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O NCE AGAIN Glendon Schubert has taken a long stride by writing a book which, from the conventional point of view of public law, is unique.1 In Judicial Policy-Making, Schubert attempts, among other innovations, to adapt a classification scheme to study the titular phenomenon. This classification is based chiefly upon the concepts "system," "structure" and "function." Surprisingly, very little has been done in studying the judiciary employing these concepts-particularly the latter two, i.e., structure and function. One political scientist treated the judiciary of the United States from this conceptual perspective, but it was only as a small part of a study of the entire American political system.2 Schubert is thus the first to devote a substantial part of a book to a structural/functional analysis of a judiciary.

Contrary to some belief, there are some, and possibly many, conditions under which survey research techniques can be put to use in the study of judicial decision-making. The present note reports on the successful use of such a technique in the collection and analysis of data drawn directly from the judicial bench of the State of Hawaii. In this case the plan to utilize survey techniques arose out of consideration of a problem that has plagued students of judicial decision-making from the beginning, i.e., the problem of getting direct information about those judicial attitudes and orientations which might reasonably be expected to function as determinants of judicial decisions.In an earlier study of the impact of judicial role orientation upon judicial decision-making, I tried to handle the problem of taking independent measures of actual judicial attitudes and orientations which could then be related to judicial decisions. My approach at the time was to use accessible and measurable law students as stand-ins for actual judges. In contrast to this approach most of the political “judicial behavioralists,” while collecting data on actual functioning judges, do not attempt to solve the problem in any way. For these scholars continue to reason tautologically from information contained mainly in judicial votes and secondarily in judicial opinions, leaving us with such essential conclusions, in effect, as: “conservative” decisions are made by “conservative” judges, etc. Who is to say which is the worst procedure: the “judicial behavioralists,” which collects irrelevant data from relevant persons; or my own, which collects relevant data from irrelevant persons?Despite advice to the contrary, I decided to try my hand at direct surveys of a judiciary, i.e., the one closest at hand.

The term "multimethodological" is probably enough to set the nerves of many readers on edge. The proposal is simpler than the term. Professors Haas and Becker invite political scientists to rally behind the behavioral banner, but at the same time call upon all behavioralists to use greater care in selecting and using their techniques, and to explore a wider variety of methods. As to their assumption that behavioralism has or will take over the field, some readers may express doubts; but as to the major thesis one can hardly quarrel with the attempt to introduce greater rigor and more flexible and appropriate methods.

As any science, natural or social, goes through various stages of development, practitioners find that past conceputalizations and tools need revamping or new applications. This is in the scheme of scientific things; it is essential for progress in science. It is necessary for developing that body of knowledge and those observations and measurement techniques comprising the sum and substance of the sciences. But one question remains: when will this occur sooner or later?