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Paradoxical self-esteem is defined as contrasting levels of self-liking and self-competence. Consideration of the social and motivational implications of this uncommon form of self-esteem suggests that heightened selectivity in the processing of social information may be behind its persistence. Two experiments were conducted to confirm the prediction of heightened selectivity in paradoxicals. As expected, those paradoxically low in self-liking were more negatively biased in their memory for personality feedback (Study 1) and interpretation of valuatively ambiguous phrases (Study 2) than were their counterparts who shared the same low self-liking but were also low in self-competence. Symmetrical with this result, those paradoxically high in self-liking exhibited a heightened positive bias relative to those who were high in both self-liking and self-competence. The findings are discussed in relation to attitudes and motivation.

Three studies were conducted to validate the conceptualization of global self-esteem as consisting of two dimensions: a sense of social worth, or self-liking, and a sense of personal efficacy, or self-competence. In Study 1, confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the a priori structure of the Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale, a self-report instrument designed to measure the two dimensions. In Study 2, a second structural analysis showed the dimensionality of Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale to parallel the proposed dichotomy. In Study 3, self-liking and self-competence were related to several theoretically linked constructs--depression, self-perceived abilities, and perceived parental approval--with the resulting pattern of correlations supporting their conceptualization as substantively distinct dimensions. The implications of these findings for understanding global self-esteem are discussed.

Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Experiments 1 and 2) or a college student (Experiment 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Experiments 1 and 2) or time pressure (Experiment 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during comprehension.

Where does self-esteem (SE) come from? Three experiments explored the idea that men's and women's SE arise, in part, from different sources. It was hypothesized that SE is related to successfully measuring up to culturally mandated, gender-appropriate norms--separation and independence for men and connection and interdependence for women. Results from Study 1 suggested that men's SE can be linked to a individuation process in which one's personal distinguishing achievements are emphasized. Results from Study 2 suggested that women's SE can be linked to a process in which connections and attachments to important others are emphasized. Study 3 demonstrated that failing to perform well on gender-appropriate tasks engendered a defensive, compensatory reaction, but only in subjects with high SE. These findings are discussed with regard to their implications for the structure and dynamics of the self.

Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) suggested that depressed and dysphoric persons verify their self-conceptions by seeking rather negative appraisals. Hooley and Richters (1992) and Alloy and Lipman (1992) have worried that (a) idiosyncratic features of Swann et al.'s participants and design may have produced their effects and (b) Swann et al. presented no evidence that self-verification strivings are motivated. We address these issues empirically. Study 1 showed that 20 dysphoric participants preferred interacting with a person who appraised them unfavorably over participating in another study, in comparison with 30 nondysphorics. Study 2 revealed that 26 dysphoric persons responded to feedback that challenged their negative self-view by working to reaffirm their low self-esteem, in comparison with 47 nondysphorics. These findings support the notion that at some level depressed and dysphoric persons want rather negative appraisals.