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Le changement climatique pose de nouveaux risques systémiques, qu’on appelle des « Cygnes Verts », auxquels les banques centrales doivent désormais faire face dans le cadre de leur mandat de stabilité financière. Les risques climatiques (physiques et de transition) demandent cependant de composer avec une incertitude radicale et des menaces potentiellement existentielles, ainsi que de penser une transformation structurelle vers une économie sobre en carbone. Dans ce contexte, l’action des banques centrales doit être pensée à travers de nouvelles approches et dans le cadre de ses interactions avec d’autres mesures d’ordre fiscal, budgétaire, réglementaire ou encore comptable. Une telle coordination devient essentielle pour faire face à une nouvelle typologie de risques écologiques qui incluent mais dépassent le changement climatique., Climate change poses new systemic risks (known as “Green Swans”) that must be addressed by central banks within their financial stability mandate. However, the identification and management of climate-related physical and transition risks are hindered by radical uncertainty and potentially existential threats, as well as by the need for a structural transformation toward a low-carbon economy. In this context, central banks cannot rely on traditional risk management approaches and need to explore new perspectives. In particular, the coordination of central banks’ own actions with other measures (of a fiscal, regulatory, or accounting nature) becomes essential for managing a new type of systemic ecological risk, including but not limited to climate change.

Several ‘critical’ raw materials, including metals, minerals and Rare Earth Elements (REEs), play a central role in the low-carbon transition and are needed to expand the deployment of low-carbon technologies. The reliable and affordable supply of these resources is subject to supply-side risks and demand-induced pressures. This paper empirically estimates the material demand requirements for ‘Transition-Critical Materials’ (TCMs) implied under two NGFS Climate Scenarios, namely the ‘Net Zero by 2050’ and ‘Delayed Transition’ scenarios. We apply material intensity estimates to the underlying assumptions on the deployment of low-carbon technologies to determine the implied material demand between 2021 and 2040 for nine TCMs. We find several materials to be subject to significant demand-induced pressures under both scenarios. Subsequently, the paper examines the possible emergence of material bottlenecks for three materials, namely copper, lithium and nickel. The results indicate possible substantial mismatches between supply and demand, which would be further exacerbated if the transition is delayed rather than realised immediately. We discuss these findings in the context of different possible transmission channels through which these bottlenecks could affect financial and price stability, and propose avenues for future research.

Several ‘critical’ raw materials, including metals, minerals and Rare Earth Elements (REEs), play a central role in the low-carbon transition and are needed to expand the deployment of low-carbon technologies. The reliable and affordable supply of these resources is subject to supply-side risks and demand-induced pressures. This paper empirically estimates the material demand requirements for ‘Transition-Critical Materials’ (TCMs) implied under two NGFS Climate Scenarios, namely the ‘Net Zero by 2050’ and ‘Delayed Transition’ scenarios. We apply material intensity estimates to the underlying assumptions on the deployment of low-carbon technologies to determine the implied material demand between 2021 and 2040 for nine TCMs. We find several materials to be subject to significant demand-induced pressures under both scenarios. Subsequently, the paper examines the possible emergence of material bottlenecks for three materials, namely copper, lithium and nickel. The results indicate possible substantial mismatches between supply and demand, which would be further exacerbated if the transition is delayed rather than realised immediately. We discuss these findings in the context of different possible transmission channels through which these bottlenecks could affect financial and price stability, and propose avenues for future research.

The concept of double materiality is developing rapidly, with potential implications for monetary and financial policies. Double materiality builds on the historical accounting and auditing convention of materiality and expands it by considering that non-financial and financial corporations are not only materially vulnerable to environment-related events and risks, but also materially contribute to enabling dirty activities and environmental degradation. Three rationales that support the use of double materiality are distinguished in this paper, each with different policy implications: i) an idiosyncratic perspective – closely connected to the concept of dynamic materiality – which considers that an entity’s environmental impacts are relevant as they provide information on the institution’s own risks; ii) a systemic risk perspective – closely connected to the concept of endogeneity of financial risks – which seeks to reduce financial institutions’ contribution to negative environmental externalities because of the systemic financial risks that could result from them; and iii) a transformative perspective seeking to reshape financial and corporate practices and values in order to make them more inclusive of different stakeholders’ interests and compatible with the actions needed for an ecological transition. Each of these rationales has potential implications for monetary and financial policies, as well as possible theoretical and practical challenges. While the adoption of a double materiality perspective remains an open question, the concept proposes the opportunity to think more comprehensively about the role of the financial system in urgently addressing the ecological challenges of our times.

Le changement climatique pose de nouveaux risques systémiques, qu’on appelle des « Cygnes Verts », auxquels les banques centrales doivent désormais faire face dans le cadre de leur mandat de stabilité financière. Les risques climatiques (physiques et de transition) demandent cependant de composer avec une incertitude radicale et des menaces potentiellement existentielles, ainsi que de penser une transformation structurelle vers une économie sobre en carbone. Dans ce contexte, l’action des banques centrales doit être pensée à travers de nouvelles approches et dans le cadre de ses interactions avec d’autres mesures d’ordre fiscal, budgétaire, réglementaire ou encore comptable. Une telle coordination devient essentielle pour faire face à une nouvelle typologie de risques écologiques qui incluent mais dépassent le changement climatique., Climate change poses new systemic risks (known as “Green Swans”) that must be addressed by central banks within their financial stability mandate. However, the identification and management of climate-related physical and transition risks are hindered by radical uncertainty and potentially existential threats, as well as by the need for a structural transformation toward a low-carbon economy. In this context, central banks cannot rely on traditional risk management approaches and need to explore new perspectives. In particular, the coordination of central banks’ own actions with other measures (of a fiscal, regulatory, or accounting nature) becomes essential for managing a new type of systemic ecological risk, including but not limited to climate change.