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Civil justice systems are a continuous topic of discussion and reform at national, European and global level with a view to improving access to justice. While traditionally focusing on basic requirements to secure the efficiency and quality of justice, new developments in the broader arena of civil justice, including technological advancements, follow each other in rapid fashion. This chapter introduces three connected and cross-cutting issues in civil justice which require a deeper and renewed reflection considering their contribution in facilitating access to justice and currents debate in Europe, which are central in this book. These are the interaction between formal and informal justice against the background of the growth of ADR; the key importance of different forms of digitised justice; and the collectivisation of civil justice, more in particular the funding of collective redress. By bringing together these three frontier issues, the present chapter reflects on the development of civil justice in Europe, focusing on current challenges and opportunities, and assesses how these three key issues will further shape the future of civil justice in Europe.

France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have taken concrete steps to design and develop international commercial courts. Most of the projects claim to be building courts that match the preferences of court users. They also try to challenge England and Wales, which evidence suggests is the most attractive jurisdiction in the EU. For the success of these projects, it is important that their proposed courts cor-responds with the expectations of the parties, but also man-ages to attract some of the litigants that go to London. This article argues that lawyers are the most important group of choice makers, and that their preferences are not sufficiently matched by the new courts. Lawyers have certain litigation service and court perception preferences. And while the new courts improve their litigation service, they do not sufficiently addressed these court perception preferences.

One of the pillars of international commercial litigation is party autonomy as it has developed over the past fifty years. In Europe, the Brussels regime established considerable freedom for parties to select the court that would have jurisdiction. The enforceability of choice of court agreements has gained ground in many countries worldwide, and the freedom to select the competent forum is exercised widely in commercial practice. Early in 2015, the new Brussels Ibis Regulation became applicable, altering the rules on choice of court. These amendments, particularly the exception to the lis pendens rule, aim at increasing the efficiency of choice of court agreements and at preventing torpedo litigation tactics. This year also marks the entry into force of the Hague Choice of Court Convention that had been adopted ten years earlier. The present paper explores the concept and development of the party autonomy paradigm from the perspective of different disciplines, and discusses the empirical evidence available on the use of party autonomy in commercial practice. It also examines the main changes brought about by the Brussels I recast and the entry into force of the Hague Choice of Court Convention, and analyses these against the background of the party autonomy paradigm, as well as their contribution to effective litigation.

Court adjudication is considered as a public good and therefore as being non-rivalrous and non-excludable. These characteristic shapes the behavior of natural and legal persons and the governments' stance towards adjudication. In case public goods' characteristics are inherent to adjudication, i.e. attributes which adjudication has without outside interferences, any attempt to treat adjudication as a private good may create legal uncertainty and political instability. In practice, non-rivalrous and non-excludable are not inherent characteristics of adjudication, but consequences of governments' stance towards “public goods”. Therefore, whether or not adjudication is a public good dependents on the government's stance. This paper argues that the competition of civil justice systems can influence governments' stance and therefore change the nature of adjudication.