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While revolutionary regimes may be durable in the long run, they are weak when they first come into power, but their particular weaknesses depend especially on whether the old regime security apparatus has been fully defeated, or if elements of it defected and persist in the new state. I argue that where old regime security forces persist, the new regime will focus on coup-proofing, leaving itself vulnerable to insurgent or foreign threats. Where the old regime’s security forces are defeated or disintegrate but armed domestic rivals remain, revolutionaries will focus on defeating them, potentially neglecting external threats. Absent both old regime forces and armed domestic rivals, revolutionaries will focus heavily on external threats, neglecting possible domestic threats. I develop this theory through interview and archive-based comparative case studies of Nicaragua, where the old regime military dissolved, and Iran, where it remained largely intact. Nicaragua’s revolutionaries emphasized foreign defense, while the Iranian regime worried primarily about coups and then domestic rebels, with military effectiveness suffering in both cases in their first several years in power. Externally focused Nicaragua allowed insurgencies to take root, while Iran’s coup-proofing revolutionary regime was only saved by invading Iraqi forces’ hesitancy. Both regimes eventually corrected their initial missteps, but their decision-making reinforces the importance of old regime security forces’ status in revolutionary transitions and that the period of early weakness is when international engagement can have the greatest impact on new revolutionary regimes.

AbstractWhat types of relationships do armed groups have with states? How do different levels of ties and power relations affect both armed group and government behavior? This article develops a spectrum across which armed group–state relationships can move, focusing on three key types of relationships—delegation, sponsorship, and autonomy. An armed group–state relationship may be classified depending on the degree to which the armed group receives material or security support from a state, whether it pursues the strategic aims of the state, and the balance of power between the armed group and the state. I examine cases and empirical examples of relationships between states and armed groups ranging from criminal organizations to Cold War-era rebels to pro-government and communal militias to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and al-Qaeda. As lines between categories of armed groups and between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurred, the integrated framework enhances our ability to analyze the behavior and liabilities of both armed groups and states and to understand sources of leverage for protecting human rights and resolving conflicts.

The complex nature of civil conflict makes it inherently difficult to study, which is exacerbated by the challenges of conducting field research in volatile conflict zones. How do these challenges affect the data gathered and inferences drawn about armed groups? This article examines the epistemological, practical, and ethical issues of researching armed organisations across varying power relations, space, and time. We highlight the divergent perspectives that emerge within armed group hierarchies, the varying realities across conflict geographies, and shifts in armed group trajectories and narratives that arise over time. Based on research in Africa and Latin America, we identify the pitfalls of capturing isolated 'snapshots' related to with whom, where, and when research was conducted, and we advocate for a 'panoramic' approach to the study of armed groups, recognising both limits to available data and the evolving nature of armed groups and their behaviour. Ultimately, we offer a conceptual roadmap for understanding the main axes along which variation in armed group organisation and behaviour unfolds, provide recommendations on how to navigate them, and call for caution in the generalisation of research findings and policy prescriptions, given the limitations and liminal nature of knowledge about armed groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of political and social violence and conflict has expanded in recent decades, concurrent with a rise in the use of mixed methods research (MMR) throughout the social sciences. This article examines how methods are best integrated in studies of violence and conflict, critically reviewing examples from previous prominent works and suggesting directions for future research. I explore the benefits of MMR for understanding structures, agency, and processes related to violence and conflict, and the opportunity MMR offers to influence a broader academic and policy audience. MMR can improve the accordance of theories and empirical studies with the complexities of social reality and enhance understanding of the causes, consequences, and potential remedies of violence and conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]