Search

This article presents a psycho-cultural framework for analysing US-China relations in the context of the great power competition, explaining the escalation of their rivalry and the proliferation of conflict. It emphasises the critical role of self-esteem and culture in shaping domestic and international dynamics, focusing on the interplay between honour and face as distinct expressions of self-esteem in US and Chinese societies. The study illustrates how pursuing national self-esteem drives confrontational interactions between these two powers, with the 2018–2020 US-China trade war as a prime example. Here, nationalist narratives were crafted to evoke emotional resonance with domestic audiences, intensifying the conflict beyond mere economic competition into a struggle for national self-esteem. The rise of identity politics in both countries has further exacerbated tensions, as perceived disrespect has triggered coercive responses, worsening bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although past studies in crisis management usually have taken a geography-focused approach to study how physical proximity increases firms' exposure to a crisis, this study draws on event system theory and proposes that independent of firms' geographic locations, an event can have multiple spatial directions and proximities to the firms in the event space. To further unpack the effects of event space, we develop an integrated framework that considers how the event space interacts with entity attributes—which are found to help firms cope with external challenges affecting their market value. Using the shock of the 2018 US–China trade war on listed firms in China's stock market, we find that the trade war has significantly reduced the market value of firms that have spatial proximity to the product market (i.e., firms that belong to target industries) and to the geographic market (i.e., firms that export to the United States) in event space. This negative effect also spills over onto peer organizations with business activities related to target industries or the United States. Moreover, there are differential moderating effects from entity attributes, such as corporate political connections and corporate social responsibility, on the different event spatial directions, pointing to the distinct natures of event spatial directions. This study introduces a novel, multidimensional view of event space and uses it to develop an event space model for geopolitical events, and in so doing, we complement extant work on the role of crises in shaping corporate strategy and performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper systematically reviews the literature on the impact of geopolitical disruptions on supply chains to identify primary discourses, emergent themes and key gaps to set a future research agenda. The guiding research question is 'how do geopolitical disruptions affect the configuration, flow, and management of global supply chains?'. The study applies a systematic literature review of 50 papers from the Association of Business Schools' (ABS) ranked academic journals in the fields of operations, production, and supply chain management published between 1995 and 2022. Through an in-depth literature analysis, this paper demarcates geopolitical disruptions and the resulting impact on supply chains as a new subfield of research. The results indicate that the impact of geopolitical disruptions on supply chains can be mitigated through: (1) supply chain re-design including regionalisation, back-shoring, and moving away from just-in-time delivery models as well as (2) the implementation of emerging technologies, such as blockchain, 3D printing and artificial intelligence, to improve supply chain transparency and the development of modularised manufacturing. This paper is one of the first to define the current state of research and thinking on the impact of geopolitical disruptions on supply chains, laying a firm foundation for future research by setting a detailed research agenda based on identified gaps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The motivation of this paper is to explore the impact of the Sino-US trade war on the R&D investment of Chinese exporting family firms (FFs). Applying a difference in difference (DID) methodology, we are able to compare FFs who have export business with FFs who have not export business, and compare FFs that have export business before and after the Sino-US trade war. We find that family firm export significantly promotes R&D investment in an emerging market context, but the Sino-US trade war negatively affects the R&D investment effect of exports. This means that the trade war has indeed reduced R&D investment by Chinese FFs. Moreover, the relationship between trade war and export R&D investment effect is governed by family ownership, institutional ownership, and government subsidy. This paper contributes to our understanding of the important role of trade war in technological innovation strategy of FFs. Plain English Summary: This research demonstrates that family firm export significantly promotes R&D investment, but the Sino-US trade war negatively affects the R&D investment effect of exports. In addition, the study found that there are three factors that can mediate the above relationship. Family ownership boosts FF's export R&D investment effect and insulates it from the trade war. On the contrary, institutional shareholding inhibits the promotion effect of exports on R&D investment and exacerbates the negative impact of the trade war. Although government subsidies will enhance the effect of family firms' export R&D investment, they will also increase the adverse impact of the trade war. Thus, the principal implications of this study are (1) families should increase their shareholding in FFs as it plays an important role in increasing the R&D input effect of exports and reducing the adverse impact of trade wars, and (2) government subsidies are a double-edged sword for FFs and should be used with caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the weak-form efficiency and asymmetric multifractal scaling behavior of rare earth stock indices in the global, U.S. and Chinese markets during the trade war and the COVID-19 period. We examine the scaling behavior across overall, upward (bullish), and downward (bearish) market states from 2013 to 2021, employing an asymmetric multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis approach. Our findings indicate asymmetric multifractality in U.S. rare earth stock prices, caused by fat tails and long-range correlations. Weak-form price inefficiency and asymmetry in U.S. rare earth stock prices are prominent during market downturns, such as the trade war and COVID-19 periods. Chinese rare earth stocks demonstrate greater efficiency than U.S. and global stocks; thus, the latter markets provide arbitrage opportunities during upward and downward trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This study investigates the weak-form efficiency and asymmetric multifractal scaling behavior of rare earth stock indices in the global, U.S. and Chinese markets during the trade war and the COVID-19 period. We examine the scaling behavior across overall, upward (bullish), and downward (bearish) market states from 2013 to 2021, employing an asymmetric multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis approach. Our findings indicate asymmetric multifractality in U.S. rare earth stock prices, caused by fat tails and long-range correlations. Weak-form price inefficiency and asymmetry in U.S. rare earth stock prices are prominent during market downturns, such as the trade war and COVID-19 periods. Chinese rare earth stocks demonstrate greater efficiency than U.S. and global stocks; thus, the latter markets provide arbitrage opportunities during upward and downward trends.

When do political risks lead to divestment from a profitable market? Existing theories argue both that foreign investors may be sensitive to political tensions, but that they may only be sensitive to violent conflict. Using the crucial case of the US–China Trade War, we outline how political risks increased rates of exit among foreign firms while firm entrenchment mitigated these risks. Using a new dataset on all foreign-invested enterprises registered in China between 2017 and 2019, we implement triple interaction models to isolate the impact of increased political risks, investor national origin, and entrenchment on firm exit. Our findings show that heightened political risks during the trade war did increase firm exits by 34%–3% points over the pre-conflict baseline. Tariffs, the targeted effect of the trade war, increase US firm exits by 1% point. Firm exit is determined by the balance of heightened political risks against the availability of firm-level resources to mitigate these risks. These findings reconcile the conflicting expectations of the ‘business as usual’ and ‘follow the flag’ literatures about how firms respond to political risk, highlighting the tremendous collateral damage tariffs can cause in an age of global value chains.

This article explores the relationship between trade and hybrid warfare conducted by state actors in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and the US-China trade war. It analyzes recent WTO case-law, notably the landmark case Russia – Traffic in Transit, where justification under GATT Art. XXI was successfully invoked by Russia – a WTO member that launched armed aggression against its neighbor, resorting to occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s territories. Panel’s application of a two-tier test in this case is put into question as Russia has neither explained what constituted an emergency in international relations nor articulated its essential security interests. The analysis addresses how Russia employed trade war tactics as part of its arsenal in the realm of hybrid warfare, subsequently escalating to a full-scale aggression against Ukraine, triggering the largest continental war in Europe since WWII. However, the article recognizes the balanced nature of the GATT Art. XXI interpretation, requiring the Panel to assess whether the measures were “taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations,” and also to identify whether the invoking member acted in good faith when establishing the connection between the measures and its essential security interests. If applied correctly, this interpretation should not encourage further trade wars.

When do political risks lead to divestment from a profitable market? Existing theories argue both that foreign investors may be sensitive to political tensions, but that they may only be sensitive to violent conflict. Using the crucial case of the US–China Trade War, we outline how political risks increased rates of exit among foreign firms while firm entrenchment mitigated these risks. Using a new dataset on all foreign-invested enterprises registered in China between 2017 and 2019, we implement triple interaction models to isolate the impact of increased political risks, investor national origin, and entrenchment on firm exit. Our findings show that heightened political risks during the trade war did increase firm exits by 34% – 3% points over the pre-conflict baseline. Tariffs, the targeted effect of the trade war, increase US firm exits by 1% point. Firm exit is determined by the balance of heightened political risks against the availability of firm-level resources to mitigate these risks. These findings reconcile the conflicting expectations of the 'business as usual' and 'follow the flag' literatures about how firms respond to political risk, highlighting the tremendous collateral damage tariffs can cause in an age of global value chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aportes Para la Integración Latinoamericana is the property of Universidad Nacional de La Plata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Al Bashaer Economic Journal is the property of Al Bashaer Economic Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We estimate the effects of the US–China Trade War on Brazilian exports in 2018 and 2019. We analyze the impacts from two perspectives: (i) on total Brazilian exports and (ii) on Brazilian exports of those products on which the United States imposed tariffs against China in the trade war. We used the statistical method of panel data. The results show that Brazil obtained export gains in the first analysis, while its exports were negatively affected in the second analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, authors critically analyze the concept of derisking. Derisking is actively promoted by the Western expert community as a new strategic basis for US-China trade relations. Derisking refers to the transition from the policy of radical breakdown from the trade partnership with China to the rhetoric of risk reduction, which implies limiting dependencies and risks arising from them. It does not imply a complete rupture with a partner. Based on the extensive historical material study, as well as applying modern conflictological methods of risk analysis, authors come to the conclusion that derisking management strategy does not have the conceptual optics necessary for analyzing political dimension of international economic relations and is unable to explain what is the source of risks in reality.Conceptual non-viability of derisking is due to disregard for the uneven capital development regularity, which determines the interstate relations. Global economy is a space of unfading conflict within the economic competition, and therefore eternal risk activity. The constant presence of risks in international relations makes conflict either a source that generates risks, or their result. On the example of the US-China trade relations, authors demonstrate how an attempt to elevate a partner who was designated for the outsiders’ fate generates a response from the risk-beneficiary to return the outsider to his native bosom by minimizing the consequences of risk for himself at the expense of others.In fact, behind the derisking strategy, lies desire to increase the intellectual rents’ price paid for Western patents and technologies. The reaction to the possibility of losing one’s monopoly position creates an impulse to shake up relations and change their dynamics in the right direction for oneself. These impulses expose inherent systematical contradictions and determine the outbreak of a new round of a hot trade war. While staying in the negative unity relations, participants have no other choice but to achieve the goals of enrichment, which are the same for all participants, through denying each other, and aspire every time to establish unequal economic exchange in their favor.

The rules-based trade order confronts a crisis as both rule-making and enforcement have stalled in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Locked in great power rivalry, the United States and China are undermining the rules, making it necessary for middle powers like Canada and Japan to lead a coalition to reform the WTO. Working together they should advocate for greater transparency over subsidy policies and guidelines for how to balance security goals with economic cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disruptive shift in US foreign policy under President Donald J. Trump is examined in this article, with a focus on America's engagement with China during the Trump administration. The US' approach towards the Indo-Pacific, the Trade War with China, and China's political system are analysed here using the framework of Walter Russell Mead's foreign policy traditions—Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian. In essence, Trump's China policy presents a complex blend of the Mead schools with a heavy Jacksonian flavour—characterized by assertive nationalism, economic protectionism and unapologetic realpolitik. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on measuring the status of industrial structure upgrading in China using a scientific and reasonable approach. We introduce a novel metric called industrial structure depth (ISD), which incorporates inter-industry proportional relationships and intra-industry technological capability, surpassing traditional indicators. Through ISD, we comprehensively assessed industrial structure upgrading across thirty provinces, sub-industries, and the national level in China from 2002 to 2022. The findings reveal a general rise in ISD at the provincial and national levels, followed by a subsequent decline. The shift in the gradient distribution of ISD among provinces is notable, with rapid development observed in certain central provinces. From the perspective of industry categories, manufacturing emerges as a significant influencer of China's overall ISD fluctuations. Furthermore, we dissect the ISD into the domestic intermediate goods technology-driven aspect and the production process technology-driven aspect, which allows for a detailed analysis of the factors driving changes in China's industrial structure upgrading. Overall, this paper sheds light on the crucial role of technological capability in promoting China's industrial structure upgrading and provides insights into the dynamics of industrial structure upgrading fluctuations across different stages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines recent Sino-US film collaborations, focusing on Mulan (2020) against the backdrop of geopolitical shifts and the COVID-19 pandemic. Through in-depth interviews and a case study, it investigates the lukewarm reception of Mulan (2020) in China. The study explores how external pressures have disrupted the previously thriving partnership, leading to investment uncertainty, intensified censorship, and shifts in audience consumption towards online platforms, which have exacerbated piracy issues. It also addresses the political tensions surrounding Mulan (2020), including controversies related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong, which hindered its box-office success in Mainland China despite domestic support. A comparative analysis with Mulan (1998) assesses the evolution of feminist themes and filial piety in the 2020 adaptation. The findings indicate that while efforts were made to enhance feminist narratives and cultural motifs, the execution was superficial, treating complex cultural themes as mere embellishments rather than integral elements of the narrative. The film's portrayal of these themes within a predominantly Western framework highlights ongoing challenges in bridging cultural narratives in Sino-US film productions. The findings underscore the profound impact of geopolitics and reveal the contentious portrayal of feminism and cultural integration in Mulan (2020), emphasizing the challenges in Sino-US film collaborations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze whether—and, if so, how—Americans reacted to the escalation of the trade war between the United States and China in June 2018. To address this issue, we leverage surveys conducted in the United States during this phase of the economic clash. We find a significant reduction in support for Donald Trump and his trade policy immediately following the announcement of retaliatory tariffs by the Chinese government. Moreover, respondents' economic concerns about the trade war were primarily sociotropic and only weakly related to personal pocketbook considerations or local exposure to Chinese retaliatory tariffs. We also find that the trade war's intensification was politically consequential, decreasing support for Republican candidates in the 2018 midterm elections. Our findings indicate that trade wars can be politically costly for incumbent politicians, even among voters who are not directly affected by retaliatory tariffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary aim of this study is to assess the relationship between Green Supply Chain Management (GSCM) practices and the Return on Equity (ROE) of industrial sector firms in the United States and China during the implications of the US-China Trade War. Principal Component Analysis and Random Effects Regression Analysis are employed to empirically test the impact of four Green Supply Chain Management practices which are: Internal Environmental Management, Green Purchasing, Eco Design, and Customer Cooperation on ROE. A sample of 50 firms in the US and 50 firms in China is employed to test the hypothesized relationships. Findings suggest that there is a significant positive relationship between Eco Design and ROE in both countries. However, a significant negative relationship between Internal Environmental Management and ROE is concluded in China only. This research contributes to identifying out and classifying the reported practices of the Green Pillar in firms' Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) reports under their related Green Supply Chain Management practices to provide a theoretical framework and facilitate future research. This paper proposes that policy makers, managers, and practitioners should accept sustainability as a strategic priority prior to implementing Green Supply Chain Management and suggests that firms should be confident of the long-term profitability of implementing Green Supply Chain Management practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Geopolitical conflicts, particularly economic ones, introduce significant uncertainties into the global supply chain. The impact of these conflicts on cross‐border buyer–supplier transactions remains underexplored, as does the capability of global suppliers to mitigate such risks by locking in their foreign buyers. Employing a combined perspective of resource dependence theory and transaction cost economics, we examine a natural experiment to investigate the effects of the 2018 U.S.–China trade war on the transactional relationships between Chinese suppliers and their U.S. buyers. Our study reveals that the trade war generally adversely affected these buyer–supplier transactional relationships, leading to a negative abnormal transaction value in the affected dyads, which amounted to 18.42% of their pre‐event level. However, we find that this adverse impact can be attenuated when Chinese suppliers demonstrate superior innovation capabilities, higher corporate social responsibility performance, or fewer local political ties. These findings yield insights for international suppliers and buyers on strategies to maintain buyer–supplier transactions and minimize the detrimental effects on global supply chain relationships during geopolitical conflicts. Highlights: The U.S.–China trade war slashed transactions between sampled U.S. buyers and Chinese suppliers by 18.42%.Innovative and socially responsible Chinese suppliers showed more resilient, effectively retaining U.S. buyers amid the trade war.U.S. buyers distanced themselves from Chinese suppliers with local political ties to navigate geopolitical uncertainties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Trump presidency, the United States and China were embroiled in an open trade war that threatened the neoliberal world order. This paper attempts to put forward an explanation of the trade war from a world-systems perspective. Using the world-systems theory, systemic cycles accumulation theory, and the new international division of labor thesis, the paper contends that the rise of China and the protectionist stance of the United States were products of the neoliberal world economic and political order. It concludes that the trade war has not ended with the end of the Trump presidency. On the contrary, the trade war is systemic and will continue to be fought regardless of which party or persons who occupy the White House. The willingness of the American leadership to use international institutions as dispute resolution mechanisms and avoid unilateral undertakings would define the nature of the trade war and its possible outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020, the UK officially withdrew from the EU (Brexit), ending its obligation to continue the EU's retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products. Recent actions by the UK government suggest that these retaliatory tariffs will eventually be eliminated. We present a dynamic modeling framework and estimate whiskey demand in the UK by source (e.g., U.S. whiskey, Irish whiskey, etc.). Estimates are then used to simulate the impacts of the retaliatory tariff on U.S. whiskey. If the tariff is eliminated, U.S. whiskey exports to the UK should fully recover and could even exceed pre-trade war levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThe trade war between the United States and China since 2008 has opened strategic opportunities to increase the economic market in ASEAN countries. This research aims to answer whether the trade war led to an oligopoly or a systemic market structure as a strategy for increasing demands, especially in ASEAN countries. The research exploration refers to trade data between Indonesia and ASEAN at the start of the 2018 US-China trade war and compares it with the latest data for 2020. This research uses the Results Index of C5 Analysis of ASEAN Trading Partner Countries and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index to examine trade between China, America, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the ASEAN economy. Findings, in a way, empirically shows that the Results Index of C5 Analysis of ASEAN Trading Partner Countries before and after US-China trade made market concentration moderate and caused an increase in the value of C5 Analysis Results of ASEAN Trading Partner Countries. Discounts on Herfindahl–Hirschman the index needs to pay attention to import players in ASEAN before the trade war. However, after the trade war, there was an increase in the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, which has a trend toward a collusive oligopoly market structure.

Which factors make some American multinational corporations (MNCs) take political action in response to the US-China Trade War and cause others to stay on the sidelines? We identify China-based subsidiaries of US firms to identify firms' political actions in response to the trade war. We combine data on firms' tariff exposure, economic actions in China, and political actions in the United States during the trade war. Together these data highlight the divergent strategies with which firms engage. Even though more than 63 percent of MNCs in our sample were adversely impacted by tariffs, only 22 percent voice opposition and 7 percent exit in response to the trade war. Our analysis reveals that US MNCs in China differ in their business models, ownership structure, experience in China, and size of capital investments. These firm-level factors determine the degree to which US MNCs are embedded in China. This in turn shapes how firms perceive political risk and choose from the menu of options to deal with the trade war. Size and age increase voice while joint-venture status decreases it.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The aim of the paper is to analyze the economic effects of technological changes and restrictions on the freedom of technology transfer in the contemporary global economy on international trade turnover in the context of the trade conflict between the United States and China. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: A qualitative method was used to analyze the problem of restrictions on technology transfer in the modern world economy. The article also uses a quantitative method, including a review of the statistics of international trade turnover of high-tech goods to examine the effects of the US-China trade war. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: On the basis of the theoretical approach to the premises of trade exchange (Ricardian model, Heckscher-Ohlin theory) and subsequent theories, in particular the approach of Schumpeter, Krugman and Melitz, the relationship between the role of technological changes and the gains from international trade was examined. The article presents the motives behind the escalation of the technological trade war between the United States and China. RESEARCH RESULTS: Scientific analysis confirmed that technological changes and the spread of technology as a result of the intensification of international trade turnover are associated with a specific impact on benefits and losses for the country with a technological advantage as a result of the "learning RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The aim of the paper is to analyze the economic effects of technological changes and restrictions on the freedom of technology transfer in the contemporary global economy on international trade turnover in the context of the trade conflict between the United States and China. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: A qualitative method was used to analyze the problem of restrictions on technology transfer in the modern world economy. The article also uses a quantitative method, including a review of the statistics of international trade turnover of high-tech goods to examine the effects of the US-China trade war. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: On the basis of the theoretical approach to the premises of trade exchange (Ricardian model, Heckscher-Ohlin theory) and subsequent theories, in particular the approach of Schumpeter, Krugman and Melitz, the relationship between the role of technological changes and the gains from international trade was examined. The article presents the motives behind the escalation of the technological trade war between the United States and China. RESEARCH RESULTS: Scientific analysis confirmed that technological changes and the spread of technology as a result of the intensification of international trade turnover are associated with a specific impact on benefits and losses for the country with a technological advantage as a result of the "learning [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the U.S.-China trade war, multinational firms may develop new contract manufacturers outside China to hedge against high tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S. market. However, tariffs exhibit high uncertainty in recent years and developing a contract manufacturer incurs costs; hence, it is challenging to decide whether to develop a new contract manufacturer. We study two competing firms' contract manufacturer development decisions in a sequential game. First, we find that multinational firms prefer to develop new contract manufacturers when tariffs are expected to rise moderately rather than sharply. This is because the value of developing a new contract manufacturer for a multinational firm is the largest when the new contract manufacturer and the existing one compete most intensely, which happens for similar tariff-inclusive costs. This implies, when taking into account competition, an overly high tariff on Chinese exports to the United States does not necessarily serve the purpose of switching suppliers from China to other regions. Furthermore, higher tariff uncertainty can decrease development value and hence the incentive to develop a contract manufacturer. When there is an upward tariff shock that induces the equilibrium where both multinational firms develop a contract manufacturer, both firms must be worse off; only when it induces the asymmetric development equilibrium is it possible for the multinational firm developing a contract manufacturer to be better off, even with tariff increase and development cost. Second, the impact of development cost on multinational firms' incentives to develop new contract manufacturers is nonmonotone. As the development cost increases, the equilibrium can switch from both not developing new contract manufacturers to one developing a new contract manufacturer. Third, when the future tariff is expected to be high, multinational firms should diversify their development strategies in environments with fierce competition. Furthermore, increasing competition is not necessarily harmful for multinational firms. We also extend the analysis to consider asymmetric development costs and unobservable wholesale prices, and find the major insights are robust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Trump presidency, the United States and China were embroiled in an open trade war that threatened the neoliberal world order. This paper attempts to put forward an explanation of the trade war from a world-systems perspective. Using the world-systems theory, systemic cycles accumulation theory, and the new international division of labor thesis, the paper contends that the rise of China and the protectionist stance of the United States were products of the neoliberal world economic and political order. It concludes that the trade war has not ended with the end of the Trump presidency. On the contrary, the trade war is systemic and will continue to be fought regardless of which party or persons who occupy the White House. The willingness of the American leadership to use international institutions as dispute resolution mechanisms and avoid unilateral undertakings would define the nature of the trade war and its possible outcomes.

The trade war between the United States and China can affect the Indonesian economy. It is because the United States and China are Indonesia's main trading partners in International trading. Indonesia's macroeconomic indicators affected by the trade war are exports, imports, interest rates, and inflation. This research examines the trade war's partial and simultaneous effect on Indonesia's macroeconomic conditions, such as exports, imports, interest rates, and inflation. The data used in this study is secondary data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and Bank Indonesia (BI) in 2017 – 2020. The data analysis technique used is MANOVA (Multivariate Analysis of Variance). The empirical results showed that trade war simultaneously affects exports, imports, interest rates, and inflation. Meanwhile, the trade war partially affects exports, imports, and interest rates but not inflation. Our research concluded that trade conflicts between Indonesia's two main trading partners, namely the United States and China, affect Indonesia's macroeconomic conditions, especially on exports, imports, interest rates, and inflation. Indonesia must take strategic steps to anticipate the impact of the trade war, especially on export, import, and interest rate policies.

The China-US trade war, which was the result of differences in the production structure of the two countries, systemic contradictions in foreign economic policy principles and the struggle for global leadership, has a significant impact on global trade flows and market conditions. The article aims to identify the key beneficiaries of the trade war, to assess the situation in individual industry markets, as well as global legal effects, which remain out of academic discourse. US pharmaceutical companies and manufacturers of electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, semiconductors and other high-tech components are the main beneficiaries of the trade war, while US consumers are facing rising import prices. Chile, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada are external beneficiaries due to the growth in the supply of agricultural products and metals. Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Japan win in electronics, while Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, as well as India get additional advantages in textile production. The United States aimed at ousting China from the world rare earth metals market, forming an investment coalition consisting of Australia and Japan. The systemic spread of sanctions and trade restrictions is shifting the trade disputes resolution from the global level towards the US legal system, which seems to be relatively more efficient in resolving trade disputes.

We examined the effects of the trade war on US wooden furniture imports by product category (kitchen, bedroom, other) and exporting source (e.g., China, European Union, Vietnam) using a two‐stage demand procedure and general nested demand framework. There were significant competitive relationships across exporting countries. However, when both trade creation and diversion were considered, competitive relationships either diminished or became complementary. Consequently, elimination of the trade‐war tariffs would increase imports from China but would also benefit countries like Vietnam. However, results indicate that imports from China would still be significantly less than pretrade war levels if the tariffs are eliminated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The causal relationship between the US–China trade war and consumption substitution of domestic films for American films in China is examined in this study using the difference-in-difference model. The daily screening film data in China's 33 major cities in 2018 are employed. The results suggest that after the US–China trade war, the average attendance rate of foreign and American films has declined by 24.75% and 19.11%, respectively, compared with domestic films. As indicated by the above-mentioned finding, the trade war has led to a shift in the consumption of US films. The consumption substitution effect weakens on holidays for specific film types. People in cities exhibiting a higher economic and trade development level and a larger share of the tertiary industry are more inclined to purchase foreign cultural products. Accordingly, the negative effect of the trade war on American films is offset to some extent. As revealed by the result of this study, the negative effects are reduced with time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has witnessed a persistent escalation of trade tensions between the United States ("U.S.") and China in the solar photovoltaic ("PV") sector. A recent move by the U.S. was to enact the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act ("UFLPA") to prevent goods, including PV products, produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ("XUAR") of China from entering the U.S. market. Considering Xinjiang's large production capacity in polysilicon--a key raw material for the manufacturing of solar PV products--the enforcement of UFLPA is likely to profoundly implicate the U.S.-China trade relation in this area or even the global solar supply chain as a whole. While the UFLPA has a regulatory objective to promote respect for human rights and dignity, its impacts on international trade, especially solar products and their components, raise an important question with regard to the Act's compatibility with the U.S. trade obligations under the World Trade Organization ("WTO") regime. This article provides one of the first critical and in-depth analyses of the interface between UFLPA and the multilateral trade rules, highlighting potential contraventions and proposing recommendations for the United States and China, respectively. Facing the imperative to facilitate the lowcarbon energy transition, the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters--China and the United States--need to find more common ground to accelerate renewable energy development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) strategy was introduced in 2015 and aims to reduce Chinese reliance on foreign technologies by adopting the import-substitution policy. The United States (US) considers China's super-ambitious industrial policy as a serious threat and is concerned about its high-tech industries, especially as Chinese technological firms are receiving generous government subsidies and tax cuts. The US, thus, entered a direct trade war with China to protect its domestic industries from unfair and inequitable competition. The US-China trade war has seriously shifted and interrupted global supply chains, thus creating a situation of uncertainty and instability for businesses that import and export US and Chinese products. The article is policy-based, and we reviewed the existing literature in depth. We addressed the industrialization pursuits of China under the MIC 2025. Furthermore, the article has analyzed the impact of the US-China trade war on global supply chains. Finally, the article has many implications; the article provides the possible policy routes for the governments of developing countries and regulators to address the reservations of developed countries regarding state-sponsored industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Académique des Études Sociales et Humaines is the property of Hassif Benbouali University of Chlef and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)