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People make inferences about the trustworthiness of others based on their observed gaze behavior. Faces that consistently look toward a target location are rated as more trustworthy than those that look away from the target. Representations of trust are important for future interactions; yet little is known about how they are consolidated in long-term memory. Sleep facilitates memory consolidation for incidentally learned information and may therefore support the retention of trust representations. We investigated the consolidation of trust inferences across periods of sleep or wakefulness. In addition, we employed a memory cueing procedure (targeted memory reactivation [TMR]) in a bid to strengthen certain trust memories over others. We observed no difference in the retention of trust inferences following delays of sleep or wakefulness, and there was no effect of TMR in either condition. Interestingly, trust inferences remained stable 1 week after learning, irrespective of the initial postlearning delay. A second experiment showed that this implicit learning occurs despite participants' being unable to explicitly recall the gaze behavior of specific faces immediately after encoding. Together, these results suggest that gist-like, social inferences are formed at the time of learning without retaining the original episodic memory and thus do not benefit from offline consolidation through replay. We discuss our findings in the context of a novel framework whereby trust judgments reflect an efficient, powerful, and adaptable storage device for social information.

In 8 experiments, we investigated motion fluency effects on object preference. In each experiment, distinct objects were repeatedly seen moving either fluently (with a smooth and predictable motion) or disfluently (with sudden and unpredictable direction changes) in a task where participants were required to respond to occasional brief changes in object appearance. Results show that (a) fluent objects are preferred over disfluent objects when ratings follow a moving presentation, (b) there is some evidence that object-motion associations can be learned with repeated exposures, (c) sufficiently potent motions can yield preference for fluent objects after a single viewing, and (d) learned associations do not transfer to situations where ratings follow a stationary presentation, even after deep levels of encoding. Episodic accounts of memory retrieval predict that emotional states experienced at encoding might be retrieved along with the stimulus properties. Though object-emotion associations were repeatedly paired, there was no evidence for emotional reinstatement when objects were seen stationary. This indicates that the retrieval process is a critical limiting factor when considering visuomotor fluency effects on behavior. Such findings have real-world consequences. For example, a product advertised with high perceptual fluency might be preferred at the time, but this preference might not transfer to seeing the object on a shelf.

Eye gaze is a powerful directional cue that automatically evokes joint attention states. Even when faces are ignored, there is incidental learning of the reliability of the gaze cueing of another person, such that people who look away from targets are judged less trustworthy. In a series of experiments, we demonstrated further properties of the incidental learning of trust from gaze direction. First, the emotion of the face, whether neutral or smiling, influenced the pattern of trust learning. Second, the effect was specific to judgments of trust; reliability of gaze direction did not influence other emotional judgments of a person, such as liking. And third, visuomotor fluency was not sufficient for learning of trust, whether or not the face served as a target or as a distractor. Taken together, incidental learning of trust is influenced by facial emotion, it is a specific effect that does not generalize to other emotional assessments, and it is not determined solely by processing fluency.

Selective attention is usually considered an egocentric mechanism, biasing sensory information based on its behavioural relevance to oneself. This study provides evidence for an equivalent allocentric mechanism that allows passive observers to selectively attend to information from the perspective of another person. In a negative priming task, participants reached for a red target stimulus whilst ignoring a green distractor. Distractors located close to their hand were inhibited strongly, consistent with an egocentric frame of reference. When participants took turns with another person, the pattern of negative priming shifted to an allocentric frame of reference: locations close to the hand of the observed agent (but far away from the participant's hand) were inhibited strongly. This suggests that witnessing another's action leads the observer to simulate the same selective attention mechanisms such that they effectively perceive their surroundings from the other person's perspective. (Contains 2 figures and 1 table.)

The attentional blink (AB) is a robust phenomenon that has been consistently reported in the cognitive literature. The AB is found when two target images (T1, T2) are presented within 500 ms of each other and errors are induced on the perceptual report of T2. The AB may increase when T1 has some salience to the viewer. This study examined the effects of using pictures of children as T1 on the AB in a sample of child molesters. A larger AB emerged in this sample when T1 was a picture of a child compared with when T1 was a picture of an animal. It is argued that this task may be potentially useful to assess child molesters' level of interest in children. (Contains 4 tables and 2 footnotes.)

When an observed action (e.g., kicking) is compatible to a to be produced action (e.g., a foot-key response as compared to a finger-key response), then the self-produced action is more fluent, that is, it is more accurate and faster. A series of experiments explore the notion that vision-action compatibility effects can influence personal-trait judgments. It is demonstrated that when an observed individual carries out an action that is compatible with the participants' response, (1) this individual is identified more fluently, and (2) the observed individual's personality is attributed with the properties of the observed action. For example, if it is easier to identify one individual with a foot-response when he is seen kicking a ball, as compared to typing, he is perceived to be more "sporty". In contrast, if it is easier to identify one individual with a finger response when he is seen typing as compared to kicking a ball, he is associated with the "academic" trait. These personal-trait judgment effects can be observed with explicit measures, where participants are asked to rate the sporty/academic nature of the person on a scale. They are also obtained when implicit measures are taken in a priming task, where participants are never explicitly asked to rate the personalities of the individuals. A control experiment rules out that these personal-trait effects are merely due to an association of motor responses (foot, finger) to individuals while identifying them, but that these effects depend on a prior manipulation of vision-action fluency.

One component of successful social interactions is joint attention. It is now well established that when a gaze shift is observed, the observer's attention rapidly and automatically orients to the same location in space. It is also established that such attention shifts via gaze are relatively transient and do not evoke subsequent inhibition processes. In contrast to this conventional view, the authors conducted a series of studies that showed that these properties of gaze attention shift are not necessarily the case in all situations. The article demonstrates (a) gaze cuing over longer intervals than previously observed, (b) that these longer term effects can be inhibitory, and (c) that the longer term gaze cuing effects do not appear to be contingent on retrieval associated with a particular face identity.

Observing averted eye gaze results in the automatic allocation of attention to the gazed-at location. The role of the orientation of the face that produces the gaze cue was investigated. The eyes in the face could look left or right in a head-centred frame, but the face itself could be oriented 90 degrees clockwise or anticlockwise such that the eyes were gazing up or down. Significant cueing effects to targets presented to the left or right of the screen were found in these head orientation conditions. This suggests that attention was directed to the side to which the eyes would have been looking towards, had the face been presented upright. This finding provides evidence that head orientation can affect gaze following, even when the head orientation alone is not a social cue. It also shows that the mechanism responsible for the allocation of attention following a gaze cue can be influenced by intrinsic object-based (i.e. head-centred) properties of the task-irrelevant cue.

We investigated whether young and older adults differ on measures of interference (INT), negative priming (NP), and inhibition of return (IOR) on a spatial selective attention task that gradually increased in cognitive demand, from simple perceptual matching to letter identification. For both groups, INT increased and IOR decreased with task demand; while NP remained stable. We round age-related increases in INT, NP, and IOR, independent of task demand. However, only between-groups differences in IOR remained after correcting for age-related slowing in response times. Finally, we found no association between our measures of attention across groups, suggesting negligible overlap between INT, NP, and IOR. Our results indicate that attention is selectively and independently influenced by age and task demands, with both effects dependent on how attention is measured. These findings shed light on the 'frontal hypothesis of aging.' Keywords: attention, aging, task complexity DOI: 10.1037/a0020650

When encountering social scenes, there appears to be rapid and automatic detection of social interactions. Representations of interacting people appear to be bound together via a mechanism of joint attention, which results in enhanced memory, even when participants are unaware that memory is required. However, even though access is facilitated for socially bound representations, we predicted that the individual features of these representations are less efficiently encoded, and features can therefore migrate between the constituent interacting individuals. This was confirmed in Experiment 1, where overall memory for interacting compared with non-interacting dyads was facilitated but binding of features within an individual was weak, resulting in feature migration errors. Experiment 2 demonstrated the role of conscious strategic processing, where participants were aware that memory would be tested. With such awareness, attention can be focused on individual objects allowing the binding of features. The results support an account of two forms of processing: an initial automatic social binding process where interacting individuals are represented as one episode in memory facilitating access and a further stage where attention can be focused on each individual enabling the binding of features within individual objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]