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Remote sensing plays an important role for modern geography and environmental science. At the same time, it often stands on a weak epistemological foundation. Remote sensing results are mostly treated as strictly objective, context-independent artifacts. This vastly ignores the human practices that led to these results. Thus, remote sensing data are uncritically incorporated into (environmental) policy decision-making processes without understanding exactly how they were generated. Recent research has been critical of this. In a previous study, I showed that the accuracy of land use results can be increased by class aggregation, while the geographic or environmental meaning of the results suffers. I called this provocatively the "more accurate, less meaningful (MALM)" effect and showed that it exists regardless of the technical level of classification. In this study, I discuss the extent to which MALM can be remedied by choosing an appropriate quality indicator. I show that, to the largest extent conceivable, the quality indicator does not and cannot unveil the effects of socio-technical practices, which are materially inscribed into land use maps. Hence, quality indicators are unable to objectivize the effects of practices and values by the researchers. Consequently, they do not solve the MALM problem. On the contrary, I show that the explicit inclusion of geographic knowledge in quality addresses the MALM effect to the largest extent possible. This reinforces my claim that more attention needs to be paid to considering the values and practices behind remote sensing information. I discuss the results in a broad context and argue that and why critical remote sensing based on critical (physical) geography and science-and-technology studies is vital to better incorporate such results into policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In 2020, the Division of Social Psychology of the German Psychological Society (DGPs) published 11 methodological recommendations for improving the quality, replicability, and transparency of social psychological research. We evaluate these recommendations in a quantitative and qualitative survey conducted with members of the division (N = 54). Most – but not all – recommendations are well-known and understood by these members of the division. For 73% of the recommendations, researchers indicated that they tend to apply them in their research. Perceived behavioral control was the strongest predictor of adherence and was generally high (82%). In the open comments, challenges and suggestions for improvement were expressed. Overall, the implementation of the recommendations progresses and respective norms emerge, but substantial challenges remain to be solved requiring collective efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) is the definitive statement of Husserl's early logic. But what does it say that logic is? I argue that Husserl in the Prolegomena thinks logic is its own discipline, namely the "doctrine of science" (Wissenschaftslehre), but has two conflicting ideas of what that is. One idea—expressed by the book's general argument, and which I call Husserl's Austrian Semanticism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the positive science explaining what science is (which turns out just to be the study of meaning) plus the dependent art that, applying the science, teaches us how to scientifically know. The other idea—expressed by the book's opening chapter, and which I call Husserl's German Idealism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the purely reflective self-knowing of science, independent of science's positive expansion. These two ideas are incompatible. Thus, the Prolegomena is ambivalent on what logic is. But since the ambivalence only deepens the significance of Husserl's early logic, the ambivalence should be embraced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Die Urologie is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the influence of the Aristotelian theory of science and the philosophical tradition of writing prolegomena upon a classical legal theory text. Through investigation of commentaries and glosses on preliminary topics in the introduction of Mukhta~ar al-Muntahā, an Islamic legal theory textbook, we will see how the conception and presentation of Islamic disciplines was influenced by the theory of science. The Aristotelian theory of science propounded that each scientific discipline comprises three elements: subject matter, principles, and problems. Meanwhile the philosophical tradition advocated for writing a proper prolegomenon, which included introducing a work with several preliminary topics, elucidating its subject matter and defining its purpose. The paper shows how these two influences, the Aristotelian theory of science and the tradition of writing prolegomenon, intersected in the commentaries and glosses on the initial section of a handbook of Islamic legal theory, the Mukhta~aral-Muntahā of Ibn al-Hājib (d. 646/1249), a prominent linguist and Maliki jurist. This text was subject to numerous commentaries and glosses. This paper will focus on those written around the fourteenth century, authored by notable figures such as Qādī Baydāwī (d. 691/1291-92), Diyāʾ al-Dīn al-Tusī (d. 706/1306-7), Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), Jamāl al-Dīn al-Hillī (d. 726/1325), Badr al-Dīn al-Tustarī (d. 732/1332), Rukn al-Dīn al-Astarābādī (d. 715/1315), Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī (d. 749/1349), ʿAdud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). The analysis herein will focus on their discussion of two preliminary sentences, which reveal a tension between the notions of mabādiʾ as principles and mabādiʾ as beginnings, the former in relation to the theory of science and the latter in relation to the tradition of writing proper introductions. The paper demonstrates that Islamic legal theory was conceptualized and presented in accordance with the philosophical theory of science, as reflected in the commentaries on Ibn al-Hājib’s Mukhta~ar, and that it stimulated a new conception of mabādiʾ that encompasses both its literal and terminological meanings. Ultimately, the debates on this topic gave rise to an argument justifying knowing the aspect of unity of a science and a critique of the theory of science at that time, challenging the idea that the genuine elements of a science are three, asserting instead that they are one.

Abstract In this essay, I claim that the primary aim of ethnobiological research is now to document disappearing traditional knowledge. This is an absolute priority due to the rate at which biocultural biodiversity in the world is disappearing. Rather than diverting our efforts into inflating the theoretical part of ethnobotany, we should concentrate on knowledge documentation to facilitate its circulation in the communties that hold it or at least to preserve it for future generations, even in the static form of databases or video recordings.

The term grammaticalization originally denoted a particular outcome of language change (lexis > morphology), then got expanded to practically all studies involving language change, the processes that create such changes, and a theory modeling these. These expansions have been challenged in the literature as conceptually flawed. A usage-based analysis of the evolution of the concept culminates in the use of the term grammaticalization as a "flag" of a particular approach to linguistics. However, the theoretical premises of grammaticalization studies are entirely compatible with the premises of Diachronic Construction Grammar (DCxG). All studies within the "expanded" concept of grammaticalization can be explicitly modeled within DCxG, which provides formalism of sufficient detail to map the gradual nature of language change in cases of grammaticalization and beyond. Consequently, the most vigorous attacks on grammaticalization lose power when grammaticalization is seen as part of a larger, more complete theory of language and language change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the influence of the Aristotelian theory of science and the philosophical tradition of writing prolegomena upon a classical legal theory text. Through investigation of commentaries and glosses on preliminary topics in the introduction of Mukhta~ar al-Muntahā, an Islamic legal theory textbook, we will see how the conception and presentation of Islamic disciplines was influenced by the theory of science. The Aristotelian theory of science propounded that each scientific discipline comprises three elements: subject matter, principles, and problems. Meanwhile the philosophical tradition advocated for writing a proper prolegomenon, which included introducing a work with several preliminary topics, elucidating its subject matter and defining its purpose. The paper shows how these two influences, the Aristotelian theory of science and the tradition of writing prolegomenon, intersected in the commentaries and glosses on the initial section of a handbook of Islamic legal theory, the Mukhta~aral-Muntahā of Ibn al-Hājib (d. 646/1249), a prominent linguist and Maliki jurist. This text was subject to numerous commentaries and glosses. This paper will focus on those written around the fourteenth century, authored by notable figures such as Qādī Baydāwī (d. 691/1291-92), Diyāʾ al-Dīn al-Tusī (d. 706/1306-7), Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), Jamāl al-Dīn al-Hillī (d. 726/1325), Badr al-Dīn al-Tustarī (d. 732/1332), Rukn al-Dīn al-Astarābādī (d. 715/1315), Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī (d. 749/1349), ʿAdud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). The analysis herein will focus on their discussion of two preliminary sentences, which reveal a tension between the notions of mabādiʾ as principles and mabādiʾ as beginnings, the former in relation to the theory of science and the latter in relation to the tradition of writing proper introductions. The paper demonstrates that Islamic legal theory was conceptualized and presented in accordance with the philosophical theory of science, as reflected in the commentaries on Ibn al-Hājib’s Mukhta~ar, and that it stimulated a new conception of mabādiʾ that encompasses both its literal and terminological meanings. Ultimately, the debates on this topic gave rise to an argument justifying knowing the aspect of unity of a science and a critique of the theory of science at that time, challenging the idea that the genuine elements of a science are three, asserting instead that they are one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I claim that the primary aim of ethnobiological research is now to document disappearing traditional knowledge. This is an absolute priority due to the rate at which biocultural biodiversity in the world is disappearing. Rather than diverting our efforts into inflating the theoretical part of ethnobotany, we should concentrate on knowledge documentation to facilitate its circulation in the communties that hold it or at least to preserve it for future generations, even in the static form of databases or video recordings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many frameworks exist across the sciences and science-policy interface, but it is not always clear how they are developed or can be applied. It is also often vague how new or existing frameworks are positioned in a theory of science to advance a specific theory or paradigm. This article examines these questions and positions the role of frameworks as integral but often vague scientific tools, highlighting benefits and critiques. While frameworks can be useful for synthesizing and communicating core concepts in a field, they often lack transparency in how they were developed and how they can be applied. Positioning frameworks within a theory of science can aid in knowing the purpose and value of framework use. This article provides a meta-framework for visualizing and engaging the four mediating processes for framework development and application: (1) empirical generalization, (2) theoretical fitting, (3) application, and (4) hypothesizing. Guiding points for scholars and policymakers using or developing frameworks in their research are provided in closing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called "new paradigm" instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the "new paradigm" is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical "old" paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new paradigm is less revolutionary as the term suggests. A more veridical view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs can thrive or fail in the face of new experimental findings. The article closes with some topics where more connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in our understanding of human reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1869, two distinguished scientists, Dimitri Mendeleev and Lothar Meyer, discovered a certain periodicity among the chemical characteristics of the then known elements. Both developed first versions of the periodic table, independently. In the wake of the 150th anniversary, UNESCO proclaimed 2019 the "International Year of the Periodic Table of Chemical Elements". Two lucid and detailed studies on the periodic table—accompanied by smaller studies on the occasion of the anniversary—have been published, recently, one of them analysing the scientific history, contributing to the (philosophical) theory of science (Eric Scerri), the other analysing the structures, patterns, and irregularities of the table (Geoff Rayner-Canham). Both studies are profound and vivid examples how scientific progress works. They illustrate that even in hard sciences—mirroring Merton's concept of middle range theory—the required degree of exactness can remain on an intermediate level, as imperfection allows interpretations which could not (yet) be reached by pure mathematics and logic. Both of these brilliant studies provide valuable material, especially for a social science, to better understand how scientific ideas develop, how the power of visualization helps shape ideas, and how contingency is absorbed by the scientific process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That Weber's essay on Stammler provides insights and concepts for the sociology of law is self-evident. In the following we will examine whether this is also true of his epistemology as a whole. First, we will present Stammler's basic assumptions, which are in part contradictory (because they confuse being and ought to be), on the basis of Sinzheimer, following Coutu (2013). We refer to Sinzheimer because he presents the main criticisms of Stammler in a clear and pertinent way, which is confirmed by a reading of Stammler's Wirtschaft und Recht. We then make a brief detour via Heinrich Popitz's 1980 study Die normative Konstruktion von Gesellschaft. Finally, we extend the significance of Stammler's critique of Weber's sociology of law, highlighted by Coutu (2013), to other components of his theory of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Community Connections: Studies on Education, Culture / Közösségi Kapcsolódások: Tanulmányok Kultúráról és Oktatásról is the property of Szeged University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Mit Blick auf eine zu erwartende Ausweitung von Programmen künstlerischer Musikforschung an deutschen Musikhochschulen befasst sich der Artikel mit einer kritischen Re-Lektüre der Empfehlungen zur postgradualen Qualifikationsphase an Kunst- und Musikhochschulen des Wissenschaftsrates (2021), die mit Aspekten aus Thomas S. Kuhns Buch Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen enggeführt wird. Auf dieser Grundlage wird zu einer mehr oder weniger spekulativ gehaltenen Skizze von Zukunftsszenarien einer musiktheoretisch inspirierten künstlerischen Musikforschung angesetzt. With a view to the expected expansion of artistic music research programs at German music universities, the article deals with a critical re-reading of the recommendations on the postgraduate qualification phase at art and music universities of the German Council of Science and Humanities (2021), which is closely linked to aspects of Thomas S. Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. On this basis, a more or less speculative sketch of future scenarios for artistic music research inspired by music theory is presented.

The aim is to contribute to scientific research development in the field of feedback. More specifically, the purpose is to illustrate how researchers, even though they are devoted to the constructivist model, still use expressions with their roots in the transfer model, and to demonstrate researchers’ use of value statements in favor of the constructivist model thus distancing themselves from the transfer model. The examples are taken from research articles on feedback mainly focusing on higher education. The empirical material is analysed using concept analysis. The result is discussed in relation to theories of metaphors and folk-theories as well as to a more general trend in favor of formative assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Österreichisches Religionspädagogisches Forum (ÖRF) is the property of Osterreichisches Religionspadagogisches Forum and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Góndola, Enseñanza y Aprendizaje de las Ciencias is the property of Gondola, Ensenanza y Aprendizaje de las Ciencias and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper discusses two passages from Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on Aristotle’s Topics that are transmitted in Ps-Jābir’s Kitāb al-Nukhab. It argues that the Arabic translation of Alexander’s commentary may have been made from a fuller version than what came down to us in Greek. Especially since the author(s) of the Jābir-corpus form a tradition different from the school of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (d. 873) and authors associated to the ‘Baghdad school’, whose earliest figure is Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 940), the Arabic fragments of Alexander’s commentary preserved in the Kitāb al-Nukhab promise to shed more light on the early reception of the Topics and the different contexts in which Aristotelian dialectic was studied in the Islamic world.

What is the influence of phenomenological thinking in psychology? An answer to this question requires both considering the complex history of psychology as a discipline and the phenomenological movement. The dialogue tries to find an appropriate perspective, in which the background of the so-called phenomenological orientation in psychology is discussed. From intellectual history, the conversation moves to the more fundamental, systematic plain of the contribution phenomenology can make to psychology. It is emphasised that phenomenology provides an elaborated approach especially for the description of the world of experience. However, it needs to be supplemented because phenomenal analyses alone cannot fully meet the subject area of psychology. The conversation ends with a look at possible additions to psychological research. The approaches of phenomenology, for example, by Shaun Gallagher, prove to be not unproblematic. Jan Smedslund's psycho-logic, which examines the redundancy of psychological theory formation with real-world certainties, is mentioned as an alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal for Business, Economics & Ethics / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts und Unternehmensethik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this text, I explore the contribution of the Dominican, Osmund Lewry, to medieval scholarship by focusing on his work on the medieval Dominican, Robert Kilwardby (1215‐1279). I examine in some detail one area of Kilwardby's thought that was first noted by Lewry: the question of how the principles of scientific knowledge are acquired. In order to do so, I will briefly connect Kilwardby's answer to this question with those of his two more famous Dominican contemporaries, Albert the Great (ca. 1200‐1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1224‐1274). The aim of this paper is to give to provide a glimpse of the outstanding contribution of both Kilwardby and Lewry to the development of medieval philosophy and the scholarship on medieval philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversial issue of homeopathy's scientificity will, in all probability, not be settled by means of clinical trials alone, as long as uncertainty or ignorance about methodological, philosophical, and socio-economical essentials prevail on both sides of the argument. Rather than uncritically adopt the standards of the currently predominant paradigm, homeopathy should not forget its roots, peculiarities, and self-conception. Contrary to conventional medicine, it is based on a teleological image of humanity, a holistic and sustainable approach towards curing sickness, and an up-to-date concept of medical theory in terms of healing arts. However, under today's frameworked conditions of industrialisation, commercialisation and commodification, the strengths of homeopathy tend to be disregarded or even attacked, and a special kind of reductionist and materialist rationality, compatible with expanding markets and profits, is preferably facilitated. To reveal and demonstrate these developments and relationships on a scientific level, there is a need for multidisciplinary research on the part of the humanities, such as history and theory of medicine, history and theory of science, history of economics, sociology of scientific knowledge, and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychological science is maturing and therefore transitioning from explorative to theory-driven research. While explorative research seeks to find something “new,” theory-driven research seeks to elaborate on already known and hence predictable effects. A consequence of these differences is that the quality of explorative and theory-driven research needs to be judged by distinct criterions that optimally support their respective development. Especially, theory-driven research needs to be judged by its methodological rigor. A focus on innovativeness, which is typical for explorative research, will instead incentivize bad research practices (e.g., imprecise theorizing, ignoring previous research, parallel theories). To support the advancement of psychology, we must drop the innovation requirement for theory-driven research and instead require the strongest methods, which are marked by high internal and external validity. Precise theorizing needs to substitute novelty. Theories are advanced by requiring explicit, testable assumptions, and an explicit preference for one theory over another. These explicit and potentially wrong assumptions should not be silenced within the peer-review process, but instead be scrutinized in new publications. Importantly, these changes in scientific conduct need to be supported by senior researchers, especially, in their roles as editors, reviewers, and in the hiring process. An important obstacle to further theory-driven research is to measure scientific merit using researchers’ number of publications, which favors theoretically shallow and imprecise writing. Additionally, it makes publications the central target of scientific misconduct even though they are the main source of information for the scientific community and the public. To advance the field, researchers should be judged by their contribution to the scientific community (e.g., exchange with and support of colleagues, and mentoring). Another step to advance psychology is to clearly differentiate between measurement model and theory, and not to overgeneralize based on few stimuli, incidences, or studies. We will use ideas from the theory of science to underline the changes necessary within the field of psychology to overcome this existential replication crisis.

Psychological science is maturing and therefore transitioning from explorative to theory-driven research. While explorative research seeks to find something "new," theory-driven research seeks to elaborate on already known and hence predictable effects. A consequence of these differences is that the quality of explorative and theory-driven research needs to be judged by distinct criterions that optimally support their respective development. Especially, theory-driven research needs to be judged by its methodological rigor. A focus on innovativeness, which is typical for explorative research, will instead incentivize bad research practices (e.g., imprecise theorizing, ignoring previous research, parallel theories). To support the advancement of psychology, we must drop the innovation requirement for theory-driven research and instead require the strongest methods, which are marked by high internal and external validity. Precise theorizing needs to substitute novelty. Theories are advanced by requiring explicit, testable assumptions, and an explicit preference for one theory over another. These explicit and potentially wrong assumptions should not be silenced within the peer-review process, but instead be scrutinized in new publications. Importantly, these changes in scientific conduct need to be supported by senior researchers, especially, in their roles as editors, reviewers, and in the hiring process. An important obstacle to further theory-driven research is to measure scientific merit using researchers' number of publications, which favors theoretically shallow and imprecise writing. Additionally, it makes publications the central target of scientific misconduct even though they are the main source of information for the scientific community and the public. To advance the field, researchers should be judged by their contribution to the scientific community (e.g., exchange with and support of colleagues, and mentoring). Another step to advance psychology is to clearly differentiate between measurement model and theory, and not to overgeneralize based on few stimuli, incidences, or studies. We will use ideas from the theory of science to underline the changes necessary within the field of psychology to overcome this existential replication crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This descriptive-prepositional article presents considerations on reproducibility and falsifiability in the scientific study of religion. The text is divided into two parts. Initially, it presents the definitions of reproducibility and falsifiability, and how science and pseudoscience operationalize them. The second part discusses the reproducibility within the scientific study of religion, presenting methodological proposals on how to ensure the assumption of falsifiability in the productions of scholars of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Finnish nursing theorist Katie Eriksson's (1943–2019) theory of caritative caring represents a non‐medical paradigm concerning the phenomena of nursing. The aim of this article was to present an oversight of the development of Eriksson's theory of caritative caring from a human science point of view. The historical development of the theory is outlined, combined with a brief overview of its philosophical connections, its impact on contemporary caring science research and its implications for nursing care. Caring science is considered a human science in the Nordic tradition, as it is deeply rooted in basic issues of human life and existence. The key ideas of Eriksson's theory of caritative caring are linked to the metaparadigm concepts of human being, health and suffering, caring and environment. All of these are permeated with the ethos of caritative caring, that is, the caritas thought of human love and mercy, and the honouring of the absolute dignity of human beings. Epistemologically, Gadamer is the most influential philosopher when it comes to the theory of caritative caring. Eriksson's theory is used in, for example, intercultural caring, caring for patients suffering from addiction, the importance of aesthetic surroundings, providing ethically good care for older people and mothers as patients in psychiatric care. In these fields of research, Eriksson's ideas of ethics, caring and suffering are highlighted in various clinical contexts. Beyond the areas of nursing care in which Eriksson's work has been cited and developed, there are at least two areas that have been actively enhanced by her works: the field of leadership and education for nursing teachers. According to Eriksson, it is momentous to ponder scientific results as not limited to empirically strengthened, randomized outcomes. Part of making the results of scientific work evident is up to the individual nurses and their being in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For some time, critique has been raised against the application of phenomenological philosophy in empirical research. In this article, we listen to the critical voices with the aim to revisit the connection between phenomenology as philosophy and its empirical practice in research. We claim that it is the question of how philosophy has been, or can be, used in empirical research that is at stake. We thus suggest a fruitful way of benefiting from philosophy in science, namely, as an art of radical questioning. Phenomenology can teach us this art, and we therefore argue for a phenomenology of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, we argue that the advent of data mining techniques and big data in media and communication studies present problems that involve fundamental methodological questions, requiring us to revisit existing ways in which the link between theory, operationalization and data are explained and justified. We note that the discourse of instrumental optimization that surrounds big data clouds epistemic debates about their appropriate integration in scholarly explanations, and argue that a discussion of these problems can usefully depart from a distinction between the two main types of data mining models (supervised and unsupervised). We argue that both types pose specific challenges and give examples of ways they have been productively overcome. In particular, we argue that while big data approaches have introduced novel opportunities for research, they have fundamentally been incorporated into media and communication studies in ways that comply with existing, prototypical explanatory schemes. Our examples link specific empirical studies to general strategies of scientific explanation, focusing on neo-positivist, critical realist and interpretivist explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers are sometimes expected to investigate a complex and interdisciplinary subject-matter in order to provide scientific support for large-scale decisions. This may prove challenging: typically, a lack of cohesion between the pieces of information investigated in the starting phase may cause confusion. This article suggests one possible road from this problem, which may lead to holistic understanding and next to communication and implementation of this understanding. The process is presented as a diagram, and selected aspects of it are analysed. The process involves moving to a higher level of generalisation in order to gain a better overview and potentially invent new concepts, and next moving back to a more detailed level in order to communicate and implement these insights. Potential challenges and roadblocks are identified. The possible conflict between normal science and decision support is briefly investigated; it is pointed out that “post-normal science” may be a more appropriate description of such processes than simply “science”.

Felix Schlagintweit worked in a medical clinic, was co-owner of a sanatorium, had a private practice and wrote fictional books. He massively improved diagnostic methods (e.g., cystoscope) and was interested in psychoanalysis. He rejected the effectiveness of surgical treatment alone and also sole use of psychosomatics. In his view, conservative treatment options were often at least as effective. Because Schlagintweit refused to take part in national socialism, he was purged from professional discourse after 1933 and was only later were his contributions to the history of urology rediscovered., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

For Fichte, philosophy must be scientific and its organisation must resemble science too: it must be the Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre). Hence, first and foremost, it should be a system, and as a scientific system it should develop from one or a few doctrines (from presumed axioms that cannot be proven). The first, starting theorem of the Theory of Science sounds like this: "The I begins by an absolute positing of its own existence." The I for Fichte, just as for Kant, is in a dual relationship with reality: not only in a theoretical (cognitive) but also in a practical (active) relationship. In its activity, through perception, representation and understanding (Verstand) it reaches reason (Vernunft), that is, real self-consciousness which captures the self according to its true essence. Its true essence is freedom, and the moral instinct requires the realisation of freedom. History, in Fichte's conception, is the progress of human communities, of humanity towards freedom; however, this process has a tortuous and contradictory nature, it appears as a process that goes through pitfalls and even alienation from its original goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bernard Bolzano was not merely a mathematician of the European format. He was also a critical social thinker whose work has distinct economic dimensions. This is why he rightly appears in the overviews of the beginnings of Czech economic thought. He began writing his work "About the Best State" 210 years ago, which made him the most famous Czech utopian. The half-forgotten Bolzano legacy, which is still alive and ahead of its time in many respects, recalls this text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the life and work of B. Bolzano, in particular with his treatment of the theory of probability. Bolzano mainly deals with this issue in his textbook on religion (Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft) and in the context of trustworthiness of Biblical testimonies. His approach, however, is modern and thorough, even surprisingly for mathematical provisions in a treatise on theology. He also pondered briefly upon this issue in another work, Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre). Nevertheless, this aspect of his work received no attention from his contemporaries, even though Bolzano himself did draw on current literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Higher education for the design professions – designers, architects and engineers – has been combining traditional disciplines of research and design in new ways, into what is now known as design research. As a discipline in its own right, design research is still quite young, and the design professions need a theory of science that takes their specific character into account, thus contributing to their self-image, and locating them in the greater landscape of research. Using philosophically oriented conceptual analysis I develop a system of basic concepts as elements of such a theory of science for the design professions. The concepts of design, research and design research are analysed, clarified and coordinated, in relation to concepts such as knowledge, theory and practice. At the same time I propose a precise, yet intuitive, terminology that may be shared and foster cross-disciplinary understanding and communication among the design professions, and which each of them can expand for purposes of its own.