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Tying has become a common practice in digital platforms. It may generate both pro-competitive effects and anti-competitive effects, which makes it difficult to distinguish between lawful and unlawful tying practices. The cases of Tencent and Android both involve tying conducts, but interestingly, the cases have different outcomes. This article explores reasons for these different case outcomes from a comparative law and economics perspective. By assessing the facts and legal rulings in Tencent and Android, we find that the different case outcomes result, on the one hand, from the different case facts, and on the other hand, from the different approaches used by the EU Commission and the Chinese Supreme People's Court. The Court scores better in terms of ensuring legal certainty; nevertheless, it may face difficulties when it has to apply economic analysis. The Commission seemingly uses more economics, but the application is not full-fledged, as it disregards important case facts when assessing competition foreclosure, and employs asymmetric legal tests and evidence standards for anti/pro-competitive effects of tying. From a law and economics perspective, we provide suggestions for China and the EU, taking the recent Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Platforms in China and the forthcoming Digital Markets Act in the EU into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One area of antitrust law in which many Big Tech organizations fight antitrust lawsuits is tying arrangements. Tying arrangements, which occur when a seller requires the sale one product to be tied to the purchase of another product, are subject to the partial per se analysis introduced in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde. Partial per se does not automatically assume that a tying arrangement is illegal, but rather sets conditions to determine when a tie between two products is an antitrust violation. However, criticism of the partial per se standard has existed for decades. This article argues that proposed changes to antitrust laws should include changing the standard used to evaluate tying arrangements to a consistent rule-of-reason approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vertical agreement is an agreement between two or more economic entities, each of which operates at different levels of the commercial market. These agreements may contain non-price excluding terms that are contrary to competition law. One of the controversial issues in this regard is whether competition law will recognize non-price restraints on vertical agreements as detrimental to competition or not only does it not constitute a barrier to competition but also finds it useful in competition. The findings of the comparative studies show that non-price restraints on US and EU competition law are among the suspected restraints, however, due to the different approaches in competition law policies, the scope of inclusion in both legal systems is different. U.S jurisprudence has recognized it as independent restrictive arrangements and analyzes it under the rule of rationality. There are general and individual exemptions in EU law for the assessment of vertical restraints, which are declared legitimate if they meet the stated criteria. In Iranian law, the competitive approach to these restraints is ambiguous due to the lack of an explicit position, however, by relying on the general rules of competition law and the interpretation of Articles 44 and 45 of Law on Implementation of General Policies of Principle (44) of Constitution, we can find examples of restrictive procedures and agreements that can be adapted to these restraints in US and EU competition law.

Franchising is an important context in studying entrepreneurship and a growing area of business activity worldwide. To date, various studies have considered the strategic implications of decisions to retain firm ownership of particular units or to franchise them. Little attention, however, has focused on the differences between employee or franchisee managers of those units. We address this gap in the literature by offering a perspective on human resource management (HRM) and franchising that considers those differences, thus providing a bridge between the HRM and franchising fields of inquiry. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article empirically assesses the relationship between power and the sources of power in a channel of distribution that has a well-defined power source: the franchisor-franchisee channel. In addition, the consequences of franchisors utilizing coercive versus noncoercive sources of power are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents U.S. legal cases and developments in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the operating features of marketing institutions the Woodbury Daily Times Co., Inc., et al. v. Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service, et al., the Argus Inc. and Interphoto Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., et al., and the California Furniture Co., Inc. v. Rhodes, Inc. and Kincaid Furniture Co., Inc. cases are cited. In reference to the relations between buyers and sellers the Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp. and Federated Department Stores, Inc., the Robert R. Koefoot, M.D., et al. v. American College of Surgeons, et al., The Victoria House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., and the Nordic Bank, et al. v. The Trend Group, et al. cases are cited.

The article presents U.S. legal cases and developments in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the relations between buyers and sellers the Gillette Tire Jobbers of Louisiana, Inc. v. Appliance Industries, Inc. et al., the Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz A.G. and Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., the Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., the Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. and Computerland, Inc., the Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp. and Federated Department Stores, Inc., and the Paul Bender et al. v. Southland Corp. cases are cited.

The article presents U.S. legal developments in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the operating features of marketing institutions and the relations between buyers and sellers the Freed Oil Co., Inc., et al. v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. and the American Oil Co., the Universal Brands Inc., et al. v. Phillip Morris Inc., et al., the Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., et al., and the Arlie Mack Moore, et al. v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., Rest Haven Memorial Association, et al. cases are cited among others.

The article discusses a number of United States Supreme Court decisions that had an effect on the field of marketing from 1968-1974. According to the author, the court made decisions regarding legal issues including copyright law, prohibition on price discrimination outlined in the Robinson-Patman Act and legitimate defenses of franchisors to attacks by franchises. Also discussed is the Supreme Court's treatment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the pricing of professional services and tying contracts.

The article reports on legal developments relating to the regulation of channels of distribution in the field of marketing in the U.S. The author provides information about questionable practices committed by shopping mall developer the Rouse Company. The developer is accused of drawing up lease agreements that man restrain trade. The court case Allegheny Uniforms v. Howard Uniform Company et al. is discussed in relation to the antitrust law known as the Sherman Act. The court case of Margaret M. London v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corporation and Columbia Broadcasting System, Incorporated is mentioned in connection with a tying agreement.

The article reports on legal issues related to the franchise system of distribution in the U.S. The author focuses on a legal issue relating to franchising that is known as the tying agreement. The author goes on to examine legal issues involving the business relationship between franchisors and franchisees, including the "disclosure problem" and the "capricious termination" problem. It is suggested that legal issues such as the tying agreement have little to do with quality control and more to do with extracting more money from franchisees through illegal, anticompetitive means. The franchising trade associations the National Association of Franchise Companies and the International Franchise Association are also mentioned.

The article presents U.S. legal developments in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the operating features of marketing institutions the La Maur, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co. and Leonard H. Lavin and Co. and the Fairfield County Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co. cases are cited. In reference to the relations between buyers and sellers the Clairol Inc. v. Cosmetics Plus, the Richard E. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., et al., and the James M. Bacon et al. v. Texaco, Inc. cases are cited among others.

The article presents legal developments in marketing. One of the developments describes the case of the United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co. and Tidewater Oil Co., in which the court found that a merger between these two companies would negatively impact trade in the relevant geographic area. Another development discusses the case of Penn Galvanizing Co. v. Lukens Steel Co. This case illustrates the differences between the two types of tying arrangements that are subject to antitrust sanction. A third development focuses on the case of Telex v. IBM. This case limits the pricing options that a monopolist may choose.

The author explores and evaluates both the functional and dysfunctional consequences of a system of distribution which accounts for approximately 25% of total consumer goods' expenditures in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent series of Supreme Court decisions has assumed the economic power of large oil companies causes dealers to restrict sales to sponsored brands with the result that competitors are denied access to the market. The validity of this assumption is questioned in this note. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article constitutes a direct challenge to applying cost tests as the sole liability test for multiproduct discounts. The article utilizes Neoclassical Price Theory to isolate the methods by which mixed bundling can harm consumers by viewing the practice as a form of predation, then alternatively as tying. Under tying, the article considers market power and the conditions aside from the aggregate amount of price cuts that must exist for coercion to produce anticompetitive foreclosure. Such factors determine the contestability of demand in the linked market. The article lastly recommends an alternative test that aims to maximize welfare by focusing the analysis on overlapping demand, contestability, the EU cost test, and the benefit of the discount to package purchasers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The abuse of market power by dominant firms continues to be one of the most controversial areas of EU competition law and tying is perhaps the most complex and intractable abuse. The European Commission investigation into suspected infringements of EU competition law by Google in relation to alleged tying practices concerning the Android open source operating system brings once again this abuse into sharp focus. In the Android case, the European Commission has a unique opportunity to clarify the test for tying. The EU case law is still, formally, adhering to a pre-Chicago understanding of tying, resting on the simplistic idea that an undertaking dominant in market A can exclude competitors in market B if it forces customers buying A to also buy B. The weakness of this framework is that it lacks a robust assessment of the anti-competitive effects of tying and a realistic approach to the legitimate objectives that tying may pursue. This article demonstrates that the practice of the European Commission has moved on from such an approach, and that even the EU Courts have never rejected a more sophisticated analysis of tying. Contrary to what the vast majority of commentators believe, in the assessment of tying under EU competition law, the European Commission has systematically taken into account the structural features of the tied market that make anti-competitive tying plausible, and has carried out a thorough analysis of the anticompetitive effects of tying, which is two-fold: (1) first, tying must be likely to exclude equally efficient competitors from the tied market and, (2) second, it must be likely to lead to the acquisition, maintenance, or strengthening of market power on an affected market (the tying market, the tied market, or a related market). Finally, dominant undertakings are always permitted to plead in their defence that tying pursues a legitimate objective, is suitable to achieving such an objective, is the least restrictive way of doing so, and that the pro-competitive effects of tying outweigh its anticompetitive effects. Provided that the dominant undertaking adduces sufficient evidence to substantiate its defence, it is for the competition authority or claimant to prove that the tying under review is, on balance, anti-competitive. This analysis is fully consistent with the post-Chicago economic theories of tying and with the case law of the EU Courts on tying and on exclusionary abuses more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents legal developments in marketing with particular focus on the regulation of channels of distribution. One of the developments describes the case of Systemcare Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Inc., et al., in which the court decided that a tying claim cannot exist without the existence of a conspiracy. Another development describes the case of Trans Sport Inc. v. Starter Sportswear Inc., which clarified that a manufacturer's policy against transshipment of licensed sports league jackets does not establish a willful intent to include intrabrand competition.

The article discusses legal developments in marketing with focus on the regulation of channels of distribution. One of the developments describes the case of Empire Volkswagen Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., which shows that an automobile dealership agreement may prelude selling competing automobiles from the same location as the manufacturer's automobiles. Another development discusses the case of Patrick W. Sharkley v. Security Bank & Trust Co. This case illustrates that a bank's insistence that a customer purchase real estate to secure a loan for the purchase of other real estate is a violation of the antitying provisions of the Bank Holding Act.

The article presents U.S. legal cases and developments in marketing relative to the regulation of unfair competition. In reference to advertising the Federal Trade Commission v. Arthur F. Furman et al. and the U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc. et al. cases are cited. In reference to trademarks and trade names the Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc. and the Power Test Petroleum Distributors, Inc. v. Calcu Gas, Inc. and Yonkers Overpass Equities Corp. cases are cited. The latter case concerned the legal issues associated with tying arrangements and trademark law.

The article presents legal developments in marketing related to the regulation of channels of distribution. Regarding the operating features of marketing institutions, the case of Deauville Corp. et al. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., et al. is discussed, involving allegations of attempted monopolization of regional shopping mall retail space. Regarding exclusive dealing arrangements and relations between buyer and sellers, the case Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., et al. is discussed, in which a franchisee attempted to show injury as the result of tie-in arrangements between the franchise license and equipment used to run the franchise. The case United States v. Dairymen, Inc. is also discussed.

The article presents legal developments in marketing relating to the regulation of channels of distribution, specifically exclusive dealing arrangements and the relations between buyers and sellers. The case of Joyce Beverages of New York, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co. is discussed, involving exclusive distributorship agreements between soft drink manufacturers and their licensee bottlers. The cases of General Business Systems v. North American Philips Business Systems, Inc. and N. V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken, and North American Philips Corp. et al. v. General Business Systems and Shasta General Systems involve manufacturers' restrictions imposed on its dealers, allegations of price fixing, and tying arrangements.

The article discusses U.S. legal developments and cases in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the operating features of marketing institutions the Continental T.V. Inc., et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. case is cited. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned a 1967 ruling which made it illegal for a manufacturer-supplier to set customer and territorial restrictions on its distributor-dealers. In reference to the relations between buyers and sellers the Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagen, A.C., et al. case is cited.

The article presents U.S. legal developments in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the operating features of marketing institutions the Clairol Inc. v. Boston Discount Center of Berkley Inc., et al. and the Tomac Inc. v. the Coca-Cola Company cases are cited. In reference to the relations between buyers and sellers the Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corporation et al., the James E. Northern and Shirley Northern v. McGraw-Edison et al., and the James Milonas, et al. v. Amerada Hess Corp. cases are cited among others.

The article presents legal developments in marketing relating to the regulation of price competition. Regarding exclusive dealing arrangements and the relations between buyers and sellers, the cases Harold Butler Enterprises #97, Inc. v. Vanlandingham, Robert Anderson, et al. v. Home Style Stores, Inc., et al., Data Centers, Inc. v. International Business Machines, and Francis B. Schuler, Inc. v. Better Equipment Launder Center, Inc. are discussed, involving illegal tying arrangements. The case Kibsgard Sports Car Center, Inc. v. Great Lake Car Distributors, Inc. is also discussed, involving a bad-faith termination of a distributorship under the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act.

The article presents legal developments in marketing relating to the regulation of channels of distribution. Regarding the operating features of marketing institutions, the United States Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) proposed regulation of franchising is discussed, involving a detailed disclosure of the requirements which franchisers must follow upon contact with franchisees. Regarding exclusive dealing arrangements and relations between buyers and sellers, the case American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Broadcasting Co. is discussed, involving illegal tying arrangements.

The article presents U.S. legal developments in marketing relative to the regulation of channels of distribution. In reference to the operating feature of marketing institutions the Billy Baxter Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co. and Canada Dry Corp. case is cited among others. In reference to the relations between buyers and sellers the Lear, Inc. v. John S. Adkins and the Advanced Business Systems and Supply Co. v. SCM Corp. cases are cited among others.

The article presents U.S. legal developments in marketing relative to the regulation of monopoly. In reference to collusion the United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc. case is cited among others. In reference to market exclusion tactics the Cardox Corporation v. Armstrong Coalbreak Company and the United States v. Oregon State Medical Society cases are cited among others.

Using franchise data, we identify that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism by strengthening the opportunism-enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied, and exit the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented which examines a commerce-related requirement that is included in America's tying arrangement (TA) law as of 2015, and it mentions the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States case which deals with TAs and the suppression of competition. According to the article, a TA exists when a seller refuses to sell one product (tying product) unless a buyer agrees to purchase another separate product (tied product).

I examine Google's pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices and identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google's tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on economic and legal analysis of tying arrangements and laws relating to tying arrangements in the U.S . Topics discussed include the legal rules that analyzes tying arrangements, the two approaches in academic writing with respect to their implementation such as the approach of Chicago-Harvard Schools and Professor Einer Elhauge, and the historical theory as well as the economic analysis that resulted in imposition of restrictions on tying arrangements.

Robert Bork was one of the key proponents of the traditional Chicago school view of tying and antitrust, which is that tying can never be used to extend or leverage market power from one market to another, so it should also never be an antitrust violation. In this paper, we review the traditional Chicago school perspective and, in particular, Bork's arguments on the topic and then discuss how these arguments relate to the more recent theoretical literature on the subject, which takes a game-theoretic approach. We then discuss Bork's later views on tying concerning the Microsoft case. We include a discussion of whether these later views of tying and antitrust were different from his earlier views or, instead, whether it was the nature of the cases that had changed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a summary of court cases addressing franchise agreement disclaimer provisions in the U.S. A brief overview of the comparative negligence doctrine in relation to franchising law is provided. The importance of implementing a balancing test to determine whether to enforce disclaimer provisions is emphasized.

Over two decades since the copyright misuse doctrine was first recognized in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, a uniform approach for determining whether a specific behavior constitutes misuse still does not exist. Circuit courts have commonly applied two competing approaches to the misuse analysis. One approach centers on the public policy underlying copyrights; the other approach centers on antitrust principles. This Note explores relevant jurisprudence and elucidates the shortfalls of each approach. It then proposes a compromise that underscores the interplay between copyright and antitrust laws. The proposed resolution aims to provide a much-needed uniform misuse analysis that does not overlook the important policies underlying copyright law, or disregard antitrust principles relevant in the context of tying arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: This study analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of aid fragmentation on donors’ decisions to tie their development aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Building on collective action theory, it argues that a donor with a larger share of the aid market in a country has stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of its aid, by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the prediction that higher donor aid shares will be associated with less aid tying. This finding is robust to recipient controls, donor fixed effects, and instrumental variables estimation. Furthermore, it contradicts other studies suggesting that when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more of their aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on antitrust regimes and the costs of the enforcement of antitrust policy. Topics include transaction and absolute costs, structuralism, and antitrust enforcement by regulatory agencies. Information is provided on exclusionary practices and the leverage theory of tying arrangements.

Franchising is a way of business cooperation of legally and financially independent enterprises. Development strategy of business entities, which is referred to as franchising, had a huge success in the whole world. There were two similar enterprises that have sold hamburgers in the USA in the 1950's of the previous century: White Castle and McDonalds. The first enterprise was significantly better-known and it had 27 restaurants, while the other enterprise had only one restaurant. In the middle of 1980's, the situation is drastically changed. The number of McDonald's restaurants has grown to over 8000, and White Castle had 167 restaurants. The reason is simple. McDonald's started with franchising then, while White Castle has remained with the same number of restaurants. It is about a classical form of restaurants spreading, along with the spreading of own enterprise on one hand, and extremely effective business approach, which is referred to as franchising, on the other hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a response to the article "Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory," by Einer Elhauge published in the "Harvard Law Review" in 2009. Topics include tying liability, safe harbor provisions for bundled discounts, and tied market foreclosure. Information is provided on artificial inflation and unbundled linking product price.

The article discusses the need to reassess the tying arrangements among business enterprises in the telecommunications industry in the U.S. as a result of the ending of iPhone exclusivity. It notes that the U.S. Supreme Court is very strict in dealing with tying arrangements despite of the fact that the end of the arrangement between Apple Inc. and AT&T did not affect the market negatively. Tying practices may even drive innovations and competition in the industry.

Abstract: A mechanism with low direct cost of use may be preferred to alternatives implementing more efficient allocations. We show this experimentally by giving pairs of subjects the option to agree on a single average price for a sequence of trades—in effect pooling several small bargains into a larger one. We make pooling costly by tying it to some inefficient trades, but subjects nevertheless reveal strong tendencies to pool, particularly when more bargains remain to be struck and when bargaining is face to face. The results suggest that implementation costs could play a significant role in the use of many common trading practices. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article discusses the law that protects the franchise system and franchise agreement in post-termination obligations under external administration. It notes that the law ensures the franchisor has the liberty to license a new franchisee without risk of the presence of the old franchisee. It explores the case of JAX tyre franchisor that responded to a franchisee that ceases to operate the franchise.

The following report is an analysis of a franchiser's responsibility to prevent sexual harassment in franchisee locations based on political, ethical, and legal reasoning. Recent sexual harassment cases are cited as examples. In the course of this study it has been found that franchisers have an ethical duty to society, customers, and employees. Companies are expected to do the right thing and behave at or above society expectations. They also have a political duty; prevention of sexual harassment is in the company's best interest to avoid bad publicity or lost profits. A heavily publicized sexual harassment suit can be very costly for both franchiser and franchisee. Companies also have a legal duty because they can be charged, subject to fines and penalties, and also forced to pay court and attorney fees. Legal fees can be very costly regardless of whether or not the company is found guilty. Based on the above analysis, this report provides practical suggestions to prevent sexual harassment such as educating employees and ensuring that the appropriate policies and procedures are in place. This paper is useful to all businesses, particularly franchises. Both franchiser and monetary and non monetary costs. Both parties will also realize the impact that sexual harassment at any location can have on the entire company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A tying arrangement is a seller's requirement that a customer may purchase its "tying" product only by taking its "tied" product. In a variable proportion tie the purchaser can vary her purchases of the tied product. For example, a customer might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design requires her to purchase varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same manufacturer. Such arrangements are widely considered to be price discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial. Tying has been attacked on the theory that price discrimination of this sort reduces consumer welfare. We show that this argument is based on a misunderstanding of the kind of price discrimination that is involved in variable proportion ties. The great majority of them almost certainly produce both welfare gains and net consumer benefits. We also consider and reject the argument that tying produces greater welfare losses when viewed from an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective. That argument rests on a flawed premise about the sources of the increased returns to innovations whose distribution requires tying. Further, it ignores the important role of fixed costs in producing innovation incentives. We also show that tying in concentrated markets produces significant benefits from the elimination of double marginalization. Then we extend our analysis to bundled discounts, focusing on the possibility of increased harm that can occur if the monopolist increases the standalone price of one good when inaugurating the bundled discount. Antitrust's per se rule is reserved for practices that are so likely to cause antitrust harm and have so little to defend them that detailed case-by-case assessment is thought to be unnecessary. They can be condemned categorically simply upon a showing that a few basic conditions are satisfied and that they belong in a particular class of restraints. No kind of unilaterally imposed tying arrangement, even by a monopolist, falls into that category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the latest updates of the German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), which came into force in 1978 to protect German citizens from uncontrolled collection and usage of personal data. It reports that every company is obliged to inform the authorities about its data organisation to determine whether the BDSG applies to it, and that any violation of BDSG provisions is an administrative offence and can lead to severe monetary fines. Franchise systems are obliged to familiarize themselves with and deal with the details of the said law.

The article discusses the ownership of goodwill, or the intangible elements of the establishment, in Brazil's franchise system. The Brazilian franchise law reportedly does not address aspects of the franchise agreement outside of the franchisor's obligation to provide the disclosure document to a potential franchisee. Determining whether the franchisee is entitled to receive any compensation for the local goodwill when the franchise ends therefore requires the analysis of the terms and conditions of the agreement along with the case's particularities.

The article focuses on the issues concerning the development of the technological tying law. It examines how the courts tried to solve the struggle involving the special innovation and restricted per se tying relative to technological tying issues. It highlights the economic theory determined relative to the technological tying law and its application. Moreover, it explores the development of the law including the Foremost approach as well as the Leasco purpose test.