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Helmut Staubmann's Sociology in a New Key develops a compelling approach to the sociologies of art and the emotions, based primarily on Talcott Parsons' Action Theory and Georg Simmel's formal sociology. This article appraises the key theoretical strategies of Staubmann's contribution, and the insights they afford, with particular reference to recent work in the 'New Sociology of Art' and the 'Strong Programme' of Jeffery Alexander and the Yale school. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pronouns, particularly gendered pronouns, convey how apocalyptic futures are understood for differently positioned subjects. The "we" is not always about embracing a commons but can also be about extending exclusions. Drawing from social linguistics and the concept of shifters, science and technology studies and the ideas of symmetry, asymmetry, as well as the author's ethnographic research at two orangutan rehabilitation centers on Borneo in present day Malaysia, this paper highlights the power of pronouns in imagining whose lives are at risk or endangered in a pending apocalypse, including the present Sixth Age of Extinction and popular fears about the end of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been much debated whether epistemic relativism in academia, for instance in the form of social constructivism, the strong programme, deconstructionism, and postmodernism, has paved the way for the recent upsurge in science denial, in particular climate science denial. In order to provide an empirical basis for this discussion, an extensive search of the social science literature was performed. It showed that in the 1990s, climate science was a popular target among academic epistemic relativists. In particular, many STS scholars used it as an allegedly clear example of claims by natural scientists that should be treated as mere social constructions, rather than as reports on the actual state of the natural world. A few connections between social constructivists and corporate science denialism were also uncovered, but the extent of such connections could not be determined. With few exceptions, the stream of criticism of climate science from academic relativists has dwindled since the 1990s. One reason for this seems to be that the contrarian position lost its attraction when it became associated with corporate and right-wing propagandists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature on the affordances of Internet platforms rarely examines the complex and recursive relationships between the actions of volunteer moderators and the behaviour of end users. Building on existing studies of Internet communities, affordances and 'public goods', this article uses an ethnographic approach to analyse two subreddits, r/paleo and r/nootropics, on the social news site reddit. It elaborates on work by Massanari to illustrate how the moderators of forums with an epistemic focus utilise the affordances at their disposal with the aim of mediating trust and establishing a paradigm for constructive discourse. End users respond to these attempts in unpredictable and unforeseen ways, indicating the interpretive flexibility of affordances. The concept of 'platform dialectics' is invoked as an overarching description of this phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The 'strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge has both exerted enormous influence on science studies, and been widely criticised for its apparent commitment to epistemological relativism. In this article we argue that the recent work of the pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom provides a potential resolution to these debates. Brandom's work, we argue, meets the key commitments of the strong programme, including particularly commitments to symmetry and reflexivity, while also demonstrating how these commitments are compatible with a robust -- but non-dogmatic, pragmatist -- concept of objective knowledge. In so doing, it provides a theoretically developed account of why the traditions of empirical science studies that emerged from the strong programme need not be seen as undermining scientific objectivity, while it also supports a reflexive, critical sociological analysis of scientific practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neste artigo crítico e construtivo, defendemos que a Sociologia da Ciência, como está estabelecida, é distorcida por uma suposta filosofia idealista que estimula uma atitude acrítica em relação ao que se supõe serem fatos. Propomos uma sociologia crítica da ciência que faz a distinção entre ciência, ciência aplicada e tecnologia; enfoca a falibilidade da ciência e da sociologia da ciência que desconstrói toda pretensão de autoridade. Construtivamente, esboçamos os elementos de uma sociologia da ciência que envolve as formas elementares da vida científica, bem como a ciência "normal" contemporânea, burocratizada e militarizada.In this critical and constructive paper we argue that much received sociology of science is skewed by a presupposed idealist philosophy, one that encourages an uncritical attitude towards the supposed facts of the matter. We propose a critical sociology of science that (1) unfuses science, applied science, and technology - (2) emphasizes fallibility in science and the sociology of science - and that (3) deconstructs all claims to authority. Constructively, we sketch the elements of a sociology of science that comprehends the elementary forms of the scientific life as well as contemporary bureaucratized and militarized "normal" science.

In this paper David Bloor defends his sociological analysis of the disputes over the nature of aerodynamic lift described in his historical study The Enigma of the Aerofoil (2011). The criticisms expressed by Christopher Norris are rejected on the grounds that Norris systematically misrepresents the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge, e.g. by treating the principle of explanatory symmetry as if it meant 'parity of esteem'. Some of the various senses of the word 'realism' are identified and an account is given of the respects in which the sociological analysis of scientific knowledge can be realist rather than, as Norris insists, anti-realist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

he study deals with the so far unexplored external history of the origin of the sociology of scientii c knowledge. Its aim is to analyse the external factors which contributed to the emergence of this discipline, for the purpose of explaining why it emerged right in the 1970s at the Science Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh and in the very form of the so-called strong programme in the sociology of knowledge. h rough the Unit's founder C. H. Waddington the study focuses on two episodes: the emergence of the politically engaged movement of British let -wing scientists in the 1930s pushing forward the concept of a social function of science, and the politicisation of the so-called two cultures issue in the post-war Great Britain that lead to changes in British scientiic policy and educational system. In its concluding part the study then turns attention to the individual interests of those members of the Unit who were directly behind the development of the strong programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay presents a long, detailed, in many ways critical but also appreciative account, of David Bloor's recent book The Enigma of the Aerofoil. I take that work as the crowning statement of ideas and principles developed over the past four decades by Bloor and other exponents of the 'strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge. It therefore offers both a test-case of that approach and a welcome opportunity to review, clarify and extend some of the arguments brought against it by critical realists. This purpose is particularly well served by Bloor's having here assembled such a wealth of scientific, historical, political and socio-cultural data concerning one specific, very crucial period of research into theories of aerodynamic lift. His book thus provides an exceptionally useful point of engagement for anyone seeking to adjudicate these issues from a critically angled but engaged and constructive standpoint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his later works, Thomas Kuhn sharply attacks the so-called strong programme in the sociology of knowledge and disavows it thoroughly. This is curious due to the fact that the representatives of the strong programme, by contrast, openly endorse Kuhn and substantially draw on his work. They perceive in it a set of key ideas, which imply the possibility of a sociological analysis of scientific knowledge. The aim of the paper is to reassess Kuhn's criticism of the strong programme and to evaluate its righteousness. For this purpose, the paper first of all reconstructs Kuhn's account of the strong programme, which is compared afterwards with the works of its founders David Bloor and Barry Barnes, where it is theoretically developed. In the following section, Kuhn's arguments against the strong programme are confronted with a historical paper, where it is applied in practice. The third section compares Kuhn's own approach to science with the strong programme in those very aspects, which Kuhn criticises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociologias is the property of Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The 'strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is based upon finitism and extensionalism. This article examines a critique of these bases. It is argued that David Tyfield's (2008; 2009) realist critique and his alternative intensionalist account of meaning face problems at least as serious as those he identifies in the strong programme's finitism. This is not to say that the strong programme is problem-free: it fails to give sufficient acknowledgement to non-conventional constraints on meaning formation and change. It is also suggested that, as they are currently conceived, realism's intensionalism and the strong programme's extensionalism are irreconcilably incompatible at such a basic level that the 'debate' between them reduces to an exchange of 'assurances'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The structure of David’s Bloor argument for the Strong Programme (SP) in Science Studies is criticized from the philosophical perspective of anti-skeptical, scientific realism. The paper transforms the common criticism of SP—that the symmetry principle of SP implies an untenable form of cognitive relativism—into the␣clear philosophical issue of naturalism versus Platonism. It is also argued that the concrete patterns of SP’s interest-explanations and its sociological definition of knowledge involve philosophical skepticism. It is claimed, then, that the most problematic elements of SP reside primarily in philosophical skepticism. It is also claimed that this sort of criticism can be directed against other more radical, versions of constructivism in science and science education studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this article I respond to the defences of the Strong Programme put forward by David Bloor and Márta Fehér in this issue. I dispute the claim that it is attention to only limited parts of the Strong Programme framework that allows me to argue that this approach: (i) leads to weak idealism, (ii) undermines the idea that theories have varying levels of instrumental success, and (iii) challenges the theoretical claims of scientific actors. Rather, I argue that these problematic positions are entailed by the constructionist tenets at the core of the Strong Programme. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In this paper I intend to discuss some of the views put forward by Stephen Kemp in his recent critique of the Strong Program (Kemp, 2005). In particular I will try to defend David Bloor’s SSK against the charge of weak idealism brought up by Stephen Kemp in his paper. The widely held accusation, namely, according to which the social constructionist approach to scientific knowledge is strongly idealist, is already rejected by Kemp himself. He argues, however that Bloor’s attempts to divert the charge of idealism from the Strong Programme were not successful with respect to the kind of idealism that Kemp calls ‘weak idealism’, that is, treating scientific discourse as free-floating and unrelated to the world of things. I intend to argue that Kemp’s charges are unfounded when levelled at Bloor’s views on meaning and reference. Kemp deals with two issues of the Bloorian program: with the social constructionist approach to concepts as self-referential social institutions, and with the actor/analyst distinction introduced by the Strong Programmers. I will focus only on the first issue in my paper. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This article critically appraises David Bloor’s recent attempts to refute criticisms levelled at the Strong Programme’s social constructionist approach to scientific knowledge. Bloor has tried to argue, contrary to some critics, that the Strong Programme is not idealist in character, and it does not involve a challenge to the credibility of scientific knowledge. I argue that Bloor’s attempt to deflect the charge of idealism, which calls on the self-referential theory of social institutions, is partially successful. However, I suggest that although the Strong Programme should not be accused of ‘strong idealism’, it is still vulnerable to the criticism that it entails a form of ‘weak idealism’. The article moves on to argue that, contrary to Bloor, constructionist approaches do challenge the credibility of the scientific knowledge that they analyse. I conclude the article by arguing that sociological analyses of scientific knowledge can be conducted without the weak idealism and the credibility-challenging assumptions of the Strong Programme approach. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In this paper I argue that the Strong Programme’s aim to provide robust explanations of belief acquisition is limited by its commitment to the symmetry principle. For Bloor and Barnes, the symmetry principle is intended to drive home the fact that epistemic norms are socially constituted. My argument here is that even if our epistemic standards are fully naturalized—even relativized—they nevertheless can play a pivotal role in why individuals adopt the beliefs that they do. Indeed, sometimes the fact that a belief is locally endorsed as rational is the only reason why an individual holds it. In this way, norms of rationality have a powerful and unique role in belief formation. But if this is true then the symmetry principle’s emphasis on ‘sameness of type’ is misguided. It has the undesirable effect of not just naturalizing our cognitive commitments, but trivializing them. Indeed, if the notion of ‘similarity’ is to have any content, then we are not going to classify as ‘the same’ beliefs that are formed in accordance with deeply entrenched epistemic norms as ones formed without reflection on these norms, or ones formed in spite of these norms. My suggestion here is that we give up the symmetry principle in favor of a more sophisticated principle, one that allows for a taxonomy of causes rich enough to allow us to delineate the unique impact epistemic norms have on those individuals who subscribe to them. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

It is widely believed that the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects—one modest, and the other less so. The programme’s modest aspect—best represented by the “symmetry thesis”—does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological “externalism”. The immodest aspect, however—in the form of “finitism”—pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism about truth. Accepting these points will allow us to put an end to much unnecessary debate surrounding the strong programme, and allow a more fruitful discussion to begin. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This is a programmatic proposal about a better use of the notion of scientific rationality in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Strangely enough, some relativistic authors in the SSK literature allow room for scientific rationality in their analyses of scientific practice. I interpret their arguments as follows: since science is essentially a collective activity, any rationality developed and sustained in science should have some institutional basis analysable in sociological terms. I advocate that sociologists should explain such scientific rationality, especially the asymmetry between science and nonscience, in sociological terms. In some sense, my programme is ‘even stronger’ than Bloor's ‘strong programme’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]