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Over the last decade, the news media increasingly seem to have become a target for politically motivated criticism seeking to delegitimise the news media. The prevalence of delegitimising media criticism is, however, unclear. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which Swedish members of parliament (MPs) engage in delegitimising media criticism on Twitter, the party distribution of those engaging in such media criticism, and the targets and expressions of such media critique. Among other things, the findings show that when MPs tweet about the news media, they are more likely to be critical than supportive, and that a clear majority of tweets that are critical toward the news media contain delegitimising media criticism. Moreover, the results show that MPs from the political right – in particular the Moderate Party and the Sweden Democrats – are most active in tweeting delegitimising media criticism, and that the most common target is public service media.

One implication of the transition to high-choice media environments is that what information people are exposed to depend less on journalistic curation and more on social, algorithmic, and personal curation. This has sparked a renewed interest in the concept of political opinion leaders, who are often assumed to be more interested in and informed about politics and society. Theoretically, political opinion leaders could hence help disseminate information to less interested and informed. At the same time, there are theoretical reasons for why political opinion leaders may be more prone to politically motivated reasoning, which may lead them to believe in and disseminate misinformation. Thus far, there is only limited research on whether political opinion leaders are more informed than others that also takes into consideration that some facts are contested, whereas other facts are uncontested. Hence, this paper seeks to investigate the relationship between political opinion leadership and knowledge, distinguishing between (a) uncontested and (b) contested facts. Among other things, findings show that those who score high in political opinion leadership traits in general are not more knowledgeable about contested and uncontested facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It can be difficult for citizens to discern factually accurate information from mis- and disinformation. Particularly in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the omnipresence of counterfactual narratives, propaganda, and partisan content may increase the likelihood that citizens select and accept mis -or disinformation. To assess citizens' performance in discerning false statements from factually accurate information on the war, we utilized original survey data across 19 countries (N = 19,037) with soft quotas for age, education, and gender to approximate population characteristics. Our main findings indicate that people perform relatively well in discerning factually accurate information from false statements and that self-perceived media literacy and the need for cognition corresponds with better performance. Stronger pro-Russia views on the war correspond with a lower performance in misinformation detection, whereas anti-Russia attitudes are associated with better evaluations of the statements' truthfulness. We find little cross-country variation in these patterns. As a key implication, we show that discernment between factually accurate information and mis- or disinformation is driven by both accuracy and partisan motivation and that these effects are similar across most different national contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Data suggests that the majority of citizens in various countries came across 'fake news' during the COVID-19 pandemic. We test the relationship between perceived prevalence of misinformation and people's worries about COVID-19. In Study 1, analyses of a survey across 17 countries indicate a positive association: perceptions of high prevalence of misinformation are correlated with high worries about COVID-19. However, the relationship is weaker in countries with higher levels of case-fatality ratios, and independent from the actual amount of misinformation per country. Study 2 replicates the relationship using experimental data. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrates the underlying mechanism, that is, perceived prevalence of misinformation fosters the belief that COVID-19 is spiralling out of control, which in turn, increases worries. Our findings suggest that perceived prevalence of misinformation can have significant psychological effects, even though audience members reject the information as being false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the role of social media in the spread of conspiracy theories has received much attention, a key deficit in previous research is the lack of distinction between different types of platforms. This study places the role of social media affordances in facilitating the spread of conspiracy beliefs at the center of its enquiry. We examine the relationship between platform use and conspiracy theory beliefs related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the concept of technological affordances, we theorize that variation across key features make some platforms more fertile places for conspiracy beliefs than others. Using data from a crossnational dataset based on a two-wave online survey conducted in 17 countries before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that Twitter has a negative effect on conspiracy beliefs—as opposed to all other platforms under examination which are found to have a positive effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A fundamental precondition for the legitimacy of democracy is a high level of trust in the electoral process. It is therefore concerning that the number of appeals regarding electoral fraud has increased, that allegations of frauds circulate on social media, and that research indicates that a significant portion of the Swedish population does not fully trust that elections are conducted in a correct manner. At the same time, there is a lack of studies examining the nature of electoral distrust and the prevalence of conspiratorial beliefs regarding Swedish elections. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate (a) the extent of belief in irregularities related to vote counting and ballot placement, (b) whether the proportion of those believing in such irregularities changes during an election campaign, and (c) the factors driving belief in conspiratorial claims of electoral fraud. The results of a panel study conducted during the 2022 election campaign indicate that the majority does not believe in conspiratorial claims of electoral fraud. However, there is a minority—characterized by a high degree of conspiracy thinking—who believes irregularities are common during Swedish elections. Furthermore, the results suggest that other explanatory factors for belief in electoral fraud include the use of right-wing alternative media and sympathy towards the Sweden Democrats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]