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Theoretically, an equity security with a negative CAPM beta should behave like portfolio insurance in the sense that the security provides a positive return during a market downturn. However, equity securities with negative betas are relatively rare and simply determining that an equity security exhibits a negative beta is not enough for determining if the negative beta equity security will perform in the desired manner. Negative betas can, at times, be attributed to causes that diminish those securities9 usefulness as insurance. Some of these causes are explored in this article.

The matrix algebra associated with finding minimum variance portfolio weights and tangency portfolio weights is greatly simplified by using an Excel presentation. A further simplification of the tangency portfolio weights process is also presented using excess returns for the risky securities. The lesson drawn from this presentation is readily performed online by sharing or recording an Excel screen with students.

Purpose The authors study the shareholder wealth effects of the adoption and subsequent litigation confirming the validity of shareholder right plans that are enacted to protect a firm’s net operating loss (NOL) carry forwards (tax benefit preservation plans (TBPPs)). The purpose of this paper is to expand the understanding of nontraditional shareholder rights plans, which are becoming increasingly more common. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers abnormal returns around TBPP adoptions and Delaware Court rulings that validated their use. The authors study 118 plans adopted between 1998 and 2011. Abnormal returns are measured using both a market model and a performance-matched sample. Findings The authors find that abnormal returns are negative at the announcement of a new TBPP. However, the full impact of plan adoption on share prices is not evident until the Delaware Courts validated their use. The Delaware Court rulings in the case of Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc. and Trilogy, Inc. are associated with additional negative wealth effects for both prior plan adopters and the firms most likely to consider adopting a plan. These results suggest that entrenchment concerns tend to outweigh the protection of NOL carry forwards when firms adopt TBPPs. Originality/value This study was the first to consider the adoption of TBPPs. Currently, it is the only study that considers Delaware Court rulings related to these plans, which allows us to successfully disentangle the entrenchment hypothesis from the potential alternative hypothesis that the negative announcement period returns are driven by investors updating their expectations for firm performance.

Using a sample of cash tender offers occurring between 1993 and 2002, we find evidence that the options market has become the preferred venue for traders attempting to profit on anticipated announcements. Options offer advantages relative to stocks. Traders gain leverage by trading in options and multiple options contracts on an individual stock. The results of our study indicate that a substitution effect does exist. Abnormal volume in the option market replaces abnormal volume in the stock market prior to cash tender offer announcements, and this abnormal option volume precedes abnormal stock volume for targets with or without traded options.

Various studies argue that underwriting fees are excessive and investment bankers prolong the price stabilization period in aftermarket trading of closed-end fund (CEF) shares. The poor performance of these funds also raises questions about the financial sophistication of initial public offering (IPO) buyers. In this study, we examine these issues for a sample of international stock CEFs. Our findings indicate that underwriting fees are not excessive relative to industrial issues, and we do not find that investment bankers prolong the stabilization period to camouflage the underwriting cost. Our findings are consistent with earlier studies that discounts contribute significantly to the poor performance during the first six months of aftermarket trading.

American depository receipts (ADRs) represent an increasingly popular and convenient mechanism for international investing. We analyze ADRs traded throughout the 1990s and find that these securities offer a diversification and portfolio performance benefit when combined with a domestic portfolio (proxied by the S&P 500). While we find that emerging market ADRs are effective instruments for reducing portfolio risk, they do not improve portfolio performance as measured by the Sharpe ratio. Developed market ADRs do improve portfolio performance as measured by the Sharpe ratio. The asset allocation which maximizes the Sharpe ratio is 84 percent domestic stocks, 16 percent developed ADRs, and 0 percent emerging ADRs. Further, due to problems in defining an appropriate market index for ADRs, the Sharpe ratio is viewed to be the preferred performance measure. Other measures such as Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor measure are susceptible to being “gamed” to distort portfolio performance.

Recent research has shown that ownership restructuring decisions by firms can enhance value. In particular, Allen and McConnell (1998) find that carve-outs elicit a favourable share price response for parent firms at the time the carve-outs are reported. One explanation is that a carve-out facilitates parental focus and enables the market to value a new entity that now has its own identity, which uncovers hidden value. Since these valuation effects are measured when the carve-outs are reported, they reflect an ex ante view of potential change in performance attributed to the restructuring of ownership. An attempt is made to determine the long-term performance of firms following carve-outs. At the time of the carve-out, parents have information about the unit unknown to the public. The performance of parents and the carved-out units are separately assessed to determine whether there is a wealth transfer between the two entities as the asymmetric information that exists at the time of the carve-out dissipat...

We study the rise of shareholder right plans aimed at protecting a firm’s net operating loss carryforwards (tax benefit preservation plans). Traditional rights plans are designed to prevent hostile takeovers and have been found to entrench management at the expense of outside shareholders. Tax benefit preservation plans, however, have the potential to benefit shareholders by protecting a potentially valuable corporate asset. We find that entrenchment concerns tend to outweigh the protection of net operating loss carryforwards when firms adopt tax benefit preservation plans. Specifically, we find that abnormal returns are negative at the announcement of a new tax benefit preservation plan. However, the full impact of plan adoption on share prices is not evident until the Delaware Courts validated their use, which also had a negative impact on the firms most likely to consider adopting a plan.

Linking executive compensation to stock price performance is predicted to decrease the usual positive price response to dividend increases for two reasons. One, increasing pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) exacerbates managers' optimistic bias regarding future firm performance, reducing the credibility of dividend signals. Two, increasing pay-performance sensitivity reduces the need for dividends as a means of reducing agency costs. Consistent with behavioral and agency theories of corporate finance, we find that price response does decrease as pay-performance sensitivity increases and that this effect is concentrated in firms with low market-to-book ratios. Additional findings are most consistent with the agency cost explanation.

Spin-offs and sell-offs are alternative methods for divesting assets, but the effects on the parent firm differ substantially. We examine firms' characteristics that may influence the asset divestiture choice between a spin-off and sell-off. Results of the analysis indicate that the primary factors influencing the choice of divestiture type are financial distress, number of directors on the board, whether the CEO is also the Board Chair, and the size of the unit divested.

This study examines the risk-compensating behavior of REIT market makers. The bid-ask spread is hypothesized to compensate market makers for three costs: asymmetric information, order processing, and inventory. As the market maker's perceived likelihood of transacting with a better-informed individual increases (decreases), the percentage of the spread that is attributed to asymmetric information will increase (decrease). This study examines the asymmetric information component of the bid-ask spread immediately prior to and following REIT dividend announcements and REIT funds from operations announcements during 1995 and 1996. The asymmetric information component increases the day before and then declines subsequent to dividend announcements of small and equity REITs. Asymmetric information costs increase following funds from operations announcements.

We study the rise of shareholder right plans aimed at protecting a firm’s net operating loss carryforwards (tax benefit preservation plans). Traditional rights plans are designed to prevent hostile takeovers and have been found to entrench management at the expense of outside shareholders. Tax benefit preservation plans, however, have the potential to benefit shareholders by protecting a potentially valuable corporate asset. Using a sample of firms with publicly available information, we find that entrenchment concerns tend to outweigh the protection of net operating loss carryforwards when firms adopt tax benefit preservation plans. Specifically, we find that abnormal returns are negative at the announcement of a new tax benefit preservation plan. Additionally, firms with such a plan in place experience negative abnormal returns around the Delaware Courts’ decisions validating their use. JEL classification: G38; H25; K34