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We present a logic of evidence that reduces agents' epistemic idealisations by combining classical propositional logic with substructural modal logic for formulas in the scope of epistemic modalities. To this aim, we provide a neighborhood semantics of evidence, which provides a modal extension of Fine's semantics for relevant propositional logic. Possible worlds semantics for classical propositional logic is then obtained by defining the set of possible worlds as a special subset of information states in Fine's semantics. Finally, we prove that evidence is a hyperintensional and non-prime notion in our logic, and provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of our evidence logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A representation theorem is proved for De Morgan monoids that are (i) semilinear, i.e., subdirect products of totally ordered algebras, and (ii) negatively generated, i.e., generated by lower bounds of the neutral element. Using this theorem, we prove that the De Morgan monoids satisfying (i) and (ii) form a variety—in fact, a locally finite variety. We then prove that epimorphisms are surjective in every variety of negatively generated semilinear De Morgan monoids. In the process, epimorphism-surjectivity is established for several other classes as well, including the variety of all semilinear idempotent commutative residuated lattices and all varieties of negatively generated semilinear Dunn monoids. The results settle natural questions about Beth-style definability for a range of substructural logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a sequent system which is Gentzen algebraisable with orthomodular lattices as equivalent algebraic semantics, and therefore can be viewed as a calculus for orthomodular quantum logic. Its sequents are pairs of non-associative structures, formed via a structural connective whose algebraic interpretation is the Sasaki product on the left-hand side and its De Morgan dual on the right-hand side. It is a substructural calculus, because some of the standard structural sequent rules are restricted—by lifting all such restrictions, one recovers a calculus for classical logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses two revisionary views about substructurality. The first attempts to reduce the structural features of a logic to properties of its logical vocabulary. It will be found to be untenable. The second aims to separate the structural features of a logic from the properties of logical consequence and to reinterpreted them as sui generis proof resources. I will argue that it is a viable path for a renewed understanding of substructurality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) is a logic of change of knowledge with modalities representing quantification over announcements. We present two rather different versions of APAL wherein this quantification is restricted to formulas only containing a subset of all propositional variables: SAPAL and SCAPAL. Such restrictions are relevant in principle for the specification of multi-agent system dynamics. We also present another version of APAL, quantifying over all announcements implied by or implying a given formula: IPAL. We then determine the relative expressivity of all these logics and APAL. We also present complete axiomatizations of SAPAL and SCAPAL and show undecidability of satisfiability for all logics involved, by arguments nearly identical to those for APAL. We show that the IPAL quantifier, motivated by the satisfaction clause for substructural implication, yields a new substructural dynamic consequence relation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some think that logic concerns the "laws of truth"; others that logic concerns the "laws of thought." This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative bilateralism to truth-maker theory, such as non-transitive solutions to paradox, and vice versa, such as notions of factual equivalence and containment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc (BPS) show that there are logics that have exactly the validities of classical logic up to arbitrarily high levels of inference. They suggest that a logic therefore must be identified by its valid inferences at every inferential level. However, Scambler shows that there are logics with all the validities of classical logic at every inferential level, but with no antivalidities at any inferential level. Scambler concludes that in order to identify a logic, we at least need to look at the validities and the antivalidities of every inferential level. In this paper, I argue that this is still not enough to identify a logic. I apply BPS's techniques in a super/sub-valuationist setting to construct a logic that has exactly the validities and antivalidities of classical logic at every inferential level. I argue that the resulting logic is nevertheless distinct from classical logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Williamson argues for the contention that substructural logics are 'ill-suited to acting as background logics for science'. That contention, if true, would be very important, but it is refutable, given what is already known about certain substructural logics. Classical Core Logic is a substructural logic, for it eschews the structural rules of Thinning and Cut and has Reflexivity as its only structural rule. Yet it suffices for classical mathematics, and it furnishes all the proofs and disproofs one needs for the hypothetico-deductive method in science. We explain exactly what Classical Core Logic is, why it is a substructural logic par excellence , and what the basic requirements would be for a logic to be 'suited to acting as [a] background logic for science'. We also explain how Classical Core Logic meets all these requirements. We end by examining Williamson's argument in order to expose where its error lies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents a truth-maker semantics for Strict/Tolerant Logic (ST), which is the currently most popular logic among advocates of the non-transitive approach to paradoxes. Besides being interesting in itself, the truth-maker presentation of ST offers a new perspective on the recently discovered hierarchy of meta-inferences that, according to some, generalizes the idea behind ST. While fascinating from a mathematical perspective, there is no agreement on the philosophical significance of this hierarchy. I aim to show that there is no clear philosophical significance of meta-inferences above the first level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All known structural extensions of the substructural logic $\textbf{FL}_{\textbf{e}}$ , the Full Lambek calculus with exchange/commutativity (corresponding to subvarieties of commutative residuated lattices axiomatized by $\{\vee , \cdot , 1\}$ -equations), have decidable theoremhood; in particular all the ones defined by knotted axioms enjoy strong decidability properties (such as the finite embeddability property). We provide infinitely many such extensions that have undecidable theoremhood, by encoding machines with undecidable halting problem. An even bigger class of extensions is shown to have undecidable deducibility problem (the corresponding varieties of residuated lattices have undecidable word problem); actually with very few exceptions, such as the knotted axioms and the other prespinal axioms, we prove that undecidability is ubiquitous. Known undecidability results for non-commutative extensions use an encoding that fails in the presence of commutativity, so and-branching counter machines are employed. Even these machines provide encodings that fail to capture proper extensions of commutativity, therefore we introduce a new variant that works on an exponential scale. The correctness of the encoding is established by employing the theory of residuated frames. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present two presumed alternative definitions of metavalidity for metainferences: Local and Global. I defend the latter, first, by arguing that it is not too weak with respect to metainference-cases, and that local metavalidity is in fact too strong with respect to types. Second, I show that although regarding metainference-schemas Local metavalidity is always stable, Global metavalidity is also stable when the language satisfies reasonable expressibility criteria (and that in fact, both concepts collapse in those cases).

This paper is a step toward showing what is achievable using non-classical metatheory—particularly, a substructural paraconsistent framework. What standard results, or analogues thereof, from the classical metatheory of first order logic(s) can be obtained? We reconstruct some of the originals proofs for Completeness, Löwenheim-Skolem and Compactness theorems in the context of a substructural logic with the naive comprehension schema. The main result is that paraconsistent metatheory can 're-capture' versions of standard theorems, given suitable restrictions and background assumptions; but the shift to non-classical logic may recast the meanings of these apparently 'absolute' theorems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser's essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson's Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hájek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk's variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as nontotal nonfunctional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson's R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mares-Goldblatt semantics for quantified relevant logics have been developed for first-order extensions of R, and a range of other relevant logics and modal extensions thereof. All such work has taken place in the the ternary relation semantic framework, most famously developed by Sylvan (née Routley) and Meyer. In this paper, the Mares-Goldblatt technique for the interpretation of quantifiers is adapted to the more general neighbourhood semantic framework, developed by Sylvan, Meyer, and, more recently, Goble. This more algebraic semantics allows one to characterise a still wider range of logics, and provides the grist for some new results. To showcase this, we show, using some non-augmented models, that some quantified relevant logics are not conservatively extended by connectives the addition of which do conservatively extend the associated propositional logics, namely fusion and the dual implication. We close by proposing some further uses to which the neighbourhood Mares-Goldblatt semantics may be put. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bilinear Logic of Lambek amounts to Noncommutative MALL of Abrusci. Lambek proves the cut–elimination theorem for a one-sided (in fact, left-sided) sequent system for this logic. Here we prove an analogous result for the nonassociative version of this logic. Like Lambek, we consider a left-sided system, but the result also holds for its right-sided version, by a natural symmetry. The treatment of nonassociative sequent systems involves some subtleties, not appearing in associative logics. We also prove the PTime complexity of the multiplicative fragment of NBL.

Standard completeness, completeness on the real unit interval [0, 1], is one of important research areas in mathematical fuzzy logic. Recently, standard completeness for semilinear logics with knotted axioms has been investigated prooftheoretically by introducing and eliminating density rule. This paper introduces model-theoretic completeness for such logics. To this end, it is first shown that knotted axioms can be divided into left and right ones and then proved that mianorm-based logic systems with left and right knotted axioms are standard complete. This completeness is provided by embedding linearly ordered algebras into densely ordered ones and these algebras again into [0, 1]. More exactly, mianorm-based systems with left and right knotted axioms and their algebraic structures are first discussed. After some examples of mianorms satisfying left and right knotted properties are introduced, standard completeness for those logics is established model-theoretically using the above construction. Finally, this investigation is extended to their corresponding involutive fixpointed systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proof theory provides a foundation for studying and reasoning about programming languages, most directly based on the well-known Curry-Howard isomorphism between intuitionistic logic and the typed lambda-calculus. More recently, a correspondence between intuitionistic linear logic and the session-typed pi-calculus has been discovered. In this paper, we establish an extension of the latter correspondence for a fragment of substructural logic with least and greatest fixed points. We describe the computational interpretation of the resulting infinitary proof system as session-typed processes, and provide an effectively decidable local criterion to recognize mutually recursive processes corresponding to valid circular proofs as introduced by Fortier and Santocanale. We show that our algorithm imposes a stricter requirement than Fortier and Santocanale's guard condition, but is local and compositional and therefore more suitable as the basis for a programming language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Priest argued in Fusion and Confusion (Priest in Topoi 34(1):55–61, 2015a) for a new concept of logical consequence over the relevant logic B, one where premises my be "confused" together. This paper develops Priest's idea. Whereas Priest uses a substructural proof calculus, this paper provides a Hilbert proof calculus for it. Using this it is shown that Priest's consequence relation is weaker than the standard Hilbert consequence relation for B, but strictly stronger than Anderson and Belnap's original relevant notion of consequence. Unlike the latter, however, Priest's consequence relation does not satisfy a variant of the variable sharing property. This paper shows that how it can be modified so as to do so. Priest's consequence relation turns out to be surprisingly weak in some respects. The prospects of strengthening it is raised and discussed in a broader philosophical context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lambek calculus with the unit can be defined as the atomic theory (algebraic logic) of the class of residuated monoids. This calculus, being a theory of a broader class of algebras than Heyting ones, is weaker than intuitionistic logic. Namely, it lacks structural rules: permutation, contraction, and weakening. We consider two extensions of the Lambek calculus with modalities—the exponential, under which all structural rules are permitted, and the relevant modality, under which only permutation and contraction rules are allowed. The Lambek calculus with a relevant modality is used in mathematical linguistics. Both calculi are algorithmically undecidable. We consider their fragments in which the modality is allowed to be applied to just formulas of Horn depth not greater than 1. We prove that these fragments are decidable and belong to the NP class. To show this, in the case of a relevant modality, we introduce a new notion of ℛ-total derivability in context-free grammars, i.e., existence of a derivation in which each rule is used at least a given number of times. It is stated that the ℛ-totality problem is NP-hard for context-free grammars. Also we pinpoint algorithmic complexity of ℛ-total derivability for more general classes of generative grammars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the literature on self-referential paradoxes one of the hardest and most challenging problems is that of revenge. This problem can take many shapes, but, typically, it besets non-classical accounts of some semantic notion, such as truth, that depend on a set of classically defined meta-theoretic concepts, like validity, consistency, and so on. A particularly troubling form of revenge that has received a lot of attention lately involves the concept of validity. The difficulty lies in that the non-classical logician cannot accept her own definition of validity because it is given in a classical meta-theory. It is often suggested that this mismatch between the consequence relation of the account being espoused and the consequence relation of the meta-theory is a serious embarrassment. The main goal of the paper is to explore whether certain substructural accounts of the paradoxes can avoid this sort of embarrassment. Typically, these accounts are expressively incomplete, since they cannot assert in the object language that certain invalid arguments are in fact invalid. To overcome this difficulty I develop a novel type of hybrid proof-procedure, one that takes invalidities to be just as fundamental as validities. I prove that this proof-procedure enjoys a number of interesting properties and I analyze the prospects of applying it to languages capable of expressing self-referential statements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given a consequence relation in many-valued logic, what connectives can be defined? For instance, does there always exist a conditional operator internalizing the consequence relation, and which form should it take? In this paper, we pose this question in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting for the class of so-called intersective mixed consequence relations, which extends the class of Tarskian relations. Using computer-aided methods, we answer extensively for 3-valued and 4-valued logics, focusing not only on conditional operators, but also on what we call Gentzen-regular connectives (including negation, conjunction, and disjunction). For arbitrary N-valued logics, we state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such connectives in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting. The results show that mixed consequence relations admit all classical connectives, and among them pure consequence relations are those that admit no other Gentzen-regular connectives. Conditionals can also be found for a broader class of intersective mixed consequence relations, but with the exclusion of order-theoretic consequence relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bilinear Logic of Lambek amounts to Noncommutative MALL of Abrusci. Lambek proves the cut-elimination theorem for a one-sided (in fact, left-sided) sequent system for this logic. Here we prove an analogous result for the nonassociative version of this logic. Like Lambek, we consider a left-sided system, but the result also holds for its right-sided version, by a natural symmetry. The treatment of nonassociative sequent systems involves some subtleties, not appearing in associative logics. We also prove the PTime complexity of the multiplicative fragment of NBL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A commutative residuated lattice A is said to be subidempotent if the lower bounds of its neutral element e are idempotent (in which case they naturally constitute a Brouwerian algebra A - ). It is proved here that epimorphisms are surjective in a variety K of such algebras A (with or without involution), provided that each finitely subdirectly irreducible algebra B ∈ K has two properties: (1) B is generated by lower bounds of e, and (2) the poset of prime filters of B - has finite depth. Neither (1) nor (2) may be dropped. The proof adapts to the presence of bounds. The result generalizes some recent findings of G. Bezhanishvili and the first two authors concerning epimorphisms in varieties of Brouwerian algebras, Heyting algebras and Sugihara monoids, but its scope also encompasses a range of interesting varieties of De Morgan monoids. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generalized bunched implication algebras (GBI-algebras) are defined as residuated lattices with a Heyting implication, and are positioned between Boolean algebras with operators and lattices with operators. We characterize congruences on GBI-algebras by filters that are closed under Gumm–Ursini terms, and for involutive GBI-algebras these terms simplify to a dual version of the congruence term for relation algebras together with two more terms. We prove that representable weakening relation algebras form a variety of cyclic involutive GBI-algebras, denoted by RWkRA, containing the variety of representable relation algebras. We describe a double-division conucleus construction on residuated lattices and on (cyclic involutive) GBI-algebras and show that it generalizes Comer's double coset construction for relation algebras. Also, we explore how the double-division conucleus construction interacts with other class operators and in particular with variety generation. We focus on the fact that it preserves a special discriminator term, thus yielding interesting discriminator varieties of GBI-algebras, including RWkRA. To illustrate the generality of the variety of weakening relation algebras, we prove that all distributive lattice-ordered pregroups and hence all lattice-ordered groups embed, as residuated lattices, into representable weakening relation algebras on chains. Moreover, every representable weakening relation algebra is embedded in the algebra of all residuated maps on a doubly-algebraic distributive lattice. We give a number of other instructive examples that show how the double-division conucleus illuminates the structure of distributive involutive residuated lattices and GBI-algebras. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seventeenth century can be viewed as an era of (closely related) innovation in the formal and natural sciences and of paradigmatic diversity in philosophy (due to the coexistence of at least the humanist, the late scholastic, and the early modern tradition). Within this environment, the present study focuses on scholastic logic and, in particular, syllogistic. In seventeenth-century scholastic logic two different approaches to logic can be identified, one represented by the Dominicans Báñez, Poinsot, and Comas del Brugar, the other represented by the Jesuits Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, and Compton. These two groups of authors can be contrasted in three prominent features. First, in the role of the theory of validity, which is either a common basis for all particular theories (in this case, sentential logic and syllogistic), or a set of observations regarding a particular theory (in this case, syllogistic). Second, in the view of syllogistic, which is either an implication of a general theory of validity and a semantics of terms, or an algebra of structured objects. Third, in the role of the scholastic analysis of language in terms of suppositio, which either is a semantic underpinning of syllogistic, or it is replaced by a semantics of propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates standard completeness for substructural fuzzy logics based on mianorms with n-contraction and n-mingle axioms. For this, first, right and left n-contractive and n-mingle logic systems based on mianorms, their corresponding algebraic structures, and their algebraic completeness results are discussed. Next, completeness with respect to algebras whose lattice reduct is [0, 1], known as standard completeness, is established for these systems via Yang's construction in the style of Jenei–Montagna. Finally, further standard completeness results are introduced for their fixpointed involutive extensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Standard reasoning about Kripke semantics for modal logic is almost always based on a background framework of classical logic. Can proofs for familiar definability theorems be carried out using a nonclassical substructural logic as the metatheory? This article presents a semantics for positive substructural modal logic and studies the connection between frame conditions and formulas, via definability theorems. The novelty is that all the proofs are carried out with a noncontractive logic in the background. This sheds light on which modal principles are invariant under changes of metalogic, and provides (further) evidence for the general viability of nonclassical mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]