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Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 was the end of the Arctic cooperation between states and others as we knew it, despite the fact that Russia’s illegal actions are not occurring in the Arctic region. Russia’s attack on Ukraine caused pronounced security fears and responses, particularly from the European and North American countries, including the other Arctic states. This naturally affected Arctic cooperation because it is precisely in the Arctic region that Russia is such a vastly central actor. For example, the region’s pre-eminent inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is struggling to continue its activities in full, as the seven western Arctic states paused participating in meetings held in and activities involving Russia. On the other hand, the first in-person meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fisheries agreement in late November 2022 successfully adopted its COP Rules of Procedure by consensus, including Russia. The purpose of this article is to investigate how adversely Arctic international cooperation in inter-governmental forums and treaties has suffered due to the Ukraine war, utilising a qualitative research methodology to collect internal and sensitive information from key informants. In particular, the article aims to find an answer to the following question: In which types of Arctic inter-governmental structures have the states been able to continue the cooperation and for what reasons? The hypothesis that will be tested in this article is whether treaty-based cooperation has fared better than cooperation founded on soft law. This article will flesh out the current state of Arctic cooperative frameworks and actual cooperative activities under them, analysing three soft law-based cooperative frameworks, including the Arctic Council and several treaty-based cooperative frameworks, such as the CAO fisheries agreement and Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement. This article is based on the facts as of 22 February 2023.

Research questions: The objectives of this study are to identify the need for Social Enterprises (SEs) as an alternative form of working in the Finnish labour market, what alternative forms of co-operation between such types of SEs could be and how larger local companies can support the sustainable operation of these small SEs by employing immigrants and the long-term unemployed. Theory: This article draws on the corporate social responsibility CSR theory of traditional enterprises to better explain the factors that can facilitate co-operation between SEs and private enterprises, thereby reaching the sustainable operation of SEs that are run by socially disadvantaged groups of people in Lapland. Phenomenon studied: SE is a new phenomenon in Lapland. There are a few SEs in the region that are struggling to maintain their existence in a sustainable manner. It is harder for the members of such SEs to run businesses or to work and to become successful in Lapland; however, obtaining employment or running a proprietorship is not an alternative (Yeasmin, 2016) for these disadvantaged people. Case context: The article contributes to the studies on the economic integration and labour market sustainability of immigrants and long-term job seekers, and particularly to the socio-economic integration of the long-term unemployed by focusing on the necessity-driven social entrepreneurship networking model in a sparsely populated region, that being the region of Lapland in Northern Finland. Findings: The disadvantaged groups need access to the labour market in Lapland, and social alliances between various partners (e.g., private, public and SE) under different social circumstances (e.g., CSR) can generate alternative options for co-operation to sustain the existence of such SEs in Lapland. An analysis explores future recommendations for co-operation that might sustain SE’s existence and development and might also increase long-term prospects for targeted SEs. Discussion: Lapland-based SEs operated by immigrants or the long-term unemployed are issues and themes that do not fall within the responsibility of any single authority or any single sector. Successfully running SEs demands positive interaction and social innovation strategies among many social partners. Networking with a variety of public stakeholder groups alongside the private sector needs to see an investment of social resources for mapping the phenomena on the topic of social economy, which is a social innovation process that might enable such SEs to have successful outcomes in Lapland.

Many immigrants are either underemployed or unemployed in Lapland, and indeed many of them are long-term unemployed. This unemployment rate among immigrants varies from region to region in Finland....

The main goal of this chapter is to explore the International Law Association’s (ILA’s) role in the restatement and ongoing evolution of Indigenous rights in international and national law. It first examines the way in which the main instrument for Indigenous peoples from a global viewpoint came into being and what its basic content amounts to. The chapter then assesses the role played by the ILA during the period of the first ILA Committee’s (Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) mandate in restating and influencing the evolution of international law as it relates to Indigenous peoples. It also examines the contribution made by the second ILA Committee (Committee on the Implementation of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the International Law Association) in ascertaining a possible implementation gap between international standards in respect of Indigenous peoples and the reality of certain cases on the ground, as well as the development of best practices to overcome it. Thereafter, this chapter draws conclusions on the ILA’s role in the evolutionary process of the law relating to Indigenous peoples.

It has been studied that there are many young immigrants who are at risk of being marginalized in Finnish Lapland. There are less opportunities for participating in activities in northern Finland, ...

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the participation of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (IPOs) in the policy and law making of Arctic governance. By focusing on the importance of the status of Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council, the chapter describes how Arctic IPOs have cemented their unique status as non-state actors in the Arctic Council and also emerged as important players in the development of Arctic policy outside this forum. Although there remain important challenges that still limit the influence of Arctic IPOs, their contribution in shaping Arctic policy has helped over the years to integrate and acknowledge the values and rights of Indigenous peoples in the governance of the Arctic. In this chapter, the Sami Council and Inuit Circumpolar Council are also singled out to illustrate their specific role in this context.

In the South China Sea Arbitration 2016, the Tribunal ruled on the criteria to determine the historic status of waters. Historic title claims are exceptional as they create rights and obligations outside the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This article examines the Canadian historic title claim to the Northwest Passage in light of the ruling. First, the article will go into the Tribunal’s analysis of the criteria and standard of evidence required for establishing a historic rights/title claim (specifically, China’s claim in the South China Sea). Next, Canada’s claim will be tested against the three general criteria (effective exercise of jurisdiction, passage of time and acquiescence by foreign states). The goal of this article is to highlight the positive and negative aspects of Canada’s historic internal waters claim.

This paper will focus on the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), as one of several forums for intergovernmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area. It will primarily discuss the origin, status, organisation, tasks and relevance of the CBSS. This will be done in comparison with the Arctic and Barents Councils, two similar organisations in the North. It will consider the broader context of Baltic Sea Area governance focusing on other institutionalised forms of cooperation in this area, including the EU and the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM). The nature of the CBSS as a ‘soft organisation’, in other words an organisation that owes its existence to ‘soft law’ instruments which are not legally binding under public international law, will be highlighted. This article asks the question to what extent does this ‘soft’ nature of the CBSS have consequences for its organisation and functioning. Consideration will also be given to the specific role of the CBSS in Baltic Sea Area governance taking into account its ‘soft’ status, limited resources, broad range of tasks and activities and the political realities affecting Baltic Sea Area cooperation. Glossary and abbreviations AEPS, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy; B7, Baltic Seven Islands; Baltic TRAM, Transnational Research Access in the Macroregion; BASREC, Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation; BEAC, Barents Euro-Arctic Council; BEATA, Barents Euro-Arctic Pan-European Transport Area; BSC, Baltic Sea Commission; BSLF, Baltic Sea Labour Forum; BSPC, Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference; BSRBCC, Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation; BSSC, Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation; CBSS, Council of the Baltic Sea States; CPMR, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions; CPN, Civil Protection Network; CSCE, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe; CSO, Committee of Senior Officials; EEA, European Economic Area; EGMP, Expert Group on Maritime Policy; EGYA, Expert Group on Youth Affairs; ENPRO, Network of Prosecutors on Environmental Crime; EUSBSR, EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region; HELCOM, Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, Helsinki Commission; Inter alia, among other things; IOM, International Organization for Migration; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; PFI, Pilot Financial Initiative; PFS, Project Support Facility; Raison d’etre, Reason of being; the purpose or claimed reason for the existence of something; SAO, Senior Arctic Official; UBC, Union of Baltic Cities; VASAB, Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea; WGE, Working Group on Environment; WGEC, Working Group on Economic Cooperation; WGIP, Working Group of Indigenous Peoples

The development of an Internationally Binding Legal Instrument (ILBI) for the conservation and sustainable management of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) has profound implications for the future regulatory activities of a host of regional governance structures exercising competence over these waters. In the rather stilted vernacular of the BBNJ Process, the ILBI aspires to “not undermine” the work of preexisting institutions and initiatives. Inevitably, given the emphasis upon future institutional symbiosis, a key challenge facing the ILBI is to promote its four thematic priorities—marine genetic resources, area-based management tools, environmental assessment, and capacity building and technology transfer—in a manner that can be effectively harnessed by current regional and sectoral frameworks. One region in which the intriguing set of challenges and opportunities presented by the ILBI are strikingly manifested is the Arctic. Some have argued for a regional treaty or clearer recognition of the “special” nature of Arctic conditions. However, we view the ILBI as a potential milestone in Arctic governance that can provide a firm platform to build on current cooperative arrangements for these vulnerable and rapidly changing marine ecosystems. Moreover, we argue that the present legal and institutional framework for the Arctic need not be revisited at this juncture, as it provides a strong regime through which to implement the core objectives of the ILBI. Its ability to do so, however, will depend on whether the ILBI (1) is effectively designed to work with preexisting machinery and (2) succeeds in clarifying and advancing universally-agreed methodological requirements for its four priority areas.

Climate change makes the Arctic ocean accessible for a range of human activities, such as shipping or hydrocarbon extraction, which can severely damage the fragile natural environment. The emergence of a ‘new ocean’ raises the question whether existing international legal norms are sufficient to adequately govern the Arctic ocean in light of this changing situation. Looking at the work of existing institutions, initiatives by Arctic States and applicable legal norms, the authors investigate the suitability of the current international legal framework for the governance of the Arctic ocean in general and the protection of the marine environment in particular. In the absence of a regional seas agreement for the Arctic ocean, particular attention will be given to the work of the Arctic Council and to potential future developments of the international legal framework governing in particular the high seas part of the central Arctic ocean.

The Arctic is undergoing unprecedented and large-scale changes that impact communities as well as the natural environment. Climate change, globalization and a rush for resources provide a unique mix of challenges also from the perspective of governance. This leads to the question how the Arctic states can react to this fundamentally new situation, a question that becomes urgent in light of the reactive nature of international law and the speed and scope of the changes experienced in the North. This issue appears under-researched from a legal perspective, just as there is a relative absence of hard law, in particular relating to the central Arctic ocean, with which this chapter is primarily concerned. The text aims at showing existing reactions to these challenges by expanding the scope of the investigation to soft law and to the role of the Arctic Council, which is not an international organization in the proper sense of the term. It is shown that there are indeed international efforts to govern the central Arctic ocean. While these efforts are currently still fragmented, their existence holds the promise of a reactive capacity of the international Arctic community even in the face of massive changes.

Norway will soon celebrate that 100 years ago, the former ‘no-man's land’ of the Svalbard archipelago was placed under its sovereignty. However, this paper focuses on another important and often omitted element also brought about by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty regarding its demilitarisation and neutralisation. We ask how has the Svalbard security regime been able to meet the various challenges it has faced over almost 100 years of existence? Also, given that the treaty was drafted at the beginning of the 20th century, are the security provisions of this regime already obsolete or are they seen still as valid, and more importantly functional against the backdrop of rapidly changing security realities? This paper then goes further and while it uses Svalbard as a case study, it tries to assess the role of demilitarisation and neutralisation in the modern context by trying to infer possible lessons from two similar regimes, which apply to Antarctica and the Åland Islands.