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International audience; From early April 2020, wildfires raged in the highly contaminated areas around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (CNPP), Ukraine. For about 4 weeks, the fires spread around and into the Chernobyl exclusion zone (CEZ) and came within a few kilometers of both the CNPP and radioactive waste storage facilities. Wildfires occurred on several occasions throughout the month of April. They were extinguished, but weather conditions and the spread of fires by airborne embers and smoldering fires led to new fires starting at different locations of the CEZ. The forest fires were only completely under control at the beginning of May, thanks to the tireless and incessant work of the firefighters and a period of sustained precipitation. In total, 0.7–1.2 TBq 137Cs were released into the atmosphere. Smoke plumes partly spread south and west and contributed to the detection of airborne 137Cs over the Ukrainian territory and as far away as Western Europe. The increase in airborne 137Cs ranged from several hundred μBq·m–3 in northern Ukraine to trace levels of a few μBq·m–3 or even within the usual background level in other European countries. Dispersion modeling determined the plume arrival time and was helpful in the assessment of the possible increase in airborne 137Cs concentrations in Europe. Detections of airborne 90Sr (emission estimate 345–612 GBq) and Pu (up to 75 GBq, mostly 241Pu) were reported from the CEZ. Americium-241 represented only 1.4% of the total source term corresponding to the studied anthropogenic radionuclides but would have contributed up to 80% of the inhalation dose.

International audience; Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (131I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 μBq m-3 except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m-3. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of 131I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related to 131I use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network. © 2018 American Chemical Society.

Significance A massive atmospheric release of radioactive 106Ru occurred in Eurasia in 2017, which must have been caused by a sizeable, yet undeclared nuclear accident. This work presents the most compelling monitoring dataset of this release, comprising 1,100 atmospheric and 200 deposition data points from the Eurasian region. The data suggest a release from a nuclear reprocessing facility located in the Southern Urals, possibly from the Mayak nuclear complex. A release from a crashed satellite as well as a release on Romanian territory (despite high activity concentrations) can be excluded. The model age of the radioruthenium supports the hypothesis that fuel was reprocessed ≤2 years after discharge, possibly for the production of a high-specific activity 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment in Italy., In October 2017, most European countries reported unique atmospheric detections of aerosol-bound radioruthenium (106Ru). The range of concentrations varied from some tenths of µBq·m−3 to more than 150 mBq·m−3. The widespread detection at such considerable (yet innocuous) levels suggested a considerable release. To compare activity reports of airborne 106Ru with different sampling periods, concentrations were reconstructed based on the most probable plume presence duration at each location. Based on airborne concentration spreading and chemical considerations, it is possible to assume that the release occurred in the Southern Urals region (Russian Federation). The 106Ru age was estimated to be about 2 years. It exhibited highly soluble and less soluble fractions in aqueous media, high radiopurity (lack of concomitant radionuclides), and volatility between 700 and 1,000 °C, thus suggesting a release at an advanced stage in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The amount and isotopic characteristics of the radioruthenium release may indicate a context with the production of a large 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment.

The performance of an air sampler and a small gamma-ray spectrometer was tested in an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) able to carry payload with mass up to 0.5 kg. Operation of the sampler was investigated with the aid of radon progeny normally present in outdoor air. Detection limits for several transuranium nuclides in air are of the order of 0.3 Bq m−3 assuming 0.5 h sampling time and 1 h counting time in direct alpha spectrometry. Unshielded 137Cs and 60Co point sources at the ground level were used to test the CsI spectrometer. Detection limits are approximately 1 GBq or larger depending on the flying altitude.

An approach for in situ alpha spectrometry that allows one to measure the spectra with good energy resolution at ambient air pressure has been developed recently. Here, novel equipment is introduced for in situ measurements. Neither vacuum pumps nor radiochemical sample processing are necessary. Flat and smooth surfaces are ideal sources provided that the radionuclide contamination represents a thin layer on the surface. Other sources, such as air filters or evaporation residues, are also possible. Alpha particle collimation is used to obtain good energy resolution, but the equipment can also be used without collimation. An estimation of the detection efficiency with and without collimation is given using an extended area source containing 241Am.

A computer code known as AASIFIT is developed to unfold complex alpha spectra. Peak shapes used in the fitting are obtained from the simulations. In addition to activities of the nuclides present in the sample, the code can provide source characterization. AASIFIT is applied for a nuclear bomb particle collected in Thule, Greenland. It is shown that direct alpha spectrometry provides more accurate activity estimate for 239+240Pu than gamma-ray spectrometry.

Radiation surveillance equipment was mounted in a small unmanned aerial vehicle. The equipment consists of a commercial CsI detector for count rate measurement and a specially designed sampling unit for airborne radioactive particles. Field and flight tests were performed for the CsI detector in the area where 137 Cs fallout from the Chernobyl accident is 23–45 kBq m −2 . A 3-GBq 137 Cs point source could be detected at the altitude of 50 m using a flight speed of 70 km h −1 and data acquisition interval of 1 s. Respective response for 192 Ir point source is 1 GBq. During the flight, the detector reacts fast to ambient external dose rate rise of 0.1 μSv h −1 , which gives for the activity concentration of 131 I less than 1 kBq m −3 . Operation of the sampler equipped with different type of filters was investigated using wind-tunnel experiments and field tests with the aid of radon progeny. Air flow rate through the sampler is 0.2–0.7 m 3 h −1 at a flight speed of 70 km h −1 depending on the filter type in question. The tests showed that the sampler is able to collect airborne radioactive particles. Minimum detectable concentration for transuranium nuclides, such as 239 Pu, is of the order of 0.2 Bq m −3 or less when alpha spectrometry with no radiochemical sample processing is used for activity determination immediately after the flight. When a gamma-ray spectrometer is used, minimum detectable concentrations for several fission products such as 137 Cs and 131 I are of the order of 1 Bq m −3 .