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Freedoms of Navigation in the Asia-Pacific Region. By Sam Bateman. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2020. Hardcover: 106pp. Over recent years, maritime disputes have been increasingly viewed as a microcosm of Great [...]

Since 2009, the South China Sea disputes have taken on increasing global significance. Situated within a rapidly transforming political landscape, these sovereignty and maritime disputes are totemic of contests over the regional security order and the institutions, rules and laws that support it. The United States has explicitly called upon 'like-minded' allies and partners to defend the so-called 'rules-based order' against the revisionism of the rising People's Republic of China, including in the maritime domain. In particular, the South China Sea has become a highly visible arena of 'normative contestation', one that raises questions about how norm-preservationist regional powers enact security practices to uphold their preferred vision of order. This study uses Australia as a regional power case study to assess the interests and approaches of a key US ally to normative contestation in the South China Sea. It addresses two questions: first, how does Australia perceive and articulate its interests in the South China Sea? Second, what security practices - diplomatic, legal and operational – can a regional power such as Australia bring to bear in its statecraft? It argues that as a regional power, Australia has adopted a normative approach to upholding maritime order. While Canberra has ratcheted up the rhetoric on the importance of maintaining the 'rules-based order' in response to China's actions in the South China Sea, its security practices have retained a routine, 'business-as-usual' quality. This approach is designed to support maritime rules while avoiding economic retaliation from Beijing, reflecting broader strategic dilemmas as a middle-sized state wedged between two great powers. Unpacking the nuances of Australia's South China Sea statecraft provides important insights for understanding for the preparedness and limitations of regional powers in defending their preferred conception of maritime order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]