Search

Autocrats are no strangers to international human rights agreements (HRAs). Some of the world's nastiest dictators - Gaddafi in Libya, "Papa" and "Baby" Doc in Haiti - have joined on to agreements that, on paper, extend far-reaching rights to citizens. Meanwhile, these countries disparage many of the most basic human rights principles enshrined in the agreements they ratify. In order to understand which autocrats ratify HRAs and which do not, I argue that we need to look deeper inside and to unpack autocratic state. While all autocrats rely to some extent on repression, they all also depend on tactics that cultivate popularity and loyalty. For some autocrats, these tools are ready-made: they come from God and family. Other autocrats aren't so lucky: they have to work at creating and maintaining (the perception of) popularity. Ratification, therefore, is particularly useful to leaders who need the good press that ratifying a human rights treaty can generate. I find support for these propositions in analyses of a comprehensive database of international human rights agreements. The so-called 'hybrid' regimes unearth some puzzling patterns worth exploring further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and why do states commit to international human rights agreements (HRAs)? We seek to move the literature on HRA ratification forward in two chief ways. First, whereas previous research has focused on one agreement or on a handful of 'core' HRAs, we examine ratification of all UN HRAs using a new dataset that includes 39 human rights conventions, covenants, and protocols. Not only does this approach provide a more comprehensive picture of the universe of international human rights law, but it also enables us to conduct tests that are not possible in a one-treaty framework. The evidence suggests substantial variation in states' propensity to ratify depending on the issue-area covered and the type of agreement under consideration. Second, whereas existing accounts have generally focused on domestic institutional determinants of ratification, external pressures, and expectations about future consequences, we also explore how public opinion shapes the ratification decision. Our findings, although preliminary, indicate that the link between public support for UN involvement in the promotion of human rights and ratification of these agreements is real. We discuss two potential mechanisms behind this relationship, and explore steps for further research to parse out causality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and why do states commit to international human rights agreements (HRAs)? We seek to move the literature on HRA ratification forward in two chief ways. First, whereas previous research has focused on one agreement or on a handful of 'core' HRAs, we examine ratification of all UN HRAs using a new dataset that includes 39 human rights conventions, covenants, and protocols. Not only does this approach provide a more comprehensive picture of the universe of international human rights law, but it also enables us to conduct tests that are not possible in a one-treaty framework. The evidence suggests substantial variation in states' propensity to ratify depending on the issue-area covered and the type of agreement under consideration. Second, whereas existing accounts have generally focused on domestic institutional determinants of ratification, external pressures, and expectations about future consequences, we also explore how public opinion shapes the ratification decision. Our findings, although preliminary, indicate that the link between public support for UN involvement in the promotion of human rights and ratification of these agreements is real. We discuss two potential mechanisms behind this relationship, and explore steps for further research to parse out causality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have recently taken great interest in international human rights agreements (HRAs), typically analyzing ratification of and compliance with one or a handful of 'core' agreements. Findings often vary from treaty to treaty, and consensus is relatively thin. This paper seeks to move the literature forward in three chief respects. First, it presents the Database of UN HRAs, a new database that covers all UN HRAs created between 1945 and 2006. Second, by conducting statistical analyses of ratification of all these agreements, I provide a more comprehensive assessment of the body of international human rights law than currently exists. This enables us to make comparisons across agreements and to identify in a more general manner what factors drive ratification. Third, I present a brief preliminary application of the data to a question that -- despite being of interest to scholars and policymakers alike -- has received little attention in the quantitative HRA literature: whether (and why) the US is 'exceptional' when it comes to HRA ratification ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. Indeed, relatively 'soft' international law often garners widespread participation, but it creates few concrete incentives for states to improve behavior. 'Harder' legal commitments make shirking more difficult, but these institutional features may deter from joining the very states whose environmental practices are least consistent with the treaty's requirements. I argue that these institutional features have important consequences for the prospects of ratification: the harder a treaty is, the more 'selective' states are about ratification. Empirical analyses of ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol provide substantial support for this proposition. As others have noted, one way in which states can mitigate this 'dilemma' that legalization produces is by creating agreements with flexibility provisions. I argue that states' ability to use these provisions increases their propensity to ratify, even if it does not fundamentally alter the relationship between compliant behavior, legalization, and ratification. The empirical findings with regard to one flexibility mechanism - carbon sinks - support this argument. The results with regard to Activities Implemented Jointly, however, follow an opposite pattern, suggesting that states may sometimes use flexibility provisions as a means of legitimizing (or at least attracting attention away from) their non-participation in the regime. Finally, I explore how social networks affect ratification. I find consistent evidence that domestic and international networks matter for ratification of the Framework Convention, but not the Kyoto Protocol. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines when and why states ratify and comply with international human rights agreements. It empirically tests my hypotheses by examining two fundamental human rights conventions on child labor and Women's wage equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. The problem of global warming provides an interesting case in the study of international environmental cooperation: it presents a clear case of cross-national externalities where incentives to defect are high; it raises fundamental questions about economic growth and development; and there have been varying degrees of scientific uncertainty throughout the climate change regime's development. This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the relationship between institutional design, compliance, and ratification in international environmental affairs. I argue that differences in enforcement mechanisms from one treaty to the next have an important impact on states' decision to ratify international environmental agreements. Treaties that do not carry binding commitments will attract a large membership base, and the extent of compliant behavior will bear little relation to the decision to ratify. Treaties that carry quantified, legally-binding, commitments are much more likely to be enforced, and therefore states will be 'selective' about ratifying them. I test these arguments using a newly-compiled dataset on carbon dioxide emissions and ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results yield strong support for my arguments. Although it is not yet possible to examine statistically the impact of these treaties on the extent of compliant behavior, the findings have important implications for future studies on that question, and for future institutional design in the international climate change regime. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many -- if not most -- international human rights agreements specify no requirements for entry or punishments for non-compliance. If these agreements have no "teeth" of their own, why would anyone NOT sign? Why would anyone comply with the international legal commitment? I argue that a government’s decision to commit to an international human rights agreement depends in large part on its expectation that the agreement will be enforced domestically. Democracies, which possess numerous domestic enforcement mechanisms, will tend to be "selective" about commitment, ratifying only when they are de facto relatively compliant. In non-democracies, where the likelihood of domestic enforcement is much lower, the extent of compliant behavior will bear little relation to the decision to ratify. This has important implications for subsequent treaty compliance. Democracies, I argue, are more likely to keep their international promises -- in large part because they only make promises they know they can keep. On the other hand, there is little reason to believe that ratification alone should improve the human rights practices of non-democracies. Using newly-collected data, I test these propositions empirically by examining ratification of and compliance with two of the International Labor Organization’s fundamental conventions: The Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment; and the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value. The statistical results largely support my arguments. These findings provide important insight into current debates among scholars and policymakers alike about how best to improve human rights conditions around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]