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When does the mind begin? Infant psychology is mysterious in part because we cannot remember our first months of life, nor can we directly communicate with infants. Even more speculative is the possibility of mental life prior to birth. The question of when consciousness, or subjective experience, begins in human development thus remains incompletely answered, though boundaries can be set using current knowledge from developmental neurobiology and recent investigations of the perinatal brain. Here, we offer our perspective on how the development of a sensory perturbational complexity index (sPCI) based on auditory (“beep-and-zip”), visual (“flash-and-zip”), or even olfactory (“sniff-and-zip”) cortical perturbations in place of electromagnetic perturbations (“zap-and-zip”) might be used to address this question. First, we discuss recent studies of perinatal cognition and consciousness using techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and, in particular, magnetoencephalography (MEG). While newborn infants are the archetypal subjects for studying early human development, researchers may also benefit from fetal studies, as the womb is, in many respects, a more controlled environment than the cradle. The earliest possible timepoint when subjective experience might begin is likely the establishment of thalamocortical connectivity at 26 weeks gestation, as the thalamocortical system is necessary for consciousness according to most theoretical frameworks. To infer at what age and in which behavioral states consciousness might emerge following the initiation of thalamocortical pathways, we advocate for the development of the sPCI and similar techniques, based on EEG, MEG, and fMRI, to estimate the perinatal brain's state of consciousness.

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

Recently, the discussion regarding the consequences of cutting the corpus callosum (“split-brain”) has regained momentum (Corballis, Corballis, Berlucchi, & Marzi, Brain, 141(6), e46, 2018; Pinto et al., Brain, 140(5), 1231–1237, 2017a; Pinto, Lamme, & de Haan, Brain, 140(11), e68, 2017; Volz & Gazzaniga, Brain, 140(7), 2051–2060, 2017; Volz, Hillyard, Miller, & Gazzaniga, Brain, 141(3), e15, 2018). This collective review paper aims to summarize the empirical common ground, to delineate the different interpretations, and to identify the remaining questions. In short, callosotomy leads to a broad breakdown of functional integration ranging from perception to attention. However, the breakdown is not absolute as several processes, such as action control, seem to remain unified. Disagreement exists about the responsible mechanisms for this remaining unity. The main issue concerns the first-person perspective of a split-brain patient. Does a split-brain harbor a split consciousness or is consciousness unified? The current consensus is that the body of evidence is insufficient to answer this question, and different suggestions are made with respect to how future studies might address this paucity. In addition, it is suggested that the answers might not be a simple yes or no but that intermediate conceptualizations need to be considered.

The cognitive phenomenology debate concerns the nature of conscious thought. On one side of the debate are those who deny that thought has a sui generis phenomenal character. This view—which I refer to as ‘conservatism’—holds that to the extent that thoughts are phenomenally conscious, their phenomenal character is purely sensory. On the other side of the debate are those who hold that thought is characterized by sui generis non-sensory phenomenal states—‘cognitive phenomenology’. My concern in this chapter is not with the question of whether cognitive phenomenology exists, but with the very debate about itself: why do philosophers of mind disagree about the nature of conscious thought? I argue for a semantic analysis of this debate: conservatives and liberals lack a shared conception of what cognitive phenomenology would be. I go on to argue that the real lesson of the cognitive phenomenology debate is that there may be no unitary concept of phenomenal consciousness.

Consciousness is—or is alleged to be—related to free will in a number of ways. This chapter distinguishes two main points of contact. The first is related to belief in the existence of free will. Here, it is argued that one might appeal to the experience of freely willing an action to explain why belief in the reality of free will is widespread and/or to explain why that belief is true (or at least reasonable). The second point of contact between consciousness and free action/will holds that consciousness is in some way necessary for free action/will. The chapter considers this proposal in light of a number of distinctions: between consciousness as a property of agents and consciousness as a property of mental state, and between consciousness understood as wakefulness and consciousness understood as experience.

At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (the NCCs). One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically neutral, it is structurally committed, for it presupposes a certain model—what we call the Lite-Brite model—of consciousness. This, we argue, represents a serious liability for the NCC framework for the plausibility of the Lite-Brite model is very much an open question, and the science of consciousness would be better served by a framework that does not presuppose it. Drawing on interventionist ideas in the philosophy of science, we suggest that the Difference-Maker framework can provide just such an alternative. Instead of searching for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), we ought to be searching for the difference makers of consciousness (DMCs). We detail how a shift to searching DMCs will change both the practice of consciousness science and the interpretation of existing results.

As human adults, we experience ourselves as intentional agents. Here, we address how intentional agency and the corresponding agentive experiences emerge in infancy. When formulating a developmental theory of intentional agency, we encounter a so-called paradox of agency: three plausible theses regarding intentional agency that in combination seem to make it impossible for the developing infant to acquire a sense of agency. By recognizing various types of intentions, we propose a framework in which the paradox can be resolved, allowing infants to bootstrap their way to becoming intentional agents and experiencing a sense of agency.

Conscious thought has been neglected, but it has not been entirely overlooked. Discussion of the topic has focused on three sets of questions. The first set of questions focuses on the kinds of states (events, episodes) that qualify as forms of conscious thought. What might a taxonomy of conscious thought look like? A second set of questions concerns the kind(s) of consciousness that characterizes thought. Are thoughts conscious in the same fundamental way that other mental phenomena are, or is ‘cognitive consciousness’—that is, the consciousness associated with thought—sui generis? A third set of questions concerns the relationship between consciousness and thought. Is consciousness essential to thought, or is it an accidental and contingent feature of thought—a feature that some thoughts possess but others lack? This chapter provides an opinionated point of entry into these and other questions.

In a recent series of experiments, Pinto and colleagues found that the split-brain patient D.D.C. was able to respond accurately to stimuli in either visual field, whether using his right hand, his left hand, or verbally. Pinto and colleagues argue that this demonstrates that a split-brain patient remains a unitary agent and thus continues to possess a unified consciousness. This paper provides a critical evaluation of that claim. First, we argue that two conceptions of the unity of consciousness need to be distinguished: an agency-based conception and an experience-based conception. Second, we argue that it is an open question whether the data presented by Pinto and colleagues is best understood in terms of the unity of agency. Whether that interpretation is correct depends not only on the mechanisms that produce split-brain behaviour, but also on what is involved in being a single agent. Third, we argue that even if the behavioral data indicated that D.D.C has a unified consciousness in the agency-based sense of the term, it is difficult to reconcile them with the claim that his consciousness is fully unified in the experience-based sense.

Eleven authors with disparate relevant backgrounds give their view on what is meant by the word "cognition".

Of late philosophers of mind have been greatly exercised by a debate about the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ (e.g., Bayne 2009; Bayne 2016; Brogaard 2013-a; Fish 2013; Hawley & Macpherson 2011; Logue 2013; Lyons 2005; Masrour 2011; McClelland 2016; Nanay 2011; Price 2009; Prinz 2013; Reiland 2014; Siegel 2006; Siegel 2010). The issue, roughly put, concerns the range of properties that ‘figure in’ perceptual experience. The focus of the debate has been very much on the contents of visual experience. It is relatively uncontroversial that colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture can all figure in the contents of visual experience. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these are also visually experienced. If a clear case could be made for adding some class of properties to the list, this would be a valuable result. This paper makes just such a case for ‘ensemble properties’—features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. Ensemble properties include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent research has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. Combining this with a number of philosophical considerations, we conclude that ensemble properties can (and often do) figure in visual experience.

The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states.

The current taxonomy for post-comatose disorders of consciousness (DoC) contrasts the vegetative state (VS), the minimally conscious state (MCS), and the emerged from minimally conscious state (EMC...

It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qualifies as a higher state of consciousness relative to the state of normal waking awareness. This article subjects this proposal to critical scrutiny, focusing on the question of what it would mean for a state of consciousness to be 'higher'. We begin by considering the contrast between conscious contents and conscious global states. We then review the changes in conscious global state associated with psychedelic drug use, focusing on the effects of two serotonergic hallucinogens: psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide. Limiting our review to findings obtained from lab-based experiments and reported in peer-reviewed journals, we prioritize the more common and reliably induced effects obtained through subjective questionnaires and psychophysical measures. The findings are grouped into three broad categories (sensory perception, cognitive function, and experiences of unity) and demonstrate that although certain aspects of consciousness are improved or enhanced in the psychedelic state, many of the functional capacities that are associated with consciousness are seriously compromised. Psychedelic-induced states of consciousness are indeed remarkable in many ways, but it is inappropriate to regard them as 'higher' states of consciousness. The fact that psychedelics affect different aspects of consciousness in fundamentally different ways provides evidence against the unidimensional (or 'level-based') view of consciousness, and instead provides strong support for a multidimensional conception of conscious states. The final section of the article considers the implications of this analysis for two prominent theories of consciousness: the Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory.

One of the features of human societies is the ubiquity of religious commitment. But why do we find religious ideas compelling? ‘The roots of religious belief’ suggests we need to look beyond the arguments for God’s existence. The ‘standard model’ of religious belief is comprised of three elements: the activity of a hypersensitive agency detection device; the intuitive pull of teleological explanations; and the need to ensure that the members of a society comply with its norms. What implications might the standard model have for the rationality of religious belief? The destabilizing thesis, the by-product argument, the argument from explanatory absence, and the argument from unreliability are all discussed.

Philosophy of Religion: A Very Short Introduction introduces the field of philosophy of religion, and engages with some of the most burning questions that philosophers discuss. Considering how ‘religion’ should be defined, and whether we even need to be able to define it in order to engage in the philosophy of religion, it goes on to discuss whether the existence of God matters. Exploring the problem of evil, this VSI debates the connection between faith and reason, and the related question of what role reason should play in religious contexts. Shedding light on the relationship between science and religion, it finishes by considering the topics of reincarnation and the afterlife.

Language plays many roles in religious thought and practice, but philosophers of religion are most interested in the doctrinal uses of language. ‘Speaking of God’ considers both realism and anti-realism—which is favoured by some theorists—and their plausibility. One of the most influential versions of anti-realism construes religious utterances as expressions of emotional states or attitudes. One motivation for anti-realism derives from the verificationist theory of meaning, but this has few contemporary advocates. The different names of God are also discussed with the two main accounts of how names refer: descriptivism and the causal view. Finally, two accounts of religious predication are outlined: the univocal and analogical accounts.

Religions differ widely in their conceptions of God’s nature, from God as a unity to God as a triune and God as a supernatural being or the totality of all that there is. ‘The concept of God’ restricts its attention to what philosophers of religion call ‘classical monotheism’ because monotheism—or theism—has dominated philosophy of religion within the Western world. Theism lies at the heart of the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and is found in certain strands of Hinduism. Theists regard God as the creator of the world; a perfect being of unlimited knowledge, power, and goodness; and the proper object of our worship.

Is it possible to prove that God exists? There is certainly no shortage of arguments that purport to establish God’s existence, but ‘Arguments for the existence of God’ focuses on three of the most influential arguments: the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the argument from religious experience. Before examining these arguments, it first considers the very enterprise of attempting to establish God’s existence. What should we expect from an argument for God’s existence? What would it take for such an argument to be successful? The attempt to justify claims about the nature and existence of God on the basis of commonly accepted truths is known as natural theology.

Assuming—as theists invariably do—that God wants to be recognized and worshipped, why does God not make Godself manifest? Perhaps God is ‘silent’ because God doesn’t exist. ‘Divine hiddenness and the nature of faith’ considers both the hiddenness objection and the benefits of divine hiddenness: that divine hiddenness is a precondition for moral agency; that if God’s existence were evident to us then any relationship that we might have with God would be inauthentic; and that belief in God is more virtuous when it is based on faith. It also discusses the thoughts of W.K. Clifford, William James, and Søren Kierkegaard on religious belief.

Speculation on the nature of the afterlife is as old as recorded history. Although the doctrine of an afterlife is not found in all religious traditions, where it does, it is typically central to the religious belief and practice. But is the idea of an afterlife intelligible? ‘The afterlife’ considers substance dualism, a concept popular throughout the history of religious thought, but no longer favoured by contemporary philosophers of religion. It also discusses three resurrection models: the reassembly, body-snatchers, and falling elevator models. In addition to asking whether life after death is a possible state for creatures like us, it also asks whether we should even want to live forever.

Philosophy of religion is concerned with philosophical questions prompted by religious faith and experience. Some of these questions concern religion generally; others concern particular families of religion; and some concern particular religious traditions. ‘What is the philosophy of religion?’ explains how there is an intimate relationship between philosophy of religion and theology, but that the nature and location of the border between them is of some dispute. Some religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Taoism, embrace philosophical reflection, whereas the Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—contain very little in the way of explicit philosophical reflection. Despite this, numerous Abrahamic philosophers have made important contributions to the philosophy of religion.

Evil represents the most serious challenge to belief in God. Philosophers of religion typically distinguish between two versions of the problem of evil: the logical and the evidential problem. ‘The problem of evil’ focuses on theists who provide two types of response to the problem without modifying the classical theistic conception of God: defences and theodicies. Almost all responses involve an appeal to the ‘greater good strategy’, including soul-making, natural law, and free will. A very different approach to the problem of evil is the sceptical response, which aims only to make plausible the idea that we can’t tell whether or not the evils of the world are absorbed.

This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcomatose disorders of consciousness (DoC), and it provides guidelines for how an improved DoC taxonomy might be developed. In particular, it is argued that behavioral criteria for the application of DoC categories should be supplemented with brain-based criteria (eg, information derived from electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging), and that the categorical framework that currently characterizes DoC should be replaced by a multidimensional framework that better captures the performance of patients across a range of cognitive and behavioural tasks. Ann Neurol 2017;82:866-872.

According to the epistemic conception of delusions, delusional thought can be distinguished from nondelusional thought by the degree to which it involves departures from the norms of epistemic rationality. This conception is enshrouded in the DSM characterization of delusions and is presupposed by most theoretical accounts of delusions. This paper presents a number of objections to the epistemic conception and argues that the view is less plausible than an alternative approach that centers on the notion of proper function. According to the proper function view, delusions occur when the systems responsible for belief fixation fail to function in the way that they were designed to function. Thus understood, delusions can involve departures from the norms of epistemic rationality but they need not.