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The disposal of designated radioactive contaminated waste resulting from the Fukushima nuclear accident is a primary issue in Japan. However, residents often strongly oppose siting a repository of designated waste; therefore, a possible site remains undecided. The NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) aspect, whereby people refuse to build a repository in their hometown, has led to strong opposition. This study examined a public acceptance model for the siting investigation of a repository of designated waste. The model proposes that the antecedents of the three types of fairness, namely, procedural, distributive, and interpersonal fairness, determine public acceptance in addition to affecting evaluation of designated waste. The study investigated the differences of influences of the three types of fairness between residents in possible siting areas and in a non-siting area to compare the cognitive process toward the NIMBY issue. The respondents included 1016 residents in possible siting areas (Miyagi, Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki, and Chiba Prefectures), and 1006 residents in a non-siting area (the Tokyo metropolitan area). All respondents completed a web-based questionnaire. The results revealed that the influence of procedural fairness on public acceptance in the non-siting area was stronger than it was in the possible siting areas. Conversely, the influence of distributive fairness was stronger in the possible siting areas than it was in the non-siting area. Furthermore, affect evaluation through antecedents of fairness was more influential for public acceptance in the possible sites than it was in the non-siting area. Therefore, the findings suggest that the strong opposition due to the NIMBY aspect was caused by the differences between the process of fairness and the concept of fairness that people emphasize.

Background. Many studies have shown that sanctions promote cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, it has also been suggested that sanctions have a negative effect. The interactions among people and systems need to be considered to examine the consequences of sanctions. Aim. We examined whether rewards and mutual punishment increased non-cooperation. We regarded illegal industrial waste dumping as a social dilemma in which everyone bears the burden of the cost of illegal dumping, legal treatment is cooperative behavior, and illegal dumping is non-cooperative behavior. Method. We used the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game. This game simulates the structure of industrial waste treatment (incomplete surveillance, various industries with different roles and payoffs, cost of cooperation, etc.) in addition to the social dilemma structure. Players take on roles in industrial waste treatment, negotiating and dealing with other players, and treating industrial waste. We set three conditions. In the reward condition, players can earn rewards by rapidly treating industrial waste. In the mutual punishment condition, players can mutually monitor and punish each other. In the control condition, neither reward nor punishment exists. Results. Non-cooperation occurred more frequently in the reward condition than in the control condition. Conversely, there was no difference in non-cooperation between the mutual punishment and control conditions. Players under the reward condition did not gather information proactively, and information on benefits was not shared. Conclusion. This study showed that sanctions caused non-cooperation. Social dynamics should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. Gaming allows us to examine social consequences, including social dynamics, which leads to discoveries not possible through traditional methods.

Background. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the “persuasion game” in changing environmental attitudes and behaviors in different cultural contexts. Personal communication has been identified as a key facilitator of environmental behaviors, but environmental communication in our daily lives is infrequent. Intervention. This study tested the effects of the persuasion game in Germany, Hong Kong, and Japan. The game divides participants into two groups: persuaders and persuadees. The persuaders were given 10 minutes to persuade as many persuadees as they could to adopt energy-saving behaviors. Further, after 10 minutes, these participants were asked to switch their roles. Method. The study employed a quasi-experimental pretest/posttest design to examine changes in attitudes and behavioral intentions of the participants toward energy-saving before and after their participation in the persuasion game. Participants were university students in Germany (N = 116), Hong Kong (N = 65), and Japan (N = 92). Results. In all three countries, playing the game was associated with increased intention to adopt energy-saving behaviors, perceived seriousness of environmental problems, descriptive norm, and subjective norm. The increase in subjective norm was especially high in Japan, where the increase in intention to adopt energy-saving behavior was particularly pronounced among those who had less environmental communication. Discussion. The results indicate that this game can not only facilitate communication on environmental issues in different cultural contexts but also change how people perceive others’ interest in environmental issues. Conclusion. This study showed that persuasion game can be played in countries other than Japan as well. Moreover, it provides an opportunity to communicate with others on environmental issues, which may contribute to promoting future environmental behaviors.

This study aims to demonstrate the significance of the discussion under the “veil of ignorance” in building consensus about the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) issue. The Siting for a Contaminated Waste Landfill Game simulating conflicts related to the site selection of a contaminated waste landfill created by the accident at Fukushima nuclear power plant was developed with the veil of ignorance implemented as the prevailing social structure. The game involves two types of players: mayors, who are aware of the interests of their regions but can only engage in discussion; and citizens, who are unaware of the specific concerns of their regions (i.e., under the veil of ignorance) but are tasked with engaging in discussions and making the final decision. The transformations in the ideas of the players were examined through this game relating to building consensus. Ten games were conducted, and no unfair decisions were discerned under the veil of ignorance. A qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions revealed that a) the participants focused on fair viewpoints and avoided obsessions with regional interests after the discussion, and b) the diversity of actors and the multiple value dimensions were consistently emphasized before and after the discussion. Hence, this study succeeded in demonstrating that by participating in discussions under the veil of ignorance, the participants were able to form a shared recognition of the multiple-decision process, which the involvement of a diversity of actors and values was crucial for the formation of a consensus on the NIMBY issue.

Measures of sustainability-related participatory programs vary according to social and cultural contexts. Thus, this study proposed a stepwise participatory program in which stakeholders and randomly chosen citizens (citizen panels) were repeatedly and sequentially involved, and the citizen panels discharged discrete functions through all the planning stages. Procedural and outcome fairness was focal to the evaluation of the participatory program because these criteria are widely deemed essential for public acceptance. Evaluation by nonparticipants was imperative because of the limited number of participants, but sustainability plans affect and mandate the cooperation of the general public. Therefore, this study undertaken during the revision of the city of Sapporo’s environmental master plan compared evaluations of nonparticipants with those of participants from three stages of the stepwise participatory program applying backcasting scenario workshops. A two-wave mailout survey was administered to test two hypotheses: (a) workshop participants would evaluate the acceptance, process, outcome, and antecedent factors more positively than nonparticipants, and (b) procedural fairness and evaluation of expected outcomes would affect acceptance. The results supported these hypotheses. Procedural fairness was associated with acceptance most robustly and consistently. The study’s primary contribution to the extant literature entails accumulating empirical evidence on stepwise participatory programs.

The evolution of cooperation is an unsolved research topic and has been investigated from the viewpoint of not only biology and other natural sciences but also social sciences. Much extant research has focused on the evolution of cooperation among peers. While, different players belonging to different organizations play different social roles, and players playing different social roles cooperate together to achieve their goals. We focus on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor that is defined as follows: a player in the i-th role interacts with a player in the i + 1-th role, and a player in the n-th role achieves their goal (1

In citizen participation, a few representatives of the total citizen population participate in discussions with authorities regarding public decisions and policies. The present study examines a dual process model in which the representatives’ voice and similarity of values facilitate public acceptance through procedural fairness and trust in representatives, respectively. The results of an experiment employing a scenario method, which included participants from Japan (n = 211) and the Netherlands (n = 200), indicate that the representatives’ voice increased procedural fairness and public acceptance when the similarity of representatives was high. The effects of representatives’ voice on public acceptance via procedural fairness was supported in both nations, while other effects of representatives’ similarity on acceptance via trust were indicated only in Japan. These results suggest that the indirect voice of citizens, as conveyed by representatives, plays an important role in increasing perceptions of procedural fairness and public acceptance among citizens.

The present study examined the processes by which children acquire pro-environmental behaviours in different cultures. Our focus was on parental influence. Several studies have been conducted on adults' environmental behaviours; however, we know little about how children's environmental attitudes and behaviours are formed. We conducted a questionnaire survey with elementary school children and one of their parents in Germany and Japan. Two hundred and twenty-one pairs participated in Germany and 365 in Japan. The results of structural equation modelling showed that parents' behaviours affected children's environmental behaviours directly and also via the subjective norm (the children's experienced expectations of their parents). A comparison of the two countries revealed that hypothesized cultural differences between the impact of personal norms and subjective norms were clearer for adults. The results also showed that the effects of subjective norms were stronger for children, indicating that children are more likely to be influenced by expectations of others. The results of the study suggest that for promoting children's environmental behaviours, showing the behaviours in daily life would be most effective.

A field study was conducted to investigate the reduction of plastic bag usage at supermarkets. Many behaviors leading to potential damage to the environment may be unintentional. This study applied a dual motivation model to plastic bag usage and examined the effects of an intervention aimed at promoting pro-environmental behavior. A voice prompt intervention was implemented in Japanese supermarkets. In the first (control) week, shoppers were given free plastic bags by the cashier. In the second (intervention) week, cashiers asked shoppers whether they wanted plastic bags. We collected observational and questionnaire measures of variables that predicted free plastic bag usage during the intervention. The results supported a dual motivation model of behavioral change. The voice prompt decreased the usage of plastic bags by both discouraging unintentional usage and encouraging an intentional reduction in usage. Possibilities for interventions designed both to attenuate unintentional motivation and to promote intentional motivation are considered.

ISAGA/JASAG2015 the 46th ISAGA conference | Japan Association of Simulation & Gaming hosts 17–21 July 2015 Kyoto, Japan post proceedingsへの掲載予定, This study explores whether information disclosure can cause co-operation in a social dilemma, even when people can disseminate false infor-mation. In the past, illegal dumping increased in Japan despite the strengthen-ing of penalties and surveillance laws, due to practical limitations in monitoring and surveillance. To resolve this, the tracking sheet used to trace the trading and processing of the wastes must be traceable in order to detect illegal dumping. This means that manifests must be written precisely in order to be effective but if maintaining a tracking log has some function other than surveillance this may not be the case. To examine this issue we used the “In-dustrial Waste Illegal Dumping game” (Ohnuma & Kitakaji, 2007) which sim-ulates the disposal of industrial waste and is structured as a social dilemma with asymmetry of information. In this study we utilised two conditions: a dis-closure and a control condition. Under the disclosure condition, players had to enter the amount of commission or disposal in the landfill but did not have to fill in the correct amount. Although players could read the report, they could not know who performed illegal dumping or how much they contributed. Therefore, this disclosure did not have an effective surveillance function and could not help detect non-cooperation. However, the results showed that the amount of illegal dumping was reduced, and information on payoffs was shared more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. Moreo-ver, players collected and shared their information more in the disclosure con-dition than in the control condition. The study thus indicates that the function of disclosure is not surveillance, but information sharing which is essential for voluntary cooperation.

The present study explored the influences of subjective and descriptive norms on environmentally conscious behaviours between the USA and Japan. It was predicted that subjective norms would have a larger effect on behaviour in Japan than in the USA. Descriptive norms were expected to have a greater influence on behaviour in the USA. The survey was done with 160 American students and 114 Japanese students. The results showed that subjective norms are relevant only in Japan, but the effect was limited. Alternatively, descriptive norms were a powerful determinant in the USA. It was also found that respondents asserted that they commit environmentally conscious behaviours more frequently than others, regardless of their country. The present research suggests that the role of subjective and descriptive norms may vary between cultures, and highlights a necessity for distinguishing between interpersonal and social norms.

This study explored two questions: 1) what kind of method for instilling trust is evaluated to be important by the general public and 2) who is considered as a legitimate third party, when administrators and organizations go through an information disclosure process. We hypothesized that voluntary declaration of self‐sanctions, before an issue becomes public, would be important in instilling trust as well as the intervention of outsiders. Further, we explored which groups were evaluated as acceptable third parties. In a social survey conducted in the Kanto district of Japan, 621 responses (24.8% response rate) were obtained using a two stage systematic stratified random sampling method and mail‐out procedure. Results showed that declaration of self‐sanctions was seen as most important in instilling trust, but with involvement of an outsider also seen as important. An analysis of possible trusted third parties showed that academics and citizens interested in the issue were considered as most appropriate ‘o...

This study examined why people accepted a demanding rule in a recycling system that was newly introduced in Nagoya City. We focused on two social psychological topics: social dilemmas and fairness. While the new system succeeded in reducing waste, it imposed a burden on citizens without providing incentives and sanctions. In a research survey, 1442 responses from a sample of 3000 (48% response rate) were obtained using a stratified sampling method. The results showed that the new recycling system was approved despite the demands placed on citizens, with a preference for more strict rules such as penalties and surveillance for noncompliance. The main determinants of approval of the new recycling system were social benefit and procedural fairness, whereas the main determinant of preference for strict rules was outcome fairness. We argue that (a) social benefit should be emphasized to facilitate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation and (b) the government should ensure sufficient discussion with citizens and acknowledgment of their opinions.

本研究は, 新しい分別収集制度に対する社会的受容を, 類似した自発的システムの有った地域と無かった地域とを比較することで, 制度評価の規定因としての自発的システムの効果を検討した。まず制度評価を, 効果の評価である社会的便益と個人的コストと, 公正さの評価である手続きの公正さと結果の公正さに分類した。名古屋市の自発的システム有地域と無地域とで住民の制度に対する評価を比較するため, 社会調査を行った。結果は以下の通りである。1) 不公平感以外はシステム有地域で高く評価され, 新制度を肯定的に評価していた。2) 自発的システム有地域はよりリサイクル行動に従事し, 周囲の期待をより強く感じ, 説明会により参加していた。3) コミットメントと周囲からの期待, 説明会参加は効果と公正さの評価に肯定的な効果をもたらした。最後に新制度の導入に既存システムを生かすことで効果的な定着が図れる可能性を示唆した。

This paper examines how citizens prefer to achieve consensus in the context of an environmental risk policy. A questionnaire-based study was conducted on the dispute over the Chitose drainage canal plan. Respondents consisted of three hundred and twenty-four adult residents randomly sampled in Sapporo City which is close to the preset area of the plan. The results of the research suggested that (1) an institution that can consistently monitor the actions of the government will improve the trust in environmental assessments and (2) citizens prefer an adversarial procedure over one that is inquisitional when making the final decision and they highly rate the acceptance of suggestions by stakeholders throughout the decision process. The implications of the results for the practice of risk management as well as theoretical study are discussed.

This research demonstrated the negative influence of monitoring and punishing during a social dilemma game, taking the illegal dumping of industrial waste as an example. The first study manipulated three conditions: a producing-industries monitoring condition (PIM), an administrative monitoring condition (ADM), and a control condition (no monitoring). The results showed that non-cooperative behavior was more frequent in the PIM condition than in the control condition. The second study had three conditions: a punishing condition (PC), a monitoring condition (MC), and a control condition (no monitoring, no punishing). The results indicated that non-cooperative behavior was observed the most in the PC, and the least in the control condition. Furthermore, information regarding other players' costs and benefits was shared the most in the control conditions in both studies. The results suggest that sanctions prevent people from sharing information, which decreases expectations of mutual cooperation.

This study examined how environmental change and others' behavior affected cooperative behavior and solution preference of the person in social dilemma situation. Participants in two experiments played an “environment game, ” in which gradual pollution in environment and reduction in profit rate were simulated. Information on behavior of other players was manipulated; in “free rider” condition, one person was an extreme free rider, and the others were cooperative; in “loafing” condition, everyone loafed. In both experiments, “Bad Apple Effect” was not observed clearly, and cooperative behavior increased as environmental pollution worsened. In Experiment 2, there was no main effect of others' behavior on solution preference. However, significant correlations were found among solution preference, motivation to control others' behavior, and perceived seriousness of the situation, only when an extreme free rider was among them.

The Environmental Commons Game simulates “The Tragedy of Commons” (Hardin 1968), in which gradual pollution of environment caused by egotistic behaviors reduces player profit. This game has been developed on the basis of Baba (1986). Players are required to maximize their assets as a manager of a factory in the game. They have three choices in how to use their assets: investment, purification, and saving. The more assets they spend on investment, the more they get in the next phase, and the more polluted the environment becomes. On the other hand, the more assets they spend on purification, the more purified the environment becomes in the next phase, and the more their assets are reduced. As the environment gets polluted, the profit rate to investment becomes worse. Accordingly, players have to purify the environment to keep the high profit rate. However, the profit rate affects all players, which means that if a player expects other players to cooperate, he/she can benefit. Thus, the structure of the game complies with the traditional definition of the commons dilemma (Fig. 1). This game enables us to analyze the processes of building a consensus for the benefit of each player, while at the same time maintaining the environment. The Environmental Commons Game should help players find a solution for daily environmental problems such as the illegal disposal of garbage. After experiencing the Environmental Commons Game, players should realize both the importance and difficulty of mutual cooperation, and thus should consider how to achieve mutual cooperation.

This study researched the effects of cognitive variables on recycling behavior, as well as effects of various media of influence on the cognition and behavior. According to Hirose (1994), the decision making process for recycling consists of two steps. The first leads to goal intention of an ecological lifestyle. The second is related to behavior intention of recycling in line with the goal intention. Mass media, such as newspaper and TV, are thought to influence beliefs about environmental problems, including three determinants of goal intention: perception of seriousness, responsibility, and effectiveness. Personal media, such as personal contacts with pro-environmental activists, are thought to influence evaluation of behavior, including three determinants of behavior intention: evaluation of feasibility, cost and benefits, and social norms. Local media, such as municipal announcement and circular, are hypothesized to have a mixed effect of the two. Path analysis indicated that goal intention affected recycling behavior through behavior intention. Effects of the three media of influence on the cognitive variables were also consistent with the hypothesis.