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As one of the world’s major coal-producing and exporting states, Russia is central to discussions on the future of the industry in the context of global climate change. This is a question that has become particularly salient in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Yet despite this, Russia remains understudied in the literature. As a result, we know little about the extent to which Russia is likely to contribute to the alleviation of coal-driven climate change or to its exacerbation. This analysis seeks to examine this question from the perspective of the coal industry, by exploring whether and how Russia’s coal companies incorporate the vulnerabilities and risks around climate change into their corporate presence and behaviour, and how this aligns with broader government policy on the coal industry. Drawing on a range of primary and secondary sources, including corporate reporting, government documents, and media commentary, this analysis identifies two central narratives emerging from coal companies. The first is focused on the risks around climate change, primarily in relation to reputation, increased regulation, and access to markets that a climate-driven global shift away from coal might entail. The second narrative acknowledges the potential opportunities around technology and ‘green coal’. Within government, both the pro-coal and coal-sceptic lobby recognise the significance of climate change; however, it is used purely instrumentally in policy debates. The coal sceptics employ climate to highlight risks around global reductions in coal demand but are unable to challenge government support for the industry. Ultimately, our findings suggest that both company behaviour and government policy in Russia remain strongly pro-coal, and that it will take a significant drop in global demand for that to change. We conclude that, before the invasion of Ukraine, selling as much coal as possible was a greater government priority than climate change policy, and the invasion is unlikely to shift the balance the other way.

The issue of poor performance of the Russian federal bureaucracy is addressed by linking performance to type of official, through analysis of biographical data on deputy ministers and division (dep...

The articles in this special issue describe various aspects of the formation of the federal budget in Russia today, largely since Vladimir Putin began his third presidential term in 2012. It is abo...

The article provides an examination of the role of Russia’s dual (semi-presidential) executive in the budget process. The Constitution gives the president a strategic role, leaving operational budget formation to the ‘government’, chaired by the prime minister, whereas the common view of Russian policy making is of the president’s ‘hands-on management’. The article looks at how the president engages in the budget process, and whether, on the one hand, excessive ‘hands-on’ presidential involvement leads to a disrupted policy process, or, on the other hand, it breaks down the inter-agency deadlocks that are common in Russian policy making. The conclusion is that a reasonable balance is found between the two.

In this article we look at the rise and fall of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) by Russian steel companies – a big expansion abroad from the mid-2000s and a major retrenchment since the end of the decade. We try to determine what drove the expansion and what might be the implications of the retrenchment. We look at the commercial motivations that are the staples of the general OFDI literature but also, given the peculiar if not unique features of Russian business and state, we consider political explanations – whether business invests abroad in order to escape a predatory state or alternatively to serve the foreign policy objectives of the state. We also consider ‘psychological’ explanations, specifically the possible ‘irrational’ if not ‘irresponsible exuberance’ of hard-driving Russian oligarchs. It is expected that the discussion will allow some significant, albeit tentative, conclusions on Russian big business and its place in the global economy.The article is structured as follows: an outlin...

Russia's recent reorientation “to the East” has gained increased urgency given events in Ukraine. Here the policymaking process surrounding the “turn to the East” is examined. The focus is on the economic dimension – the economic development of the Russian Far East and engagement with the Asia-Pacific region – rather than geostrategic and security issues. Policymaking is evaluated in terms of general approach and process, with the implications of the evaluation for Russian policymaking more generally then being explored. “Turn to the East” policymaking exhibits a strong commitment to strategic planning that is characteristic of Putin, and which in this case struggles not only with process issues but also with contradictions within the strategy and the challenging realities of the region. Regarding process, a far more institutionalized policy process than the currently dominant personalist view would lead us to expect is found, with relevant bureaucratic and non-state actors well represented in an elaborat...

Russia is playing an increasingly important role on the global coal market. The large mining corporations in the country have expanded their coal extraction, and ever larger quantities of coal are being exported. The coal sector simply ignores the existence of climate change - as does the state, which assists the entirely privately-owned companies in the coal sector with huge, covert subsidies. In particular, the government is providing funds for the expansion of the railway routes from the main extraction region in the Kuzbass to the Pacific ports more than 5,000 kilometres away. These measures are based on the assumption that international climate policy will fail, since if it does succeed, enormous investments will be lost. However, it is the people living in Russia who are paying the price for this huge gamble, particularly in the Kuzbass. They are the ones who are suffering from the devastating air pollution, noise and appropriation of land that are the direct result of the extraction and transportation of coal.

Ten of the twelve cities in Russia with the worst air pollution are home to the metal industry. The industry is also responsible for a significant portion of greenhouse gas emissions. The state supports the position taken by the five large corporations in the sector that investments to reduce the level of sulphur and carbon dioxide emissions are only appropriate when they are of economic benefit. Serious national environmental standards are almost non-existent, and the environmental authorities are powerless to act. These are the reasons why the modernisation and replacement of old plants from the Soviet era is making such slow progress.

In the context of the ongoing debate over the relative importance of personalist and institutionalized arrangements in contemporary Russian policy-making, an analysis is undertaken of the Russian decision to annex Crimea. The findings, while necessarily tentative, are that, while the specific decision was probably taken within a small group of officials with close personal links to the president, those officials themselves represent significant policy institutions. Additionally, decision makers had access to a range of information sources on the potential implications of the annexation decision. However, while the presence of institutional arrangements with moderating potential should not be ignored, it is suggested that they are weaker here than in less security-related areas of Russian politics.

Two specialists on Russia's minerals industries examine the evidence supporting the argument that the Russian mining conglomerate Noril'sk Nickel can be viewed as a global company. Included among the criteria they assess are the geographic dispersion of the company's markets and operations, the diversified and multinational character of its ownership, whether it has matched the performance standards set by its major international competitors, and the effect of the company's ownership presence on the management style of its foreign operations. A particular focus is on how an ongoing conflict between two major Russian oligarch shareholders (Vladimir Potanin and Oleg Deripaska) has shaped Noril'sk Nickel's ownership and management structure, which is characterized by the continued (background) presence of the state, the lack of any organized policy for training a multinational management cohort, and the absence of a major block of foreign shareholders. In the end, they conclude that Noril'sk Nickel is not a ...

A noted specialist on Russia's industries surveys the restructuring of Russia's steel industry in response to the challenging conditions of the 1990s (collapsing domestic markets, the nonpayments crisis, and insider privatization) and its subsequent stabilization during the early years of the 21st century due to effective implementation of a "survival model" at many plants. The author examines the major elements of that model, namely an export orientation made possible by relatively low labor and energy costs, reliable access to basic raw materials, a focus on crude (rather than specialty) steel, not inconsequential investment in process modernization, and effective control exercised by new private ownership. The paper's concluding section explores the new challenges faced by the industry due to the global financial crisis of late 2008-2009, and particularly the decline in world steel and company share prices, the extreme tightening of credit, the difficulties of servicing existing levels of debt, and pro...

While Putin's presidency offers successful examples of policymaking with some consultation and transparency, negotiation, and compromise, other policy processes were less effective. This article uses the rewriting of the Law on Subsurface Resources, from 2002 to the present, as a case study of a policy process characterized by bureaucratic infighting, delay, shifts and turns in policy preferences, and bitter debate. Legislation and other policy documents created by the major players, and the press, are used to describe and analyze this process. The process itself, not its outcomes, is the focus. The implications of this type of policymaking process for Russian politics is considered.

The paper surveys the Russian aluminum industry during the turbulent transition years of the 1990s, and updates developments to the current period. The focus is on primary aluminum production, with emphasis on the key topics of ownership and governance, output and performance, costs of production (dominated by energy and transportation), investments, technology, and alumina and bauxite inputs. Considerable attention is devoted to elucidating the corporate strategies of the two dominant Russian aluminum companies emerging by the end of the period—Rusal and SUAL. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F21, L61, L72. 1 figure, 4 tables, 79 references.

This chapter begins with an outline of the structure of the post-Soviet Russian economy, as the context for a description of the nature of Russia’s business-government relations. A resourcedominated economy and oligarch-style business go hand in hand, with the struggle over resource rent forming the basis of the relationship between business and government. Those relations in turn provide the context for a debate within Russian policy-making circles over the future shape of the economy.

In deciding — in the first half of 2008 — to undertake a study of the contemporary Russian policymaking process, it had been my intention to examine that process in ‘normal’ times. In particular I was interested in whether changes made when Vladimir Putin became prime minister in May 2008 would lead to improvements in policymaking. However, the global financial crisis intervened soon afterwards and I was left no choice but to recognize that the nature of the project was, for the moment, going to change. That was unfortunate even if only because one could reasonably suggest that policymaking is easier in crisis circumstances, since there is a greater sense of unity among policy actors and reduced need to deal with lower priority distractions.

Privatisation is the final, and perhaps structurally most demanding, leg of the shock therapy sequence introduced to Russia at the beginning of 1992. It has been pursued with dogged determination, although the general approach and specific procedures have changed considerably over time. This article surveys the relevant decrees and legislation and summarises the approach eventually adopted: a mixture of workforce ownership, citizens’ ‘vouchers’ and ‘sell to the highest bidder’. Taking workforce ownership and management control as currently the most common outcome of privatisation, the implications for Russian industrial performance are examined, using the Western corporate governance literature as a guide.

Nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion arbeiteten die russische und die ukrainische Stahlindustrie weitgehend unabhängig voneinander. In beiden Ländern wurde die Stahlindustrie privatisiert und die neuen Unternehmer strebten nach vertikaler Integration. Mitte der 2000er Jahre begannen die russischen Stahlproduzenten sich dabei auch für ausländische Unternehmen zu interessieren und sahen sich alsbald mit dem Vorwurf eines politisch motivierten Vorgehens konfrontiert. Insbesondere hinter dem Engagement von Evraz in der Ukraine wurden geostrategische Interessen des Kreml vermutet. Diese Vorwürfe sollen im Folgenden anhand der Firmenpolitik von Evraz diskutiert werden.

In a brief autobiographical sketch in a 1990 volume of collected writings T.H. Rigby described his early intellectual influences.1 As an undergraduate and Masters student at the University of Melbourne immediately after the end of World War Two he was intellectually most stimulated by Karl Marx and Max Weber — although as he wrote: ‘I could never claim to be a real disciple of either’. The influence of Marx was limited even at that early stage by Rigby’s inability to accommodate Marx’s views on property with what he knew of the social distribution of power and privilege in the USSR. The influence of Weber was far stronger. From the beginning Rigby was excited by the linkages that could be made between Weber’s typologies of authority and legitimation and actual social structures, including those of the Soviet Union.

Benjamin Cohen, in writing about sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), states that ‘a turning point was reached … when China and Russia two countries with unmistakable geopolitical ambitions — joined the game. … Here suddenly were two major powers with pockets deep enough to make a real impact.’ As quoted by Cohen, John McConnell, then director of US national intelligence, believed that ‘concerns about the financial capabilities of Russia, China, and OPEC countries and the potential use of their market access to exert financial leverage to achieve political ends represents a major national security issue’ (Cohen 2009, pp. 719–20).

T.H. Rigby on Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Politics S.Fortescue Institutionalization and Personalism in the Policy-making Process of the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia S.Fortescue The Boss and his Team: Stalin and the Inner Circle, 1925-33 S.Fitzpatrick Building the Communist Future: Legitimation and the Soviet City G.Gill Legitimation and Legitimacy in Russia Revisited L.Holmes Perestroika as Revolution from Above A.Brown How Much Did Popular Disaffection Contribute to the Collapse of the USSR? P.Reddaway Pantouflage a la russe. The Recruitment of Russian Political and Business Elites E.Huskey Conclusion S.Fortescue

Although the Russian Academy has not been operating long enough to permit a categorical statement that it will act exactly as the Soviet Academy did, there is now enough information to justify stating that in its structure and stated functions it differs in no significant way from the Soviet Academy which it replaced. While it might well have been weakened, through a decline in its own prestige and through the weakening of the government under which it operates, it is unlikely to be so weakened that it will allow either the democrats and rank-and-file research workers on the one hand, or the new bureaucratic arrangements on the other to get the better of it. While the desperate budgetary situation will almost certainly force the Russian Academy into considerable retrenchment in its research activities, it will continue to be a body of bureaucratically organised and experienced managers of science and will conduct itself accordingly. Those who believe that a high level of participation by the rank-and-file of the staff is essential in the management of science, will see that as a catastrophe for Russian science. Those who believe that particularly in times of stress, bureaucratic skill and experience are of great importance will see it as providing some hope of salvation.

In diesem Beitrag wird die Eff ektivität der Oligarchen beim Management ihrer Unternehmen unter den Bedingungen der aktuellen Wirtschaftskrise untersucht. Zudem wird die Einstellung des Staates gegenüber den Oligarchen analysiert, wobei sowohl ihre Rolle im politischen Prozess als auch die Frage der Renationalisierung behandelt wird.

Gorbachev has exposed science to the same pressure for restructuring as all other sectors of Soviet society, as there has been an increasing recognition of poor scientific returns on a major investment. Some of the key problems of Soviet science are examined, in two basic categories: problems which are internal to Soviet science itself and problems of its relations with the outside world. The first category includes planning and funding difficulties, management style, and management-staff relations; the second, backwardness in key technologies and isolation from the world scientific community. The analysis of each of these areas of difficulty includes an account of current attempts at reform.