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Transportation infrastructure is associated with economic development, but it can also be used for social control and to benefit the governing elite. We explore the connection between the construction of road networks, state-led repression, and land allocations in the longest dicta­torship in South America: Alfredo Stroessner military regime in Paraguay. Using novel panel data from the truth and reconciliation commission, we show that proximity to roads facilitated state-led repression and the illegal allocation of agricultural plots to dictatorship allies. These results suggest that infrastructure projects can also hinder economic development.

We use data from seven low and middle income countries with diverse drug procurement systems to assess the effect of centralized procurement on drug prices and provide a theoretical mechanism that explains this effect. Our empirical analysis is based on exhaustive data on drug sales quantities and expenditures over several years for forty important molecules. We find that centralized procurement of drugs by the public sector allows much lower prices but that the induced price reduction is smaller when the supply side is more concentrated.

National audience; The question of infrastructure needs is a crucial policy one in Latin America, given evidence of large access shortfalls across all major types of infrastructure, and the increase in demand linked to the rapid growth in households’ income over the past two decades. However, how much and how fast countries should invest in each of the main infrastructure areas are largely speculative, as to date, literature on investment needs has relied exclusively on aggregate data and cross-country regressions, ignoring both potential policy and supply-side differences across settings, and variations in demand along the income distribution. This paper addresses these shortcomings, providing building blocks to better assess infrastructure investment needs across the region. It does so documenting access to services and ownership of infrastructure-related durables in the water, energy, telecom, and transport areas, based on harmonized household survey data covering 1.6 million households in 14 Latin American countries from 1992 to –2012. It provides a systematic disaggregation of access and ownership rates at different levels of income and over time, and econometrically derives the country infrastructure premium, a measure of how much a household benefits from simply being located in a given country. Within countries, the results show extensive inequality of access across the income distribution, but this is also the case for households at similar levels of income across countries. Few country fundamentals appear to be significant in explaining this variability, pointing to differences in policy choices and local constraints as important determinants. The paper derives disaggregated income elasticity measures for the full set of infrastructure indicators and uses these to estimate the time that would be needed to close the remaining gap for households at different levels of the income distribution in each country under a “business as usual” hypothesis. Under that scenario, universal access appears to still be decades away for many countries in the region. The last part discusses the policy challenges, arguing that in a context in which public budgets face strong constraints and significant increases in private investment are unlikely to be forthcoming, a large part of the solution lies in refocused investment strategies, better demand management, and improved public spending efficiency.

This paper summarizes what is known about the impact of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the three sectors where they have been used intensively: infrastructure (energy, transport, water and sanitation, and telecommunications), education, and health. It lays out the main elements of economic theory relevant to analyzing the trade-off between PPPs and the public provision of complex projects. It places PPPs within a historical perspective. It reviews empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of PPPs and, whenever possible, the implications for social outcomes. Finally, it draws conclusions on cross-cutting issues that influence the efficiency of PPPs, from contract design and regulation to renegotiations and institutional issues. The paper straightens out and qualifies the record of existing evidence and signals some of the main areas and topics for future fruitful research.

We investigate the impact of revolving door on public procurement outcomes, combining 10 years of Brazilian health procurement data with a comprehensive employer-employee dataset tracking individuals’ job trajectories. We identify how movements between public administrations and private providers affect total contracting amounts and acquisition prices. Analyzing career changes in both directions, we uncover positive and negative effects, consistent respectively with reward for high-skill workers’ competence, and collusive behavior. Administration-to-supplier movements appear beneficial to public bodies, while supplier-to-administration ones are detrimental. This points to unexpected policy implications related to the tolerance of revolving door practices.

Does social promotion perpetuate shortfalls in student achievement, or can low-achieving students catch up with their peers when they are pushed ahead? Using data from Brazilian primary schools, this paper presents evidence of substantial catch up among socially promoted students. After documenting sorting across schools in response to the policy, in particular away from gatedpromotion private schools, we show that social promotion cycles has no significant effect on municipality enrolment figures or on the percentage of students.

The standard view suggests that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement reduces informality and boosts investment and growth. However, a general equilibrium approach shows that this conclusion may hold to a lesser extent in countries with a constrained supply of funds because of, for example, a more concentrated banking sector or lower financial openness. When the formal sector grows larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy, but the higher pressure on the credit market limits further capital accumulation. We show empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.

This paper studies the impact of the rapid expansion of the Brazilian road network, which occurred from the 1960s to the 2000s, on the growth and spatial allocation of population and economic activity across the country's municipalities. It addresses the problem of endogeneity in infrastructure location by using an original empirical strategy, based on the "historical natural experiment" constituted by the creation of the new federal capital city Brasília in 1960. The results reveal a dual pattern, with improved transport connections increasing concentration of economic activity and population around the main centers in the South of the country, while spurring the emergence of secondary economic centers in the less developed North, in line with predictions in terms of agglomeration economies. Over the period, roads are shown to account for half of pcGDP growth and to spur a signifficant decrease in spatial inequality.

In 2008, an opposition coalition defeated the Paraguayan Colorado Party, which had been in power for 61 years, including 35 years of the longest dictatorship in South America. Using data of all the public procurement transactions from 2004 through 2011 and the political connections of the 700 largest public providers, this paper documents how the volume of contracts received by connected firms evolved after this landmark political change. It shows that firms connected with the first ring of power were punished and that there were efficiency gains, mostly in the form of institutions shifting to bigger and more competitive contracts, but that these gains were constrained by the scarcity of entrepreneurs able to step in to replace firms connected to the previous regime. This demonstrates that the potential economic benefits of democratization are hampered by the perverse rent-seeking entrepreneurial incentives created by a long-term single-party authoritarian regime.

We analyze how uncertainty regarding future climate conditions affects the design of concession contracts, organizational forms and technological choices in a principal-agent context with dynamic moral hazard, limited liability and irreversibility constraints. The prospect of future, uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm’s effort creates an option value of delaying efforts which exacerbates agency costs. Contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility. Our analysis is relevant for infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of Public-Private Partnerships in this context.

A standard view holds that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement would reduce informality and boost investment and growth. We show, however, that this conclusion may not hold in countries with a concentrated bank- ing sector or with low financial openness. When the formal sector becomes larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy and the higher pres- sure in the credit market increases the interest rate. This reduces future capital accumulation. We show some empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.

Many developing countries are unable to provide their industrial sector with reliable electric power and many enterprises have to contend with insufficient and unreliable electricity supply. Because of these constraints, enterprises often opt for self-generation even though it is widely considered a second best solution. This paper develops a theoretical model of investment behavior in remedial infrastructure when physical constraints are present. It then tests econometrically implications from this model using a large sample of enterprises from 87 countries from the World Bank enterprise survey database. After showing that these constraints have non-linear effects according to the natural degree of reliance on electricity of an industrial sector and on firm size, the paper draws differentiated policy recommendations. Credit constraints appear to be the priority in sectors very reliant on electricity to spur entry and convergence to the technological frontier while, in other sectors, firms would benefit more widely from marginal improvements in electrical supply.