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Through this study, the Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation (OPRE) in the Administration for Children and Families in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services seeks to (1) understand how Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), child support, and other human services programs gather and use input from the families they have served, currently serve, or could serve for program improvement; (2) identify ways for TANF and child support programs to incorporate family input for program improvement; and (3) identify the successes and challenges these programs face in gathering and using family input. This study will explore approaches to gathering family input, create program resources to support programs in gathering and using family input, engage TANF and child support programs in formative learning cycles to test and refine the resources, and report on findings. The Family Input Study is one sub-study of the TANF and Child Support Moving Forward project. The other sub-study is the Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic study.

This paper explores how the Canadian landscape is figured through two interrelated processes of settler colonialism, which form social and subjective identities in relation to Canadian environmental discourse. I explore these processes through what I refer to as settler sanctified and sacrificed landscapes. I read this dual process of settler sanctification and sacrifice through a literary representation in M.T. Kelly’s 1987 novel, A Dream Like Mine, exploring the operation of contemporary settler liberal environmentalism in a self-conscious settler narrative, and through Canadian environmental policy, which expresses the preemptive sanctification of the settler landscape present in Canada’s oldest piece of environmental legislation, the recently amended Navigation Protection Act. My readings of these two seemingly disparate texts aim to illustrate that a particular kind of sanctification of the landscape has structured settler-Canadian engagement with the environment from the very inception of official Canadian environmental discourse, thus creating the conditions for the landscapes’ inevitable sacrifice., Canadian Literature, No 228-9 (2016): Emerging Scholars 2

Death is often characterised within naturalism as being ‘nothing to us’ and we are urged to think of ‘nothing less than of death’. In his lectures on Spinoza, Deleuze says ‘thinking of death is the most base thing’. Thinkers such as Lucretius, Nietzsche and Spinoza (all of whom greatly influence Deleuze’s work), have clear perspectives on the need to avoid thinking about death. They share in the belief that meditation on death only leads to fear and sadness. These affirmationists, that is, philosophers whose writings aim at affirming life, therefore denounce death as unimportant to philosophy. Deleuze also presents a philosophy that seems affirmationist, in keeping with the tradition of those whose ideas he interprets and incorporates into his own philosophy. And yet, death - in the form of the death drive - is a key concept in Deleuze’s work Difference and Repetition. This thesis asks the question: Does Deleuze present a concept of death that affirms life? \ud \ud The concept of death is rarely explored in Deleuze studies, and yet it plays an important role in his philosophy. This thesis seeks to contribute to this research, by delineating and examining Deleuze’s concept of death in Difference and Repetition. The description of death provided by Deleuze is compared with the concepts of death in the works of two affirmationists, Lucretius and Spinoza. Hegel’s concept of death is then explored to determine whether Deleuze succeeds in avoiding the use of negation in death’s relation to the subject. The thesis then considers Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return. The result of his use of the eternal return leads to discussions around kenosis, transpantheism and immanence. It is decided that the naturalist process of demystification is taken by Deleuze to require the demystification of identity, giving primacy to immanence as a singular life.\ud