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This paper utilises selective writings by John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as the conceptual basis for considering how an enhanced synergistic focus on habit and embodiment could support practice gains in schools. The paper focuses on Dewey's belief that established habits can help students to incorporate experiences into evaluations of educational progress and Merleau-Ponty's spotlight on the body-subject, and how it provides a holistic way of conceiving relations that avoid over privileging abstraction and cognition and under-representing the centrality of the body in human experience. We then evaluate the role of language and reflection in relation to habit, embodiment, and education before discussing some of the general educational practice considerations which might improve the quality of students learning experiences. In conclusion, we consider the possibilities for Dewey's pragmatism to function as a theoretical bridge to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and the nature of experience. We argue that while it is important to recognise points of difference, in relation to philosophical treatments of habit and embodiment, it is also important to consider the overlap and new connections between Merleau-Ponty and Dewey which are valuable to take forward in contemporary education.

In recent years there has been a notable increase in the use of phenomenology as a research method, particularly in educational research. With the rise of phenomenology as a research method, confusion has also arisen concerning what counts as phenomenology, and how best to practice phenomenological research in non-philosophical contexts. Consequently, this article will be concerned with three issues: firstly, to contextualise the debate, I provide a brief overview of three popular and influential approaches to phenomenology as a research method: (1) Giorgi's "descriptive phenomenological method;" (2) van Manen's "hermeneutic phenomenology;" and, (3) Smith's "interpretative phenomenological analysis;" secondly, for the sake of conceptual clarity, I then turn my attention to a critical discussion of these approaches and argue that these approaches tend to converge phenomenology into either a descriptive or interpretative focus that essentially transforms phenomenology into a kind of solipsist subjectivism; and, lastly, to progress the debate forward, I argue that it makes sense to look beyond the qualitative or educational research literature to successful applications of phenomenology in non-philosophical contexts because there are plenty of relevant resources that can offer significant theoretical and methodological support to researchers.

This essay uses a narrative -- in this case a fictional dialogue -- to explore how neoliberalism and managerialism is taken forward in unexpected ways in the contemporary university. In order to make sense of zombie academic leadership, I turn my attention to how it is cultivated in the academy by using the "case of J," which is taken from MacIntyre's work titled, "Social structure and their threats to moral agency." Indeed, the "case of J" is used as a valuable resource for understanding how certain social structures cultivate zombie academic leaders through the phenomenon of compartmentalisation. This is then followed by a critical discussion and analysis of the fictional dialogue on zombie academic leadership. I argue that the zombie metaphor is an apt articulation of zombie academic leaders because they lack the capacity to exercise their powers of rational agency beyond what a particular role requires. I finish by briefly considering whether reform is possible or not in the contemporary university.

This critical paper posits that an ongoing reconceptualising of educational aims and values is necessary and desirable, especially so given the multiple complexities of current times and the associated need to reappraise the overarching pedagogical principles that inform contemporary education. We propose that phenomenology can yield incisive insights that can inform and shape students' holistic learning experiences. We focus specifically on the contribution of Merleau-Ponty, as his work concentrates on an intersubjective interpretation of experience which constructively draws on a mix of self and shared, and cultural and environmental occurrences children share. We analyse the seldom explored content of Merleau-Ponty's Sorbonne Lectures on Child Psychology and Pedagogy and discuss these in relation to embodiment and intersubjectivity; matters which we see as pivotal to the realisation of a more rounded and nuanced education of the mind and body. We then conduct a review of methodological and pedagogical insights which highlight how embodied and intersubjective aspirations could be taken forward in contemporary school education. We argue that if effective, more eventful and at times optimistic pedagogical episodes could support whole school attempts to recover and construct new and enlivening educational opportunities.

In this essay, I briefly outline Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence that has implications for education, and life in general; and, lastly, I argue that from an educational point of view, Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence is best viewed as the great cultivating thought that has radical ramifications for any project of character education. Indeed, Nietzsche's concern with self-cultivation ("Bildung") to a large degree brings together the central tenets of his thinking to emphasise an ethics of character that is meant to serve as an alternative approach to cultivating character or the self in such a way that it reveals 'what one is' now ("being"), and who they could become ("becoming"). In order to bring this about, Nietzsche does not conceive the eternal recurrence as a theoretical doctrine, but as an exercise that we incorporate into our lives as a habitual practice, vis-à-vis, through repeated and prolonged meditation, reflection, thought and dialogue on the significance of the idea in such a way that it transforms the individual for the better. Subsequently, the idea of the eternal recurrence only becomes cultivating and "truly" educational if it transforms our lives in such a way that we come to revalue the self as a work of art to a point where we are "able" to educate ourselves "against" our age.

The use of narrative has been a time-honoured way of exploring complex ideas, and a valuable way to learn. An obvious example that epitomises this thesis, are the dialogues of Plato. Indeed, what gives significance to these dialogues is the way in which complex ideas are revealed through the struggles and conflicts of one or more characters. With this in mind, one of my aims is to present my own fictional dialogue that I have created between two academics who are in conflict over a student who is deemed to be 'at risk' by an educational institution as a means to explore notions of justice in education. Although there is much that can be learned about justice from formal arguments; however, I argue that narratives are useful devices to learn about complicated concepts, and at the same time, serve as a catalyst for debate about principles that are fundamental to education. Consequently, this article uses a narrative approach for the dual purposes of elucidating the concept of justice exhibited through the characters found in the narrative, which in turn offers the means in which to critically discuss and analyse the narrative in relation to justice in education.

This paper reviews the theoretical underpinnings of phenomenology-related writings which support claims that the self and the social (the 'I' and the 'We') can plausibly be integrated and nurtured together in education. We begin by analysing contemporary theorising which suggests that reviewing foundational phenomenologists, particularly Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, can lead to greater clarity in understanding and appreciating the intersubjective sense of the self and the social. This perspective is aided by reviewing the reciprocal connections which take place during human action, situational structuring, and reality construction. Building on this review we consider some of the ontological possibilities for a self and social phenomenology to become more central to educational aims. In doing so, we raise rather than unpack in exhaustive detail associated methodological matters in light of their educational implications. If successfully enacted, we perceive considerable benefits for students in being able to directly attend to the properties of their experiences, especially in contexts where new habits are formed and where opportunities arise for self and shared experiences to be reviewed and reflected on by all involved.

AbstractThe recent proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) raises questions as to the role of such tools both within an educational learning environment and their epistemic capacity. If, as Alfred North Whitehead remarked, western philosophy indeed ‘consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’, it would be of doubtless importance to evaluate the position of LLMs in his epistemological framework. We analyse Plato and existing scholarship regarding his epistemology, combining this with a brief outline of the architectural features of GPT-3 and similar LLMs, before finally addressing whether they meet Plato’s criteria, and where they stand in relation to education in general. We conclude that, in conjunction with the well-known factual unreliability of LLMs, they are likewise unsuited for the satisfaction of a Platonic epistemological standard. On account of this, we find LLMs to be sub-optimal within an educational learning environment, and this is why we suggest that their use be accordingly circumscribed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors consider in this critical paper that claims that human agents experience things-in-the-world as the same are deeply flawed as these accounts misconstrue and fail to appreciate the phenomenology of embodied subjectivity. To overcome these complex problems they outline how phenomenology can reach beyond positivist and standardised approaches to classroom learning and assessment and offer a broader and more encouraging perspective. They consider that the naturalistic account of subjectivity advanced by Merleau-Ponty provides a theoretically sound basis for understanding experiences better and for embodiment to become more central to educational aims. In developing their position they detail how recognising changes in Merleau-Ponty's thinking over time are crucial for appreciating the nature of embodied subjectivity. Thereafter, they highlight and exemplify how practical approaches based on a phenomenological reduction of seeking, sensing and seeing could enhance the centrality of embodied subjectivity in contemporary education.

The constant and perennial plea by academics in the field to reform or change physical education share some similarities with the myth of Sisyphus from Greek mythology. Just as Sisyphus was condemned to an eternity of endless frustration of rolling an enormous stone up a mountain as punishment for trying to be too clever, we argue that if the physical education profession continues down the path of more of the same unquestioned assumptions surrounding notions of change will be tantamount to being condemned like Sisyphus was to the torment of the stone. Part of the problem as we see it relates to insufficiently rigorous engagement with theory, and hence why we argue that physical education could benefit from a shift from a disproportionate focus on practice or practices to theory as a means to closing the gap between theory and practice. We do understand that our position may be uncontroversial to some; however, we equally understand that there will be many who will find our position controversial in the field. From our position, this has become an unavoidable problem due to the inherent way in which the relationship between theory and practice is understood differently by academics, teachers, and other actors in this context.

The use of phenomenology and phenomenography as a method in the educational research literature has risen in popularity, particularly by researchers who are interested in understanding and generating knowledge about first-person events, or the lived experiences of students in certain educational contexts. With the rise of phenomenology and phenomenography as a method, some conceptual mistakes and associated confusion have also arisen; however, accounts examining both are limited. As a result, this paper will be concerned with the discussion of two issues: (1) for the sake of conceptual clarity, I provide a brief outline of phenomenology and phenomenography; and, (2) I then turn my attention to a critical discussion of phenomenography. In the latter case, I argue that when phenomenography departs from phenomenology it actually weakens its legitimacy as an approach to research. In order to overcome this problem, I argue that it makes sense to consolidate phenomenography within the broader research agenda of phenomenology which extends on the work of Husserl. Of course, the caveat to this idea is contingent upon a significant shift within phenomenography so it closely aligns itself with phenomenological principles and methods. As a way forward, I offer "research direction" to those who may be interested in the study of human experience by opening-up interdisciplinary dialogue about phenomenology, and at the same time I explore core methods used in phenomenology that extend on the continental tradition of phenomenology.

Psychology has made, and continues to make, a significant contribution to the discipline area of education. Since one of the main aims of education concerns student learning -- which is an indisputably psychological phenomenon -- we argue that the emerging research agenda of embodied cognition has much to offer educational practitioners, researchers, and/or policy-makers. Although embodied cognition is still in its infancy, the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature of the literature provides some thought-provoking recommendations to enhance educational practice or practices, which in turn can bring about student learning more effectively. Consequently, this article will be concerned with the discussion of two issues: first, we provide a brief historical overview that foregrounds embodied cognition, and, second, we outline the educational implications of embodied cognition through the use of some examples significant to education. We conclude with an argument for the importance of making findings in an area we call 'embodied education' available to teachers.

In this essay I intentionally employ Nietzsche's genealogical method as a means to critique the complex concept of 'good' teaching, and at the same time reconstitute 'good' teaching in a form that is radically different from contemporary accounts. In order to do this, I start out by undertaking a genealogical analysis to both reveal the complicated historical development of 'good' teaching and also disentangle the intertwining threads that remain hidden from us so we are aware of the core threads that hold it together. Two major threads are identified in my analysis, which I refer to as: Genealogy I: Teaching as applied science or practice; and, Genealogy II: Teaching as a vocational calling or neutral profession. With this in mind, I take the two value systems (Genealogy I and II) presented in my critique of 'good' teaching, and rather than return to old, or create new values, I argue that the true task of any educational endeavour is to make human beings human. Therefore, in the spirit of Nietzsche, I revive and extend Nietzsche's account of Bildung as a dynamic way of living timeless educational aims, such as learning to see, think, speak, write and feel in becoming true human beings.

The use of narrative -- in this case a fictional dialogue -- has been a time-honoured way of exploring ideas and most importantly indispensable for learning, at least since the time of the Sophists. Indeed, the dialogues of Plato exemplify this thesis because the qualities and characteristics of philosophy and philosophising are revealed through their lives. Extending on this premise, we would argue that we learn to understand both the unity and complexity of philosophy -- particularly in education and educational research -- not by formal philosophical arguments, necessary as they are in some contexts, but by narratives that are relevant, narratives that make the actions of one or more characters intelligible and justifiable. As a result, this article uses a narrative approach for the dual purpose of exhibiting the relevance of philosophy intelligibly exhibited through the examples of the characters put forward (enquiring Ph.D. student and university professor), but at the same time characters we ourselves can learn from as they both dialectically engage with philosophically orientated problems.

This essay argues that much can be gained from a close examination of Nietzsche's work with respect to education. In order to contextualise my argument, I provide a brief critique of Nietzsche's thinking on aesthetics, educators and education. I then turn my attention to the work of "Thus Spoke Zarathustra", the figures Zarathustra and the "Übermensch", and other Nietzschean works with a view to outline what I mean by a Nietzschean education. My central thesis being that a Nietzschean education is primarily concerned with the cultivation of the self. This is certainly not an easy undertaking as it requires both an educator and education that can reveal to students "what one is" now (being), and who they could become (becoming). In order to bring this about, Nietzsche employs the use of an "aesthetic model" (ideal type) in the form of an exemplar for students to aspire to become. Here, the exemplar plays an important educative function in Nietzsche's thinking because the role of the ideal type is to unsettle the student so that they are inspired to attain their unattained self that they recognise in the other. Consequently, what makes my account of a Nietzschean education significant is due to its concern with fostering timeless educational aims, such as learning to see, think, speak, write, and feel, by unsettling students with an "ideal educator" and "true education" so that students can get a sense of who they are "now" and who they could "become".

This paper explores Australian secondary physical education (PE) teachers' understanding of PE in the context of new curriculum familiarisation. Data was initially collected through online surveys (phase 1), and based on this data, participants were sourced from, and volunteered to be interviewed as part of phase 2 (interviews). The analysis of the phase 2 data highlighted a diverse array of teachers' views relating to PE that ranged from PE being synonymous with sport and a strong desire to develop habits and patterns of behaviour for long-term physical activity participation in recreational pursuits. Although the multi-activity program model is highly problematised in academic literature, it was found that the multi-activity model is prominent and uncontested in most secondary school PE programs. A conflict between the rhetoric and reality of the educative importance of PE was evident. Therefore, it is argued that there is a gap between the proposition for a curriculum to demonstrate the value of learning "about", "through" and "in" movement, and the "everyday practice" of PE found in schools.

This article argues that assessment is a central feature of teaching, particularly as a means to determine whether what has been taught has been learnt. However, I take issue with the current trend in education which places a significant amount of emphasis upon large-scale public testing, which in turn has exacerbated the "teaching-to-the-test" syndrome, not to mention distorting teaching decisions that are detrimental to the overall development of student knowledge and understanding. Part of the problem with assessment in education seems to revolve around the nature of knowledge and how best to assess human knowledge and understanding. Although much philosophical uncertainty and disagreement exists surrounding the nature of knowledge, I argue that coming to know something is a "sine qua non" of any education. In saying this, I highlight the limits of assessment by demonstrating how certain activities are resistant to large-scale public testing because they are not easily reducible to facts which can be tested for, or at least in the same way as propositional forms of knowledge. Consequently, my argument is a philosophical one to the effect that assessment, particularly large-scale public testing is incapable of assessing all forms of learning, or even the quality of student understanding because the instruments available are both too blunt and tend to capture a certain kind of knowledge that privileges theory over practice, and mental skills over physical skills.

We write as critical theorists who share an interest in how conceptions of physical education are taken forward in policy and practice. In this respect, we are particularly intrigued by Peter Arnold's conceptual account of meaning in movement, sport and physical education, and the subsequent ways in which his ideas have informed national curriculum ambitions. Despite the prominence of Arnold's influence, we are concerned that there has been an insufficiently rigorous and robust review of his theorising to date, particularly in relation to where his ideas originated from. Accordingly, we critically discuss the merits of adopting a genealogical approach in order to support a detailed analysis of Arnold's conceptual account of meaning in movement, sport and physical education; one which especially focuses on learning "about", "through" and "in" movement. We conclude by questioning a number of the complex strands of Arnold's work in the expectation that greater lucidity and purpose can emerge. This it is argued will be beneficial in terms of providing clarity on aim or aims statements in physical education, which in turn can secure greater policy coherence and practice gains.

MacIntyre's earlier work and concern with social science enquiry not only exposes its limits, but also provides an insight into how its knowledge claims have been put to ideological use. He maintains that the institutional embodiment of these ideological ideas is the bureaucratic manager who has had a negative role to play in social structures because managerialism revolves around a notable absence, or at least marginalisation of conflict since the nature of rational debate and conflict is unpredictable and unmanageable, and hence would seriously undermine the perception trying to be projected of a competent technocrat in control of their organisation. MacIntyre, in lamenting the place of contemporary universities in society, highlights how most universities have become business corporations and irremediably fragmented and now serve purposes so alien and foreign from their initial conception as sites of constrained mutual rational debate and conflict. As a result, MacIntyre's account of how managerial authority is justified in bureaucratic institutions and its social role and character is scathing and particularly apt for explaining the malaise of contemporary universities. In order to overcome this malaise, I want to struggle against the corporatisation of universities by revitalising and extending upon MacIntyre's argument that a university is set up for constrained disagreement and imposed participation in conflict, and also highlight the importance of reason or wisdom and its development because it enables us to see the interconnectedness and interrelationship between different forms of knowledge that can lead us to truth and of the good.

We write as critical theorists, who consider that in terms of scoping out robust conceptual elaborations which are suitable for contemporary schooling, that physical education has ground to make up connecting theory with practice and practice with theory. We advocate that aspects of existentialism and phenomenology can provide a theoretically sound basis on which to argue that embodied learning should be the foundational cornerstone of physical education programmes. To avoid embodied learning becoming overly learner centric and insular, we advance Merleau-Pontian informed ideas on how learning could flourish when an individual and embodied focus merges with a school-wide physical culture agenda which is underpinned by social and moral theorizing. In developing our focus on merging embodied learning and physical culture, we draw upon MacIntyrean views on the goods which are internal to practice and extend thinking on how these goods could merge with the diverse aims and intentions informing the culture and ethos in schools. In pursuing these ambitions, we outline the constructive activist-based benefits of teachers working within subsidiarity-based school communities where pedagogical decisions are made at a level consistent with realizing whole schools aims. This is in spite of our acknowledgement that the lack of career-long professional learning adds to the difficulty of achieving these aims. In conclusion we argue that if physical education is to become a pivotal component of realizing a diverse range of whole school aims there is a need for greater professional engagement with pedagogical approaches that attempt to derive greater meaning from learners movement experiences and which help learners to understand better both their own identity and the ethos of the school context and environment they share with others.

This paper analyses two pedagogical case studies (PCS) from a multidisciplinary perspective to highlight the problems of theoretical knowledge in tertiary physical education teacher education (PETE) programmes, school-based physical education (PE) practice and continuous professional learning (CPL) in PE. We argue that a critical view of tertiary PETE and PE teacher educator CPL practice or practices is particularly important if PETE programmes want to develop future PE and current teacher practitioners who are transformative agents. In setting up the pedagogical case study accounts, we recall common conversations about the bodies of knowledge in tertiary PETE programmes that have been positioned as problematic. The accounts highlight the existence of an artificial divide between PE educators as theory generators and both pre-service PE teachers and school-based PE practitioners as theory appliers. We suggest that part of the reason why this divide exists can be attributed to a general misunderstanding of theoretical and practical knowledge that have been wrongly compartmentalised into "theory" and "practice," and hence erroneously taught as isolated entities without any connection or direct link with each other, or the former considered to be less relevant and perhaps even irrelevant in practice.

This paper uses a narrative approach in the form of a fictional dialogue between a physical education teacher educator (PETE) and an enquiring physical education teacher (EPET) in order to both contextualise the problem posed by Almond, that Teaching Games for Understanding-Game Sense (TGfU-GS) has been better accepted in academia than in the "natural setting" of physical education (PE) teaching, and to intentionally provoke change about how TGfU-GS is positioned as a highly conceptualised "instructional model" for games and sport teaching. Drawing on research by Green that PE teachers operate from "everyday philosophies" and not necessarily from highly conceptualised curriculum or pedagogical models, this paper proceeds from the premise that competing descriptions of PE teaching found in the literature and its applications are problematic to the PE teacher because teachers do not necessarily see or want to see the same boundaries between pedagogical models as researchers do as theory generators. It is argued, that the tension suggested by Almond exists in part because of contextual and operational differences leading to each viewing the teaching of PE differently. The EPET is concerned about the praxis of teaching that is theoretically informed by pedagogical knowledge and made real through the experience of teaching; whereas, to the PETE, PE is viewed with a more nuanced interpretation of the complex, non-linear dynamics of the classroom, nature of learning and the need for theoretical informed practice. However, some similarities exist between the EPET and PETE which revolves around bringing order to the essentially unpredictable learning environment by adapting the environmental and task characteristics so that learning may occur. Consequently, we argue that the tension between the EPET and PETE is inevitable because each privilege certain "everyday philosophies" about the design and enactment of PE teaching.

This paper critically discusses MacIntyre's thesis that education is essentially a contested concept. In order to contextualise my discussion, I discuss both whether rival educational traditions of education found in MacIntyre's work--which I refer to as instrumental and non-instrumental justifications of education--can be rationally resolved using MacIntyre's framework, and whether a shared meaning of education is possible as a result. I conclude that MacIntyre's synthesis account is problematic because the whole notion that there are "rationally negotiable" ways in which to compromise or harmonise opposing justifications of education found in instrumental and non-instrumental forms of education is troubling--the reason being that these are cultural disagreements about human flourishing that are not neutral-free, and due to a lack of care distinguishing between the common uses of the term "education", and its looser usages to mean something like school learning that embraces a range of aims and goals that are often incompatible. In this light, it is argued that the contestability card has been unnecessarily overemphasised, and brings to our attention the complex ways in which we interpret education and what it means to be educated.

Forming the first of two articles, this dialogue begins from the dilemma posed in the writings of David Kirk that physical education is in crisis because the dominant practice of physical education as "sport-techniques" is resistant to change. In order to make sense of crisis discourse, the discussion explores the potential for change in physical education by examining current practice and practices, and concludes with some remarks that physical education is part of a historical tradition that is dynamic and endlessly evolving due to ongoing and continuous debates surrounding what physical education "is" or "ought" to be.

This article argues that psychological discourse fails miserably to provide an account of learning that can explain how humans come to understand, particularly understanding that has been grasped meaningfully. Part of the problem with psychological approaches to learning is that they are disconnected from the integral role embodiment plays in how I perceive myself, other persons and other things in the world. In this sense, it is argued that a central tenet of any educational learning involves being taught to perceive, come to know ourselves and the world around us. This may seem like stating the obvious, but there is a general tendency to take the experience of perception for granted. Since phenomenology according to Merleau-Ponty recognises that perceptual experience is the basis of "all rationality" makes it particularly apt for explaining the significant role embodiment plays in understanding what has been learned, and understanding that has been grasped meaningfully. What makes this account of embodied learning educationally significant is that the whole person is treated as a whole being, permitting the person to experience him or herself as a holistic and synthesised acting, feeling, thinking being-in-the-world, rather than as separate physical and mental qualities which bear no relation to each other.