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The established representative democracy in Europe is facing growing challenges. In a rapidly evolving landscape that resolves some crises while encountering new ones, two movements -- populism and technocracy -- are emerging as alternatives to the traditional party-based system. This article investigates the interaction between these movements and representative democracy, focusing on how they influence and potentially transform the current political framework. My objective is to determine whether the (re)emergence of these movements signifies the decline of representative democracy or if they will instead reshape it and become integral components of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The established representative democracy in Europe is facing growing challenges. In a rapidly evolving landscape that resolves some crises while encountering new ones, two movements – populism and technocracy – are emerging as alternatives to the traditional party-based system. This article investigates the interaction between these movements and representative democracy, focusing on how they influence and potentially transform the current political framework. My objective is to determine whether the (re)emergence of these movements signifies the decline of representative democracy or if they will instead re-shape it and become integral components of the system.

Copyright of Conjuntura Austral is the property of Conjuntura Austral and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Digital platforms have become powerful weapons in the hands of many politicians. In search for disintermediation of information, Jair Messias Bolsonaro found in social networks a new space to interact with his voters. With a communication strategy primarily online, the former president of Brazil had social profiles on all platforms and has transformed these channels into official government sources, in a campaign whose goal was to discredit the traditional media and occupy the place of speech of these social actors. This article analyzed Bolsonaro’s weekly live streams, made available on his YouTube channel in order to study the technopopulism undertaken by Bolsonaro. Through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis, 121 videos (with a total duration of 83 hours and 58 minutes) were examined, from March 7, 2019, when the president of Brazil began doing the weekly YouTube broadcasts, until May 11, 2022, when this research was planned. The results indicate that the themes addressed in the live streams have influenced the disinformation process in Brazil and especially the hate attacks against important Brazilian democratic institutions. The speeches of resentment against the press, the Supreme Court, and the opposition parties are constant in Bolsonaro’s weekly programs. Finally, this article concluded that Bolsonaro’s communicative strategy on YouTube is an example of technopopulism based on the manipulation of public opinion with the dissemination of propaganda favorable to the government, and veiled attacks on all kinds of enemies of the current system in place as a true example of right-wing populist government.

Populism and technocracy represent a challenge to pluralist party democracies. The first promotes the rule by 'the people', while the second demands the rule by independent experts. The literature on populism and technocracy as challenges to party democracy is burgeoning. Less is known about citizens' attitudes towards the ideas that underpin both populism and technocracy. In this article these opinions are explored in a survey conducted in Spain using a comprehensive battery of items tapping into technocracy and populism. It is found that populist attitudes correlate with two dimensions of technocracy: anti-politics and pro-expertise sentiments. A latent-class analysis shows that the largest sample group simultaneously endorses rule by the people and the enrolment of experts in political decision making. In the article this group is named technopopulists. The article challenges extant views of populism and technocracy as separate alternatives and spurs works on voter demand for the involvement of experts in politics. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2027116. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the extent to which digitalized welfare harmonizes the socio-economic goals of economic reform and low-carbon energy transitions in an emerging democratic context. It analyzes digitalized welfare's effectiveness in facilitating sustainable energy transitions through market mechanisms using a centralized approach to welfare delivery. Using narrative analysis, this article describes the shift to the direct benefits transfers regime from a regime of indirect subsidies for cooking gas in India. It describes the design aspects of various government programs through which target populations are socially constructed, as part of the policy of cooking gas cash transfers in India. Further, it analyzes the role of the practices of communicative governance and digitalization in calibrating the key policy characteristics to strengthen policy legitimacy. The insights from this article contribute to the emerging body of the theory and practice of digitalized welfare for sustainable energy transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reads the restructuring of European party systems in the 2010s as a transition from cartel to techno-populist parties, with a specific focus on left-populist challengers. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, it demonstrates how a long-term cartelization and particular mode of crisis management after 2008 drove the gradual replacement of the party cartel with a cohabitation of populism and technocratic politics: techno-populism. Although this techno-populist template has been deployed for parties such as Five Star Movement and some right-wing populist outfits, it has usually been left aside for left-wing variants. This article investigates two techno-populist subtypes from the left: Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain. The former took place within a cartel party (‘intra-party’), while the latter occurred from outside the party cartel (‘extra-party’). Although such party cartelization cuts across cases, the rise of Corbynism and Podemos took place under different institutional conditions: different electoral systems, different European Union membership and different dynamics of party competition on the left. The article concludes with the observation that rather than an anomaly, the presence of techno-populist tropes in and outside of parties and across institutional settings indicates the pervasiveness of these logics in contemporary European party politics.

Introduction: Political parties struggle to reconnect to Young people by using social networks. Acknowledging that 2020 has been the year of TikTok, most Spanish political parties have joined this social network: Podemos, with 191.400 followers and 3.1 million likes, is the most followed political party on this platform. Method: Using multimodal content analysis, this paper aims at analyzing how the party is using this social network, and for which purposes, placing the attention on how Podemos has adapted to TikTok specificities in terms of both language and technical affordances. Results: Results show that while the party perfectly adapts to TikTok’s specific language and technical affordances (special effects, etc.), instead of focusing on entertainment, the platform’s main genre, it uses TikTok as a showcase for political activities, failing in favoring a renovating relationship with users. However, politics is represented through the “game frame”, that is to say, dramatized as a battlefield between Good and Evil, which strengthens the populist dichotomous vision of the world, endorsing emotional response. Conclusion: In this sense, it is possible to conclude that, although Podemos mainly displays political content, this content falls into the category of politainment. Considering that present trends in usage rates suggest that the short-video format is the future of social media, we might expect an increase in politainmement content.

Copyright of Culture, Language & Representation / Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación is the property of Universitat Jaume I and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When history books about Brexit are written a key question asked will be 'how did it happen?' How did a country renowned for stable governments, pragmatism and diplomacy produce a chaotic outcome so harmful to its economic interests and international standing? This article examines the factors that produced Brexit by analysing its political and historical context, the main campaign groups and their communication strategies. Drawing on the work of Verdery (1999), Maskovsky and Bjork-James (2020) and other anthropologists, I suggest we need to look beyond conventional political science concepts and consider Brexit in terms of 'enchantment', 'angry politics' and 'technopopulism'. I conclude that while Brexit provides a window for analysing fault lines in contemporary Britain, it also highlights problems in the EU, its austerity politics and democratic deficit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reads the restructuring of European party systems in the 2010s as a transition from cartel to techno-populist parties, with a specific focus on left-populist challengers. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, it demonstrates how a long-term cartelization and particular mode of crisis management after 2008 drove the gradual replacement of the party cartel with a cohabitation of populism and technocratic politics: techno-populism. Although this techno-populist template has been deployed for parties such as Five Star Movement and some right-wing populist outfits, it has usually been left aside for left-wing variants. This article investigates two techno-populist subtypes from the left: Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain. The former took place within a cartel party ('intra-party'), while the latter occurred from outside the party cartel ('extra-party'). Although such party cartelization cuts across cases, the rise of Corbynism and Podemos took place under different institutional conditions: different electoral systems, different European Union membership and different dynamics of party competition on the left. The article concludes with the observation that rather than an anomaly, the presence of techno-populist tropes in and outside of parties and across institutional settings indicates the pervasiveness of these logics in contemporary European party politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that technopopulism is a discursive formation that emerges from the convergence of two preexisting discourses: populism and technolibertarianism. Whereas these discourses are historically distinct the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 wave of struggles have precipitated the political conditions for their intersection and hybridization. Such convergence produces both tensions and possibilities. On the one hand, technopopulism engenders a radically participatory model of democracy, which is ultimately anti-institutional as citizens cooperate and engage in sophisticated decision-making without the mediation of professional politicians. On the other hand, the more successful technopopulist parties—at least in the electoral arena—are all led by charismatic leaders who synthesize the positions that emerge from the netroots to mobilize them against the establishment. These two seemingly contradictory aspects precipitate in two variants of technopopulism: a leaderless-technocratic variant, which is derived from the open source mode of governance and from early experiments of the Global Justice Movement in networked self-government; and a leaderist-populist variant, which is more strictly focused on the electoral competition as an intrinsically reductive and thus hegemonic practice. The article concludes with a reflection on the discursive complementarity of these two variants and on the political tensions and challenges technopopulism faces in the current phase.

Copyright of Revista Internacional de Sociología is the property of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article contends that technopopulism is a discursive formation that emerges from the convergence of two preexisting discourses: populism and technolibertarianism. Whereas these discourses are historically distinct the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 wave of struggles precipitated the political conditions for their intersection. Such convergence produces both tensions and possibilities. On the one hand, technopopulism engenders a radically participatory model of democracy, which is ultimately anti-institutional as citizens cooperate and engage in sophisticated decision-making without the mediation of professional politicians. On the other hand, the more electorally successful technopopulist parties are led by charismatic leaders who synthesize the positions that emerge from the netroots to mobilize them against the establishment. These two seemingly contradictory aspects precipitate in two variants of technopopulism: a leaderless-technocratic variant, which is derived from the open source mode of governance and from early experiments of the Global Justice Movement in networked self-government; and a leaderist-populist variant, which is more strictly focused on the electoral competition as an intrinsically hegemonic practice. The article concludes with a reflection on the discursive complementarity of these two variants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]