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While the conflict literature has examined the use of forced recruitment in conflict, the question remains why groups would choose to do so when forced recruits require expensive coercion and time ...

Declining trust in government is often cited as the cause of declining support for policies that require ideological sacrifices. Yet pivotal to the effect of trust is the broader political context, which can vary over time. In a context of deep partisan divisions, for individuals who do not trust the government, even small ideological costs can signal the beginning of a process that leads to much larger ideological costs down the line—a process akin to a “slippery slope.” We demonstrate the conditional relationship between partisan divides, governmental trust, and support for policy through empirical tests that focus on the case of gun control. We first show that the effect of trust in government on conservatives’ gun control attitudes increases as polarization over the issue grows. We then use a continuum of gun control policies to demonstrate that the effect of trust on policy support can follow a slippery slope structure during polarized points.

People support inefficient spending on preventing disasters, and these preferences are translated into inefficient policies as elected officials try to appeal to their constituents. Here, we find preferences for prevention spending are biased by the "cost conflation" mechanism, where people assume expensive problems have expensive solutions. In this article, we present a formal model of collective action, and illustrate how cost conflation causes people to deviate from the equilibria. We test for these hypothesized deviations using an incentivized experiment. The experimental subjects engage in cost conflation-they believe the costs of disaster prevention are positively related to the costs of disaster damages, even when explicitly told otherwise. As a result, they fail to prevent smaller disasters and pay too much to prevent large disasters when cheap solutions exist. Furthermore, we provide evidence that overemphasizing disaster damages undermines successful disaster prevention because people view these disasters as too big to solve.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessments (IPCC) Special Report on 1.5 °C of global warming is clear. Nearly all pathways that hold global warming well below 2 °C involve carbon removal ( IPCC, 2015 ). In addition, solar geoengineering is being considered as a potential tool to offset warming, especially to limit temperature until negative emissions technologies are sufficiently matured ( MacMartin et al., 2018 ). Despite this, there has been a reluctance to embrace carbon removal and solar geoengineering, partly due to the perception that these technologies represent what is widely termed a “moral hazard”: that geoengineering will prevent people from developing the will to change their personal consumption and push for changes in infrastructure ( Robock et al., 2010 ), erode political will for emissions cuts ( Keith, 2007 ), or otherwise stimulate increased carbon emissions at the social-system level of analysis ( Bunzl, 2008 ). These debates over carbon removal and geoengineering echo earlier ones over climate adaptation. We argue that debates over “moral hazard” in many areas of climate policy are unhelpful and misleading. We also propose an alternative framework for dealing with the tradeoffs that motivate the appeal to “moral hazard,” which we call “risk-response feedback.”

Some technologies, such as solar or wind power, create certain but relatively small reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Others, such as carbon sequestration devices, have larger potential upsides, but a greater possibility of failure. Here we show using economic games that people will invest in high-risk high-reward technologies when more certain options will not be sufficient. Groups of players had to contribute enough to avoid a simulated climate change disaster. Players could defect, make a certain contribution or make a risky contribution with a high potential gain. Across four studies using both laboratory (n = 296 and n = 297) and online (n = 501 and n = 499) samples, we found that more players made riskier contributions when necessary targets could not be met otherwise, regardless of the magnitude of potential losses. These results suggest that individuals are willing to invest in risky technology when it is necessary to mitigate climate change. In economic games, players shift to riskier contributions when targets that prevent catastrophic losses cannot be met otherwise, suggesting people are willing to invest in riskier technology when more certain options will not be sufficient to mitigate climate change.

Women's body attractiveness is influenced by specific anthropometric cues, including body mass index (BMI), waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), waist-to-stature ratio (WSR), and shoulder-to-waist ratio (SWR). Despite the existence of multiple functional hypotheses to explain these preferences, it remains unclear which cue-based inferences are most influential in regulating evaluations of women's body attractiveness. We argue that (i) the common link to the morphological cues that influence women's body attractiveness is that they all reliably indicate high reproductive value (as defined by youth and low parity); and (ii) ancestrally, selection pressures related to tracking between-women differences in reproductive value would have been among the strongest acting on adaptations for body evaluation. An empirical study then tested the resulting prediction that cue-based estimates of reproductive value function as powerful regulators of women's body attractiveness judgments. Subjects viewed standardized photos of women in swimsuits (with heads obscured), and were assigned to either estimate components of their reproductive value (age or number of offspring) or rate their attractiveness. Structural equation modeling revealed that a latent variable capturing estimated reproductive value was almost perfectly correlated with a latent variable capturing body attractiveness. Moreover, unique associations of women's BMI, WHR, and WSR with their body attractiveness were entirely mediated via estimated reproductive value. These findings provide strong support for the longstanding hypothesis that women's body attractiveness is primarily explained by cue-based estimates of reproductive value – expected future utility as a vehicle of offspring production.

Feeling affected by climate change related disasters has the potential to mobilize belief in climate change, concern about the issue, and support for mitigation policies – even when accounting for the effects of physically living through a disaster. In this study we use a two-wave survey design where respondents in the United States were interviewed before and after Hurricane Florence to better understand who feels affected by such disasters. First, we find that being worried about climate change increases the feeling of being affected by the hurricane among those who regularly discuss climate change. Second, we find that those who are high in perspective taking are more likely to feel affected. However, those who are high in empathic concern, but feel obligated to help victims of disasters, are less likely to feel affected. This suggests that hurricanes may cause a collapse of compassion, where those who are especially sensitive to the suffering of others down-regulate their emotional response to costly disasters.

De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.

Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out a compelling theory for folk-economic beliefs, focusing on beliefs about markets. However, societies also allocate resources through mechanisms involving power and group decision-making (e.g., voting), through the political economy. We encourage future work to keep folkpoliticaleconomic beliefs in mind, and sketch an example involving pollution and climate change mitigation policy.