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Abstract In this study, we take into account the of modified Szász–Mirakyan–Kantorovich operators to obtain their rate of convergence using the modulus of continuity and for the functions in Lipschitz space. Then, we obtain the statistical convergence of this form. In addition, we determine the weighted statistical convergence and compare it with the statistical one for the same operator. Medical applications and traditional mathematics; one way to get a close approximation of the Riemann integrable functions is through the use of the Kantorovich modification of positive linear operators. The use of Kantorovich operators is tremendously helpful from a medical point of view. Their application is shown as an approximation of the rate of convergence in respect of modulus of continuity.

Abstract In this paper, a modification of general linear positive operators introduced by Ibragimov and Gadjiev in 1970 is constructed. It is shown that this modification preserves exponential mappings and also contains modified Bernstein-, Szász- and Baskakov-type operators as special cases. The convergence properties of corresponding operators on [ 0 , ∞ ) $[ 0,\infty ) $ and in exponentially weighted spaces are investigated. Finally, the quantitative Voronovskaja theorem in terms of modulus of continuity for functions having exponential growth is examined.

In this study, we take into account the of modified Szász–Mirakyan–Kantorovich operators to obtain their rate of convergence using the modulus of continuity and for the functions in Lipschitz space. Then, we obtain the statistical convergence of this form. In addition, we determine the weighted statistical convergence and compare it with the statistical one for the same operator. Medical applications and traditional mathematics; one way to get a close approximation of the Riemann integrable functions is through the use of the Kantorovich modification of positive linear operators. The use of Kantorovich operators is tremendously helpful from a medical point of view. Their application is shown as an approximation of the rate of convergence in respect of modulus of continuity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a modification of general linear positive operators introduced by Ibragimov and Gadjiev in 1970 is constructed. It is shown that this modification preserves exponential mappings and also contains modified Bernstein-, Szász- and Baskakov-type operators as special cases. The convergence properties of corresponding operators on [ 0 , ∞) and in exponentially weighted spaces are investigated. Finally, the quantitative Voronovskaja theorem in terms of modulus of continuity for functions having exponential growth is examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In the summer of 1978 a large 1-day event was scheduled to take place in the Grand Ballroom at the Hilton Hotel in Park Lane, London between the psychotherapists Carl R. Rogers (1902–1987), and his associates, and Ronald D. Laing (1927–1989) and his group. From among all the eyewitness accounts of that meeting, I have found only the testimonies of Maureen O'Hara, Ian Cunningham, Charles Elliot, and Emmy van Deurzen. According to O'Hara, Laing behaved in a rude, impolite, and aggressive way toward his American colleague Rogers. For his part, Cunningham says that Rogers came over as he had expected: a genuinely nice, caring, humane person. Laing, though, was even more impressive in person than in his books. Similarly, Elliot observes that Laing and Rogers held a genuine encounter, one in which both sat like two real mutually respecting persons who asked each other questions, while the perspective of van Deurzen is more in line with that of O'Hara than that of Elliot. Aims: Taking into account the different versions given on the Laing-Rogers event, I will analyze whether this encounter was only an unfortunate meeting or something else. Methods: Narrative review; combining eyewitness accounts with the few sources found in the literature on this topic. Results/conclusions: As I will show here, all these accounts taken jointly paint a picture of Laing as a brilliant clinician and as a terrible man. Without exculpating Laing for committing all sorts of mischief, I will offer a tentative account of his behavior sustained by his own psychic dynamics. In doing so, I will attempt to explain why Laing reacted in so censurable a way, going beyond Thomas S. Szasz's (1920–2012) condemnation in his essay on antipsychiatry, which gives credence only to O'Hara's version without quoting more sources or posing more questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mid-1970s, as the role of institutional psychiatry was being debated, Thomas S. Szasz directed a severe and unexpected critique at the work of Ronald D. Laing, after which there arose an acrimonious debate between Szasz and supporters of Laing in the Philadelphia Association (PA). (Laing himself conspicuously declined to respond to Szasz). This clash of views was initiated by Szasz in The New Review (TNR), which prompted a series of rebuttals from those working alongside Laing in the PA. Pivotal to this dispute were contrasting ideas on how to guide people from breakdown to sanity and the roles to be played by professionals and institutions in engaging with them. The main purpose of this article is to evaluate whether Laing (seen through lens of his then-associates in the PA) and Szasz were "antagonists," whether they shared a kindred spirit in their view of the psychiatric establishment, or whether their perceived differences on how to treat psychic sufferers stemmed from misrepresentations created by themselves or others. My conclusion is that, even though Laing and Szasz shared an interest in changing conventional psychiatric practice and the mode of understanding and treating psychic suffering, each side misconstrued the position of the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: As has been evaluated in a previous paper, Thomas S. Szasz redoubled his attacks against R. D. Laing in a series of articles which were published in The New Review (TNR) during the 1970s. Laing, however, consciously decided not reply to Szasz, a task taken up instead by Leon Redler on behalf of the Philadelphia Association (PA). Aims/objective: The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on the motives which led to Laing to decline to take part in TNR debate. Secondly, I evaluate the impact this had on the writing of Szasz in his widely read book, Antipsychiatry. Quackery squared, published in 2009. Methods: In order to gain a balanced perspective of the issues involved, I review all oral and written sources which I have been able to locate, including correspondence with mental health professionals who met Laing and Szasz in person. Results and conclusions: My conclusion is that Laing and members of PA would have preferred for Szasz to meet Laing in person to discuss antipsychiatry. However, Szasz opted not to see Laing personally when he traveled to London, whilst Laing decided not to reply to Szasz's harsh criticisms either in public or in print. As a result, the debate on antipsychiatry was brought to an unsatisfactory close, only to be reopened by Szasz in his book on antipsychiatry, published long after Laing's death (1989), and hence requiring others to respond in his memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Depression is regularly declared to be equivalent to a bodily illness, yet critics have long contested this 'medical' view of mental disorders. Following the ideas of Szasz and Foucault, we describe an alternative 'moral' view of depression, which emphasises the agency of the individual and presents depression as a potentially problematic but meaningful response that can be regarded as an aspect of character. We use popular internet blogs by people with depression to explore these contrasting conceptions, which can also be found in other research and information on depression. In blogs, the medical view is used to challenge what bloggers perceive as a persistently influential moral view, by deflecting criticism and responsibility and disowning unwanted aspects of the self. At the same time, bloggers make positive use of the moral concept of depression when discussing recovery. The moral view enables people to take active steps to address their difficulties and to integrate the experience of depression into their understanding of themselves in a challenging yet rewarding process of personal development. We suggest that the moral view of depression represents an enduring aspect of our understanding of ourselves, which the medical view has been superimposed onto, but has not managed to suppress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is a critical review of recent collections of articles by friends and colleagues of Thomas Szasz. Apart from the usual misunderstandings and wilful misinterpretations of Szasz's social psychology generally and critique of mental illness specifically, his friends and colleagues add a new dimension to Szaszian criticism by damning him with faint praise. Ignoring his indebtedness to social psychologist, George Herbert Mead, they interpret his work as an ideological defence of libertarianism, rather than as a logical critique of mental illness. A defence is, therefore, especially indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay traces Thomas Szasz's intellectual development from the social behaviourism of George Herbert Mead to a dramaturgic-existentialism which he used to reinforce and extend his critique of mental illness. As Mead's model resembles existentialism in several ways, Szasz used both perspectives to overcome aporia in each. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Henry Calderwood, a nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher interested in madness, published in 1879 an important work on the interaction between philosophy of mind, the nascent neurosciences and mental disease. Holding a spiritual view of the mind, he considered the phrase ‘mental disease’ (as Feuchtersleben had in 1845) to be but a misleading metaphor. His analysis of the research work of Ferrier, Clouston, Crichton-Browne, Maudsley, Tuke, Sankey, etc., is detailed, and his views are correct on the very limited explanatory power that their findings had for the understanding of madness. Calderwood’s conceptual contribution deserves to be added to the growing list of nineteenth-century writers who started the construction of a veritable ‘philosophy of alienism’ (now called ‘philosophy of psychiatry’). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 50th anniversary issue of The Myth of Mental Illness, Szasz conceded that, conceptually, his argument had been ignored because of the promulgation that mental illnesses are diseases of the brain. Responding to a recent editorial by T. Benning in the British Journal of Psychiatry Bulletin, which is somewhat critical of Szasz’s conceptual arguments, we argue that such criticisms are inaccurate. We highlight how no mental illness stands up to pathological scrutiny, yet treatments can cause iatrogenesis. In addition, we elaborate on how Szasz argued that the false concept of mental illness results in legal fictions. It is therefore important to defend and restate Szasz’s main thesis and conceptual arguments in light of recent criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to illustrate limitations of Dr. Thomas S. Szasz's absolutist approach in critiquing psychiatry, psychotherapy, and the concept of mental illness most famously expressed in The Myth of Mental Illness (Szasz, 1961). This article illustrates that Szasz mistook scientific proof for absolute truth. First, a comparison of scientific proof to its superior relation, mathematical proof, illustrates its theoretical short-comings. Szasz relies, sometimes subtly, sometimes quite overtly, but always selectively on "real science" to present psychiatry and the mental health fields as imposters in the field of medicine or health, while neglecting to see or discuss limitations of "science" in general and medicine in particular. Secondly, a summary of evidence supporting psychotherapy's effectiveness will be presented, the discussion of which was either consciously or unconsciously omitted in Szasz's (1978; 1988) The Myth of Psychotherapy. Third, summary of Pennington's (2002) integration of both biological and psychological basis of psychopathology through cognitive neuroscientific theoretical framework is presented as it reasonably addresses Szasz's confusion about and critique of mental illness and the mind-body problem.

In psychiatry, the criteria by which the need for psychiatric attention is evaluated are often the object of disagreements, thus bringing to the fore debates regarding the validity of the concept of mental illness. Whereas anti-psychiatrists, such as Szasz (1961), argue against the prevention of suicide, Freud (1915) describes a case of melancholia that would justify psychiatric intervention in suicidal individuals. In this article, I examine these arguments and argue that Freud's account of melancholia puts Szasz's position into question.

This paper shows that Szasz (1) opposed the presumption of illness; (2) duelled with dualism; (3) researched the history of 'hysteria'; (4) perceived its profound paradigmatic potential; (5) confirmed the compassion of the confused; (6) denounced 'mental health' and 'anti-psychiatry'; (7) rejected the role of 'physician' to the 'mentally ill'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Myth of Mental Illness remains a seminal text within psychiatry, psychology and psychotherapy. Fifty-four years on from first publication, Szasz' contentions concerning 'mental illness' are examined in light of current understandings and research. It is suggested that there can indeed be 'mental illness' but that this may nonetheless lead to compassionate practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plautus’ Roman comedy Menaechmi ( The Two Menaechmuses) of c. 200 BC anticipates in fictional form the famous Rosenhan experiment of 1973, a landmark critique of psychiatric diagnosis. An analysis of the scenes of feigned madness and psychiatric examination suggests that the play (and the earlier Greek play from which it was adapted) offers two related ethical reflections, one on the validity of psychiatric diagnoses, the other on the validity of the entire medical model of insanity—that is, of the popular notion and political truth that mental illness is a (bodily) disease “like any other.” This essay is offered as a contribution to the interpretation of the play as well as to the history of psychiatry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore what I call the habituation of novelty within psychotherapy. I make recommendations for the practice of existential assessment too. Both are informed by the observation that psychotherapy within state-funded settings no longer exists, because the state-funded psychotherapist no longer exists (Szasz, 2003). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we deal with some properties of a mixed sequence of summation integral type operators, namely Szász - Inverse Beta operators. These properties are refering to the monotonic convergence under convexity, preservation of Lipschitz constants, using probabilistic methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the links between liberal political theory and the evaluative nature of medical classification, arguing for stronger recognition of those links in a liberal model of medical practice. All judgments of medical or psychiatric “dysfunction,” I argue, are fundamentally evaluative, reflecting our collective willingness or reluctance to tolerate and/or accommodate the conditions in question. Illness, then, is “socially constructed.” But the relativist worries that this loaded phrase evokes are unfounded; patients, doctors, and communities will agree in the vast majority of cases about what counts as illness. Where they cannot come to agreement, however, we are faced with precisely the sort of dispute about values and ways of life that the institutions of the liberal state are designed to accommodate. I accordingly sketch a model of medical practice, based loosely on Jürgen Habermas's political theories, designed to maximize both our awareness and our understanding of these disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What is a "mental illness"? What is an "illness"? What does the description and classification of "mental illnesses" actually involve, and is the description of "new" mental illnesses description of actually existing entities, or the creation of them? "Solastalgia" is a neologism, invented by the Australian environmental philosopher Glenn Albrecht, to give greater meaning and clarity to psychological distress caused by environmental change (Albrecht et al 2007) The concept received some coverage in the international mass media in late 2007 (Thompson, 2007) Much of this described solastalgia as "a new concept in mental illness", a description endorsed by Albrecht himself. The doctor and former British Foreign Secretary, Lord Owen, has coined the phrase "hubris syndrome" to describe the mindset of prime ministers and presidents whose behaviour is characterised by reckless, hubristic belief in their own rightness. This paper uses both the concept of solastalgia and the related concepts Albrecht posited of psychoterratic and somaterratic illnesses and hubris syndrome as a starting point to explore issues around the meaning of mental illness, and what it means to describe and classify mental illness. These issues illustrated tensions between natural and social philosophy, with the nature and status of psychiatry as a scientific, "value-free" enterprise or a humanistic, "value-laden" one discussed. Should "the distress caused by environmental change" be deemed a mental illness? Could it thereby included in catalogues of mental illnesses such as DSM -IV and ICD -10? The process whereby the psychiatric establishment defines and categorises mental illness is described, and as well as examining whether solastalgia and hubris syndrome meets these criteria, those criteria are compared to more critical views of psychiatry and the nature of mental illness. The approaches of Szasz, Boorse, Fulford, Canguilhem and other thinkers to issues related to mental illness are discussed. Finally it is suggested that the language of mental illness is increasingly used for rhetorical purposes, and that caution should be exercised in extending the label of illness to the phenomena of solastalgia and hubris syndrome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a pair of articles in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, E. Fuller Torrey's psychiatry is castigated by Thomas Szasz. In return, Torrey dismisses Szasz's criticism as ‘increasingly anachronistic.’ The current exchange clarifies the early ties between the two and their subsequent unraveling. Apparently at opposite ends of the psychiatric spectrum, Szasz and Torrey actually have much in common and share foundational assumptions about mind and body, the definition of ‘disease,’ and the nature of medical practice and medical science. Their presuppositions, all readily challenged, are problematic for all of medicine including psychiatry. Physicians treat persons, not diseases; people go to the doctor with ailments and illnesses, not diseases; mental illnesses are not necessarily diseases; medicine is a social response to human need, not a pure science; medical science is a practical, not a pure, science. What is true for medicine in general is, of course, also true for psychiatry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]