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Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Customs duties were the first sustainable source of revenue for New South Wales, the colonies that hived off from it, and the other colonial settlements in Australia. From Sydney's original three-roomed customs house, with its wooden walls and bark roof, to the magnificent neo-renaissance palazzo of Melbourne, the neoclassical splendour of the Brisbane Customs House, to a Queen Anne confection in Albany, custom houses became symbols of the Australian colonies' growing economic power. Yet, unlike Anglophone Canada and New Zealand, which also engaged in practices of marginalising First Nations peoples and asserting exclusionary Britannic identities, the Australian colonies were parochial. They competed with one another for revenue and protected their own infant industries. Tariffs played an important role in establishing and maintaining this fractured nationalism; they were also instrumental in healing it. Federation was only made possible by the horse-trading over customs duties that is enshrined in the Australian Constitution. Professor John Taylor's tax history practice included extracting uniquely Australian stories from the grand narrative of international taxation. This article seeks to pay tribute to that approach and investigates custom houses at the time of fractured nationalism as a story which, on the one hand is part of the greater British-heritage narrative of indirect taxation and related architecture, but, on the other hand, is specifically Australian. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, the regional economic development model affected by government competition is an important factor leading to the income inequality of urban and rural residents. This paper aims to study the influence mechanism of tax competition among local governments on urban-rural income gap from the perspective of government intervention and tries to explain the reasons for the gradual narrowing of urban-rural income disparity since 2010. Using a dynamic panel data of 30 provinces, this study reveals that tax competition has alleviated the urban-rural income gap, and this effect shows temporal extensibility and spatial correlation. It is more obvious in eastern and central China and consistent in different local tax categories. Although tax competition has narrowed the overall income gap, the wage income inequality has been exacerbated. In addition, local fiscal autonomy, urbanization, public service provision and industrial structure are the important influencing channels of the mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the lens of a quantitative general equilibrium model of international trade and multinational production, this paper studies corporate tax competition and cooperation among asymmetric countries. The model theoretically supports the empirical regularities that corporate income taxation influences multinational firms' location and production decisions. Calibrating the model to three asymmetric countries for a hypothetical tax competition, I find that race to the bottom occurs in the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, counterfactual analysis of the global minimum corporate tax shows welfare reduction compared to the equilibrium of tax competition but welfare improvement compared to the current tax regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes how differences in countries' preferences for public goods affect the stability of coalitions. In a three-country framework, we show how heterogeneity in public goods preferences can shape countries' decisions to sign up for capital tax rate harmonization agreements (partial or full). In the context of asymmetric preferences, we identify situations in which these discrepancies make harmonization either cost-effective or harmful. We find that countries with similar preferences have an incentive to commit to capital tax harmonization. However, partial harmonization is only stable if the difference in preferences with the outsider is relatively large. A sufficiently high level of capital supply is also required to limit the effects of tax competition on the outsider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between tax policy and environment is a hot topic of widespread concern. Clarifying the mechanism between them is of great significance to promote the coordinated development of economy and environment. This study constructs a theoretical framework based on the multi-sector model of general equilibrium theory to investigate the effect of tax competition on environmental pollution. It is theoretically supported that such an effect exists and is affected by environmental protection investment (EI), that is, there is a threshold effect derived from EI. The theoretical finding is confirmed by an empirical study employing the spatial panel threshold model and using China's provincial panel data from 2007 to 2019. The empirical result shows that the threshold effect of EI is significant since that lower tax competition (i.e., higher tax collection and management efficiency) tends to reduce environmental pollution when EI is below the threshold value and vice versa. In addition, we find that the effect of tax competition is regionally heterogeneous. Finally, several policy recommendations are proposed based on the theoretical and empirical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between e-commerce development and the intensity of commodity tax competition under two tax principles for goods purchased online: the destination principle and the origin principle. The main findings are as follows: Given that origin-based tax is applied to purchases made in brick-and-mortar stores, (i) tax competition under destination-based taxation on e-commerce is more intense than tax competition under origin-based taxation; and (ii) the expansion of the online market intensifies destination-based tax competition while easing origin-based tax competition. The main factor leading to the results is that replacing the choice of "where to purchase" goods, consumers will have a new choice of "how to purchase" when online purchasing becomes available, and destination-based taxation distorts the latter choice, while origin-based taxation is neutral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses and compares the performance of resource taxes and capital taxes in financing public goods while considering the positive effects of public expenditure on firm productivity. It is motivated by Franks et al. (2017), who argue that the advantage of the resource tax consists in its potential to reap foreign resource rents. I employ an analytical general equilibrium framework of n $n$ identical resource‐poor countries, where local firms use internationally mobile capital and a net imported resource in production as well as local public infrastructure. The latter is financed solely by either taxing the input of the resource or capital. The choice of the policy instrument is exogenous to policy makers and symmetric across countries. I find that expenditure on infrastructure renders the impact of fiscal policy on the terms of trade ambiguous under resource taxation and negative under capital taxation. Moreover, public expenditure weakens the outflow of factors moderating the deficit of public spending caused by tax competition. This holds for both policy scenarios. Considering both effects simultaneously, resource taxation cannot generally be identified as the policy to provide higher provision or efficiency. A numerical exercise shows cases for higher provision of either policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyze the nuanced relationship between corporate income tax (CIT ) rate reductions as a tax incentive and foreign direct investments (FDI) across the Western Balkan countries. Additionally, it examines the extent to which they have progressed with their achievements during two decades (2000-2022). The transition of the Western Balkans from a closed and controlled economy to an open market economy has been challenging, but despite this, they have implemented certain policies to compete in the global market. For instance, they have reduced tax rates and offered tax incentives to attract foreign investors. This has had the effect of lowering the average tax rate, specifically in the year 2000, the average tax rate in corporate income tax was around 17%, while in 2023 the average tax rate in corporate income tax is 11%, or 6% lower. However, despite taking measures, the expected results have not been achieved. Privatization of public enterprises has been one of the main investments that these countries have attracted. The paper addresses the problems that have led to poor results and the inability of countries to convince investors for larger investments. In Kosovo, the issue of progress in this area is being overlooked by the government. It is important for Kosovo to recognize that neighboring countries are making significant progress, and therefore, it is critical to conduct research that not only highlights the current situation but also identifies potential solutions for the future.

This paper examines the endogenous choice of unit and ad valorem taxes in a model of tax competition with unemployment. Governments maximize objective functions that are a weighted sum of regional welfare and revenue. In the tax competition model, a high fixed wage rate generates unemployment and employment externalities. This effect can be either positive or negative because of freely mobile capital among regions. Without unemployment, revenue-maximizing governments choose unit taxes as their tax instrument to avoid revenue losses from intense tax competition under ad valorem taxes. However, with unemployment, positive employment externalities generate additional benefits for using ad valorem taxes to stimulate employment. Therefore, the present study shows that one region chooses an ad valorem tax, whereas the other chooses a unit tax, or that both governments use ad valorem taxes depending on employment externalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis paper assesses tax competition in China across provinces as well as time-space and examines the direct and spatial effects of economic growth on tax competition using data from 31 provinces in China from 2011-2020. Additionally, digital development and fiscal governance are measured using the TOPSIS model based on the EWM and text analysis methods, and the moderating effect of two between economic growth and tax competition is evaluated. The results suggest a general phenomenon of tax competition among provinces in China, which is a “race to the bottom” and a significant spatial spillover effect. In fact, economic growth at the provincial level has significantly weakened tax competition, and there is a potential weakening of tax competition in neighbouring provinces. While the digital economy and fiscal governance at the provincial level are relatively low in China, both reinforce the weakening effects of economic growth on tax competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the convergence of tax systems in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) over the period 1995–2018. Due to the increasing impact of tax competition, we have focused on income taxes, in particular, corporate ones. We have identified the factors that influence the taxation system and trends in income taxation in the CEECs by adapting the hidden Markov model approach. We find that many CEECs have reduced income taxation in the analysis period, mainly by lowering tax rates. Corporate income taxes have also decreased in many CEECs in the same period; however, the reverse has been observed too. Both convergence and divergence have been identified among the CEECs over the period considered. The speed of these processes based on the used variables varied depending on both exogenous and endogenous factors. These factors have been diagnosed as being specific to the periods of tax reforms, i.e., before and after accession to the European Union (EU) and the global financial crisis.

Tax policymaking in China has created conditions for local governments to strategically leverage tax policies (e.g. tax preferences, tax collection and management efficiency, and fiscal subsidies) to have carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060. By constructing an endogenous growth model with tax competition, capital mobility, technological innovation, and carbon emissions, this study investigates how tax competition is influencing firm-level behaviour and providing climate-relevant policy implications. It has theoretically demonstrated that this effect depends on technological innovation and operates through the capital mechanism. This finding is empirically confirmed in this analysis using a spatial panel threshold model with fixed effects designed to fit a balanced provincial panel dataset in China over the period 2005–2018. The main results are fourfold. First, provinces with similar carbon emissions intensity (CEI) tend to cluster spatially. That is, a province with a high CEI usually has neighbours with high CEIs. Second, a threshold effect is confirmed, revealing that higher tax collection and management efficiency (lower tax competition) decreases CEI if technological innovation is below the threshold value; otherwise, lower tax competition usually increases CEI. Third, capital mobility is a potential mechanism through which tax competition influences CEI. Specifically, provinces with a high level of technological innovation attract more knowledge- and technology-intensive firms and crowd out firms with low innovation capacities, potentially reducing local CEI. Finally, as indicated in our spatial heterogeneity analysis, the effect of higher tax competition decreasing CEI is only observed in the western region. These findings suggest the need for cross-provincial collaboration in developing taxation policies to ensure these policies help to advance the transition to a low-carbon economy and raise capital entry barriers for high-carbon emission projects in provinces with a low level of technological innovation. Cross-provincial taxation policies can be designed to encourage the transition to a low-carbon economy due to spatial agglomeration and heterogeneity of carbon emissions intensity (CEI). The focus of tax competition should be knowledge- and technology-intensive firms with a high level of technological innovation. Tax competition can be relaxed in China's provinces with a low level of technological innovation to reduce CEI; otherwise, it should be strengthened. The central government in China could usefully raise capital entry barriers for high-carbon emission projects in provinces with low levels of technological innovation and guide local governments to attract more projects with high returns and low carbon emissions to avoid a race to the bottom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concerns about firm pollution have entered the global spotlight in recent years, emphasizing the central role that governments play in addressing this pressing issue Existing literature mostly focuses on the influence of government regulations on the environment, with limited attention given to the role of government fiscal pressure. Leveraging detailed firm-level data from 2000 to 2007, we investigate the causal effect of fiscal pressure, stemming from China's Income Tax Sharing reform on the local environment. Employing a difference-in-differences estimation, we find that such fiscal pressure amplifies sulfur dioxide emission intensity, especially in non-state-owned, large-scale firms and small to medium-sized cities. We argue that this fiscal tension not only prompts local authorities to ease environmental regulations but also escalates a downward spiral in tax competition, fostering environments conducive to pollution, thereby deteriorating local environmental quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does trade liberalization aggravate tax avoidance? We build a three‐country model of tax competition consisting of two nonhaven countries and one tax haven in which goods are traded between the nonhavens and firms may shift profits to the tax haven. When the nonhavens cooperate, the reduction in trade costs does not change the degree of tax avoidance. In contrast, when the nonhavens do not cooperate, the equilibrium tax rates become higher, resulting in more tax avoidance. Furthermore, trade liberalization strengthens the tax competition between nonhavens, which further increases the tax‐avoidance activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By the turn of the 1990s, tax competition among national governments had emerged as a powerful law-making practice. The possibility of tax competition essentially depends on the design of transnational law, such as European law. This Article examines the change of economic, political, and legal ideas that have shaped responses by the European Communities and the European Union (EU) to income tax competition. It asserts that under the post-war settlement of embedded liberalism and moderate market integration, tax competition was not perceived as a fully developed phenomenon. Under increased cross-border economic mobility in the 1990s, tax competition became a critical concern but received a liberal and permissive reaction from the EU. In the 2010s, governing tax competition in the EU became a more vital topic. Still, in the contemporary EU, turning political ideas into legal rules capable of addressing tax competition remains hampered by the EU law requirement of unanimous decision-making. The European choice of whether and how to address tax competition involves profoundly contrasting ideas on the means by which to govern the socio-economic reality. The decision between spontaneous and regulated income tax integration is therefore a salient political question, but the unanimity rule undermines political contestation over tax competition and over the European model of fiscal federalism. The Article comes to a close by reflecting on whether the EU legal order offers means to overcome the deadlock of unanimity and whether it could accommodate a more properly political contestation over the Europeanisation of income taxation.

Copyright of GeSec: Revista de Gestao e Secretariado is the property of Sindicato das Secretarias e Secretarios do Estado de Sao Paulo (SINSESP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Técnica Tributaria is the property of Asociacion Espanola de Asesores Fiscales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

By the turn of the 1990s, tax competition among national governments had emerged as a powerful lawmaking practice. The possibility of tax competition essentially depends on the design of transnational law, such as European law. This Article examines the change of economic, political, and legal ideas that have shaped responses by the European Communities and the European Union (EU) to income tax competition. It asserts that under the post-war settlement of embedded liberalism and moderate market integration, tax competition was not perceived as a fully developed phenomenon. Under increased cross-border economic mobility in the 1990s, tax competition became a critical concern but received a liberal and permissive reaction from the EU. In the 2010s, governing tax competition in the EU became a more vital topic. Still, in the contemporary EU, turning political ideas into legal rules capable of addressing tax competition remains hampered by the EU law requirement of unanimous decision-making. The European choice of whether and how to address tax competition involves profoundly contrasting ideas on the means by which to govern the socio-economic reality. The decision between spontaneous and regulated income tax integration is therefore a salient political question, but the unanimity rule undermines political contestation over tax competition and over the European model of fiscal federalism. The Article comes to a close by reflecting on whether the EU legal order offers means to overcome the deadlock of unanimity and whether it could accommodate a more properly political contestation over the Europeanisation of income taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how exposure to international tax competition affects domestic firms' employment. Consistent with prior work, we find evidence that reductions in foreign tax rates affect the domestic competitive environment via increases in import competition and investment in foreign-owned subsidiaries. We posit that these changes in the domestic competitive environment can cause managers to reduce their firms' employment levels. Consistent with our expectation, we find that relative decreases in foreign tax rates negatively affect total labor compensation at domestic firms ex ante exposed to import competition and competition from foreign-owned peers. The effect of exposure to tax competition is greater for firms more exposed to product-market competition and those that are less able to expand investment without also increasing employment levels. Taken together, our results suggest that foreign tax rate changes can affect managers' domestic employment decisions by changing the domestic competitive environment. JEL Classifications: E24; F14; F16; H23; H35. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to map the political economy of top personal income tax rate setting. A much-discussed driving factor of top rate setting is the corporate tax rate: governments may prefer to limit the differential between both rates in order to prevent tax-friendly saving of labour incomes inside corporations. Recent studies have highlighted several other driving factors, including budgetary pressure, partisan politics, and societal fairness norms. I compare these and other potential determinants in the long run (1981–2018) by studying tax reforms of 226 cabinets in 19 advanced Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries using regression models. I find little evidence for the effects of economic, political, and institutional factors; instead, the main determinant of the top rate is the corporate tax rate. As corporate tax rates are still declining under competitive pressure, the recently set minimum rate of 15% will not stop tax competition from constraining progressive income taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine competition for foreign direct investment when governments compete in tax incentives along with intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. Higher IPRs result in a lower probability of imitation and thus higher expected profits and tax revenues, all else equal. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategies of two competing jurisdictions and show that since individual hosts do not internalize the benefit of lower prices for other jurisdiction's consumers, the non‐cooperative equilibrium exhibits an IPR externality in addition to the well‐known fiscal externality from tax competition. Thus, compared to joint policy setting, equilibrium IPRs are too high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. When governments maximize tax revenues, we show that overconfidence unambiguously reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium, while increasing tax revenues. When the government objective incorporates the welfare of resident managers, however, bonus taxes also serve a corrective role and may rise in equilibrium when overconfidence is increased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Globalization leads to significant transformations in the tax structures of countries, as in every field. Taxes come to the fore as the most effective tool in the competition of countries in order to attract highly mobile capital. With the effect of globalization, the national power of countries in the use of taxation powers weakens and it becomes a necessity for them to act in accordance with international requirements. The study analyzes the transformation of the globalization in the taxation of labor and capital in OECD member countries. For this purpose, tax revenues, tax rates, and the distribution of taxes types in total tax revenues are examined from 1965 to the present. As a result, it can be seen that globalization does not cause a decrease in the share of tax revenues in the Gross Domestic Product, both in OECD member countries and in Türkiye, on the contrary, it leads to increases. However, the tax burden changes in favor of capital and against labor. The most effective factors in this situation are the rate cuts in income tax and corporate tax, and especially the increase in social security premiums. Due to the increase in social security premiums, the high tax wedge is considered as a problem especially for Türkiye. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers the role of fiscal policy in ensuring the competitiveness of the national economy. In particular, the essence of fiscal policy is defined and the basic scientific approaches to scientists’ understanding of the content of economic competitiveness are analyzed. It is substantiated that such competitiveness is directly related to the competitiveness of the fiscal system. Considering the structure of the fiscal system and the main directions of fiscal policy, the article determines that the tax system plays an important role in shaping such a policy. It is substantiated that the overall level of competitiveness of the country’s economy depends partly on the efficiency of tax competition in the country. To this end, the article deepens the theoretical provisions of understanding the essence of this type of competition, which is implemented on the basis of an analysis of approaches to its consideration available in the scientific literature. In general, the authors determine that tax competition, in the current realities, is an important and integral component of the entire process of forming an appropriate level of competitiveness of the country in the global markets of goods, services, raw materials and, especially, markets of capital. As the experience of many countries shows, a transparent and efficiently functioning tax system in the country helps to attract foreign investment in the real sector of the economy, in particular in high-tech spheres. So, the specific features of this type of competition are specified and it is found that the competitiveness of the tax system is determined through a comparative analysis of its parameters from the indicator of functioning of tax systems in other countries. Analyzing the essence of fiscal policy, peculiarities of its development and implementation, the article expands the theoretical foundations of the ontological relationship between such a policy and the overall level of competitiveness of the national economy. It is determined that, on the one hand, such a policy is a component of the economic policy of the State and, accordingly, an integral part of economic relations, and on the other hand, it can actively influence the functioning of other subsystems and objects that have the ability to exert external influence on the development of the national economy.

Recent changes in the Russian tax legislation aimed at weakening the tax powers of the federal subjects in relation to profit tax open the question of a reasonable degree of limitation of the fiscal autonomy of Russian regions, as well as the regulation of regional tax competition. This article discusses the peculiarities of regulation of domestic tax competition in Canada and the United States on the basis of an analysis of the provisions of the tax legislation related to the fiscal powers of regional jurisdictions (provinces, states). The article focuses on approaches to limiting harmful tax practices that affect the economy or budget revenues of other regions. Empirical studies confirm the existence of negative effects of domestic tax competition, as well as the relevance of measures to restrict it. The considered countries make efforts to limit domestic tax competition both at the level of interregional agreements and at the level of central authorities. However, practice shows that it is difficult to ensure actual implementation of agreements at the regional level, so regulation by the central government is of key importance. Based on this result, recommendations are given for taking measures against harmful tax competition between the regions of Russia.

Managers take into account the tax burden when they decide about a new investment; therefore, they seek countries with lower tax rates. Governments respond to these requirements and battle for new investments by lowering tax rates as part of tax competition. This study focuses on the Visegrád countries as a region of new foreign investments from other OECD countries, and analyses the determinants of a bilateral FDI position of equity. As a model, it uses dynamic panel regression with GMM estimation. Results show that FDIs are affected by the level of difference in corporate taxation and the size of both countries. Every other potential determinant has no effect on the level of investment. These results show that foreign investors care about tax burdens more when investing within the Visegrád Group. Visegrád countries are relatively close when considering conditions for business; therefore, the most important difference becomes the taxation of profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International capital mobility intensifies tax competition between jurisdictions. However, many firms only operate domestically and are internationally immobile. This paper aims to analyze the effect of tax competition on the profitability of local (immobile) firms, especially when tax and non-tax instruments, including infrastructure provision, are involved. We show that tax competition decreases investment and profit of local firms when internationally mobile firms do not benefit sufficiently from local infrastructure. Tax harmonization does not eliminate this result and is not always favorable to local firms. Under tax discrimination, increased mobility of capital is beneficial to local firms. However, this discrimination is detrimental to local firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the implications of tax system and public borrowing limit asymmetries for the welfare cost of business cycles and interregional consumption risk sharing in a two-region fiscal union. We identify the welfare-improving and risk-sharing-improving designs of the regional tax systems and borrowing limits. We find that the choice of public borrowing limits is more consequential than is the choice of a tax regime for union welfare. It also serves as an argument for the harmonization of fiscal policies adopted in the fiscal union, as it would internalize fiscal externalities and improve consumption risk-sharing across the union regions. The key parameter determining the merits of alternative regional tax systems and possible limits to public borrowing in the fiscal union is the productivity of public good. Other aspects of the economy, such as the type of technology process, or the nature of the productivity shock do not affect the union public finance system design significantly. Extensive simulations suggest that if the productivity of public capital lies within the range of plausible empirical estimates, allowing both regions to have flexible borrowing limits and to choose whatever tax system they prefer will reduce the overall welfare costs of business fluctuations. However, for very low productivity of public capital, the welfare-improving regional public finance reforms that would prohibit public borrowing and tax labor income can produce limited benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis undertaken in this article is of the migration of natural persons, self-employed and not self-employed, for economic (including tax) reasons, which has been recorded among the citizens of Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and Vietnam. Tax migration, which is a type of economic migration of individuals, including those engaged in business, is one of the forms of reaction to taxes and tax reforms introduced in a country and the shape of the system of tax preferences. This study aims to examine the conditions of income taxation of individuals in the countries studied (Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, and Vietnam). The shape of the tax system has been or could be a premise for the migration of individuals from Poland to other countries, as well as from the countries studied to Poland. The reason for choosing these countries for the analysis of this phenomenon was the well-established scholarly cooperation of the Polish authors with authors representing public universities in Vietnam, Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as the available statistical data confirming the fact that residents of these countries account for the largest number of permanent and temporary residence permits given in Poland. It was considered that a comparison of legal solutions to the income taxation of taxpayers in the indicated countries, given the significant level of migration to Poland, can lead to exciting conclusions due to the differences in their legal systems, economic development, and tax systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on tax competition argues that the representative tax system (RTS), which is a standard form of tax base equalization, can internalize interregional externalities due to capital mobility. Although this conventional view holds when per unit tax on capital is imposed, it does not hold when corporate income is subject to tax. This paper proposes an efficient tax base equalization system under which each region's tax base is evaluated by the average factor return of all regions, not by each region's factor return (as in RTS). By investigating the nature of externalities arising from non-cooperative tax policy, we explain the workings of our "average-return" tax base equalization system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Modern Economic Science is the property of Modern Economic Science Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper aims to present the size and structure of passive income payments, such as dividends, interest, royalty payments, and fees for intangible services, made by companies domiciled in Poland belonging to a multinational enterprises (MNE) group. The authors formulate a hypothesis that tax jurisdictions offering extensive legal and tax incentives for holding structures, in particular concerning the tax treatment of dividends and other withholding tax payments, are the preferred location of holding companies. A review of the literature and legal sources precedes empirical research. The empirical analysis shows that passive income flows, including dividends, interest, royalties, and fees for intangible services, which constitute the dominant type of payments to holding companies, are directed from Poland primarily to countries with tax and regulatory solutions that are friendly to holding companies, including in particular the so-called intra-EU tax havens, namely Luxembourg, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Malta and Ireland. Real trade with these countries is neither significant nor proportional to the scale of passive income.

International competitiveness has solidified itself as a key policy goal for nation states. The consequent competitive re-design of tax systems has reduced corporate tax rates across borders. To understand the policy-shaping nature of tax competition, we examine how the changing imagery of competitiveness has rationalised lowering the corporate tax rate in three Finnish tax reforms since the 1990s. In attracting mobile capital by inventing tax system disparities, governments increasingly rely on imaginary capital migration. Examining imaginary capital migration demonstrates that governments' competitive policies of fiscal nationalism greatly overlap with corporate taxpayers' tax avoidance arrangements, as both practices are largely disembedded from the material dynamics of economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers the role of fiscal policy in ensuring the competitiveness of the national economy. In particular, the essence of fiscal policy is defined and the basic scientific approaches to scientists’ understanding of the content of economic competitiveness are analyzed. It is substantiated that such competitiveness is directly related to the competitiveness of the fiscal system. Considering the structure of the fiscal system and the main directions of fiscal policy, the article determines that the tax system plays an important role in shaping such a policy. It is substantiated that the overall level of competitiveness of the country’s economy depends partly on the efficiency of tax competition in the country. To this end, the article deepens the theoretical provisions of understanding the essence of this type of competition, which is implemented on the basis of an analysis of approaches to its consideration available in the scientific literature. In general, the authors determine that tax competition, in the current realities, is an important and integral component of the entire process of forming an appropriate level of competitiveness of the country in the global markets of goods, services, raw materials and, especially, markets of capital. As the experience of many countries shows, a transparent and efficiently functioning tax system in the country helps to attract foreign investment in the real sector of the economy, in particular in high-tech spheres. So, the specific features of this type of competition are specified and it is found that the competitiveness of the tax system is determined through a comparative analysis of its parameters from the indicator of functioning of tax systems in other countries. Analyzing the essence of fiscal policy, peculiarities of its development and implementation, the article expands the theoretical foundations of the ontological relationship between such a policy and the overall level of competitiveness of the national economy. It is determined that, on the one hand, such a policy is a component of the economic policy of the State and, accordingly, an integral part of economic relations, and on the other hand, it can actively influence the functioning of other subsystems and objects that have the ability to exert external influence on the development of the national economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny (0035-9629) is the property of Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper studies the interplay between two groups of countries, large and small, which compete sequentially on corporate taxes and environmental regulations to attract imperfectly mobile firms. We show that in general, the small countries undercut the large countries in terms of corporate taxes. The small countries choose to be both tax and pollution havens when they are less concerned about the environment than the large countries are and capital integration is low. The large countries never act as both tax havens and pollution havens. Finally, we find that higher firm mobility narrows the tax gap between the large and the small countries but does not affect the optimal environmental policy: tax competition immunizes countries against the detrimental effect of globalization on emission caps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a federal country with two regions, consumers can decide not only the region where to invest, but also the type of capital investment. We analyse how such decision is affected by the fact that a first type of capital is taxed at a regional level while a second one is taxed at a federal level with tax compliance for federal taxation varying across regions. A standard horizontal tax competition arises for the first type of capital across regions. Instead, vertical tax competition arising between the regional and the federal level is not standard because there is not tax base overlap between the two tiers of government. However, both regional and federal tax bases are affected by tax policies decided by each level of government via capital movements from one type of capital towards the other one. Our main result shows under which conditions an increase in federal taxation in response to an increase in tax noncompliance may be less severe than in a set-up with only one type of capital because of capital flights arising not only across regions, but also across different types of capital investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyse the Romanian tax system in terms of tax structure and tax rates, in relation to countries in the geographical area of Romania, trying to configure a tax profile of the Romanian tax system. The methodology used combines the empirical analysis of statistical data and their interpretation, with the identification of causalities, in convergence with the objective. The debate and concern are justified by the fact that there are no concrete pragmatic "recipes" for adjustments to guarantee the success of fiscal policy measures, but there are theories that are valid under certain conditions, many of them in conditions of relative economic stability, aiming at adjustments and fine adjustments, with discreet effects on the economy, and less optimal solutions to shocks of the magnitude of recent ones. The results obtained, we appreciate, reflect the current general situation of the Romanian tax system, revealing adjustable and improved aspects, which may prove useful in future more complex analysis of tax authorities in the design of a medium- and long-term fiscal strategy.

The aim of the paper is to highlight, at a theoretical level, the effects of globalization on fiscal policy, as well as the issue of profit shifting at OECD level, given that, although substantial progress has been made internationally in multilateral fiscal coordination, it remains at a significant level, and the estimated loss of income for advanced economies reaches up to a third of the taxes collected. For developing countries, given their greater dependence on corporate taxes, the losses may be even higher. Therefore, measures are needed to reduce the tax revenues losses, namely excess profits taxes, the wealth taxes or the United Nation tax convention. The methodology was a descriptive one, using various bibliographic sources, mainly from foreign literature: scientific articles, relevant analysis and studies in the field of reference, legislation, official documents of various tax bodies.

Today we are witnessing almost the widest gap between the richest and the poorest. Besides the economic aspect of inequality, democracy deficit, acceleration of global warming, urgent needs to adopt sustainable development can be considered as main problems of today’s world. Current national and international models are being insufficient to address these problems. Taxation one of the is the main mechanisms to struggle these problems. However, European Union does not have a strong mechanism to adopt tax measures. European Union institutions lack the democratic legitimacy that would be needed to have tax-raising powers. Considering that challenge The Manifesto for the Democratization of Europe constitutes an essential effort to tackle these problems with its concrete suggestions. Suggestions in the Manifesto are easily filling the gaps in the existing system in Europe. The system envisaged in the Manifesto is focusing on the European Assembly especially with its tax-raising and expenditure power. The mechanism is also novel, in the sense that it leaves the traditional way of budgeting. In this article, the authors aim is to identify and evaluate the suggested model of the Manifesto and the Treaty on the Democratization of Europe.

The literature on tax competition has argued that tax base equalization, which reduces regional disparities in tax bases, can serve as a means of internalizing horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities. This argument assumes that each government relies on a single tax base (a regional tax on mobile capital and a federal tax on savings). This paper considers the case in which a distortionary labor tax is also available. Internalizing fiscal externalities requires that while the regional capital tax base is fully equalized, a region's equalization entitlement for the labor tax is positive when its tax base is "larger" than the average tax base of all regions. This efficient tax base equalization system is incompatible with the primary objective of fiscal equalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]