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We test hypotheses about individual-level (partisanship and self-interest) and state-level (tax policy) factors that may shape public attitudes about raising taxes. Respondents were given a scenario where a state budget needed to be balanced with spending cuts or tax increases, and a scenario where either state sales or state income taxes would be increased. We find partisanship, ideology, and self-interest had substantial relationships with how people responded. Democrats, liberals, and those with fewer resources preferred tax increases over spending cuts, and preferred income tax increases over sales tax increases. Republicans (particularly wealthy Republicans), conservatives, and those with more resources preferred spending cuts to tax increases, and preferred sales tax increases over income tax increases. We also find income tax increases and higher tax burdens may correspond with preferences for cutting spending rather than raising taxes, but variation in the rates of a particular tax was not associated with attitudes about raising that tax. Our results suggest an electorate that may be somewhat more sophisticated about fiscal policy than what has been portrayed in several influential studies.

This article tests if radical right populist (RRP) parties draw support from voters with non-mainstream, illiberal attitudes. This follows from assumptions that these parties have rhetorical, stylistic and practical critiques of liberal democracy that appeal to people with politically authoritarian attitudes. I use Module 5 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data and Wave 7 World Values Survey data to test how authoritarian attitudes, in particular, approval of strong, unchecked leaders, may be associated with support for RRP parties. Of 12 unique cases where RRP parties received at least 5% support in a recent election, in most cases preferences for strong, unchecked leaders differentiated RRP party supporters from supporters of other parties generally, and from supporters of centre-right parties. In some cases, negative views of democracy, and acceptance of army rule, also characterized RRP supporters. Most cases have evidence consistent with the hypotheses, with the strongest evidence from supporters of Austria’s FPÖ and Germany’s AfD.

New Zealand First is occasionally misclassified as a ‘radical right’ and/or ‘right-wing populist party.’ This presents an opportunity to examine how parties might be placed into this family of part...

We test how perceptions of feeling like a loser in American politics may condition support for changes to how elections are conducted. We report a survey experiment that sheds some light on why people may feel like an electoral loser, then use this measure of losing to predict support for a range of proposals to change elections. The experiment prompted people to consider if they were satisfied with how democracy works and to think about the design and structure of American government. Respondents were then asked if they felt like they were on the winning or losing ‘side’ of politics. The prompt was associated with higher rates of respondents reporting they felt like they were on the losing side. Non-experimental estimates of support for a range of proposed changes to elections find a substantial relationship between this form of feeling like a loser, and supporting changing how elections are conducted. This relationship holds with controls for partisanship and other factors. One implication of this is that the more that some Americans are prompted to think about their government and democracy, the more likely they support changing how it works.

Studies of support for radical-right populist (RRP) parties find the parties generally receive more support from men than women. This note re-examines the persistent RRP gender gap and explains variation in the gap with country and party-level characteristics. It provides two measures of the gap at the party/country level, and offers hypotheses about where it may be higher or lower. These are tested with over 200 observations of support for 32 European RRP parties from surveys conducted between 2001 and 2019. The gender gap is expected to be lower where there is less gender equality as this may correspond with a reduced likelihood of men perceiving a gender threat. The gap is found to be lower in Western European countries with less gender equality, in countries where a larger proportion of the population are Catholic, and the gap is lower for larger RRP parties. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2034091 .

Direct democracy elections bring into sharp focus several enduring questions about the role of voters in elections. Questions of voter competence, majority rule, spending effects, and process concerns are all highlighted. Many of these questions form the basis of often very pointed debates within the literature. The study of direct democracy throws into sharp relief some of the most enduring questions relating to elections and electoral democracy. So far, however, the answers have not proved satisfying to many observers. In some cases, these debates have persisted despite an accumulation of empirical evidence that would seem to resolve the issues. Contrary to the claims of repeated criticisms, voters are capable of voting on ballot propositions in accord with their own interests and are supportive of the process as a means of making decisions. While direct democracy does have its flaws, the flaws identified by many critics are not really as damning as the critics would seem to believe. For whatever reason, however, the criticisms repeat.

The literature on comparative political institutions highlights a tradeoff between majoritarian/plurality and proportional/consensus models of democracy. The former arrangement is said to enhance having governing parties held accountable. The latter is said to promote representation of a range of views, with a coalition of multiple parties governing. A tradeoff may be that the representativeness of multi-party coalitions can make it difficult for voters to hold government accountable, while single-party governments that facilitate accountability might fail to represent a range of parties in government. The ability of voters to respond to such differences is, however, subject to some skepticism given that the public opinion literature finds serious limits on a person’s ability to know basic facts about political institutions, let alone have preferences for governments that reflect democratic norms of accountability and representativeness. We assess public preferences for single versus multi-party governments and find evidence of systematic preferences that suggests people may link democratic norms of accountability and representativeness to the governmental system that promotes the respective norm. Preferences are also associated with the party system that people are familiar with.

We model attitudes about Congress as structured by perceptions of campaign finance. Attitudes about unlimited corporate and union spending are modeled as structured by knowledge about Congress. We find people with more factual knowledge of Congress were more likely to view unlimited independent corporate and union spending as having improper influence. We also found that people made some distinctions about sources of campaign finance. Knowledgeable people viewed unlimited independent expenditures as improper influence, but were less likely to perceive direct contributions from individuals to candidates as corrupt. When attitudes about Congress are estimated as a function of perceptions about financier influence, we find that perceptions about unlimited independent spending predicted negative views of representation and Congress, whereas perceptions of limited individual donations did not. People who knew the most about Congress were substantially more likely to find unlimited independent spending—the sort allowed by Citizens United—to be troubling.

Public opinion on high-visibility election rules can be expected to reflect elite-level party divisions. We explain how partisanship affects support for, and opposition to, low-visibility convenience voting reforms. We find state-level factors such as quality of polling-place voting and party polarization explain some variance in support. However, individual-level factors are paramount. Attitudes about election reforms are strongly conditioned by partisan predispositions, with Democrats more supportive and Republicans more opposed. In addition, we find younger people, those with lower incomes, nonvoters, and people with disabilities were more likely to support proposals that might make voting easier. Although this cannot demonstrate that increased convenience voting would alter the composition of the electorate, it shows that, above and beyond partisanship, people who faced greater barriers to voting were most supportive of making voting easier. However, the dominant role of partisan predispositions suggests limits to rules changes that might make voting easier.

We compare sources of Donald Trump’s appeal in the 2016 US presidential campaign to the appeal of right-populists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. We compare the appeal of right-popu...

The 2016 US presidential contest, and Donald Trump’s election, present challenges to political science. This special issue explores some of what political science got “right” and “wrong” in terms o...

Features of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over-estimate effects of electoral rules if country-level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.

Right-wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right-wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right-wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right-wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right-wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

We propose a model of public response to politicized election reform. In this model, rival partisan elites send signals on the need and consequences of a proposed reform, with partisans in public adopting those positions. We apply this to test how state use of voter identification laws corresponded with public evaluations of the conduct of a state's elections. We find that the relationship between photo identification laws and confidence in state elections was polarized and conditioned by party identification in 2014. Democrats in states with strict photo identification laws were less confident in their state's elections. Republicans in states with strict identification laws were more confident than others. Results suggest strict photo identification laws are failing to instill broad-based confidence in elections, and that the reform could correspond with diminished confidence among some.

We present reasons to expect that campaigns are less negative under preferential voting. We then examine if preferential voting systems affect how people perceive the conduct of elections. This paper reports results from surveys designed to measure voters‘ perceptions of candidates’ campaigns, comparing places with plurality elections to those that used preferential voting rules. Our surveys of voters indicate that people in cities using preferential voting were significantly more satisfied with the conduct of local campaigns than people in similar cities with plurality elections. People in cities with preferential voting were also less likely to view campaigns as negative, and less likely to respond that candidates were frequently criticizing each other. Results are consistent across a series of robustness checks.