Search

The emergence of the ability to think about future possibilities must have played an influential role in human evolution, driving a range of foresightful behaviours, including preparation, communication and technological innovation. Here we review the archeological evidence for such behavioural indicators of foresight. We find the earliest signs of hominins retaining tools and transporting materials for repeated future use emerging from around 1.8 Ma. From about 0.5 Ma onwards, there are indications of technical and social changes reflecting advances in foresight. And in a third period, starting from around 140 000 years ago, hominins appear to have increasingly relied on material culture to shape the future and to exchange their ideas about possibilities. Visible signs of storytelling, even about entirely fictional scenarios, appear over the last 50 000 years. Although the current evidence suggests that there were distinct transitions in the evolution of our capacity to think about the future, we warn that issues of taphonomy and archaeological sampling are likely to skew our picture of human cognitive evolution.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

Adults often reason about what might have happened had they chosen an alternative course of action in the past, which can elicit the counterfactual emotion of regret. It is unclear whether young children's emotions are similarly impacted by counterfactual thinking about past possibilities. In this study, 4- to 9-year-old children ( N = 160) opened one of two boxes, which concealed small and large prizes, respectively. Some children had the means to open either box, whereas other children only had the means to open one box. After seeing that the prize they did not obtain was larger than the one they did obtain, children were significantly more likely to report a negative change in emotion when the non-obtained prize had been a straightforward counterfactual possibility than when it had not. This shows that even young children experience counterfactual emotions following choices, which may ultimately drive them to make better choices in the future. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

Viewing static images depicting movement can result in a motion aftereffect: people tend to categorise direction signals as moving in the opposite direction relative to the implied motion in still photographs. This finding could indicate that inferred motion direction can penetrate sensory processing and change perception. Equally possible, however, is that inferred motion changes decision processes, but not perception. Here we test these two possibilities. Since both categorical decisions and subjective confidence are informed by sensory information, confidence can be informative about whether an aftereffect probably results from changes to perceptual or decision processes. We therefore used subjective confidence as an additional measure of the implied motion aftereffect. In Experiment 1 (implied motion), we find support for decision-level changes only, with no change in subjective confidence. In Experiment 2 (real motion), we find equal changes to decisions and confidence. Our results suggest the implied motion aftereffect produces a bias in decision-making, but leaves perceptual processing unchanged.

Prospective memory (PM) tasks that impose strong demands on strategic monitoring decline more in late adulthood relative to tasks dependent on more automatic cue detection processes. This finding has proven robust to numerous manipulations, with one exception: time-based PM. However, conventional time-based tasks may inadvertently present time-related yet still event-based cues. At the same time, prior studies have failed to consider whether time-based age differences vary according to the degree of deliberate strategic processing required to access these cues. In this study, 53 younger and 40 older participants completed three time-based PM conditions in which a response had to be executed when a sand timer completed a cycle. In one condition, this timer could only be accessed by explicit, deliberate monitoring (by pressing a specific key), in a second, it could also be accessed more perfunctorily (simply by altering ones' visual focus)-and in the third, could not be accessed at all (forcing participants to rely solely on internal temporal estimation processes). Negative age differences emerged in both conditions where participants were able to access the timer, but not in the condition where the timer was hidden. These data provide novel evidence of age-related preservation in at least some aspects of the temporal processing required to support time-based PM. They also suggest that younger and older adults can and do engage in monitoring when given this option, but that only the former group may be able to benefit, even when this monitoring can be conducted relatively perfunctorily. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Ferrigno et al. (2021) claim to provide evidence that monkeys can reason through the disjunctive syllogism (given A or B, not A, therefore B) and conclude that monkeys therefore understand logical “or” relations. Yet their data fail to provide evidence that the baboons they tested understood the exclusive “or” relations in the experimental task. For two mutually exclusive possibilities—A or B—the monkeys appeared to infer that B was true when A was shown to be false, but they failed to infer that B was false when A was shown to be true. In our own research, we recently found an identical response pattern in 2.5- to 4-year-old children, whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated that they could make both inferences. The monkeys’ and younger children’s responses are instead consistent with an incorrect understanding of A and B as having an inclusive “or” relation. Only the older children provided compelling evidence of representing the exclusive “or” relation between A and B.

Objectives:While emotional responses experienced in-the-moment appear to remain intact in Parkinson’s disease (PD), no study has tested whether this extends to the prediction of future emotional responses. The present study aimed to provide the first assessment of affective forecasting capacity in this cohort.Methods:A positively and negatively valenced affective forecasting task and broader clinical battery were completed by a PD group (ns = 28 and 37, respectively) and a demographically matched neurotypical control group (ns = 38 and 39, respectively).Results:No group differences emerged on the two tasks, with the two groups underestimating their level of happiness and overestimating their level of negative affect to a similar degree. Affective forecasting error scores were unrelated to clinical characteristics.Conclusions:Given that affective forecasting relies on self-projection into the future, a skill shown to often be disrupted in this cohort, impairments were expected. However, this study provides initial evidence that this may not be the case. These findings are potentially important given that how we think about and envisage the future affectively is a major determinant of goal-directed behavior. Further work is now needed to establish whether these findings are robust and generalize to other types of affective stimuli.

Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised this external strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Experimental psychologist Jonathan Crystal and evolutionary psychologist Thomas Suddendorf debate with nonhuman animals experience human-like episodic memory.

Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation ( d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators ( QM) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.

The ability to plan for future events is one of the defining features of human intelligence. Whether non-human animals can plan for specific future situations remains contentious: despite a sustained research effort over the last two decades, there is still no consensus on this question. Here, we show that New Caledonian crows can use tools to plan for specific future events. Crows learned a temporal sequence where they were (a) shown a baited apparatus, (b) 5 min later given a choice of five objects and (c) 10 min later given access to the apparatus. At test, these crows were presented with one of two tool–apparatus combinations. For each combination, the crows chose the right tool for the right future task, while ignoring previously useful tools and a low-value food item. This study establishes that planning for specific future tool use can evolve via convergent evolution, given that corvids and humans shared a common ancestor over 300 million years ago, and offers a route to mapping the planning capacities of animals.

This article examines the nature and evolution of mental time travel. Evidence for capacities in other animals is reviewed and evaluated in terms of which components of the human faculty appear to be shared and which are unique. While some nonhuman animals store episodic memory traces and can display a range of future-directed capacities, they do not appear to share the open-ended ability to construct mental scenarios, to embed them into larger narratives, nor to reflect and communicate on what they entail. Nested scenario building and the urge to exchange mental experiences seem to set human minds apart in this context as in many others. The article ends with a discussion of the archeological evidence for mental time travel, focusing on deliberate practice as an example of its tremendous fitness consequences.

One of the fundamental roles of human imagination is to enable the representation of possible future events. Here, we survey some of the most critical abilities that this foresight supports: anticipating future emotions, setting and pursuing goals, preparing for threats, deliberately acquiring skills and knowledge, and intentionally shaping the future environment. Furthermore, we outline how metacognition bolsters human capacities even further by enabling people to reflect on and compensate for the natural limits of their foresight. For example, humans make contingency plans because they appreciate that their initial predictions may turn out to be wrong. We suggest that the processes involved in monitoring, controlling, and ultimately augmenting future-oriented imagination represent an important and understudied parallel of “metamemory” that should be called “metaforesight.”

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

Mobile containers are a keystone human innovation. Ethnographic data indicate that all human groups use containers such as bags, quivers and baskets, ensuring that individuals have important resources at the ready and are prepared for opportunities and threats before they materialize. Although there is speculation surrounding the invention of carrying devices, the current hard archaeological evidence only reaches back some 100,000 years. The dearth of ancient evidence may reflect not only taphonomic processes, but also a lack of attention to these devices. To begin investigating the origins of carrying devices we focus on exploring the basic cognitive processes involved in mobile container use and report an initial study on young children's understanding and deployment of such devices. We gave 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 106) the opportunity to spontaneously identify and use a basket to increase their own carrying capacity and thereby obtain more resources in the future. Performance improved linearly with age, as did the likelihood of recognizing that adults use mobile carrying devices to increase carrying capacity. We argue that the evolutionary and developmental origins of mobile containers reflect foundational cognitive processes that enable humans to think about their own limits and compensate for them.

The quality and frequency of human technical innovation differentiates us from all other species, and has played a primary role in creating the cognitive niche that we occupy. Yet, despite the centrality of technical innovation to human culture and our daily lives, most people rarely if ever innovate new products. To address this discrepancy we consider our evolutionary history, and how it might have created a species whose members are both highly innovative and highly unlikely to invent new products. We propose the social innovation hypothesis, which suggests that our minds evolved to innovate, but with a social rather than a technical orientation. Because people find social relations rewarding, they gravitate toward social rather than technical solutions to their problems. Thus, it may primarily be people who are less socially oriented who innovate technically. Consistent with this possibility, 1) engineers and physical scientists are less socially oriented and more likely to innovate new products than people in the humanities and social sciences, and 2) men are less socially oriented and more likely to innovate new products than women.

Prospection refers to thinking about the future, a capacity that has become the subject of increasing research in recent years. Here we first distinguish basic prospection, such as associative learning, from more complex prospection commonly observed in humans, such as episodic foresight, the ability to imagine diverse future situations and organize current actions accordingly. We review recent studies on complex prospection in various contexts, such as decision-making, planning, deliberate practice, information gathering, and social coordination. Prospection appears to play many important roles in human survival and reproduction. Foreseeing threats and opportunities before they arise, for instance, drives attempts at avoiding future harm and obtaining future benefits, and recognizing the future utility of a solution turns it into an innovation, motivating refinement and dissemination. Although we do not know about the original contexts in which complex prospection evolved, it is increasingly clear through research on the emergence of these capacities in childhood and on related disorders in various clinical conditions, that limitations in prospection can have profound functional consequences.

The future harbours the potential for myriad threats to the fitness of organisms, and many species prepare accordingly based on indicators of hazards. Here, we distinguish between defensive responses on the basis of sensed cues and those based on autocues generated by mental simulations of the future in humans. Whereas sensed threat cues usually induce specific responses with reference to particular features of the environment or generalized responses to protect against diffuse threats, autocues generated by mental simulations of the future enable strategic preparation for hazards that may not require an immediate response. The overlap of these mechanisms makes defence effective and versatile, yet can manifest as contemporary anxiety disorders in humans.

Humans have evolved mechanisms for the detection and management of possible threats in order to abate their negative consequences for fitness. Internally generated ('detached') cognition may have evolved in part because of its contributions to this broad function, but important questions remain about its role in threat management. In this article, we therefore present a taxonomy of threat-related internally generated cognition comprising episodic and semantic formats of memory and prospection. We address the proximate mechanisms of each of the capacities in this taxonomy, and discuss their respective contributions to adaptive threat management in humans. For instance, mental time travel empowers people to contemplate and learn from threats experienced long ago, as well as to plan for dangers that might arise in the distant future. However, despite their functional benefits, these thought processes are also central to contemporary anxiety disorders and may be a potent source of distress.

Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) discuss the possible function of meta-representations in temporal cognition but ultimately take an agnostic stance. Here we outline the fundamental role that we believe meta-representations play. Because humans know that their representations of future events are just representations, they are in a position to compensate for the shortcomings of their own foresight and to prepare for multiple contingencies.

Eleven authors with disparate relevant backgrounds give their view on what is meant by the word "cognition".

Perceptual judgements are, by nature, a product of both sensation and the cognitive processes responsible for interpreting and reporting subjective experiences. Changed perceptual judgements may thus result from changes in how the world appears (perception), or subsequent interpretation (cognition). This ambiguity has led to persistent debates about how to interpret changes in decision-making, and if cognition can change how the world looks, or sounds, or feels. Here we introduce an approach that can help resolve these ambiguities. In three motion-direction experiments, we measured perceptual judgements and subjective confidence. Sensory encoding changes (i.e. the motion-direction aftereffect) impacted each measure equally, as the perceptual evidence informing both responses had changed. However, decision changes dissociated from reports of subjective uncertainty when non-perceptual effects changed decision-making. Our findings show that subjective confidence can provide important information about the cause of aftereffects, and can help inform us about the organisation of the mind.

Humans often engage in complex thought about the past, present, and future. They not only think about what did happen, is happening, and will happen, but also what did not happen, is not happening, and will not happen. Here we present an integrated taxonomy of mental time travel and counterfactual thought, in which event representations are assigned categorically distinct temporal locations (i.e., past, present, or future) and subjective propositional values (i.e., affirmed, negated, or uncertain). We review research on children's developing abilities to generate and reason about event representations with these characteristics. We find that children's development typically proceeds in three stages: (1) the capacity to imagine and reflect on affirmed and uncertain past, present, and future outcomes, (2) the capacity to imagine and reflect on counterfactual, negated versions of known past outcomes and present situations, and (3) the capacity to anticipate experiencing counterfactual emotions (i.e., regret and relief) in the future. This protracted developmental trajectory may be a function of increasing executive demands, increasing hierarchical complexity of temporal representations, or both.

This study examined 3-year old children and monkeys' capacities to prepare for immediate future events. In Study 1, children were presented with several tube apparatuses with two exits. When targets were certain to emerge from both, children tended to prepare to catch them by covering each exit. When it was uncertain where targets would emerge, however, they tended to prepare for only one possibility. These results substantiate the claim that simultaneous preparation for mutually exclusive possibilities develops relatively late. Study 2 found no evidence for such a capacity in monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi, Cebus apella, Papio hamadryas) given the same tasks.

Stroke is often associated with increased difficulty engaging in specific future-directed thoughts and behaviors, such as generating phenomenological characteristics of future events (a component of episodic foresight) and executing directed preparatory behaviors (a component of prospective memory). The objective of this study was to clarify whether this group also exhibits increased difficulties using episodic foresight to appropriately guide future-directed behaviors. Stroke patients (n = 26) and demographically matched healthy controls (n = 26) were administered a behavioral measure that met strict criteria for assessing episodic foresight. In keeping with our focus on the functional application of foresight, this measure required participants to identify a problem, self-generate a resolution, and execute the appropriate future-directed intention. Relative to controls, individuals who had suffered a stroke were less likely to acquire items that would later allow a problem to be solved and were also less likely to subsequently use these items to solve the problems. There were no group or task differences between left- and right-hemisphere-stroke subgroups. There were also no significant associations between our measure of episodic foresight with other cognitive measures or a measure of daily function. These data indicate that the capacity to apply episodic foresight in an adaptive way can be disrupted after stroke. Future work is now needed to more fully delineate the implications of difficulties engaging episodic foresight in everyday life as well as how these difficulties might be remediated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Despite the wealth of research examining children’s future-oriented cognition, little is known about the development of spontaneous information seeking behavior aimed at achieving future goals. Here we present a first experiment directly investigating the emergence of such behavior in 4- to 7-year-old children. We presented children with two sets of cards: one with target information that they were told they would be tested on in the future, and a second set with distractor information that they were told had no future purpose. Without being provided instructions on which information to memorize, children were then given time to study the cards in preparation for the future event. The 6- and 7-year-olds, but not the 4- and 5-year-olds, spent significantly more time attending to target cards than distractor cards. While only a minority of children used overt learning strategies (e.g., verbal rehearsal, self-testing), the number of children who did so increased with age.

Mody and Carey (2016) investigated children's capacity to reason by the disjunctive syllogism by hiding stickers within two pairs of cups (i.e., there is one sticker in cup A or B, and one in cup C or D) and then showing one cup to be empty. They found that children as young as 3 years of age chose the most likely cup (i.e., not A, therefore choose B; and disregard C and D) and suggested that these children were representing the dependent relationship between A and B by applying the logical operator “or”. However, it is possible that children succeeded using simpler strategies, such as avoiding the empty cup and choosing within the manipulated pair. We devised a new version of the task in which a sticker was visibly removed from one of the four cups so that 2.5- to 5-year-old children (N = 100) would fail if they relied on such strategies. We also included a conceptual replication of Mody and Carey's (2016) original condition. Our results replicated their findings and showed that even younger children, 2.5 years of age, could pass above chance levels. Yet, 2.5-, 3- and 4-year-olds failed the new condition. Only 5-year-old children performed above chance in both conditions and so provided compelling evidence of deductive reasoning from the premise “A or B", where “or” is exclusive. We propose that younger children may instead conceive of the relationship between A and B as inclusive “or” across both versions of the task.

Animal brains have evolved to predict outcomes of events in the immediate environment [1, 2, 3, 4 and 5]. Adult humans are particularly adept at dealing with environmental uncertainty, being able to mentally represent multiple, even mutually exclusive versions of the future and prepare accordingly. This capacity is fundamental to many complex future-oriented behaviors [6 and 7], yet little is known about when it develops in children [8] and whether it is shared with non-human animals [9]. Here we show that children become able to insightfully prepare for two mutually exclusive versions of an undetermined future event during the middle preschool years, whereas we find no evidence for such a capacity in a sample of chimpanzees and orangutans. We gave 90 preschool children and 8 great apes the opportunity to catch an item dropped into a forked tube with two bottom openings. Children’s performance improved linearly across age groups (2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4 years), with none of the youngest group but most of the oldest group spontaneously covering both openings the first time they prepared to catch the item. The apes performed like 2-year-olds on the first trial, with none of them covering both openings. Some apes and 2-year-olds eventually passed the task, but only in a manner consistent with trial-and-error learning. Our results reveal the developmental trajectory of a critical cognitive ability that allows humans to prepare for future uncertainty, and they also raise the possibility that this ability is not shared with other hominids.

Human children copy others' actions with high fidelity, supporting early cultural learning and assisting in the development and maintenance of behavioral traditions [1]. Imitation has long been assumed to occur from birth [2-4], with influential theories (e.g., [5-7]) placing an innate imitation module at the foundation of social cognition (potentially underpinned by a mirror neuron system [8, 9]). Yet, the very phenomenon of neonatal imitation has remained controversial. Empirical support is mixed and interpretations are varied [10-16], potentially because previous investigations have relied heavily on cross-sectional designs with relatively small samples and with limited controls [17, 18]. Here, we report surprising results from the most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date. We presented infants (n = 106) with nine social and two non-social models and scored their responses at 1, 3, 6, and 9 weeks of age. Longitudinal analyses indicated that the infants did not imitate any of the models, as they were just as likely to produce the gestures in response to control models as they were to matching models. Previous positive findings were replicated in limited cross-sections of the data, but the overall analyses confirmed these findings to be mere artifacts of restricted comparison conditions. Our results undermine the idea of an innate imitation module and suggest that earlier studies reporting neonatal imitation were methodologically limited.

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

There has been a persistent debate about how to define episodic memory and whether it is a uniquely human capacity. On the one hand, many animal cognition studies employ content-based criteria, such as the what-where-when criterion, and argue that nonhuman animals possess episodic memory. On the other hand, many human cognition studies emphasize the subjective experience during retrieval as an essential property of episodic memory and the distinctly human foresight it purportedly enables. We propose that both perspectives may examine distinct but complementary aspects of episodic memory by drawing a conceptual distinction between episodic memory traces and mental time travel. Episodic memory traces are sequential mnemonic representations of particular, personally experienced episodes. Mental time travel draws on these traces, but requires other components to construct scenarios and embed them into larger narratives. Various nonhuman animals may store episodic memory traces, and yet it is possible that only humans are able to construct and reflect on narratives of their lives - and flexibly compare alternative scenarios of the remote future.

Humans frequently create mental models of the future, allowing outcomes to be inferred in advance of their occurrence. Recent evidence suggests that imagining positive future events reduces delay discounting (the devaluation of reward with time until its receipt), while imagining negative future events may increase it. Here, using a sample of 297 participants, we experimentally assess the effects of cued episodic simulation of positive and negative future scenarios on decision-making in the context of both delay discounting (monetary choice questionnaire) and risk-taking (balloon-analogue risk task). Participants discounted the future less when cued to imagine positive and negative future scenarios than they did when cued to engage in control neutral imagery. There were no effects of experimental condition on risk-taking. Thus, although these results replicate previous findings suggesting episodic future simulation can reduce delay discounting, they indicate that this effect is not dependent on the valence of the thoughts, and does not generalise to all other forms of “impulsive” decision-making. We discuss various interpretations of these results, and suggest avenues for further research on the role of prospection in decision-making.

Mental time travel is an adaptive capacity that enables humans to engage in deliberate, prudent action on the basis of remembering past episodes (episodic memory) and simulating future scenarios (episodic foresight). This capacity has become a popular and rapidly growing topic of interdisciplinary research. Perhaps the most influential and frequently tested neuroscientific hypothesis in this domain is that the hippocampus is a hub in a critical neural network for mental time travel, support for which is now commonly assumed by most researchers in the area. In light of recent findings revealing limitations with existing measures of episodic foresight, we critically evaluate the available evidence for this hypothesis and find that it is inconclusive. We suggest that this is due in significant part to the exclusive and widespread reliance on noisy verbal measures and discuss this case as an example of a more general issue pertaining to the measurement of episodic foresight. Accordingly, we suggest that an essential focus of future research should concern the development of objective measures that capture capacity differences by requiring people to put foresight not just into words, but into action.

This study examined future-oriented behavior in children (3-6 years; N = 193) from three diverse societies-one industrialized Western city and two small, geographically isolated communities. Children had the opportunity to prepare for two alternative versions of an immediate future event over six trials. Some 3-year-olds from all cultures demonstrated competence, and a majority of the oldest children from each culture prepared for both future possibilities on every trial. Although there were some cultural differences in the youngest age groups that approached ceiling performance, the overall results indicate that children across these communities become able to prepare for alternative futures during early childhood. This acquisition period is therefore not contingent on Western upbringing, and may instead indicate normal cognitive maturation.

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) fail to make the important distinction between why a trait originally evolved, why it was maintained over time, and what its current utility is. Here we point out that episodic memory may have originally evolved as a by-product of a general metarepresentational capacity, and that it may have current functions beyond the communicative domain.

Objective. In this paper, we examine the relationship between episodic foresight and anxiety from an evolutionary perspective, proposing that together they confer an advantage for modifying present moment decision-making and behaviour in the light of potential future threats to fitness. Methods. We review the body of literature on the role of episodic foresight in anxiety, from both proximate and ultimate perspectives. Results. We propose that anxious feelings associated with episodic simulation of possible threat-related future events serve to imbue these simulations with motivational currency. Episodic and semantic details of a future threat may be insufficient for motivating its avoidance, but anxiety associated with a simulation can provoke adaptive threat management. As such, we detail how anxiety triggered by a self-generated, threatrelated future simulation prepares the individual to manage that threat (in terms of its likelihood and/or consequences) over greater temporaldistances thanobserved in other animals. We then outline how anxiety subtypes may represent specific mechanisms for predicting and managing particular classes of fitness threats. Conclusions. This approach offers an inroad for understanding the nature of characteristic future thinking patterns in anxiety disorders and serves to illustrate the adaptive function of the mechanism from which clinical anxiety deviates.