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Amidst multiple foreign policy flip-flops of the Turkish government, the Middle East is where observers agree most about the explanatory priority of ideational factors over realpolitik calculations. The assertive foreign policy activism to extend the country's role in the region has largely been linked to the Islamist leanings of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). This study revisits Turkey's Middle East policy with a particular focus on the AKP's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Muslimin), which marked Turkish foreign policy formulation and implementation in multiple theatres from Yemen to Egypt to Libya. Using a neoclassical realist approach, it argues that the AKP's ideological ties to the Ikhwan are significant for the availability of new resources but Turkish foreign policy behavior in the Middle East, including relations with the Ikhwan, reflects a grand strategy to respond to systemic and sub-systemic stimuli.

Through a discourse-theoretic approach, this paper problematises the under-theorised chameleonic quality of populism. While populist politics is often expressed as construction of the people against the elite, this paper argues that the political should rather be sought in how populism revives itself despite (and through) constant discursive shifts. It examines the interrelations between populism, identity and foreign policy, inserting 'dislocation', the transitory moment of disruption in the discursive field, as the main enterprise of populist politics. Empirically, the paper scrutinises how Turkish President Erdoğan switched from conservative democratic to Islamist to nationalist discourses, each with repercussions in the field of foreign policy, and sustained the populist moment through successive dislocations. In particular, it focuses how the 'Ottoman' myth spelled different populisms and foreign policy discourses in different periods of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) rule.

Inspired by the populists' salient urge to recalibrate and locate contingent developments within a larger temporal order and establish historical continuity, this paper dwells on the chronopolitics of national populism and calls for a systematic treatment of time in these movements. Focusing on the neglected narrative dimension, such an inquiry will afford an alternative reading from which to engage with and critique the magnitude of populism. This study argues that despite ample variance and claims of uniqueness, national populisms employ a shared temporal template that accounts for a particular national subjectivity through a set of timing and sequencing of events complemented by affective stimuli. It focuses on the case of Turkey. More pronounced since 2013 Gezi Protests, the rising tide of national populism under President Tayyip Erdoğan's rule encapsulates how these populisms conflate the past, present, and future into a single narrative about the people's survival and prosperity.

Diasporas do not arise from fixed connections to objective circumstances such as dispersion or relation to a homeland, but instead constantly are negotiated and re-constituted. Ranging from internal gradual change to sudden exogenous change, the re-making of a diaspora can take diverse forms. Despite the prevalence of constructivist and processual approaches, however, research on diaspora identity change has been limited. This paper takes a comparative historical perspective to the post-2016 diasporization of the Gülen Movement (GM) and discusses how the GM responded differently to sudden exogenous shocks in 1997, 2007, and 2016. In both historical institutionalism and rational choice theories, the sudden exogenous shocks do the heavy lifting to explain change; however, it is rather the endogenous parameters that account for the variation in the GM's responses to those shocks.

Since the outset of the 2000s, the "Turkish model" embracing Islamic liberalism was set as an example for the Muslim world in turmoil. Today, far from being a desired model country, even many of its own citizens feel despair about Turkey's political and economic future and are looking for a new life abroad, while thousands of others flee repression, seeking asylum in Western, democratic countries. Despite its wide recognition as a host or transit country in current migration flows, Turkey has traditionally been one of the top emigration countries, with over 6.7 million diasporans and another three million permanent returnees. The ongoing outflow, widely ranging from asylum seekers to wealthy businesspeople, represents Turkey's fifth emigration wave in its republican history. Relations with Turkey and different asylum regimes specific to respective host countries largely shape what kind of migration is being received from Turkey. While academics, journalists, and artists have developed a vigilant diaspora activism in opposition to Turkey's current ruling party, most newcomer-emigrants remain in relative seclusion. This is because they lack trust in Turkish institutions and organisations abroad, as well as in other diaspora groups emerging from Turkey. While Turkish emigration does not appear to be waning anytime soon, European authorities should enhance their solidary networks with threatened groups and diversify legal means of acquiring visas for the young, educated, and easy-to-integrate groups. The current wave has deepened intra-diaspora strife, which can be diminished if host countries increase communication with diaspora organisations and their representatives to eliminate discrimination and nurture social cohesion.

Although populism does not dictate a coherent ideological or programmatic agenda, some of its elements still leave distinct marks on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This paper argues for the study of populism in its tangible policy impacts and scrutinizes the nexus of populism and foreign policy in contemporary Turkey under President Erdoğan's rule. Despite the abundant references to the 'people' in the populist rhetoric, it identifies personalization in foreign policy decision-making, nationalization in foreign policy implementation, and civilizationalization in the foreign policy discourse. Having established the patterns of populist foreign policy from a wider reading, this study then examines, generally, how populism has informed Turkish foreign policy and, specifically, Turkey's approach to the recent border disputes over the gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This article scrutinises the extraterritorial repression strategies of contemporary non-democracies, as evidenced by the Turkish Justice and Development Party's efforts to purge the Gülen Movement globally after the 2016 coup attempt. Adopting "repertoire", as conceptualised by Charles Tilly, this article explores it in light of "extraterritorial repression," which includes the diverse skills and tactics mobilised to stifle dissent beyond national borders. This set of repressive measures is further directed at making claims on individuals and movements in the diaspora. By bringing attention to the repressive side of diaspora engagement, this article shows that diasporas are also shaped by repressive policies from their home countries.

Much attention has been paid to the ongoing Islamisation under AKP rule in Turkey. Yet while President Tayyip Erdoğan nowadays relies more on coercion, the focus on the aforementioned ideological transformation overlooks the key relevance of the new security regime now dominating Turkish politics. Efforts to establish the New Turkey have culminated in the politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics. Erdoğan backtracked on the European Union's proposed path of establishing "objective control of the military" in legal-institutional terms and opted instead for its "subjective control," specifically by fusing together the civilian and military spheres and politicising the latter. Along with a highly militarist discourse, Erdoğan is diversifying the country's military and paramilitary instruments in both domestic and foreign politics as a strategy of coup-proofing and regime survival. The nascent security regime is not without its defects. Beside fractures within the ruling coalition that might endanger loyalty to Erdoğan, the effect of paramilitarisation on coup-proofing is open to question. European Union authorities need to build a more comprehensive approach that covers such a diverse array of armed organisations, and considers the militarisation of domestic and foreign politics together. They should be in political dialogue with the Turkish state for a full-fledged civilianisation of the regime along the Copenhagen criteria.

Die anhaltende Islamisierung der Türkei unter der AKP-Regierung wird mit großer Aufmerksamkeit beobachtet. Während Präsident Tayyip Erdoğan gegenwärtig stärker auf Repression setzt, übersieht ein allein auf die ideologische Transformation des Landes gerichteter Blick die zentrale Bedeutung des neuen Sicherheitsregimes. Dieses bestimmt zunehmend die türkische Politik und führt dabei zu einer Politisierung des Militärs und einer Militarisierung der Politik. Erdoğan ist von dem von der Europäischen Union gewünschten Pfad einer rechtlich-institutionellen und "objektiven Kontrolle des Militärs" abgewichen. Stattdessen beschreitet er Wege einer "subjektiven Kontrolle", bei der die zivilen mit den militärischen Bereichen stärker miteinander verquickt und Letztere politisiert werden. Flankiert von einem hochgradig militarisierten Sprachstil, diversifiziert Erdoğan die militärischen und paramilitärischen innen- wie außenpolitischen Instrumentarien des Landes, um sich gegen weitere Putschversuche zu wappnen und das Überleben seines Regimes zu sichern. Das dabei entstehende Sicherheitsregime hat allerdings Schwächen. Zum einen zeichnen sich Bruchlinien innerhalb der Regierungskoalition ab, die die existierende Loyalität gegenüber Erdoğan verringern könnten. Außerdem ist fraglich, ob eine Paramilitarisierung Erdoğan vor weiteren Putschversuchen bewahren wird. Es ist an der Zeit, dass die Europäische Union beim Thema Militarisierung eine ganzheitliche Herangehensweise entwickelt. Nur so lässt sich ein derart vielfältiges Spektrum an bewaffneten Organisationen erfassen und die Militarisierung der türkischen Innen- und Außenpolitik analysieren. Der politische Dialog sollte entsprechend den Kopenhagener Kriterien die Demilitarisierung des türkischen Regimes zum Ziel haben.

Facing a heavy-handed crackdown since the 15 July 2016 abortive coup, many Gülenists are fleeing Turkey and seeking refuge mostly in European countries. With this ongoing influx, a Gülenist diaspora is in the making. The fall from grace and the traumatic experience of exile have paved the way for heated internal debates on what went wrong and how the movement may start over. Although the Gülen movement has heavily invested in the Global South, most followers have sought refuge in Western democratic countries, where the rule of law may protect them better from the Turkish state's aggression. Since 2016, the number of asylum seekers from Turkey has increased five-fold in the European Union; many of them belong to this movement. The contradictions of the Gülenist organisation illustrate the common pitfall of jamaahs ("religious communities") in Turkey, which first emerged in the mid-1920s but could not fully translate themselves into the new political and social order. The movement's destiny as a diaspora, however, largely depends on this legacy. Strikingly, the Gülenists in exile live in a comfort zone, diminishing the odds of reform happening: the movement's victim status enables it to swim with the tide of anti-Erdoğan sentiment in the West, while its modern, non-violent, eager-to-integrate stance - standing in contrast to many other Islamic movements - appeals to Western policymakers. But, for the first time ever, criticism from within the movement has been loudly heard, and reverberated across its membership base. Exile has triggered an emotional break among many Gülenists, who are now revisiting their very conceptions of state, nation, and religion. The Gülen movement is at a crossroads of its own making. German and European policymakers have the unique opportunity to shape the future trajectories of this movement, and should push for full organisational transparency. From a broader perspective, they can establish channels - such as dialogue conferences - between

Turkey's presidential and general elections, held on 24 June 2018, marked a significant turn in Turkish politics. The controversial referendum of 2017 narrowly approved constitutional amendments that replaced the parliamentary system with an executive presidential one. With the 2018 presidential vote those amendments took effect, sealing Turkey's transition into a presidential system. Strategically, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan relied on contained uncertainty, which generated hope among the opposition, gave legitimacy to the elections, and simultaneously perpetuated a sense of despair through the common belief that he would win by any means necessary. The elections, held under a state of emergency, were among the most unjust in Turkey's recent history. Despite the extremely unfavourable conditions, and the sobering cynicism after election night, the opposition has revived its can-do spirit that had been lost after the 2013 Gezi protests. The presidential system granted Erdoğan the opportunity to legalise and institutionalise his existing one-man rule. Since his inauguration on 9 July 2018 as the first executive president, Erdoğan has embarked upon a complete overhaul of the state apparatus, with a hands-on micromanagement style. The elections hardly brought stability to the country. The looming economic crisis, social polarisation, the Kurdish conflict, the war in Syria, and troubled foreign relations will likely determine the course of future events. The elections of 24 June 2018 did not deliver Turkey's long-awaited normalisation, but paved the way for the institutionalisation of granting emergency powers to the executive. Turkish civil society will be completely smothered if left to the country's inner dynamics. The European Union can do more than expressing its "deep concerns" about Turkey's de-democratisation and act in line with its criticism in the latest progress report.

Contemporary developments throughout the world have been marked by post-truth politics. Epitomized by a disregard for truth coupled with a reliance on emotive arguments, the term 'post-truth politics' has not yet been adequately reflected upon by political or social theory. This article uses Turkey's 15 July (2016) abortive coup as an entry point to address this gap and argues that the post-truth has altered both the grammar and vocabulary of politics. The term denotes the contemporary shift from a 'regime of truth' to a 'regime of common sense', which also operates as the discursive ground of new populisms. While treating three contending narratives of 15 July - 'kamikaze coup', 'staged coup' and 'controlled coup' - this article focuses on the post-truth elements in the government's narrative performance that obstructed the pursuit of truth and set the conditions for a particular interpretation of the events of 15 July.