardised. Technical means for mitigation of debris in orbit can be expected to minimize the production of new pieces of debris. However, mitigation efforts must be accompanied by active debris removal (ADR) of existing pieces of debris from space in order to effectively protect the space environment. Additionally, on-orbit servicing (OOS) of satellites may also help in reducing pieces of space debris. However, both ADR and OOS cannot be effectively undertaken due to the existing complex legal problems, primarily at international level. One way of resolving these legal problems is to establish an international regulatory framework as well as an intergovernmental organization that will conduct ADR and OOS activities. This brief paper, discusses a proposal for an integrated development of operational, institutional and international regulatory framework and the creation of an intergovernmental organization (based on the models of earlier international satellite organizations like INTELSAT and INMARSAT) for carrying out active space debris removal and on-orbit servicing of satellites.

This chapter deals with habitability or the adequacy of an environment for living and working in space. Other chapters describe the harsh, high-risk elements of the space flight environment, while this chapter describes general habitability requirements and the mission factors (e.g., mission duration and distance from Earth) that affect elements of habitability such as privacy, proxemics, and mobility in microgravity, as well as psychological stressors. The second topic of this chapter, habitat design, discusses elements that make it possible to manage microgravity (e.g., foot restraints, handrails) and other specialized designs to accommodate normal life functions like eating and sleeping. The chapter concludes with descriptions of the way noise control is managed and how radiation shielding is required to enable habitation by humans.

This chapter provides an introduction to systems safety engineering and basic safety design principles, policies, and standardization practices. It describes the sociotechnical evolution of system safety in government space programs, and an accident model based on systems theory. In addition, a possible regulatory model for commercial human spaceflight based on shared responsibilities between industry and government is outlined. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned process practices that can provide valuable support any safety program.

In order to provide some guidance for preventing human interface problems that could affect human performance and safety during a space mission, this chapter on human-system interface design primarily covers the design of the cockpit, from a technical and process point of view, and the related design of visual-aural alert system and crew seats. In addition, this chapter covers the topic of “contact hazards” with reference to sharp edges, touch temperature, and the specific issue of electroshock hazards during extravehicular activities (EVA).

Selection and training represent two means of ensuring flight crew members are qualified and prepared to perform safely and effectively in space. The first part of the chapter looks at astronaut selection beginning with the evolutionary changes in the US and Russian programs. A discussion of the critical skills and selection best practices augments the description of NASA basic requirements. In addition, commercial astronaut and passenger medical criteria for selection are described. The training part of the chapter begins with a description of typical training phases and sequences followed by the discussion of specific types of training that addresses nominal, off-nominal, contingency, and emergency conditions. Next, training facilities are described as well as the use of orbital and suborbital spaceflight simulators. Final sections focus on the training of cosmonauts in Russia and commercial human spaceflight training.

For commercial human spaceflight to flourish and expand, industry has to develop a notion of safety as the collective responsibility and common strategic business goal of all members. In 2004, the U.S. private spaceflight industry welcomed a law (i.e. the Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act (CSLAA)) postponing the ability of FAA to issue safety regulations, except for aspects of public safety until 2012. The deadline was later moved to 2015. The law, currently undergoing a second postponement until 2020, offers a historic opportunity for space industry to engage in the development of a comprehensive set of industrial consensus standards, based on the experience gained in more than 50years of government programs. This paper proposes framework and rules of an industrial cooperation for consensus standards, in the form of textual content for a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Those standards, when established, could become the basis of a mixed regulatory regime, where industry takes care of self-certifying the vehicles safety, while government regulators would continue to cover launch and reentry operations for all aspect of public safety. This paper also suggest to carry out standardization activities within the broader scope of a Space Safety Institute.

The growing Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment in Earth orbit poses an increasing risk not only to active satellites but also to the general public. Of particular concern are the objects in low earth orbit (LEO) which have the potential for catastrophic consequence upon entry and collision with vulnerable terrestrial targets including airborne planes. There are limitations to the ability to predict uncontrolled object re-entry with sufficient precision to give timely or actionable warnings to threatened air traffic zones or surface locations. A system called R-DBAS (Re-entry Direct Broadcasting Alert System) invented by the co-author of this paper, T. Sgobba former head of the European Space Agency Independent Safety Office, has the potential to avoid catastrophic impacts by generating timely surface or air traffic impact warnings. The system includes a self-contained housing with on-board geolocation receiver, processing, memory with debris breakup models, and direct warning broadcast capability.

The safety of any space system requires a deliberate and interdisciplinary integration of the flight hardware design with the design of its operations throughout the entire lifecycle of the system. This chapter introduces the subsequent chapters that more thoroughly address safety issues associated with the operations of space vehicles, from the design of the infrastructure on ground, through launch, on-orbit, and re-entry operations. This chapter begins with a discussion of safety and risk management at the conceptual level, including several fundamental goals and definitions. The balance of the chapter describes several seminal events and lays the foundation for a graduate level education in space operations safety.

This chapter deals with some key topics of orbital safety. It starts with an overview of the issue of space traffic control and space situational awareness, and then proceeds to address conjunction analyses and collision avoidance maneuvers (CAM), including for the International Space Station. Another kind of collision risk discussed is the jettison of discarded hardware. The chapter then covers rendezvous and docking/berthing operations. Collision safety risks, their causes and consequences, and the measures for protection are discussed in detail. The chapter also covers the issues of space vehicles charging and contamination hazards, including the shock hazard for astronauts involved in extravehicular activities. Finally, the chapter presents end-of life mitigation measures and techniques for space debris removal, such as space tugs, drag devices and electrodynamic propulsion.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses Mission Control Center (MCC) design and operations. This covers the need for and purpose of the MCC and then details structure, operations, design considerations, and mitigation of external events. The second section, on hazardous commands identification and control, explores identification of hazardous commands and then, implementation, including two-step commanding and error prevention, giving the International Space Station life support system as an example. The final section, on flight rules, covers the history of flight rules and their application, use and purpose in space flight, including their documentation and production process.

Several entities have developed, or are involved in the process of developing, safety regulations or guidelines that are appropriate for civil space activities both at the national and international levels. This section provides a brief overview of such entities and of their standardization activities with a view to assessing their (in)adequacy regarding regulatory protection and promotion of space safety.

On 15 October 2002, a Russian Soyuz launcher exploded some twenty seconds after lift-off from the Russian Plesetsk cosmodrome. The launcher’s payload was an unmanned Foton M-1 research satellite containing 44 experiments belonging to the European Space Agency. One of the four Soyuz boosters malfunctioned after launch and lost power. It fell away from the vehicle as it is designed to do when thrust no longer holds it in place and upon impact with the ground its tanks ruptured causing a large fire that resulted in significant damage to the pad. The launcher then automatically shut down the three other boosters about twenty seconds into the launch and the entire rocket fell back, struck the ground, and exploded in a huge fireball at a location about 1 km away from the launch pad. Apparently, the supply of hydrogen peroxide to the propellant turbo pumps was blocked by a metallic object. The explosion killed a Russian soldier watching the launch from the first floor of the integration building. Fortunately, all forty engineers and scientists from various European countries involved in the preparation of the spacecraft who were also watching the launch from a location closer to the explosion but on lower ground were unharmed in the accident.

In this Chapter, several other factors and developments are examined to further assess the rationale for ICAO’s involvement in space. Also included are the modalities for implementing the ICAO for Space proposal.

Publisher Summary This chapter reveals the precise knowledge on not-for-profit fee basis industry that deals with space travel and proposes a comprehensive overview of the safety specifications and safety testing modus operandi of the new industry that deals with commercializing space journey. Although left for specifications, U.S. units and metric measurements are required to be completely obtained. Provisions for amendments are required to be kept for better clarifications while specifying the latest technology or concepts in space flight along with gradual experience. These protection authentication experiments and several security specifications are of great value for the commercial human space flight vehicle developers and for commercial human space flight service providers. However, the International Space Safety Board (ISSB) does not perform its envisaged function. Besides this, the chapter also provides information on preliminary certification by the ISSB by following a methodical process that includes reviewing safety measures in the fields of fabrication, design, and operation.

Publisher Summary The chapter unveils that due to the Russians' outstanding historical achievements, current technical capabilities, and essential contributions to the new International Space Station (ISS) configuration, the involvement of Russia in the space station program brought a new perspective to the NASA partner's relationship. Generally, the commercial activities involving safety risk require licensing and enforced adherence to government-imposed regulations. According to the chapter, norms are also required to prevent the overall independence, consistency, and effectiveness of the safety process by the delegation of some safety-related responsibilities to industry. It is also necessary to ensure that rules are applied evenly by all parties to avoid possible distortion of the commercial competition. ISS commercialization and the international structure of the program would benefit—both in efficiency and effectiveness—by the establishment of a single independent Safety Authority to which ISS partners' space agencies participate and are represented, in respect of the roles and responsibilities assigned by the IGA and MoUs. Therefore, the ISS Safety Authority should be empowered with effective means to achieve its mission. Since the founding Chicago Convention in 1944, the techniques and procedures of such an authority are generally similar to those of commercial aviation airworthiness authorities, which have worked successfully.

Publisher Summary Prevention of human error is an integral part of a good design. Indeed, operational errors can result in inadvertent commanding or the execution of operations that exceed the qualification envelope of the hardware. In the past, human operational errors were controlled mainly through instruction and training. Nowadays, any foreseeable mistake that is not prevented adequately by design is considered in every respect to be a design error, such as the wrong mating of connectors or the accidental activation of a switch. Design errors in space projects are a consequence of the complexity of space systems and the relative ease by which failures of highly energetic systems can propagate to catastrophic consequences. The difficulty of minimizing the occurrence of design errors is exacerbated by the limited systems safety engineering culture of design teams as a whole. The complexity of space systems design, as well as that of the organizations involved in its realization, demands broad knowledge of the key principles and techniques of safety engineering and a multidisciplinary awareness of the associated hazards and potential vulnerabilities inherent in the system. Unfortunately, safety design methods and hazard analysis techniques generally are not taught in engineering schools. In the aerospace industry, on-the-job training in systems safety usually is relegated to small, specialized groups of safety engineers, who often lack the in-depth knowledge of all systems necessary for them to become an integral part of the design teams.