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Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine brought back the debate about the European Union's strategic autonomy ambitions in security and defence. The notion had slipped off the EU's radar following the post-2016 thematic shift in strategic autonomy discussions to global economic interdependencies. Our article contributes to an appraisal of the strategic autonomy debate in security and defence since Russia's full invasion of Ukraine, while also tracing the emergence and revival of the concept over the past 25 years. By unpacking the EU's quest for strategic autonomy as a process of maturation since the late 1990s, we examine the extent to which the EU has grown into an autonomous security and defence actor. We further discuss the implications of maturation for EU security and defence policy. Drawing on 20 semi-structured interviews with policymakers and foreign policy experts in seven member states, our study brings the underexplored aspect of national acceptability of EU external action to the fore. We show that significant progress has been made regarding both ideational and material aspects of EU security and defence policy. Yet, prevailing differences in underlying national beliefs, perceptions and goals about security and defence continue to hamper the Union's further maturation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on Kingdon's Multiple Stream Approach, the article analyses the political dynamics that led to the introduction of the Strategic Compass, which gained prominence in the context of the Russian war in Ukraine. Due to its comprehensiveness and adoption at the highest political level – the European Council – the study considers the Compass a manifestation of policy change. Assuming that change in EU security policy originates from various sources, the article identifies Germany, France, the High Representative, and the European Commission as potential policy entrepreneurs. By examining their entrepreneurial strategies, it traces their footprint on policy change. The analysis reveals a particularly strong influence of French diplomacy on the process of shaping the Compass and points to the key role of the High Representative, despite the institutional constraints of the office. The article also highlights the usefulness of MSA for studying foreign policy change and, in particular, the dynamics between entrepreneurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project reflects on the ambivalence of the EU member states in their relationships with the new institutional arm of European diplomacy - the European External Action Service, headed by the High Representative. While trapped in rhetorical support for stronger and better-coordinated EU foreign policy, the member states show little willingness to equip the newcomer with political mandate and room for action, and provide a case in point for the post- Maastricht integration paradox. The main aim of this paper is to shed light on the reasons for this paradoxical behaviour. Taking into consideration the timeline 2009-2014, the article looks at patterns and dynamics of the mutual cooperation between the EEAS selected member states (Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom).

This article assesses the achievements of the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU regarding foreign and security policy in the second half of 2022, while taking into account the external context provided by the Russian war in Ukraine, national conditions in which the presidency was conducted, and issue-specific characteristics related to EU foreign and security policy. It discusses where the Czech presidency has managed to contribute to progress, such as the implementation of the Strategic Compass and the reinvigoration of the enlargement process, as well as pointing out shortcomings where it failed to deliver results. Overall, the article argues that by skilfully setting and scheduling the agenda and staying on top of the key policy dossiers, Prague successfully leveraged the window of opportunity triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine to push tangible progress within security and defence issues forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought about diplomatic condemnation across Europe and military support for Kyiv amid an uptick in European collective identity. Yet national responses differed significantly in terms of their contribution, their consistency, the degree of underlying contestation, their willingness to lead, and their choice of institutional frameworks. Explaining this variation requires an understanding of the interaction between systemic forces and a host of unit-level attributes, including military capabilities and geopolitical position, ideas and identities, and domestic politics. This introductory article examines each of these factors with a view to explaining the underlying variation in European responses, engaging with theoretical insights from Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis. Drawing on examples from the Special Section, we show how the divergent responses of several European countries – France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden – can be explained by reference to these three categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) have significant incentives for close collaboration in foreign, security and defence policies, given their shared strategic interests, the clear potential for efficiency savings in working together, and the intensity of prior working relations. That the recently negotiated EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement contains no provisions in this area is thus puzzling for followers of European security, who predicted prompt agreement, and for theories of international cooperation, which emphasise the importance of shared threats, absolute gains and prior interaction. We argue the failure to reach such an agreement stemmed from the politics of the withdrawal process itself, which resulted in acute problems of institutional selectivity, negotiating dynamics that polarised the relationship, institutional change that made an agreement less likely, and distributional scrabbling to supplant the UK. Our findings show that the dynamics of moving away from existing forms of cooperation are highly distinct from those motivating cooperation in normal times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union has witnessed a transformation of national political elites in the last decade. In addition to local factors, this is caused by a range of broader societal and political discontinuities. By applying Higley's model of political elite transformation to the Eurozone- and migration crises, we reveal the nature of this transformation: political elites today are more differentiated and less united than a decade ago. The analysis shows that the discontinuities brought forth newly founded political parties and strengthened those with previously little voice in decision-making. These new elites reflect the Euroscepticism of an increasing proportion of their constituency. Thus, we argue that the European political landscape has moved beyond the constraining dissensus to a post-constraining dissensus, where national elites themselves challenge European integration. As elite transformation continues, the process of European integration will have to grapple with the realities of increased elite diversity for the foreseeable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]