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Background: Many clinical and population-based research studies pivoted from in-person assessments to phone-based surveys due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The impact of these transitions on survey response remains understudied, especially for people living with HIV. Given that there are gender-specific trends in alcohol and substance use, it is particularly important to capture these data for women. Objective: Identify factors associated with responding to an alcohol and substance use phone survey administered during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Women's Interagency HIV Study, a multicenter US prospective cohort of women living with and without HIV. Methods: We used multivariable logistic regression to assess for associations of pre-pandemic (April–September 2019) sociodemographic factors, HIV status, housing status, depressive symptoms, alcohol use, and substance use with response to an early-pandemic (August–September 2020) phone survey. Results: Of 1,847 women who attended an in-person visit in 2019, 78% responded to a phone survey during the pandemic. The odds of responding were lower for women of Hispanic ethnicity (aOR 0.47 95% CI 0.33–0.66, ref=Black/African American) and those who reported substance use (aOR 0.63 95% CI 0.41–0.98). By contrast, the odds were higher for White women (aOR 1.64 95% CI 1.02–2.70, ref=Black/African American) and those with stable housing (aOR 1.74 95% CI 1.24–2.43). Conclusions: Pivoting from an in-person to phone-administered alcohol and substance use survey may lead to underrepresentation of key subpopulations of women who are often neglected in substance use and HIV research. As remote survey methods become more common, investigators need to ensure that the study population is representative of the target population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of manipulation arguments against compatibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particular action) do not impact judgments about free will and moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people's judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: people judged that an agent was less free and responsible when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least one but not all agents) than when the manipulation was universal (impacting every agent). This study examines people's judgements about existential and universal manipulation cases that involve both intentional and non‐intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation scope also affects people's free will and responsibility judgments in manipulation cases involving both intentional and non‐intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we also found that manipulation type influences the effect that manipulation scope has on people's free will judgments but not their moral responsibility judgments, which indicates that people's free will and responsibility judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and moral responsibility are conceptually bound together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature on forgiveness is dedicated to understanding the reasons to forgive and what changes in attitude are required to do so. But philosophers have been much less attentive to what happens after agents forgive. This is a serious oversight, since the reasons to forgive do not always retain their force and it is not always possible, or advisable, to maintain the changes in attitudes that forgiveness requires. Fortunately, Monique Wonderly has begun to fill this lacuna in the literature with her recent work on un-forgiveness. According to the author, un-forgiveness involves altering our attitudes, by either reinhabiting an adversarial stance towards an agent for their wrongdoing and/or returning one’s relationship with them to the state it was in prior to forgiveness taking place. While Wonderly’s account of un-forgiveness is both novel and illuminating, it is incomplete. In this paper, we argue that one can also un-forgive by forgetting that the wrong in question occurred and/or that the previously forgiven agent was the perpetrator of the wrong. We contend that not only is it possible to un-forgive by forgetting, but doing so can be both justified and morally important. We defend our view by considering the objection that un-forgiveness by forgetting can negatively impact victims’ relationships with wrongdoers as well as addressing the concern that agents cannot exercise their agency over their memories in order to un-forgive by forgetting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Methadone is increasingly initiated during hospitalization for the treatment of opioid use disorder (OUD). However, little is known about which factors are associated with linkage to opioid treatment programs (OTP) and retention in methadone maintenance therapy (MMT) following hospital discharge. Materials & Methods: This is a retrospective study of adults with OUD hospitalized in an urban, safety-net hospital referred by inpatient clinicians to an onsite OTP for post-discharge MMT follow-up from October 2017 to July 2019. We used multivariable modified Poisson regression models to generate adjusted risk ratios (aRR) for associations of sociodemographic factors, mental health disorders, alcohol use, stimulant use, and prior care engagement with post-discharge OTP enrollment and MMT retention at 30 and 90-days. Results: Of the 125 patients referred, 40% enrolled in the OTP post-discharge. Among enrollees, 74% were retained at 30-days and 52% were retained at 90-days. Patients with co-occurring stimulant use were less likely to enroll in the OTP post-discharge compared to those without stimulant use (aRR 0.65, 95% CI 0.44–0.97). We found no associations with 30-day MMT retention, but patients who reported stable housing were more likely to be retained in MMT at 90-days compared to those without stable housing (aRR 1.66, 95% CI 1.03–2.66). Conclusion: Our findings suggest that hospitalized patients with co-occurring stimulant use may need additional support to optimize post-discharge OTP linkage. Stable housing may improve retention in MMT. Additional research is needed to identify trends in MMT engagement among those referred from the acute hospital setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a research which argues that Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility are immune to manipulation arguments. The paper argues that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. It also considers two ways of modifying manipulation arguments to resist Strawsonian challenge. The paper also focuses on Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument.

In a 2020 article in Analysis , Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite's lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen's own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite's and hypercrite's standing to self-blame , which reveals that the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different from the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent essay, Deery and Nahmias (Philos Stud 174(5):1255–1276, 2017) utilize interventionism about causation to develop an account of causal sourcehood in order to defend compatibilism about free will and moral responsibility from manipulation arguments. In this paper, we criticize Deery and Nahmias's analysis of sourcehood by drawing a distinction between two forms of causal invariance that can come into conflict on their account. We conclude that any attempt to resolve this conflict will either result in counterintuitive attributions of moral responsibility or will undermine their response to manipulation arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are ~20 types of retinal ganglion cells (RGCs) in mice, each of which has distinct molecular, morphological, and physiological characteristics. Each RGC type sends axon projections to specific brain areas that execute light-dependent behaviors. Here, we show that the T-box transcription factor Tbr2 is required for the development of several RGC types that participate in non-image-forming circuits. These types are molecularly distinct, project to non-image-forming targets, and include intrinsically photosensitive RGCs. Tbr2 mutant mice have reduced retinal projections to non-image-forming nuclei and an attenuated pupillary light reflex. These data demonstrate that Tbr2 acts to execute RGC type choice and/or survival in a set of RGCs that mediates light-induced subconscious behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the recent article 'A new approach to manipulation arguments,' Patrick Todd seeks to reframe a common incompatibilist form of argument often leveraged against compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. Known as manipulation arguments, these objections rely on cases in which agents, though they have met standard compatibilist conditions for responsibility, have been manipulated in such a way that they fail to be blameworthy for their behavior. Traditionally, in order to get a manipulation argument off the ground, an incompatibilist must illustrate that a manipulated agent is not at all responsible for her behavior. Todd argues that this is an unnecessarily heavy burden-the incompatibilist need only show that the presence of manipulation mitigates ascriptions of responsibility. Though innovative, Todd fails to present his modified manipulation argument in a way that poses a true threat to the compatibilist. In fact, by introducing a scalar conception of moral responsibility, Todd gives the compatibilist the tools necessary to better handle the incompatibilist's original manipulation argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer's account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, ; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), ) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311-313, ). We show that Lehrer's examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer's account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer's own account is more plausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: As health profession schools implement addiction curricula, they need survey instruments to evaluate the impact of the educational interventions. However, existing measures do not use current non-stigmatizing language and fail to capture core concepts.Objective: To develop a brief measure of health profession student readiness to work with people who use drugs (PWUDs) and establish its content validity.Methods: We conducted a literature review of existing instruments and desired clinical competencies related to providing care to PWUD and used results and expert feedback to create and revise a pool of 72 items. We conducted cognitive interviews with ten pre-clinical health profession students from various US schools of nursing, pharmacy, and medicine to ensure the items were easy to understand. Finally, we used a modified Delphi process with twenty-four health professions educators and addiction experts (eight each from nursing, pharmacy, and medicine) to select items for inclusion in the final scale. We analyzed expert ratings of individual items and interdisciplinary agreement on ratings to decide how to prioritize items. We ultimately selected 12 attitudes and 12 confidence items to include in the REadiness to Discuss Use, Common Effects, and HArm Reduction Measure (REDUCE-HARM). Experts rated their overall assessment of the final scale.Results: Twenty-two of twenty-four experts agreed or strongly agreed that the attitudes scale measures student attitudes that impact readiness to work with PWUDs. Twenty-three of twenty-four experts agreed or strongly agreed that the confidence scale measures student self-efficacy in competencies that impact readiness to work with PWUDs. Seven of 72 initial items and none of the 24 selected items had statistically significant differences between disciplines.Conclusions: The REDUCE-HARM instrument has strong content validity and may serve as a useful tool in evaluating addiction education. Additional research is needed to establish its reliability, construct validity, and responsiveness to change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are 'biased toward the future'. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal hierarchy that the authors claim is inherent to the structure of epistemically responsible belief-formation: pursuing true beliefs by pursuing beliefs that are objectively likely given one’s total available evidence; pursuing this sub-goal by pursuing beliefs that are likely true (given that evidence) relative to one’s own deep epistemic sensibility; and pursuing this sub-sub-goal by forming beliefs in accordance with one’s own all-in, ultima facie, epistemic seemings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]