1. Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games
- Author
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Jason F. Shogren, Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malézieux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), University of Wyoming (UW), University of Alaska-Anchorage, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung (WZB), Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC), Region Grand-Est, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Tax Administration Research Centre, University of Exeter (TARC), The authors thank the Conseil Régional de Lorraine for its financial support., Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), University of Exeter, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Declaration ,oath ,Tax evasion ,JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments ,Compliance (psychology) ,honesty ,Consistency (negotiation) ,JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H27 - Other Sources of Revenue ,Honesty ,0502 economics and business ,Economics ,050207 economics ,Empirical evidence ,050205 econometrics ,Law and economics ,media_common ,Commitment device ,JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance ,Oath ,05 social sciences ,commitment ,part-time Lying ,[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance ,Lying ,Finance - Abstract
International audience; Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.
- Published
- 2020
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