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This article aims to provide a philosophical elucidation of the concept of divine atemporality (i.e. divine timelessness and immutability), found within the theological trajectory of Classical Theism, and a philosophical model – termed Aspectival Pluralism – that demonstrates its compatibility with the further notion of Divine Preservation. To achieve this end, an original interpretation of the concept is formulated within the Aspectival Account and the thesis of Theistic Ontological Pluralism, as extended by the temporal ontology of Priority Presentism, introduced by Sam Baron, and the Exdurantist view of persistence, introduced by Theodore Sider, which will ultimately enable the notion to be elucidated in a clear and consistent manner and help to answer an important conceptual question concerning it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science and religion have been described as the "two dominant forces in our culture". As such, the relation between them has been a matter of intense debate, having profound implications for deeper understanding of our place in the universe. One position naturally associated with scientists of a materialistic outlook is that science and religion are contradictory, incompatible worldviews; however, a great deal of recent literature criticises this "conflict thesis" as simple-minded, essentially ignorant of the nature of religion and its philosophical and theological underpinnings. In this first part of a two-part article, I set out the wide-ranging background required for a proper understanding of the debate as a preliminary for the second part, in which Ian Barbour 's influential four-fold typology of science-religion relations is critically assessed, leading to the conclusion that the conflict model is not to be so easily dismissed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following article will examine three argumentative strategies to address a recent topic of debate in the philosophy of religion known as the "Gap Problem." It aims to study the "Stage II" of cosmological arguments, where the goal is to establish the theistic properties or attributes that identify the first cause or necessary being with the concept of God. The unique contribution of this study lies in the formalized and systematic presentation of the various solutions proposed by authors in the philosophical field, synthesizing their central ideas and presenting them in the form of arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perfect being theism is the view that the perfect being exists and the property being-perfect is the property being-God. According to the strong analysis of perfection, a being is perfect just in case it exemplifies all perfections. On the other hand, the weak analysis of perfection says that a being is perfect just in case it exemplifies the best possible combination of compatible perfections. Strong perfect being theism accepts the former analysis while weak perfect being theism accepts the latter. In this paper, I argue that there are good reasons to reject both versions of perfect being theism. On the one hand, strong perfect being theism is false if there are incompatible perfections; I argue that there are. On the other hand, if either no comparison can be made between sets of perfections, or they are equally good, then there is no best possible set of perfections. I argue for the antecedent of this conditional statement, concluding that weak perfect being theism is false. In the absence of other analyses of perfection, I conclude that we have reason to reject perfect being theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay begins with preliminary observations about the nature of agnosticism. Based on the term's etymology, in this essay an agnostic about some proposition (e.g., God exists) is someone who does not know whether the proposition is true. Being an agnostic about the truth of a proposition is compatible with the proposition appearing to be true or the state of affairs obtains but incompatible with an agnostic knowing its truth or that the state of affairs obtains. (Reference to propositions and states of affairs is intended to be inclusive, rather than a controversial metaphysical distinction.) Based on apparent virtues and vices, reasons are offered about when agnosticism (or the profession of agnosticism) is virtuous or philosophically desirable and when either actual agnosticism or its profession seems to be a vice or undesirable. The essay concludes with challenging Anthony Kenny's case for agnosticism about theism based on the virtue of humility. The central claims about apparent virtues and vices rest on the positive epistemic standing of appearances as defended by many so-called "common sense philosophers" Thomas Reid, Roderick Chisholm, and, more recently, Thomas Nagel's thesis about the justified status of the appearance of values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some classical theists contend that the Christian tradition demands affirmation of the following four tenets—divine simplicity, timelessness, immutability, and impassibility—in their absolute or strict senses, a position I refer to as strict classical theism. These four tenets, however, are the subject of considerable debate in recent scholarship. This article engages the ongoing debate by focusing on some significant difficulties strict classical theism faces relative to meeting two widely held standards of Christian theological method: the standard of biblical warrant and the standard of systematic coherence. First, highlighting classical Christology as a test case, this article suggests that strict classical theism faces pressure to either revise or abandon some contested tenets or confront the prospect of abandoning the standard of systematic coherence. Second, the article turns to highlighting some ways that strict classical theism struggles to meet the standard of biblical warrant, which might necessitate a reevaluation of some of its core claims and the viability of common appeals made to the Christian tradition in support of such claims. This article is not intended as a conclusive argument against strict classical theism but aims at the more modest goal of pressing these points regarding theological method, calling for serious consideration, and inviting further discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues against the "free will theodicy" for hell. It demonstrates how St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas considered this theodicy to be Pelagian and opposed to divine transcendence. It is shown that by claiming that God cannot cause the conversion of sinners without violating their freedom, the free will theodicy denies divine omnipotence, empties divine predestination of meaning, undermines the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, and implicitly abandons key tenets of classical theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that under certain assumptions, Islamic theism moves in the direction of a multiverse. We present several arguments in two major categories. The first is based on the divine attribute of everlastingness: if God's everlasting attributes are expressed in the creation and the universe has a finite past, then God created a multiverse. The second category involves perfect being theology: if some of God's attributes express themselves in the creation, and God has every compossible perfection, then we should expect God to create a multiverse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on my recent argument that an all-good, all-powerful God is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world, I explore what grounding ethics can have without the God of traditional theism. While theists have argued that ethics is grounded either in God's commands and/or in his nature, I show that no such adequate grounding exists, even if my argument—showing that the God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world—were shown to be unsuccessful, and I further show that such a grounding is impossible, given that my argument is successful. I then go on to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded and show how an ethics, so grounded, can be appropriately related to our biological and cultural past, present, and future, as understood through Darwinian evolutionary theory. In this way, I hope to undercut a recent attempt to use Darwinian evolutionary theory to debunk ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can a coach rightfully integrate a religious orientation in their coaching in a public institution? In its recent Kennedy v Bremerton School District (2022) decision, the U.S. Supreme Court defended the educational value of players' exposure to diverse expressive activities as a part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society. I contend that religion-sport separation is the most philosophically defensible position, based primarily on the problems with supernatural theism in religions like Christianity. Nonetheless, there is a form of religion-sport integration that is theoretically possible within my critique of theism which could strengthen the inner morality of sport. I describe the two necessary conditions of this potential religion-sport integration but conclude that the problems with defining the 'religious' might ultimately strengthen my defense of religion-sport separation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noah McKay provides a novel argument for theism over naturalism. The argument is novel because it connects metaphysical issues to issues regarding moral epistemology. The connection concerns the power of theism and naturalism, respectively, to explain the human capacity to obtain correct beliefs about the domain of morality. The gist of McKay's argument is that theism provides a much more plausible account of this capacity than naturalism. The reason for this superiority, according to McKay, is that theism secures an intimate connection between human moral intuitions and truths within the domain of morality while naturalistic explanations sever the connection between human moral intuitions and truths within the domain of morality. A central contention of McKay's argument is that there are exactly two plausible and naturalistic explanations for the content of human moral intuitions—one appealing to evolutionary considerations, the other appealing to social conventions. I argue that this contention is incorrect. Some Buddhist traditions locate veridical moral intuitions in a kind of experience available to those who achieve freedom from ignorance and attachment. This explanation is naturalistic (as McKay understands that term) and no less plausible than the theistic explanation that McKay considers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay addresses 'the God‐haunted Atheist paradox' in Sartre's early philosophy and argues against a series of efforts to show that Sartre maintains a 'secular theology'. It shows that if Sartre's ontology is correct, the God of 'classic theism' cannot possibly exist. It argues against two sophisticated efforts to show that theological influences infiltrate Sartre's early ontology and permeate his moral psychology. It also rejects the claim that Sartre's (Existentialism is a Humanism, 1946/2007, Yale University Press) distinction between secular and religious existentialism 'has no basis in fact'. It shows that Sartre appropriates religious language in order to give debunking secular explanations for religious phenomena and that he inverts traditional Christian values. It concludes that Sartre is an anti‐theologian. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theist needs a conception of the distinction between doing and allowing because much of the literature focused on the problem of evil attempts to justify (via theodicy) or defend (via defence) God's allowing evil to occur. I present a counterfactual account of the doing/allowing distinction in the divine context and argue that, even if there are compelling objections to counterfactual accounts of the distinction in the human context, they do not work against such an account in the divine context. The counterfactual analysis to follow will allow the theist to plausibly claim that God does not ever bring about evil, which is crucial to some defences against the problem of evil. I conclude by defending my account against possible objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Panentheism is the position that the world is in some sense 'in' God, and God 'in' the world, without the world being identical to God. Thus, it tries, like what I call mainstream theism and against pantheism, to protect the transcendence of God, while giving greater emphasis to his immanence in creation than the former. I aim to explicate an approach that I call Orthodox Panentheism. The word 'orthodox' is to be read in two ways. First, the picture is derived from the writings of some of the most important figures in Eastern Christian thought, so that it is Orthodox in the 'big "O" sense'. Second, I hope to show that it is a legitimate Christian picture of the God–world relation which is both distinctive and worthy of being called 'panentheism' – an orthodox panentheism in the 'little "o" sense'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that sceptical theists have too narrow a focus: they consider only God's axiological reasons, ignoring any non-axiological reasons he may have. But this is a mistake: predicting how God will act requires knowing about his reasons in general , and this requires knowing about both God's axiological and non-axiological reasons. In light of this, I construct and defend a kind of sceptical theism – Deontological Sceptical Theism – that encompasses all of God's reasons, and briefly illustrate how it renders irrelevant certain charges of excessive sceptical and how it evaporates equiprobability objections. Furthermore, I put forth a simple argument in favour of Deontological Sceptical Theism, which shows that everyone (at least currently) ought to endorse it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is renewed interest in philosophical and theological investigations about God, religions and the implications of religious beliefs among philosophers and theologians in Africa. This development is itself profitable because the question or the problem of God is a relevant discourse in Africa where the majority of people are theists. However, unlike the exploration of the first-generation African scholars—philosophers and theologians—whose primary objective was to show the symmetry between Christianity and African Traditional Religions (ATR), contemporary discourses arise within the clamour for decoloniality. The investigations, with varied emphasis, advocate the decolonisation of the concept of God, epistemic decolonisation, decolonisation of Christianity and African Christian theology, etc. In this essay, I critically examine the contemporary decolonial discourse about God, divine attributes, religious belief, and the relationship between African Christian theology and ATR. I argue that most of the contemporary literature is entangled in conceptual convolution and as such, there is a lack of clarity about what needs to be decolonised. Put differently, most works do not clearly distinguish between reality (the person or phenomenon "God"), thought (the concept "God"), and conceptions of God (language, that is, the terms and images used in making assertions about God). Further, I argue that when conceptual clarifications are adequately attended to, there is no need for decolonisation of discourses about God, divine nature, divine attributes, and the relationship between Christianity and ATR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With regard to the assertion of the nature of the world, primitive Buddhism advocates "all phenomena that arise from causes" and opposes the existence of "God" or "Creator", who created everything in the universe, which is significantly different from monotheistic beliefs such as Brahmanism, Christianity, and Islam and is therefore often called "atheism". This paper introduces the Buddhist cosmology of Mount Sumeru and the tri-sahasra mahā-sahasra lokadhātu under the perspective of comparative religions and the first human beings who came to this world from the ābhāsvara-deva as recorded in the Buddhist scriptures and explores the question of whether Buddhism is atheistic. It is believed that the key to the debate between Chinese and Western scholars on whether Buddhism is atheistic is the difference in understanding the concept of "God". Buddhism does not deny the supernatural power of "ghosts and gods", so its essence is still theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within contemporary Christian philosophical theology, there are three broad theories of providence being debated. These are theological determinism, Molinism, and open theism. Of course, there are nuances amongst proponents of each theory, but the nuances are not terribly important for my purposes in this essay. I will argue that the basic conceptual machinery of each theory seems to entail divine temporality. Since open theists are already committed to divine temporality, there is nothing for me to argue there. Things get interesting when I consider theological determinism and Molinism. There are proponents of each view who already affirm divine temporality, but there are also proponents of each view who affirm divine timelessness. What I will argue is that theological determinism and Molinism are incompatible with divine timelessness. In order to make my case, I will start by defining some terms. Then, I will offer some arguments related to acting for a reason, divine freedom, and so-called logical moments in the life of a timeless God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Social Sciences Studies is the property of Social Sciences Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article revisits Feuerbach's "break with speculation" in the early 1840s in light of issues raised by the original Pantheism Controversy, initiated in 1785 by the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza. The article first describes the concerns underlying Jacobi's repudiation of Spinozism, and rationalism more generally, in favor of a personalistic theism that disclaims the possibility of philosophical knowledge of God. It goes on to reconstruct Hegel's alternative to Jacobi's famous salto mortale before considering how Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's philosophy of religion, as well as the personalism of the so-called Positive Philosophy (inspired by the late Schelling), was influenced by both Spinoza and Jacobi in ways that have not yet received sufficient attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Locke bases his moral and political philosophy on his doctrine of the ‘law of nature’. Scholars have debated the content and grounding of this law and its relationship to Christian theology. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law’s content are traceable to an unclear grammatical construction in a crucial passage of the Treatises of Government, which can be resolved by following out a related set of arguments in that work. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law’s grounding can then be resolved by the hypothesis, strongly supported by textual evidence, that Locke relies tacitly on the reasoning of a parallel passage in Hobbes. Lockean natural law rests on neither atheistic nor specifically Christian premises but on a hypothetical natural theology. Locke’s conclusions from that natural theology represent an attempt to follow out Hobbesian logic while also tightening it up on one important point on which Hobbes himself appears to vacillate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Would God's existence be a good thing for us? According to anti-theism, the answer is No. Probably, many theists will want to reject anti-theism. But it isn't obvious why. After all, whether p is good for us is logically independent from whether p is true. So anti-theism seems entirely compatible with theism. In this essay, however, I argue this seeming compatibility is mistaken. If anti-theism is true, then the theism of most practicing believers is false. And if I am right about this, then anti-theism presents a serious challenge to traditional theistic belief, notably theistic belief anchored in the Bible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines Dylan Thomas's "Poem on his Birthday," exploring its ambiguity regarding the existence of God. It discusses how Thomas uses poetic language to balance interpretations between atheism and theism, highlighting the inner conflict of the speaker, who navigates uncertainties about divine presence amidst vivid imagery and metaphorical expressions.

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While discussions on beauty in the works of philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoreans, and others have been documented, it became a significant epistemological domain from the 18th century onwards. The connection between beauty and its truth has been articulated among Western philosophers as evidence for God's existence. The nature of the aesthetic argument and how it proves the existence of the divine through the beauties of the world is explored by Louis in a manner that the researcher seeks to analyze. Based on this, the writer, through sub-questions and a descriptiveanalytical approach, aims to study and examine the dimensions of this issue. The research findings indicate that this argument attempts to prove the existence of God through both epistemic and ontological ways. These methods focus on our ability to recognize beauty or the inherent beauty in existence itself. C.S. Lewis's perspective on beauty is rich and distinctive, illuminating that he considers the longing for beauty a natural inclination connected to a dependency and, by establishing a link between the beauty of nature and the existence of God as the creator of the world, he provides evidence for this argument. Although challenges such as the rejection of natural inclination and the existence of counterexamples for satisfying human desires have been raised against this argument, it remains a novel initiative in the contemporary era. It continues to be a focal point of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religion has different aspects and dimensions including doctrinal, moral, empirical, mythical-narrative, ritual, social, and material ones. Religious experience is one of the dimensions of religion and is a significant religious fact and aspect that has diverse relations with other dimensions of religion. Hence, recognizing the kind of religious experience's relations with religion's dimensions has its special significance. So the question of research is what relations can be conceivable between religious experience and the dimensions of religion? To answer such a question, first, we should pay attention to the importance of different tendencies toward religion and religious experiences, that is, our understanding of religious experience defines its relation with religion's dimensions. Our understanding of religion, also, is significant in determining its essence and diverse aspects or dimensions. In this case, considering two important religious traditions of the world, namely classic monotheism and atheism, we can notice the significance of the Transcendent Being or Sacredness/Divine aspect of religion, and think of some dimensions of religion such as doctrinal, moral, mythicalnarrative, empirical, social, ritual or material that each one has its special relation with religious experience, although creedal and ritual ones can be more respectable. In this case, it seems the doctrinal dimension can make or interpret religious experiences, ritual and worshiping dimention shows and manifests its symbolic repeatation. Mythical-narrative one can transfer virtues of religious experiences to the next generations, moral one can make and extend the results of religious experiences, and material one can manifest externally and make the background for the next religious experiences. In the meantime, paying attention to noticeable theories such as essentialism and structuralism about religious experiences, and dividing them into two nouminous and intuitive-theoretical experiences, can make complicated and plural of their relations with some dimensions of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Hare interprets the moral gap according to Kant's teachings that is in practical reason and between moral will and human desire. He considers the first step to bridge this gap with the help of two categorical imperative: general law and the end in itself. The categorical imperative requires us to obey moral laws, because if it were not within our power, we would not be commanded to do so. So, we have to choose a rule that we can consider as a general law and act according to it; then we should be able to put humanity as our goal and prioritize other people's goals and objectives over our own desires; However, despite the evil that is inherent in humans, preferring our happiness over the happiness of others is dangerous. Using these rules leads to an internal revolution that is not possible except with divine assistance. That is, one should believe that there is a supreme good that if a person prefers the happiness of others to his own happiness and leads a virtuous life, he will be given a happiness commensurate with his virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sal Restivo's book, "Beyond New Atheism and Theism: A Sociology of Science, Secularism, and Religiosity," explores the ongoing debate between new atheists and theists in the Anglo-American sphere. Restivo argues that both sides are wrong in placing the individual at the core of their perspectives and overlook the societal context and its influence. He suggests that embracing secularism, which combines atheism with humanistic values, can lead to a more meaningful existence. While the book provides valuable sociological insights, some notable omissions and logical inconsistencies are present. Researchers of Jews and Judaism can use Restivo's analysis to understand the relations between beliefs and society in Jewish contexts. [Extracted from the article]

Why does Kant reject atheism in such strong terms despite his denial of the traditional proofs for the existence of God? I take the position that the question of atheism and the problem it entails are not a side issue but the recurring portrait of a figure that haunts Kant not just in the Religion, but throughout his critical philosophy. I seek to expand what Kant criticizes in atheism or, more accurately, to identify atheism as part of a collection of positions that Kant rejects on grounds of what John Hare calls "rational instability," which is ultimately a moral-rational instability. This includes also certain forms of theism and theological beliefs. I claim that Kant's agenda is to construct a world view in which genuine moral behaviour is possible by preserving the world as a moral space in which individuals are free to be moral, and that the target of his metaphysical criticism is those who over-explain the world so as to deny the possibility of a meaningful self-consciousness of agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

McNabb and DeVito have recently argued that Graham Oppy's objections to the First Way are found wanting. In response, McNabb and DeVito restructured the First Way on behalf of St Thomas. More recently, Joseph Schmid and Daniel Linford argue that the restructured argument given by McNabb and DeVito is problematic, claiming that it is either valid but unmotivated or it is plainly invalid. In this paper, I argue that McNabb and DeVito's schematic glossing of the First Way is both valid and motivated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to ontological naturalism, the existence of an incorporeal cause for the world is in conflict with science, and basically the world does not need such a cause. According to methodological naturalism, too, scientific method is the most successful method for understanding the structure of the world and the causal relationships governing it. Looking at the issue from the faspective of theoretical philosophy, which does not belong to anything other than the outer world, we find that science has a limited share in the explanation of nature in terms of its method, and if the empirical findings arising from it are not in interaction with the metaphysical foundations of science, then it cannot have decisive theories in the explanation of the world and has nothing to say in the ontological issues. It seems that by considering the link between science and metaphysics, one can use philosophical theology in order to defend the belief in God as a complementary element in the explanation of the world of existence, and the use of science in the realm of ontology is considered unscientific and fallacious. Regarding essentialism in science, Ellis believes realistically that instead of lacking profaties, creatures have powers and capacities that make up their essence and inherent profaties and make their nature active and full of profaties. It can be concluded that naturalism is valuable as a way of understanding material nature, without being in conflict with the transcendental and incorporeal cause. Methodological naturalism does not necessarily correlate with ontological naturalism, and what brings these two closer together is the metaphysical foundations of science, which alone is efficient in theology and the ontological explanation of nature. In sum, new essentialism establishes a connection between the inherent profaties and the existence of things, and builds an objective and real foundation on the proof of the metaphysical foundations of science, from which theology can open a way to prove the belief in God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkish Studies - Comparative Religious Studies is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Classical theism is often said to suffer from the problem of modal collapse: if God is necessary and simple then all of his effects (creatures) are also necessary. Many classical theists have turned to extrinsic predication in response: God's simple and necessary act is compatible with any number of possible effects or no effects, and is only said to be an act of creating in virtue of the existence of the universe itself. Leftow and Schmid criticize this solution for leading to "providential collapse": God would not have control over which creation obtains if all his intrinsic features are compatible with any possible universe. Thomistic classical theism avoids both modal collapse and providential collapse by utilizing the metaphysics of relations. With no differences within his simple essence/act, God can relate himself differently to his possible effects, willing some and not willing others. These relations determine whether or not the effects will exist. Thomistic classical theism's version of divine simplicity is not incompatible with God having a multiplicity of relations, for the three divine persons are distinct relations within God. Divine simplicity is only incompatible with a multiplicity of absolute items within God. Furthermore, not all differences of relation are grounded in the different absolute characteristics of their relata. Rather, sometimes differences of relation themselves ground differences in the absolute characteristics of their relata. God's divine act is thus said to be an act of willing this creation rather than that in virtue of his chosen, contingent relation to possible creatures, rather than in virtue of the creatures themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it correct to think of God as a perfectly good personal agent? Not so, argue John Bishop and Ken Perszyk. Bishop and Perszyk, in their most recent work, God, Purpose, and Reality: A Euteleological Understanding of Theism (2023), outline a series of challenges that bring into question this concept of God—i.e., as a perfectly good personal agent, who is unique, unsurpassably great, all-powerful, and all-knowing. I aim to critically evaluate one of these challenges, namely the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). The NRLAFE has God's perfect goodness as its target. Bishop and Perszyk argue that people who are committed to certain values about what constitutes right relationship amongst persons, might reasonably judge God as lacking perfect goodness. They also contend that the relevant values will likely be endorsed by theists. My aim in this paper is twofold: first, I aim to assess the Bishop-Perszyk argument from evil, in light of the tradition of Islamic Theism. The tradition of Islamic Theism is as broad as it is deep, and within the tradition there are a variety of ways in which God has been conceptualised. This includes debates as to whether we can view God as a personal agent. Second, I contend that we have available to us, from within and beyond the tradition of Islamic Theism, a set of resources that: (a) permit us to understand God as being a personal agent; and (b) allow us to resist the NRLAFE while endorsing the value commitments that Bishop and Perszyk have in mind. The perspective I bring to this paper is that of a reflective Muslim—i.e., a person of the Islamic faith who acknowledges that people of other religious and non-religious persuasions are as educated and concerned with seeking truth and avoiding error as they themselves are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open theism argues that traditional responses to the problem of evil fail to provide comfort amidst suffering because of their notion of metaphysical determinism and over-dependence on Greek philosophy. Open theists argue that the best solution to the problem of evil lies in our understanding of the nature of God’s power, which has been relinquished due to his love, the open nature of creation, and the creatures’ inherent powers. This study argues that the open-theistic notion of divine power is reductionistic because it does not consider coercive power as part of divine power. Further, the open theistic logic-of-love defence propagates a loveless God who respects his covenant with the beloved more than the beloved. Finally, the study argues that the open theists’ notions of divine omniscience and divine power are not viable; they raised many questions and objections and, therefore, created room for despair rather than comfort in adversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present the cult of the Goddess Rādhārāṇī as something prominent in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, starting from the 15th century books of bhakti-yoga, Hindu devotional theism. Before this bhakti literature, Rādhārāṇī was already mentioned in sacred books of Hindu Vaiṣṇavism and already had a cult in the Vaiṣṇava line of master Nimbārka Ācārya. However, her role as the Supreme Deity became more prominent after the period called Bhakti Renaissance, with some other philosophical sects emphasizing Rādhā as the Ultimate Reality. We will present the history of the cult and an analysis of the main aspects attributed to Rādhārāṇī, presenting her as an epitome of all possible love for God and considered the very personal manifestation of divine love, the Supreme and primordial Goddess. We will use as our main base the sacred texts of the tradition and comments from theologians, masters and scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Atheism is an ideology that rejects the existence of God and has gained increasing prominence in societies globally, including Malaysia. Atheism significantly challenges the religious orientation of Malaysian society. Specifically, atheism challenges spiritual and ethical foundations, unity, and cultural heritage linked to religious beliefs. Understanding these challenges is vital to formulate proactive measures, education, and informed dialogue to mitigate the negative impact of atheism on Malaysian society. This study explored the effects of atheism on Malaysian religious society via library research analysis. Scholarly articles, books, and reputable online resources on religious and atheism underwent content analysis, which yielded five key findings. Firstly, atheism leads to the loss of spiritual guidance and morality. Secondly, atheism potentially erodes ethical values and societal norms, and subsequently reduces social trust and cohesion. Thirdly, atheism contributes to moral relativism and ethical ambiguity, which potentially undermines established moral frameworks and social norms. Fourthly, atheism can weaken community cohesion. Lastly, ‎atheism threatens religious institutions and practices. Additionally, the absence of the role of God might undermine the cultural and heritage importance of religion. This study presented critical insights on the negative societal effects of atheism. By exploring the potential consequences of atheism on social cohesion, moral foundations, and existential perspectives, this study highlighted the need for religious education as part of atheism prevention and rehabilitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The classical doctrine of the eternal relations or origin (ERO) claims that these relations are (1) atemporal and (2) causal. In this paper, I investigate the casual nature of the ERO, highlighting that the patristic and medieval Christian thinkers who developed this doctrine understood causality in terms of Aristotle's efficient causality, highlighting that these are casual acts that produce an effect. I then provide an analysis of some of the major theories of efficient causation on offer in contemporary metaphysics to see which theory best comports with how the ancient and medieval Christian thinkers understood the efficient–causal aspect of the ERO, concluding that a powers theory of causation seems to work best. I conclude by discussing the implications the classical doctrine of the ERO has for models of God, arguing that they are compatible only with classical theism and neoclassical theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an attempt to consider an alternative pluralist pantheism (Mary Jane Rubenstein) as the next step in the evolution of interpersonal, interspecies, and God–human–nature relationships and its possible realisation in (post-)Christian ecofeminism and its epistemology. It follows the methodology and epistemology of theological ecofeminism, which assumes that the oppression of women and the exploitation of nature stem from the same constellation of phenomena: patriarchal domination, dualistic anthropologies, and global hypercapitalism. Recognising that pantheism is a very complex phenomenon and should not be viewed as a single codified viewpoint, but rather as a diverse family of different doctrines, this paper understands pantheism primarily as the paradigm that asserts that everything is part of a divine unity consisting of an all-encompassing, manifested deity or God/Goddess. The paper first explains the pan-en-theistic turn in Christian ecofeminism as a tool for deconstructing the dominant Cartesian dualistic binaries and their symbolism and metanarratives, and as the first "safe" phase of transition from Christian anthropocentrism. From this standpoint, Grace M. Jantzen's defense of pantheism as an alternative to transcendental theism is further explored as she argues that divinity is found "in" the physical and material world and nowhere else. The paper then moves to the second phase, proposed in the final part of the paper, on the possibility of the theoretical adoption of pluralist pantheism in (post-)Christian ecofeminist ecotheology. Here, the question of the "fear and horror of pantheism" in Western thought is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From ancient times to the present day, the question of faith and unbelief has troubled all mankind, from the common man to his greatest geniuses. In expressing belief and/or non-belief, the notion of „atheist“ is frequently used, which has many different meanings. There are frequent cases in which, in a conversation, people use, each distinctly, the notion of „atheist“, (1) either with the most different meanings, (2) or with ambiguous, unclear meanings, and in one case and in another, reaching the situation of „talking together and understanding each other separately“. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work is concerned with Whitehead's dipolar theism, which, among other things, makes a case for real relations and contingency in God. It undertakes this task using the methodological tools of analysis and hermeneutics. Alfred North Whitehead, in his works, especially Process and Reality, makes some strong statements that underscore and reiterate the creative nature and freedom of actual entities. For him, this is simply a given, a fact of experience. This affirmation of the self-creative nature of all levels of actualities permeates and influences his process philosophic system. He moves, therefore, to posit a dipolar theism, which he feels does justice to the reality of self-determination of actual occasions, a movement that favors the affirmation of the real relationship between God and the world from both perspectives of the world and God. Maintaining this dipolarity in God, he establishes that God whose nature is both primordial and consequential-superject and the world are, in some sense, infinite and in another finite. God, in this scheme, would, in some sense, be characterized by contingency. This position evidently counters Thomistic--classical theodicy which denies any real relation between God and creatures from the standpoint of God. He writes about a dipolar God and creativity that is the ultimate for which God and actual entities are its creatures. In doing this, there appears to be a direct contrast between what God within the classical system can accomplish and what God within the process system cannot do, and in this case, an undermining, at least in the context of classical philosophy, of the classical notion of God. Conversely, there is also the disparity between what the process actual occasion can achieve and what the classical creatures cannot do. With this, an undermining of the process of actual entities. Thus, in classical philosophy, there is an asymmetry in the divinecosmic connection, while in Whitehead and process philosophy, the relationship is symmetrical. It is with this God-world relationship that the work is concerned and is poised to evaluate this from the standpoints of Whitehead and classical philosophies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mind and consciousness are philosophically and theologically significant in many religious and secular traditions. This article focuses on the importance of the concepts of mind and consciousness in Christian theological views of human nature and God. Christian theological teachings that have implications for ideas of mind and consciousness are diverse; theological anthropology includes versions of soul-body dualism, hylomorphism, materialism, and a variety of alternatives. Because of the historical prominence of some form of soul-body dualism in Christian thought about human nature – and because critics of Christian theology in recent philosophy link the credibility of theism with the plausibility of dualism – this article investigates the cogency of dualism and its ostensible link with theism. Sections include an overview of Christian theological anthropology; a depiction of the hostility toward mind and consciousness in modern philosophy; the combined critique and the recent resurgence of dualism and Christian theism; theological objections to dualism; and mind and consciousness in Christian theology without dualism, including Christian forms of agnosticism, hylomorphism, materialism, idealism, and panpsychism.

The conversion of C. S. Lewis to Christian theism weaves together his quest for joy and his evolving view on the power of imagination. Lewis' acceptance of Christianity raises questions about the nature of the relationship between these two fundamental elements of his philosophical evolution: joy and imagination. In this article, we aim to clarify this aspect of Lewis' intellectual and spiritual life by considering his philosophical development. The essential relationship between joy and imagination becomes clear only if we consider Lewis' intellectual journey from Atheism to Idealism and then to Christian theism. In this article, we consider Lewis' intellectual development from the moment he adopted his own version of subjective idealism.