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INTRODUCTION 1160 I. BACKGROUND 1170 A. Legislative History of Opportunity Zones 1170 B. Opportunity Zones and Opportunity Funds Generally 1173 C. The Aftermath of Opportunity Zone Legislation 1176 II. INCORPORATING [...], Opportunity Zones are low-income areas or economically distressed communities in the United States. The Opportunity Zone program encourages investment in low-income areas or economically distressed communities by offering investors tax benefits. Scholars have found little evidence that Opportunity Zones positively impact zone residents' lives, concluding that Opportunity Zone legislation mostly benefits wealthy investors and should be reformed to benefit community members better. Investors are currently not required to finance projects geared toward the needs of local communities; they are instead funding developments they would have already invested in, whether located in an Opportunity Zone or not. This Article argues that current reform efforts and related scholarship do not give adequate weight to active and direct participation by community members and investors as it relates to economic development tax incentives. It argues for a comprehensive framework that focuses on active, direct, and transformative participation by community members and investors. This Article uses the Opportunity Zone program as an example of how two novel policy reforms for economic development tax incentives could be implemented. First, Opportunity Zone investors should be required to buy into the community financially. Buy-in would entail a one-time lump sum payment to a community Opportunity Fund to ensure actualized commitment to community development. Second, a portion of each Opportunity Zone should be reserved for current community members to invest in. The buy-in will provide community members--often members of historically disadvantaged groups--with resources, allowing them to benefit irrespective of an investor's intent. The funds collected from the buy-in will be allocated to community members, allowing them to invest in and benefit from Opportunity Zones, which are otherwise prohibitively expensive for average residents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 258 II. THE PRELUDE 262 III. A SURFEIT OF LITIGATION VEHICLES 266 IV. A MOST PECULIAR QUESTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 271 V. THE SUPREME COURT [...], The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Moore v. United States, for the purpose of deciding whether the realization doctrine remains a constitutional limitation on Congress's ability to impose an unapportioned income tax, as the Supreme Court held in its famous 1920 decision in Eisner v. Macomber. For most of the past hundred-plus years, Macomber has languished somewhere between life and death--never overruled by the Court, but never again applied by the Court to invalidate a provision of the income tax (including some provisions that the 1920 Court would surely have considered impermissible). Should the Court now declare Macomber fully alive, the impact on the present and future of the federal income tax would be far reaching. Existing provisions of major revenue significance would be invalidated (including the 2017 redesign of cross-border taxation at issue in Moore,), and a number of intriguing reform proposals would be constitutional nonstarters (including the so-called billionaires' tax proposed by the Biden administration). Although it is natural to look to 1920 and Macomber as the cause of today's uncertain scope of the congressional power to tax income, what did not happen in the Court's 1943 decision in Helvering v. Griffiths is as significant as what did happen in 1920. Despite Griffiths being of comparable importance to Macomber, it has faded into obscurity, even as Macomber remains the most famous tax case of them all. The presence o/Moore on the Court's docket today depends on Macomber's wildly improbable survival in 1943. That survival was the product of a perfect storm of unlikely circumstances. This article tells the story of Griffiths, and how Congress and the Roosevelt administration snatched defeat from the jaws of victory (with a crucial assist from Justice Jackson). The story is offered here both for its own sake--it is fascinating and little known--and because of its timeliness as Moore awaits the Court's consideration. Although the article's focus is on Griffiths, not Moore, the story may offer lessons for today's Supreme Court, for Congress, and for the Biden administration.

Table of Contents I. Introduction 130 II. Historical Treatment of R&E Expenses 131 III. The TCJA Approach to R&E Expenses 137 A. Expenditures Subject to Section 174 140 1. The [...], In the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), Congress eliminated the deduction for research and experimental (R&E) expenditures that has been a part of the federal Tax Code since 1954. Despite numerous attempts at delay or repeal, this change went into effect in 2022. Instead of deducting their R&E costs, businesses must now capitalize and amortize those expenses over five years, or 15 years for research conducted abroad. The new law has the potential to cause substantial tax increases for businesses that engage in R&E activities. It also creates a number of interpretive issues, and sets up potential conflicts with other provisions of the tax code. In addition, it makes the United States an outlier among the OECD nations, where current expensing of R&E expenditures remains the norm. The TCJA's changes to section 174 may incentivize large businesses either to reduce their research activities or to shift those activities to foreign affiliates, taking high-paying jobs, and even the resulting intellectual property, with them. Despite these potential consequences, Congress made the decision to up-end more than sixty years of consistent tax policy with remarkably little discussion, data analysis, or explanation. This article analyzes the new rules governing the tax treatment of R&E expenditures, identifies significant interpretive issues, and considers the potential impact of these rules on businesses engaged in R&E activities.

INTRODUCTION 83 I. CURRENT LAW: MEDICAL EXPENSES, SECTION 213, AND O'DONNABHAIN 85 II. 26 C.F.R. [section] 1.213-1 AND STATE-LEVEL BANS ON GENDER-AFFIRMING CARE 89 III. RECOMMENDATION 92 CONCLUSION 93 INTRODUCTION [...], More than twenty states currently limit or ban access to gender-affirming medical and surgical care for minors, and three more have bans that went into effect on January 1, 2024. For many transgender youths and their families, this will mean crossing state lines to obtain appropriate medical care and make this often-costly care even more expensive. This situation is not only a crisis for the civil rights of trans people; it also presents an undecided issue of federal income tax law. Since 2011, when the IRS acquiesced in O'Donnabhain v. Commissioner, the tax-deductibility of at least some gender-affirming healthcare has seemed secure. But a situation in which medical care deemed deductible for federal income tax purposes is illegal under the state law of the taxpayers residence is unprecedented. The Internal Revenue Code and its Regulations do not address this possibility. Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits taxpayers to take a federal income tax deduction for unusually large medical expenses, does not condition deductibility on the legality of the medical treatment, but the current Regulations do. These Regulations must be amended to clarify that so long as gender-affirming care is lawful where provided, the associated expenses are tax deductible, regardless of their status under the state law of the taxpayer's residence.

Table of Contents I. Introduction 606 II. Elective Workarounds and the 1944 AGI Concept 608 A. SALT Cap 608 B. Role of the AGI Concept 610 C. Conduit Principles 614 [...], In response to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, many states have enacted elective entity-level passthrough taxes that allow business owners to circumvent the individual cap on deductibility of state and local taxes (SALT), reducing federal tax revenue at no cost to the states. Entity-level workarounds purport to shift state income tax liability from the owners' personal tax returns to the entity's tax return. The passthrough entity claims an uncapped ordinary business deduction for state income taxes, reducing the owners' adjusted gross income for federal tax purposes; state income tax credits roughly equal to the entity-level tax reduce or eliminate the owners' state tax liability. In Notice 2020-75 the outgoing Trump administration blessed entity-level workarounds, violating fundamental principles of conduit taxation that seek to treat passthrough owners as if they conducted the entity's business individually. Because elective entity-level taxes function as nearly perfect substitutes for individual income taxes, they should be required to be separately stated and deducted at the individual level, subject to the SALT cap. Allowing passthrough owners the equivalent of an above-the-line deduction for state income taxes is inconsistent with the concept of adjusted gross income which Congress introduced in 1944 to establish rough parity between business and nonbusiness taxpayers regardless of source of income. Notice 2020-75 conspicuously fails to explain why the separate statement rules do not apply to elective entity-level taxes; it also ignores longstanding guidance concerning the business--nonbusiness distinction and the meaning of "state taxes on net income." Whether or not Congress retains the SALT cap, Notice 2020-75 should be rescinded.

I. INTRODUCTION 590 II. THE HISTORY AND PRESENT UNCERTAINTY OF THE CTC 591 A. A Brief History of the CTC 592 B. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 593 [...], More than ten million children in the United States live in poverty, largely because of the country's relative lack of investment in children and families. Child poverty is associated with higher rates of child maltreatment and contributes to a host of outcomes that harm children and society. Recent legislation that increased the size and scope of the Child Tax Credit (CTC) demonstrated the power of cash assistance policies to reduce child poverty. However, implementation issues prevented many of the poorest families from receiving benefits, and the CTC expansion expired at the end of 2021. This Note proposes a Universal Child Benefit (UCB) that would provide $700 monthly for children under age six and $400 monthly for children ages six to seventeen. All families would automatically receive the benefit through the Social Security Administration (SSA). The UCB would drastically reduce child poverty and improve child well-being in the U.S.

Table of Contents I. Introduction 420 I. The History of Section 1202 422 A. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 422 B. Temporarily Increased Section 1202 Exclusion 424 C. Permanently [...], Section 1202 provides a significant incentive for investors in small business stock by allowing them to exclude from their income large amounts of gain on the sale of this stock. The rules allow investors to exclude either ten times their investment or a flat $10 million from their gross income. Currently, taxpayers with little capital at risk are receiving multiple $10 million exclusions by gifting the stock to family without increasing the amount of capital at risk. To limit this situation, the Treasury should reinterpret the Code to limit the ability of taxpayers to multiply the $10 million exclusion over multiple persons. Alternatively, Congress could act to eliminate this seemingly unintentional consequence of the Code. These changes would increase federal tax receipts while likely not decreasing investment or innovation in small businesses.

Table of Contents I. Introduction 248 II. Subpart F--Foreign Base Company Sales Income and the Branch Rule 249 III. The Structure of, and Background to, Whirlpool 255 IV. The Tax [...], This Article focuses on the decisions of the Tax Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. Commissioner, that address the scope of subpart F foreign base company sales income and the branch provision thereunder, and why this writer believes the courts reached the correct outcomes. These are important and controversial opinions which have been subject to criticism (as discussed infra). Both the Tax Court and a divided Sixth Circuit found in favor of the Service, and the Sixth Circuit denied the taxpayer's ensuing request for a rehearing or rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court subsequently denied a petition for certiorari. Before discussing the courts' opinions and reasoning, as well as this writer's thoughts about the decisions, the Sixth Circuit dissent, and certain assertions raised by the parties and amici curiae, it is beneficial to provide the reader with a brief background of the foreign base company sales income regime of section 954(d), as well as the special branch rule contained in section 954(d)(2). It also requires an understanding of the rather complex statutory and regulatory provisions, as well as the convoluted structure, involved here. Whirlpool undertook a reorganization of its Mexican appliance manufacturing operation with virtually nothing changing on the ground. But through paper shuffling, related party sales income was shifted to a Luxembourg controlled foreign corporation, in this case, the non-branch "remainder." (A corporation will often conduct a function such as selling, purchasing, or manufacturing as an unincorporated branch. The part of the corporation not operating as a branch is often referred to as "the remainder.") It was not, however, the questionable substance of Whirlpool's restructuring that resulted in Whirlpool's loss in the courts. Instead, Whirlpool properly lost the case because it undertook a practice of separating related party sales income from the manufacturing entity or, to be precise in this case, the manufacturing branch. This was the type of activity Congress meant to be denied deferral. The statute and the Regulations accomplished that intention, and the decisions of the Tax Court and Sixth Circuit reached the correct outcome.

Table of Contents I. Introduction: "You Can Observe a Lot by Watching" 294 II. The Internal Revenue Code, Tradeoffs, and Burden Sharing Among Economic Classes 301 III. Itemized Deductions: Ditching [...], Taxpayers who take advantage of the Code's exclusions, deductions, and preferential rates implicitly "vote" on the shape of American society. Pre-TCJA, the Code enfranchised "aspirational" taxpayers who sought to own homes in flourishing neighborhoods, to educate their offspring, and to retire comfortably. The TCJA disenfranchised such taxpayers and enfranchised a business owner/investment class who will vote for a different type of American society. This article evaluates the TCJA's changes to the Code against this straightforward rubric: "Does a change to the Code's itemized deductions make our society better? A change should impel those who would reduce their income tax liability through itemized deductions and other preferences to make society better." The TCJA ditches one class of taxpayers in favor of another without addressing, indeed exacerbating, the invidious discriminations of the pre-TCJA code. The TCJA makes the Code into an instrument of exacerbating and entrenching wealth inequality. An "across-the-board" percentage tax cut too obviously reduces the income tax liability of high income taxpayers more than it reduces the income tax liability of other taxpayers. Congress did not cut taxes "across-the-board" in the TCJA, instead reducing disproportionately the ordinary income of high income taxpayers through deductions realistically available only to them, broadening the tax brackets below the top bracket, and compressing tax brackets from the top. Tax preferences are increasingly realistically available only to high income taxpayers. Tax preferences previously available to lower income taxpayers have either become unavailable to them (but not to high income taxpayers) or atrophied. This worsens inequality as the TCJA decreases the marginal tax bracket on all of a taxpayer's taxable income much more for high income taxpayers than for lower income taxpayers. This decrease in progressivity or increase in regressivity is hidden in plain sight. Progressivity would be enhanced by changing itemized deductions into tax credits equal to a percentage of an expenditure for which Congress wishes to provide a tax benefit. The expiration of many TCJA provisions provides Congress an opportunity to move away from itemized deductions and towards tax credits. This would re-enfranchise many taxpayers who lost their voice in shaping American society. Maybe that society was not ideal, but the TCJA did not improve it.